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Libertarianism is a thesis according to which free will is incompatible with determinism 
and human agents possess free will to some degree.  Three formidable objections have 
been raised against this thesis by its opponents: (i) Libertarianism requires the falsity of 
philosophical naturalism or materialist theories of mind; (ii) Indeterminism threatens 
freedom by undermining the rational, volitional control of agents; (iii) If indeterminism 
does not threaten our freedom, then neither does it enhance our freedom or add to human 
agency anything of appreciable value.  I address these challenges in novel ways by 
assessing recent work on mental causation and consciousness and applying that work to 
the problems at hand, arguing that progress may be made in the free will debate by 
vii 
reorienting it toward an examination of those conditions which are essential to agency 
simpliciter.  In response to (i) I argue that a coherent account of libertarian agency 
requires no greater an ontological inventory than naturalism allows provided that there is 
a naturalistic solution to the problem of mental causation, one that (i*) secures the causal 
efficacy of mentality, (ii*) coheres with the characteristic purposiveness of intentional 
behavior, and (iii*) illuminates what it is for an agent to produce or bring about an 
action.  I show that (ii) is unfounded on a causal construal of action, since the most 
promising sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for purposive behavior are 
adeterministic, and therefore do not require the obtaining of deterministic causal 
connections between intentions and matching behavior.  Since agents exercise the 
relevant capacities of control just in case they act purposively, it follows that 
indeterminacy does not in itself vitiate agential control.  I analyze the claim expressed in 
(iii) as a special case of the conceptual gap between the first-person and the third-person 
perspectives, arguing that the conceptual irreducibility of agential production (iii*), 
which results from the deployment of phenomenal concepts in our thinking about agency 
generally, is what lies at the root of the present objection, but that such conceptual 
irreducibility does not entail that the exercise of genuine free will cannot consist in 
suitably related indeterministic event causes. 
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Necessitarianism cannot logically stop short of making the whole action of the mind a part of the physical 
universe.  Our notion that we decide what we are going to do, if as the necessitarian says, it has been 
calculable since the earliest times, is reduced to illusion.  Indeed, consciousness in general thus becomes a 
mere illusory aspect of a material system.  What we call red, green, and violet are in reality only different 
rates of vibration.  The sole reality is the distribution of qualities of matter in space and time.  Brain-matter 
is protoplasm in a certain degree and kind of complication—a certain arrangement of mechanical 
particles.  Its feeling is but an inward aspect, a phantom.  For, from the positions and velocities of the 
particles at any one instant, and the knowledge of the immutable forces, the positions at all other times are 
calculable; so that the universe of space, time, and matter is a rounded system uninterfered with from 
elsewhere.  But from the state of feeling at any instant there is no reason to suppose the states of feeling at 
all other instants are thus exactly calculable; so that feeling is, as I said, a mere fragmentary and illusive 
aspect of the universe.  This is the way, then, that necessitarianism has to make up its accounts.  It enters 
consciousness under the head of sundries, as a forgotten trifle; its scheme of the universe would be more 
satisfactory if this little fact could be dropped out of sight.  On the other hand, by supposing the rigid 
exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how little—be it by only a strictly infinitesimal amount—we gain 
room to insert mind into our scheme, and to put it into the place where it is needed, into the position which, 
as the sole self-intelligible thing, it is entitled to occupy, that of the fountain of existence; and in so doing 
we resolve the problem of the connection of soul and body.   
– C.S. Peirce 
 
We approach the issue of free will from many directions.  If we cannot solve the problem, at least we can 
surround it.   
– Robert Nozick 
 
To say precisely what is the problem of free will is perhaps part of the free will problem.  
In truth there is a cluster of interwoven conundra relating to the possibility of human 
freedom, and any reasonably pithy expression of “the problem of free will” will therefore 
likely exclude one or more puzzle about the nature of freedom equally deserving to be 
honored with the definite article.   
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Yet a succinct formulation of the problem of free will is wanted, if for no other 
purpose than to fix the focus of our discussion and provide us with a touchstone in what 
follows.  To that end, then, I suggest that we adopt the following formulation, which is 
found in the pages of Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind.  Ryle writes this: 
The problem of the Freedom of the Will was the problem how to reconcile the hypothesis 
that minds are to be described in terms drawn from the categories of mechanics with the 
knowledge that higher-grade human conduct is not of a piece with the behaviour of 
machines. (1949: 20)   
A peculiar formulation.  One would expect that any viable description of the free will 
problem would include (at a minimum) the general thesis of determinism, together with 
the widespread assumption that freedom requires the ability to do otherwise or the having 
of alternative possibilities to action.  But these features are conspicuously absent from 
Ryle’s description.  Instead he speaks of minds and machines, pointing cryptically toward 
a tension between higher-grade human conduct and the explanatory categories of 
mechanics.  And why, one might ask, isn’t this just a description of the problem of mind, 
conceived as the question whether mentality can be objectively understood?1 Or, insofar 
as higher-grade human conduct includes intentional behavior, why isn’t this just an 
expression of the mind-body problem, the problem of how our mental and physical 
natures relate?  We could extend a little charity by noting that intentional action is 
paradigmatically free action; that would allow us to say that the notion of freedom is at 
least implicit.  Even so, it seems that Ryle’s formulation is at best ambiguous between the 
                                                 
1 In Thomas Nagel’s (1986) sense of ‘physical objectivity’, perhaps. 
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mind-body problem on the one hand and the problem of free will on the other, and 
therefore of little use if we wish to capture what is distinctive about the latter. 
 Yet I want to suggest that the ambiguity inherent in this formulation is no 
accident, that it reflects a crucial unity between the problems of freedom and mind that 
has gone largely unappreciated.  One philosopher, however, who has not failed to take 
note of the deep similarities between the problem of freedom and the mind-body problem 
is David Sosa (1999).  Let us resist the urge to compartmentalize these traditional 
philosophical puzzles and follow Sosa in adopting a broader viewpoint.  What do the 
mind-body problem and the free will problem have in common?  They are both at their 
core “philosophical problems about the place of persons in the natural world.  And they 
both involve a threat to our dignity as persons that seems to emanate from what we might 
call an ‘alienated’ conception of nature” (p. 1).  That is, in both cases there is something 
unique about ourselves, something that sets us apart from the general run of material 
objects and makes us different—different in a way that makes us “worthy of some special 
sort of respect” (p. 5).  And in both cases these special features of the human person seem 
threatened by the assumption that we are after all natural beings, situated within a law-
governed physical system.   
The question what underwrites the respect and human dignity of which Sosa 
speaks is of course hardly foreign to the free will debate.  But it is just as surely a 
motivating factor in the mind-body debate as well, even if it is explicitly discussed with 
less frequency in that domain.  Jaegwon Kim is no doubt correct in claiming that 
4 
The shared project of the majority of those who have worked on the mind-body problem 
over the past few decades has been to find a way of accommodating the mental within a 
principled physicalist scheme, while at the same time preserving it as something 
distinctive—that is, without losing what we value, or find special, in our nature as 
creatures with minds.  (1998: 2) 
And, as David Sosa has observed (ibid.), this seems just as apt a description of the 
contemporary discussion about free will when the relevant terms are substituted.  Here 
too, the shared project of the majority has been to find a way of accommodating freedom 
within a principled physicalist scheme, while at the same time preserving it as something 
distinctive—that is, without losing what we value, or find special, in our nature as 
creatures with freedom. 
Of course, ‘physicalism’ is a term of art, and if that term is too hard on the ears 
we can easily replace it with the softer ‘naturalism’ without any real loss of content.  For 
in either case there is a commitment to the notion that what we are, how we work, is 
ultimately determined by our physical constitution—if ‘naturalism’ means anything it 
means that we are no less a part of nature than anything else.   
But why might this thesis be thought to jeopardize what is distinctive or valuable 
about us?  I think the beginnings to an answer emerge when we reflect upon our 
interpersonal relationships, particularly upon our evaluative practices.  In those contexts, 
when we try to assess or understand one another, we draw from the well of normativity—
a notion that “may serve to indicate the complex of properties that constitute the 
possibility of human dignity and disgrace, or of admiration and resentment” (Sosa 1999: 
12)—the categories of which share a certain family resemblance that the categories of 
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natural science lack.  These distinctively personal categories are expressed in familiar 
terms, terms like: reason, purpose, should, ought, rational, good, admirable, dishonorable 
and wise.  “Our philosophical problem is precisely that the physical world seems 
intuitively ill-suited to be understood in those terms” (ibid.), whereas we cannot make 
sense of our mental lives—or the actions we undertake as a result of choice—in any other 
way. 
Sosa’s insights are mirrored nicely in Ryle’s formulation of the problem of free 
will, a point which bolsters my conviction that the problematic he (Sosa) has set forth, 
and the relations he has urged us to explore, are indeed in need of sustained investigation.  
I think we may faithfully capture this general problematic limned by Sosa in the terms 
deployed in Ryle’s formulation of the free will problem: Insofar as our task is to 
reconcile what we know of higher-grade human conduct with the hypothesis that our 
nature is at some level answerable to physical, mechanistic description, we seek a 
harmonization of mind with body on the one hand, and freedom with cause and effect on 
the other.  Following Sosa, what I want to explore is the possibility that these 
harmonization projects are two sides of the same coin, and that success in our 
reconciliatory task requires moving forward on both fronts at once.     
The present work is divided into three main parts partitioned by chapter.  Each 
chapter is concerned with the relation between mental causation and free will—both as 
philosophical problems and as phenomena in need of an account—and they are organized 
around the framework outlined by Sosa together with a methodological principle 
advanced by Robert Kane (1996).  Kane’s principle, the “Free Agency Principle,” 
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proscribes the appeal to “categories or kinds of entities (substances, properties, relations, 
events, states, etc.) that are not also needed by nonlibertarian (compatibilist or 
determinist) accounts of free agency” (1996: 116).  If the Free Agency Principle is 
satisfied, then “any unsolved problems remaining about incompatibilist free will (such as 
problems about the nature of consciousness) would be problems confronting all persons, 
whatever their positions on free will, and not problems specifically created by libertarian 
theories” (p. 117).  As I shall argue below, it is of vital importance to recognize that this 
principle not only constrains the theorizing of the libertarian but that it also holds the 
compatibilist accountable.  Neither side, we might say, gets an ontological free lunch; and 
I believe the time is ripe for bringing the philosophical challenges proponents of either 
position face to the forefront of the debate.  To connect this point with the foregoing, 
notice that one such problem confronted by anyone concerned with the nature of agency 
is that of mental causation.  The point may seem obvious enough in light of the above, 
but I believe it has far reaching ramifications when fully appreciated.2 For what the 
compatibilist needs out of mental causation, I shall argue, is just what the libertarian 
needs to formulate a theory of free will.  And if this is correct, it seems to me that the 
libertarian has nothing to fear and much to gain by restricting himself to the terms of the 
Free Agency Principle.  In what remains of this chapter I shall explain why this is so by 
providing an overview of the main argument to come. 
                                                 
2 Sosa seems to anticipate this important point: “It is too easy to view Soft Determinism as a secure resting 
place in the free will debate…Compatibilist commitment to freedom appears to demand commitment to 
mental causation.  But that presupposition of compatibilism’s is so far, it seems to me, a promissory note 
that threatens to put the view into default” (1999: 6). 
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In the following chapter I present three arguments for the thesis that free will and 
causal determinism are incompatible (‘incompatibilism’), along with the most well-
received objections to them.  Although I find the arguments for incompatibilism 
persuasive, my aim is not as much to convince the reader of their soundness as it is to 
diagnose the minority status incompatibilism holds among contemporary analytic 
philosophers despite the respectability of those arguments and the persistency of the 
intuitions they express.  There I will argue that the main de facto impediment to adopting 
‘libertarianism’ (which we shall understand to conjoin incompatibilism with the 
affirmation of free will) derives from the pronounced difficulties involved in producing 
an adequate metaphysics of free agency.  The three most formidable challenges put to 
libertarians by their opponents in that regard are these:  
 
(i) Libertarianism requires the falsity of philosophical naturalism or materialist 
theories of mind.  
(ii) Indeterminism threatens free agency by undermining the rational, volitional 
control of the agent.  
(iii) If indeterminism does not undermine agential control, then neither does it 
enhance our freedom or add to human agency anything of appreciable value.   
 
 It is on the introduction of these problems into the discussion, I will suggest, that 
whatever dialectical momentum the libertarian had generated in arguing the thesis of 
incompatibilism begins to dissipate; and it is primarily these problems, I suspect, which 
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fuel attempts to show that freedom and determinism are in fact compatible 
(‘compatibilism’), or at any rate that the incompatibilist’s arguments do not succeed.   
Yet for these objections to play the role they appear to play in altering the dialectical 
climate so as to favor the compatibilist position, it must be that compatibilist theories of 
freedom do not run afoul of like difficulties.  So for example, if the alleged inconsistency 
of libertarianism with philosophical naturalism provides us with reason to reject it and 
adopt compatibilism in its place, this can only be because compatibilism is, whereas 
libertarianism is not, assumed to be thoroughly consistent with a naturalistic metaphysics.  
Perhaps it is.  But I will argue that the contention should not go—as it typically has 
gone—uncontested.  For insofar as the compatibilist is a realist about agency, what the 
presupposition of compatibilism’s consistency with naturalism too easily overlooks is the 
compatibilist’s commitment to the reality of mental causation.  Compatibilism offers us 
free action by way of the agent’s deterministic control of her behavior through choice.  If 
we are to have such freedom, then, our choices must be relevant to behavioral output; 
they must “make a difference” to what goes on in the world.  And if it is true that one of 
the two principal challenges confronting materialist theories of mind is precisely to 
explain how causation by mental states is possible,3 we are justified in requesting a 
solution to that problem before accepting the claim that compatibilism is not, whereas 
libertarianism is, jeopardized by a naturalistic view of mind and world. 
                                                 
3 The other principal challenge is of course explaining phenomenal consciousness.  See Jaegwon Kim 
(2005, chapter 1) for a delineation of these two problems and a description of their relation. 
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 As a bare tu quoque, the forgoing point is worth making—perhaps even 
significant—but to a certain degree tangential.  However, the importance of recognizing 
the centrality of mental causation to the possibility of human agency increases 
proportionately as the problems of mental causation and free will are seen the more 
intimately to interconnect.  My effort in chapter 2 to motivate the relevance of mental 
causation to the free will debate is sensitive to this fact.  In that chapter I am primarily 
concerned with displaying the potential impact that an appreciation of the mental 
causation problem can make on the atmosphere in which the contemporary free will 
debate takes place, and the corresponding promise it holds as a means of approaching the 
ancient problem of freedom in fresh and illuminating ways.  But what emerges in the 
process is an intriguing congruence between the values we associate with freedom and 
with the causal efficacy of the mind, as well as between the intuitions and motivating 
factors driving work on both of the problems.  Against the backdrop of limning a new 
approach to the problem of freedom, then, the ground is being prepared to unearth some 
of the deep conceptual ties between free will and mental causation which will receive a 
fuller exploration in the subsequent chapter. 
 Chapter 3, accordingly, is taken up with the task of examining the problem of 
mental causation and exploring the parallels between it and the problem of free will.  It is 
the longest chapter in the dissertation and its most interesting features resist easy 
summarization, but it will be useful to offer the reader a general outline of it and a brief 
description of its main theme here.   
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In the third chapter I provide an overview of the mind-body debate as it has 
developed over recent years, lingering especially over the transition from the identity 
theory of the mid-twentieth century to the various forms of nonreductive physicalism 
which came to replace it.  As nonreductive physicalism arguably remains the most 
widely-held position on the mind-body relation I devote most of my attention to the 
family of theories falling under that heading, with the reductionist theories of David 
Lewis (1972, 1999) and Jaegwon Kim (1998, 2005) coming in at a close second.  In some 
ways the chapter is organized around the conflicting positions and philosophical 
commitments of Donald Davidson and Jaegwon Kim.  The dispute between them as to 
the nature of mentality is not only of intense independent interest, but is especially 
germane to our purpose in view of its richly suggestive connections to questions 
concerning free agency.  For although the “multiple realization” arguments of Hilary 
Putnam (1967) and Jerry Fodor (1974) were possibly the more influential in the move 
from classical reductionism to the “antireductionist consensus,” I believe it is Donald 
Davidson’s (1970) argument for the nomological irreducibility of the mental that 
expresses the most powerful antireductionist intuitions—at least to the extent that those 
intuitions relate the more obviously to our standing as agents and cognizers in the natural 
order, a topic which I take to be of deeper human concern.   
To briefly explain.  By Davidson’s lights, resistance to reductionism is motivated 
and sustained by a point about normativity and the distinctive role played by the mental 
in grounding our special status as acting and reasoning beings (a significant fact given 
the problematic established by Sosa).  In his view a reductionist physicalism would 
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fatally compromise the integrity of the mental as a system, characterized as it is by its 
own essential (normative) features—rationality, consistency, coherence, intentionality—
which have “no echo,” as he memorably put it, in physical theory (Davidson 1974).  I 
find his concerns very easy to sympathize with.  Yet I am equally sympathetic with 
Kim’s contention that we cannot have things both ways.  Davidson, and the 
nonreductivists generally, want to preserve the causal efficacy of mentality without 
acceding to a physical reductionism which might threaten the distinctive character of 
mental properties.  But the nonreductive physicalist, whatever her stripe, must contend 
with Kim’s celebrated “causal exclusion argument” (sometimes called the 
“supervenience argument”), an argument designed to show that mental causal efficacy 
requires psychophysical reduction.   
This is not the place to provide a detailed account of either Kim’s causal 
exclusion argument or Davidson’s antireductionist argument; that will have to wait until 
chapter 3.  But I do want to point out an interesting dilemma that arises in connection 
with their conflicting positions and provide a brief example of the overlap between the 
problems of mental causation and free will that I find so intriguing.  We need not 
examine the arguments for their respective positions in detail to appreciate the following 
dilemma: If Kim is right, then unless reduction goes through mental causation is 
impossible.  Yet if Davidson is right, then psychophysical reduction would amount to a 
kind of eliminativism—so that unless reduction fails mental causation is impossible.4 Of 
                                                 
4 Compare Kim’s remarks concerning this kind of dilemma in his (1993: 366-367). 
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course, a theory of mental causation should be just that—a theory of mental causation.  
And our task is to see how both elements can be captured at once.   
Now consider how aptly Ryle’s description of the problem of free will 
characterizes this dilemma.  Davidson (at least initially) cannot see how our pretheoretic 
knowledge of higher-grade human conduct could be squared with the hypothesis that that 
conduct is, after all, of a piece with the behavior of machines.  Yet our world is a physical 
world for all that, and to the degree that the mind cannot be described in terms drawn 
from the categories of mechanics we face a disconnect between mind and world in the 
form of isolated irrelevance.  What’s wanted is of course a reconciliation of the mental 
with the mechanical, rather than a peculiar kind of severance between the two; but by 
Ryle’s lights, finding such a reconciliation is what the free will problem is all about.  
Further, Kim is quite clear that what’s at stake in the problem of mental causation is the 
possibility of agency.  It is in fact “first and foremost” because “we care about human 
agency,” he says, that we care about the causal powers of the mind at all (Kim 2002: 
675).  But it is equally, and just as explicitly, the case with Davidson that his opposing 
stance on the question of reduction is motivated by the desire to safeguard human agency, 
as Kim insightfully puts it, by “insulating the mental from the full impact of physical 
determinism” (1985: 212).  Here is Davidson: 
Mental events as a class cannot be explained by physical science…We explain a man’s 
free actions, for example, by appeal to his desires, habits, knowledge and perceptions.  
Such accounts of intentional behaviour operate in a conceptual framework far removed 
from the direct reach of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason and 
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action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent.  The anomalism of the mental is thus a 
necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous. (1970: 225) 
What emerges is a parallel dilemma.  On the one hand, if reduction fails then free agency 
is impossible.  On the other hand, if reduction goes through, then free agency is 
impossible.  But, once more, a theory of free agency should be just that.  And the trick, as 
before, is to get both elements at once. 
 It is this sort of parallel, and the striking similarities between the competing 
approaches to the problems of mental causation and free will that emerge when the issues 
are compared, which fortify my conviction that these two problems are deeply related, 
and I explore in detail what are to my mind the most interesting of these associations in 
chapter 3.  That said, much of the third chapter consists of close, critical analysis of 
various theories of mental causation and responses to Kim’s challenge, so there is a 
certain danger of losing the forest for the trees.  But however involved the analysis of any 
particular point may be, each section is ultimately aimed at deriving a “moral of the 
story” that has application to our assessment of the free will problem.  I want to turn now 
to a few of these morals that will be of particular importance in the final chapter. 
 As already noted, the reality of mental causation is “common ground” between 
philosophers on either side of the dispute about the compatibility of freedom and 
determinism: mental causation is required for any variety of freedom worth wanting.  Yet 
while it is important to us all that our choices make a difference in the world, it is equally 
important to us that our choices make a difference in a salient way.  Here again we find a 
commitment shared by both compatibilists and libertarians: both parties want it to be true 
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that we act rationally and purposively, rather than being “carried along,” as it were, by 
mechanical processes with respect to which questions of rationality and purposiveness do 
not sensibly arise.  It is this feature of mind, I believe, with which the problem of mental 
causation is especially concerned: 
…I am a rational, intelligent creature.  I do not merely react to my environment in a 
reflexive, mindless way, but rather I plan, deliberate (at least on occasion), and generally 
try to act in a way that is rationally connected to the attainment of my goals.  We might 
add, as a part of this feature [of mind], the very fact that I have goals.  Objects that clearly 
lack minds, such as tables and chairs, or even plants and sufficiently lower animals, do 
not, I presume, share this feature.  Their behavior, if such it could be called, is totally 
governed by—is predictable and explicable in terms of—mindless laws of nature. 
(Levine 2001: 3) 
Is it possible that our behavior (if such it could be called) is likewise governed by, 
predictable and explicable in terms of, mindless laws of nature?  And if so, would it 
follow that the rational and teleological character of intentional action is illusory—that 
our actions are merely reactions—as Levine’s passage suggests?  Quite clearly, this is a 
concern that any action theorist must confront.  The mind must indeed be a source of 
causal effect if anyone ever acts; but its causal efficacy must not come at the expense of 
subsuming its operations under laws of a form that would strip it of its role in grounding 
genuine agency.   
 By common confession, when we act (to say nothing of when we act freely), 
something happens that is importantly different from what goes on when tables and 
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chairs are moved about.  Joseph Levine calls our attention to the fact that in the paradigm 
cases our behavior is purposive, rationally connected to the attainment of our goals—that 
is, according to him, a feature which sets apart the behavior of the minded from that of 
the mindless.  Yet this is not the only feature of mind that concerns us when we consider 
the nature of human agency, and our theorizing about mental causation, if it is to do the 
work required of it, must keep the following feature in view as well.5 What I have in 
mind is the fact that actions, as a class, are events with a special kind of etiology—they 
are produced, brought about, made to happen by the agents whose actions they are.  
Actions, as it is sometimes put, are something more than mere happenings.  I do not wish 
to argue that such agential production (or the ‘bringing about’ of an action) requires a sui 
generis form of causation one relatum of which is the agent herself, as the agent-causalist 
has it.  I think, to the contrary, that a satisfactory theory of action citing only event causes 
between mind and body is possible.  But supposing that action does not require what the 
agent-causalist thinks it does, both the compatibilist and the libertarian remain in need of 
a positive account explaining just what this relationship between agents and their actions 
consists in.  And if agent-causation is a false theory, the causal genesis of any act must of 
course find its location in the mind.  (Where else are we supposed to look?)  Moreover, 
insofar as we are interested in developing a naturalistic theory of agency, this feature of 
action must require no greater an ontological inventory than naturalism can provide.  So 
John Bishop: “Of course action differs from other behaviour in that the agent brings it 
                                                 
5 See especially Jaegwon Kim (2002: 675ff.) in this connection. 
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about, but the problem is how to accommodate such bringing about within a naturalist 
ontology” (1989: 69).6 
 The need to accommodate this phenomenon within a naturalist ontology provides 
us with further common ground between (naturalistically-minded) philosophers on either 
side to the dispute about the compatibility of freedom and determinism, and it is the final 
shared problem I will unearth in connection with mental causation in chapter 3.   
If my analysis has been correct, then both compatibilist and libertarian theories of 
free agency must involve the following three features, each of which is an essential 
component of agency simpliciter.  First, both libertarians and compatibilists are 
committed to the thesis that  
 
(i*) mental states (such as intentions) are causally efficacious.   
 
Second, both libertarians and compatibilists agree that  
 
(ii*) intentional human behavior is purposive, that is, rationally guided by the agent 
with a view toward the attainment of her goals.   
 
Third, both libertarians and compatibilists require that  
 
                                                 
6 See also Taylor (1966), Nathan (1975), Bishop (1983), Strawson (1986), Nagel (1986), Velleman (1992). 
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(iii*) actions, as opposed to mere happenings, be produced or brought about by the 
agents whose actions they are.   
 
With these pieces in place, we may turn our attention to the fourth and final chapter.  
There is a certain value in simply getting a cleaner grasp on perennial 
philosophical problems, and it is certainly helpful to achieve a clearer conception of what 
satisfying solutions to those problems might look like; philosophical progress need not 
always involve arriving at a definitive answer.  Still, it would be nice if we could make a 
different kind of progress as well, one that involves providing some positive suggestions 
as to how solutions to our problems might best be sought.  As interesting as the 
connections between freedom and mental causation may be, for example, we want to 
avoid the pitfall of simply subsuming the traditional problem of free will under a new 
framework, or of merely using a new vocabulary to reiterate the same arguments and 
positions.  In chapter 4, therefore, I attempt to take the findings of the forgoing chapters 
and outline an approach to the free will problem which I believe has some chance of 
moving the debate into some relatively unexplored terrain.  Lest I promise more than I 
intend to deliver, I want to be clear that the fourth chapter of this work presents what can 
only be called a sketch, a sketch drawn in response to the question, “Where to from 
here?”  In that chapter I hope to describe a way forward on the free will problem which 
will not only avoid some of the familiar stalemates that characterize the free will debate, 
but will also more sharply demarcate which philosophical challenges are unique to the 
libertarian position—which problems, that is, a libertarian conception of freedom itself 
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creates—and which are the difficulties the libertarian must face simply qua action 
theorist.  My suggestion is that we address the principal challenges to libertarianism (as 
specified in (i)-(iii) above) by examining the necessary components of any adequate 
theory of action (as specified in (i*)-(iii*) above) and putting the resources needed to 
secure those components to work in aid of the libertarian’s case. 
 To describe my strategy in brief, let us return to what I have identified as the three 
main challenges to libertarianism, one by one.  First, it has been argued (assumed?) that 
(i) libertarian free will requires the falsity of philosophical naturalism or materialistic 
theories of mind, that it commits us to an essentially mysterious metaphysics; and insofar 
as compatibilism is meant to provide a plausible, naturalistic conception of freedom, 
compatibilism seems to get a leg up.  Now I think there is undeniably some historical, 
and even some conceptual, justification for this associating of libertarianism with dualism 
and other anti-naturalist outlooks.  But this association may be due in part to the 
libertarian’s concentration on those features of agency in general which tend to resist 
easy naturalistic analysis, and not in the first instance because libertarianism considered 
as a distinctive position concerning the nature of freedom is inconsistent with 
naturalism.7 What I want to argue, accordingly, is that if the libertarian view of free 
action is truly inconsistent with a naturalistic metaphysics, then the inconsistency does 
not derive from libertarianism’s distinctive conception of what it is to act freely, but 
rather from libertarianism’s common conception of what it is to act. 
                                                 
7 Here compare the interesting remarks of Thomas Reid, a dualistic libertarian par excellence: “[If matter] 
require only a certain configuration to make it think rationally, it will be impossible to show any good 
reason why the same configuration may not make it act rationally and freely” (1969: 367). 
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To explain.  We have already noted that one major difficulty for naturalistic 
theories of mind is accounting for the possibility of mental causation, and we have 
likewise noted that this challenge is one that anyone concerned with the nature of agency 
must face—the problem of mental causation, Kim reminds us, “threatens to take away 
both agency and cognition” (1998: 32).  Yet we have also seen that action requires 
something in addition to the bare efficacy of the mind; it essentially involves the 
purposeful guidance of certain bodily movements, a condition which requires that the 
mind interact with the body in the right sort of way.  Here too, a naturalistic orientation 
presents us with a challenge.  For example, it has been argued that causal theories of 
action cannot be made to cohere with our conception of action as a teleological 
phenomenon, and that we should therefore pursue non-naturalistic alternatives to 
agency.8 Similarly, it has been urged that any naturalistic construal of agency necessarily 
ignores the role of the agent in bringing her actions about; naturalism, it has been argued, 
entails that the agent no longer acts, but merely provides the backdrop or arena within 
which certain happenings take place.  It is in view of this concern that N.M.L. Nathan 
claims, strikingly, that “materialism is false if anyone ever performs an action” (1975: 
501).   
Now if these theorists are right, then libertarian free will does indeed require the 
falsity of philosophical naturalism—but then any respectable compatibilism does as well.  
                                                 
8 To take one example, Scott Sehon (1997) argues that teleological explanations of behavior are not 
reducible to causal explanations, and that the inability of causal theories of action to explain what it is for 
an agent to act for a goal or purpose forces us to call the viability of naturalistic accounts of mind and 
agency into question. 
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That is, under these assumptions we shall be forced to admit that the charge expressed in 
(i)—that libertarianism isn’t consistent with naturalism—is a charge the libertarian 
cannot avoid.  But so what?  For under these assumptions the reason(s) that libertarianism 
is inconsistent with naturalism is the very same reason(s) compatibilism is inconsistent 
with naturalism: either naturalism rules out (i*) mental causation, or naturalism rules out 
(ii*) the purposiveness of intentional behavior, or naturalism rules out (iii*) the 
production of actions by agents.  And if that is so, one wonders whether naturalism has 
very much to recommend it after all.9 
But suppose that compatibilist free agency is indeed consistent with naturalism.  
Then naturalism must not rule out the essential elements of agency as specified in (i*)-
(iii*).  That is, there must exist a naturalistic solution to (i*) the problem of mental 
causation and, since “any adequate account of our mental powers must extend to a theory 
of their connection with action” (Audi 1993: 1), it must be a solution that illuminates both 
(ii*) what it is to act purposively and (iii*) what it is for an agent to originate or bring 
about an act.  If such a theory is in principle available, I shall argue, then we have all of 
the tools required in order to understand how free will can be realized in the natural 
order, given the assumption that determinism is false.10 A coherent naturalistic theory of 
libertarian free will would therefore be possible, and challenge (i) to libertarianism—the 
                                                 
9 Here I am in agreement with Jerry Fodor: “…if we can’t get both the causal responsibility of the mental 
and an argument for physicalism, then it seems to me that we ought to give up the argument for 
physicalism” (1989: 156). 
10 More strictly, provided that indeterminism sometimes obtains at certain crucial loci along the causal 
pathways from deliberation, to intention formation, to the performance of an intentional act. 
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claim that libertarianism requires the falsity of naturalism—will have been shown to be 
false. 
That is our goal.  But the realization of this goal obviously depends on the 
possibility of answering the second and third major problems for libertarianism, using 
only those resources which are likewise needed by the (naturalistically-minded) 
compatibilist to explicate the notion of intentional action as behavior that the agent brings 
about on purpose or for a reason.  I shall now briefly explain how I intend to approach 
problems (ii) and (iii) in light of conditions (ii*) and (iii*), beginning with the former 
problem. 
A well-worn objection to indeterministic conceptions of free action has it that so 
far from augmenting our freedom, indeterminism would threaten our freedom, for 
undetermined events are simply random events and random events by their nature are not 
“up to” anybody or within anyone’s control.  So if an event, such as an action or the 
formation of an intention to act, were left undetermined by its causal antecedents, then no 
one at all could be said to have brought it about for a purpose.  No one, that is, could be 
said to have exercised agential control over its occurrence, since its occurrence would be 
due simply to chance.  This is our problem (ii), and it seems to be an especially daunting 
one.  By way of response, it seems right to ask for an elucidation of the conditions under 
which an action can legitimately be said to be controlled by the agent who performs it.  
These, I will argue, must come in the form of the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
human behavior to count as intentional. 
22 
The notion of intentional action is difficult and elusive, but it is generally agreed 
that an action intentionally performed is an action performed for a reason, and guided by 
the agent toward a desired end.  The exercise of such guidance is crucial to intentional 
behavior, and the main challenge to our understanding how an agent’s guidance of her 
behavior can be captured in causal terms arises from the possibility of deviant or 
wayward causal chains between intentions and matching behavior.  Roughly, the concern 
is that an agent may form an intention to perform some action A in order to bring about 
some state of affairs S, and that very intention may in fact cause the agent to A and S to 
be brought about as a result, but the causal trajectory between the intention and A may be 
such that it precludes the agent from exercising control over what she does, rendering her 
action unintentional.11 The intention in question might produce in the agent a state of 
nervousness or surprise, for example, a state which subsequently causes her to 
temporarily lose control over her behavior but, fortuitously, also causes her body to move 
in just the way she had intended it to.  In such a case, the agent no longer performs the 
action intentionally or on purpose, for she does not guide or control her behavior in the 
right way.12 
Now the problem of causal deviance has been well advertised, and the amount of 
energy expended in an effort to solve it—by specifying the “right way” in which 
intentions must cause matching behavior if the behavior is to be intentional—has been 
considerable.  But the significance of the issue of deviance for our purposes is this.  It is 
                                                 
11 A classic presentation of the difficulty may be found in Davidson (1963). 
12 Here and throughout I shall focus on the fundamental problem of primary deviance, leaving the issues of 
secondary and tertiary deviance (cf. Mele 1997: 6-8) for another day.  
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clear, first, that the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for non-deviantly 
caused or intentional action is, at least in part, the attempt to explain how agential control 
might be captured in event causal terms, for a case of causal deviance is just a case in 
which the agent no longer controls or guides her behavior toward the end she had 
intended to bring about.  As one might expect, there is no generally accepted solution to 
the problem.  But strikingly, none of the proposals which seem to enjoy the most 
widespread support among causalists require that the causal sequence from intention to 
action be deterministic.13 (In fact, I know of no serious causal analysis of intentional 
action produced in response to the problem of deviance that does.)  The conditions 
provided by the pertinent theorists are explicitly adeterministic, meant to be consistent 
with both deterministic and indeterministic conceptions of agency.  And the import of 
this fact for the defense of libertarianism is clear: if what it is to control one’s actions is 
capturable in conditions the obtaining of which is independent of the truth or falsity of 
determinism, then the claim that indeterminism undermines control is, so far forth, 
without support.  So until we hear more about just what this control indeterminism 
allegedly undermines is—where the analysis given suffices for purposive, intentional 
behavior—we may justifiably reject as unfounded the notion that indeterminism threatens 
agential control.  And, as long as any of these (naturalistic) theories of action provide 
sufficient conditions for (ii*), then, contrary to claim (ii), agents may exercise the 
                                                 
13 Peacocke (1979), Searle (1983), Audi (1986), Bishop (1989), Mele (1992), (1995), Mele and Moser 
(1994). 
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relevant capacities of control over their actions without being determined to act in just the 
ways they do.14 
Supposing that challenge (ii) can be met, however, we are not yet out of the 
woods.  For even if indeterminism does not entail that our actions are simply random or 
capricious, still, we seem intuitively to have fallen short of the robust notion of freedom 
that we were after.  What makes libertarianism compelling, to the extent it is, is that it 
offers us the possibility of self-determination, ultimate responsibility for at least some of 
the things we do and some of the choices we make.  Determinism seemingly removes the 
possibility of this kind of freedom, screening off the alternatives before the agent has the 
opportunity to exercise his capacity of choice—but even if the failure of determinism 
makes room for freedom, mustn’t there be something in addition to the mere absence of 
determination by prior conditions, something that “fills the gap” that indeterminism pries 
open so that we can act with free will?  And how, one might ask, can a theory of freedom 
making use solely of indeterministic event causes ever deliver that?  At best, such a 
theory would amount to what we might call a compatibilist kind of freedom in an 
indeterministic world, and libertarianism will have fallen short of satisfying our 
expectations. 
This, our problem (iii) for libertarianism, is a very serious one, but I do not think 
it is unanswerable.  Here again I will argue that we should look to the common ground 
                                                 
14 Much more, of course, remains to be said on the issue of control.  My discussion in chapter 4 will include 
additional arguments for (ii) which grant that the minimal control enjoyed by agents when they act 
intentionally is not threatened by indeterminism.  At this point I merely wish to provide a flavor of the form 
my general response will take. 
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between libertarians and compatibilists in order to formulate a response, in this case by 
asking what it would take to satisfy condition (iii*) on agency.  That is, our first order of 
business will be to ask how it is possible in general that agents produce their actions, 
rather than simply being the locus of reflexes or mere happenings.  Provided such an 
explanation is forthcoming, I will argue, we may get more mileage out of “mere 
indeterminism” than we had thought.   
“Our conception of a person as an agent is a conception of something with a 
causal power…[a power] to initiate series of events containing some we want.  An action 
is the exercise of such a power, and a person’s actions are the events at the start of those 
series she initiates” (Hornsby 1993: 164).  No doubt Hornsby is correct, but the question 
is how such initiation is possible given that the agent’s initiation of any action is itself a 
matter of her pertinent mental states’ being caused by prior events.  Viewed far enough 
from the outside, nothing of agency seems to remain within this network of events, for 
both the agent and her putative initiating powers are swallowed up in that relentless tide 
of occurrences: 
Something peculiar happens when we view action from an objective or external 
standpoint.  Some of its most important features seem to vanish under the objective gaze.  
Actions seem no longer assignable to individual agents as sources, but become instead 
components of the flux of events in the world of which the agent is a part. (Nagel 1986: 
110) 
Now libertarians must of course contend with this difficulty insofar as they believe in 
action, but any action theorist espousing a naturalistic form of compatibilism must 
confront the challenge as well, for the “essential source of the problem is a view of 
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persons and their actions as part of the order of nature, causally determined or not” 
(ibid.).   
My suspicion is that problem (iii) for libertarianism amounts at least in part to an 
illicit transfer of problem (iii*)—a problem for the libertarian just qua action theorist—to 
libertarianism itself, as though compatibilism could afford to remain silent on the issue.  
But however that may be, I will argue that an appropriate response to either problem must 
begin with a close examination of the source of our discomfort, which I believe to be the 
gap between what it is like to act, and what we are eventually told action is.  “[Anyone] 
seriously concerned with the philosophical problem of freedom must be concerned with 
the cognitive phenomenology of freedom,” says Strawson (1986: 55).  To this I would 
add that anyone concerned with the philosophical problem of action must do the same.  
For it is part of our conception of ourselves as agents that we are in some sense initiators 
or producers, and this feature of our conception of agency is one that we come by from 
the internal point of view, in experiencing what Carl Ginet (1980) has dubbed the “actish 
phenomenal quality.”  Indeed, it seems to me that our intuitive descriptions of the agent’s 
role in bringing her actions about would be flatly unintelligible to a cognizant being who 
(per impossible?) had never acted at all.  
What makes it so difficult to see how condition (iii*) on agency could be satisfied 
on a naturalistic, causal construal of action, I will argue, is that our thinking about action 
unavoidably involves the phenomenology of action, and the phenomenology of action is 
conceptually irreducible.  Accordingly, no causal analysis of action—even one that 
successfully avoids the problem of deviance—will fully capture our notion of actions as 
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events brought about by the agents whose actions they are.  But recall, we have assumed 
that naturalism is not incompatible with agency simpliciter, and, since (iii*) is an 
essential element of action, agential production must in fact consist in event causal 
processes of a certain kind.  So the reluctance we feel in identifying any action with a 
given series of mental and physical events must find its explanation not in the fact that 
agential production requires an anti-naturalist ontology, but rather in the fact that a 
familiar sort of gulf obtains between our experience of action—and therefore our 
conception of it—and our conception of what goes on in a world of events when we act. 
Granting that this is so, and granting further that indeterminism need not 
undermine agential control, challenge (iii) to libertarianism begins to look less 
formidable.  The notion that the theoretical function of indeterminacy is to provide 
“gaps” in causal chains within which agents, hovering somewhere above those gaps, 
make their presence known by determining the outcomes on the gaps’ far sides is 
probably too simplistic a way to put the intuitive worry expressed in (iii), yet I think 
something like this picture is probably at the bottom of it.  But if agency is a matter of 
event causation at all then the agent is already involved in the production of action, not 
by way of exerting an irreducible force from outside of the causal process, but in virtue of 
the right involvement of his deliberations, intentions and reasons within the process itself.  
An agent’s bringing about an act is constituted by the process in question, and no further 
involvement of the agent is necessary or possible. 
If this is the right way to understand agency generally, I will argue, then we 
should begin to view indeterminacy as more of an asset than a liability.  For what is 
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missing from a deterministic account of free agency need not be either the agent’s 
control15 or production of her behavior—this is only to grant that action could occur in a 
deterministic world—but rather the possibility of being the final or ultimate source of 
one’s purposes, a possibility undercut by the obtaining of prior determining factors which 
have as their final or ultimate source something else: 
When an agent acts with free will, she is able to do other than perform the action that she 
actually performs; she has a choice about whether she performs that action; what she does 
is up to her.  On such an occasion, the agent determines, herself, what she does; she is an 
ultimate source or origin or initiator of her behavior (Clarke 2003: 15). 
If determinism is false then Clarke’s commonsense description of free will may be 
satisfied even in a naturalistic world of event causes—as long as persons can act in such a 
world to begin with.  For what makes an agent who acts with free will free is not merely 
that she produces her actions (iii*) by virtue of her choices (i*) and guides them with a 
view to an end (ii*), but rather that she is the “ultimate source” or “origin” of her 
purposes, a possibility which may be realized when which end she adopts is not 
antecedently determined, and so does not have an ultimate cause or explanation in 
something other than what she decides to do “there and then.”  To claim that in such a 
case nothing at all is ultimately responsible for the agent’s adopting a particular end or 
forming a given intention is, I will argue, to forget that the agent herself has causally 
                                                 
15 ‘Control’ is ambiguous between what John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) have dubbed 
‘guidance control’ and ‘regulative control’, where the former does not require the having of alternative 
possibilities (and so does not require indeterminism) but the latter does.  When I say an agent may control 
her behavior in a deterministic world, I have nothing stronger than guidance control (or something like it) 
in mind. 
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produced the intention expressing that end.  And if this is correct, we may agree with 
Aristotle both that “the origin of action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice, and 
that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end” (Nicomachean Ethics 
1139a31-2) and that “The stick moves the stone and is moved by the hand, which is again 
moved by the man; in the man, however, we have reached a mover that is not so in virtue 
of being moved by something else” (Physics VIII, 256a6-8), completing our defense of 
the natural possibility of free will. 
At the end of the fourth chapter the task of outlining my approach to freedom (my 
“research project”) will be complete, and despite the important work that remains to be 
done my dissertation will be drawn to a close.  However, some philosophers will remain 
suspicious of naturalistic approaches to free will, and I have attempted to show how my 
general approach to the problem of freedom can still be of value to them in an appendix 
on emergentism and agent-causation.  My own sentiment about these and related views of 
mind and agency is that although they are worth looking into, we are not yet in a position 
to say that they are theoretically necessary.  But if agent-causation, for example, does 
turn out to be an ineliminable feature of any robust account of free will, I want to show 
that the necessity of an agent-causal capacity derives in the first instance from the notion 
of action (as an event brought about by an agent), and not from any worries stemming 
from the possibility of causal determinism.  Similarly, if emergentism or any other 
serious form of dualism is needed for some feature of freedom (in order to explain the 
genesis of the ‘active powers’ involved in the exercise of free choice, perhaps), I suggest 
that we concentrate on showing how emergentism (or dualism) is well-motivated on 
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independent grounds.  Classical Emergentism was, after all, supremely concerned with 
securing the causal efficacy of the mind while at the same time refusing to see mentality 
‘mechanized’; and the doctrine has clearly undergone something of a renaissance of late, 
seemingly in response to the threat of causal exclusion.  If it should turn out that either 
emergentism or agent-causation is needed to understand our place in the world, then they 
will of course be needed for libertarianism; but not for libertarianism alone. 
Before turning to the main text itself, I want to indicate a few limitations on the 
scope of this work.  First, my intended audience is in some ways restricted to realists 
about mind and action, and in particular to compatibilist and libertarian thinkers who are 
in dead earnest about the metaphysical problem of free will.  Nothing I say here would 
make much of a difference to eliminativists about mind or freedom, for example, and I 
offer very little by way of direct argument against their respective positions.  Second, I 
assume that causation is not essentially deterministic, that probabilistic causation is 
possible.  I agree with Anscombe (1971) that at the core of our conception of causality is 
the notion of production, and that causality itself hasn’t anything especially to do with the 
hypothesis of universal determinism.  Last and relatedly, I offer no empirical arguments 
to the effect that probabilistic causation, which some might be willing to concede occurs 
at the level of micro-physics, is or could be a macro-phenomenon.  Any full orbed 
defense of free will must of course contend with this issue.  But the conceptual and 
metaphysical problems surrounding the nature of human freedom provide us with more 
than enough work to do, and as my present aim is to address how libertarian free will is 
possible in the natural order, it is those problems that will occupy our attention. 
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2. A Survey of the Dialectical Landscape 
We care not so much that our choices are uncaused, as we do that our choices have real effects.  
– J.S. Mill 
 
There are no free lunches in philosophy any more than in real life, and I believe the cheap ones aren’t 
worth the money.   
– Jaegwon Kim 
 
The easy part for the incompatibilist, if there is an easy part, is to drum up worries about 
the implications of determinism vis-à-vis the way in which we view ourselves and our 
place in the world, and to underscore the force of the intuition that free and responsible 
agency requires that determinism be false.  After all, if, given the circumstances into 
which I was born, there is nothing I could ever have done to make myself different from 
the way that I now am, how can I be ultimately responsible for my character or the 
actions issuing from it?  Other than the fact that I am physiologically complex, how, to 
use Nozick’s dramatic image,1 am I any different from a marionette with respect to 
ultimate responsibility, self-determination or control?   
 These intuitive concerns have motivated many critical analyses of the various 
compatibilist theories of freedom and responsibility, including my own,2 and have led me 
to embrace a restrictive form of incompatibilism, one which does not require (for moral 
responsibility) indeterminacy at every point of action, but which does require 
indeterminacy at salient points along an agent’s causal history.  I am led to this position, 
                                                 
1 Nozick (1981). 
2 Judisch (2005) and (forthcoming). 
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as I say, by the force of incompatibilist intuitions: but although intuitions are a fine place 
to start, they are never a very satisfying place to finish.   
 Several notable contemporary philosophers, recognizing the need for a 
metaphysical justification of the incompatibilist thesis, have crystallized the core 
intuitions into formal arguments.  The reader will have noticed that I have not so much as 
mentioned these important arguments or the vast literature consisting in their 
presentation, criticism and defense.  To remedy this deficiency I will present three 
influential incompatibilist arguments below, together with the most popular objections to 
them.  I will not provide an exhaustive synopsis of this wide-ranging discussion, nor will 
I attempt to break the stalemate that characterizes it.  But I will draw some conclusions 
about the general dialectical climate in which this discussion takes place, and argue that 
progress can be made by reorienting the direction the discussion should take. 
 In his seminal (1983) book, Peter van Inwagen presented a series of arguments for 
incompatibilism that were to excite discussion and debate for decades.  The arguments, 
he is quick to remind us, are not difficult to formulate.  It is perhaps not surprising, 
according to van Inwagen, that so many philosophers have believed a controversial thesis 
without providing arguments for it,3 but it is rather surprising that they have done so 
when arguments are manifestly easy to give.  The following argument, dubbed the 
                                                 
3 As Kane (1996: 44) points out, however, it may be that an inkling of the formal structure of this argument 
can be found in the writing of some medieval thinkers (and to this I would add that a version of the 
argument seems at least implicit in the writings of both Spinoza and Leibniz).  And it should of course not 
be thought that none of van Inwagen’s contemporaries were offering arguments of the same sort prior to the 
release of his book; see Carl Ginet (1966), David Wiggins (1973), James Lamb (1977). 
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“Consequence Argument,” is one that would occur pretty quickly to anyone who thinks 
that the possibility of universal determinism is relevant to our status as free agents: 
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequences of the laws of nature and events 
in the remote past.  But it is not up to us what went on before we were born, and neither 
is it up to us what the laws of nature are.  Therefore, the consequences of these things 
(including our present acts) are not up to us. (1983: 16) 
 The Consequence Argument is subsequently formalized in three ways, but van 
Inwagen maintains that the structural similarity of these three formalizations is sufficient 
to ensure that a serious problem with one will apply with equal force to the others as well.  
It is the third formalization that has received the most attention, however, and it is to this 
instance of the argument that I now turn. 
 The third argument introduces a peculiar modality, ‘N’, designating the lack of 
choice about a given state of affairs relative to all agents.  N, then, is an operator 
attaching to sentences with truth-values such that, for any sentence p, prefixing p with N 
abbreviates the flanking of ‘and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether’ with 
instances of p.4 Van Inwagen makes no attempt to construct a complete logic for N, but 
under any plausible construction he thinks at least the following rules ought to be 
included: 
 
(α) □p ├ Np 
(β) N(p ⊃ q), Np ├ Nq  
                                                 
4 Van Inwagen (1983: 93). 
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‘□’ in (α) designates broadly logical necessity, rendering (α) itself fairly incontestable.  
(β) specifies that N is closed under entailment. 
 The symbols ‘Po’ and ‘L’ abbreviate sentences expressing propositions, a 
proposition exhaustively describing the state of the actual world at some time in the 
distant past in the case of Po, and the conjunction into a single proposition of all the laws 
of nature in the case of L.  Finally, we let ‘P’ designate any sentence expressing a true 
proposition, and assume the truth of determinism—that is, that given Po and L, there is 
but one physically possible future.5 The Consequence Argument then runs as follows: 
 
(1) □((Po & L) ⊃ P)  Consequence of determinism. 
(2) □(Po ⊃ (L ⊃ P))  Conditional Exploitation. 
(3) N(Po ⊃ (L ⊃ P))  (α), (2). 
(4) NPo    Assumption. 
(5) N(L ⊃ P)   (β), (3), (4). 
(6) NL    Assumption. 
(7) NP    (β), (5), (6). 
 
                                                 
5 More generally, for any two nomologically equivalent worlds, w and w*, if w differs from w* with respect 
to no matter of fact at t, then, necessarily, for any time subsequent to t, w differs from w* with respect to no 
matter of fact.   
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This argument, if sound, shows that determinism entails that no one has or ever 
had a choice about anything, since any arbitrary sentence expressing a true proposition 
may be substituted for P.  Rule (α) seems incontestable (necessary truths aren’t up to 
anyone, or at any rate aren’t up to us), (1) is just what we mean by determinism and the 
inference to (2) is licensed by elementary sentential and modal logic, leaving both of 
these premises above reproach.  The denial of (4) or (6) seems extremely 
counterintuitive, but can be and has been defended by analyzing certain key terms (‘can’, 
‘power’, ‘ability’) in “compatibilist-friendly” ways, and ingenious counterexamples have 
been constructed in an effort to undermine (β).  The controversy (or at any rate most of 
the controversy) has therefore centered on the validity of (β) and the semantics of the 
crucial terms. 
Let us begin by considering the semantical question within the context of an 
assessment of (β)’s validity.  We shall then consider the validity of (β) without appeal to 
a particular analysis of the critical terms, and then return again to the question of the 
meaning of those terms in connection with the next argument.   
To say that I have no choice about whether a state of affairs S obtains is to say 
that I lack a certain power or ability with respect to S.  Intuitively, if there is nothing I can 
do to prevent some state of affairs from coming about, then I am powerless to prevent it; 
and if I am powerless to prevent it, then I cannot bring it about that a proposition truly 
describing that state of affairs is false.  In particular, it seems, I cannot render Po or L 
false, for the past and the laws just aren’t up to me; and on the strength of (β) it follows 
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that I cannot falsify any proposition entailed by the conjunction of Po and L.
6 (β), then, 
entails that 
 
(8) If I can render p false and ((Po & L) ⊃ p), then either I can render false Po, 
or I can render false L. 
 
So any counterexample to (8) will therefore invalidate (β).   
 Initially, the prospect of finding such a counterexample does not appear very 
promising.  But the question whether (8) is true hangs crucially on the meaning, in this 
instance, of the word ‘can’.  Van Inwagen himself believes that ‘can’ and its cohorts are 
fairly primitive, extremely difficult to analyze in terms of more basic concepts.7 But 
compatibilists have since the early modern times favored a conditional analysis of ‘can’ 
and its cognates.  Under the conditional analysis, to say “S could have done A” is to say 
that “S would have done A, if S had so chosen” in the counterfactual case, and to say “S 
can do A” is to say that “S will do A, if S so chooses” in the case of the present indicative.   
If we adopt this analysis, then the antecedent of (8) becomes 
 
(8a) I will render false p if I so choose, and ((Po & L) ⊃ p). 
                                                 
6 Van Inwagen introduces the ‘rendering a proposition false’ idiom in his first formulation of the argument 
(1983: 70ff.). 
7 “I doubt very much whether there are any simpler or better understood concepts in terms of which [the 




And there is nothing problematic about (8a): the antecedent of the left conjunct is in fact 
false given the truth of the right conjunct, but that is of course consistent with the left 
conjunct’s being true, and hence with the truth of (8a). 
 But notice now the upshot of the conditional construal of ‘can’ in the consequent 
of (8): 
 
(8c) I will render Po or L false, if I so choose. 
 
But clearly, even if I choose (or try or want) to render false a law of nature or a fact about 
the past, I will not be able to do so.  The compatibilist can, therefore, deny the validity of 
(β) on the strength of the conditional analysis, without having to argue that we have the 
ability to change the past or the laws.  
 Not surprisingly, supporters of the Consequence Argument have not been 
impressed with conditional analyses of these important terms.  And notably, there is a 
growing consensus even among contemporary compatibilists that these analyses are 
problematic, quite apart from the question of the compatibility of free will and 
determinism.8 Against this objection to his Consequence Argument, van Inwagen has 
argued that the rule (β) is much more intuitively plausible than any conditional analysis 
of ‘can’, so that if the latter invalidates the former, then so much the worse for the latter.  
                                                 
8 For an illuminating overview of the conditional analysis in this context, see Kane (1996 chapter 4) and 
Berofsky (2002: 181-201). 
 38
But several incompatibilists, to say nothing of the compatibilists, have countered that this 
sort of retort is simply question-begging and unfair.9 It would appear then, that whether 
we insist upon the validity of (β) or insist upon a conditional analysis of ‘can’, a 
complaint of question-begging can be lodged from either side to the dispute.  Stalemate 
ensues. 
 A stronger response to the incompatibilist argument would require an example 
invalidating, or at any rate calling into question, the inference rule (β) without appeal to a 
disputed semantical analysis, and preferably without reference to the free will debate.  
And this is just what has been done, to a first approximation by Michael Slote (1982), and 
then decisively (in van Inwagen’s estimation) by Thomas McKay and David Johnson 
(1996). 
 Drawing upon an earlier argument of Slote’s, McKay and Johnson note that the 
following inference rule, which Slote calls “Agglomeration,” can be derived from (α) and 
(β): 
 
(A) Np, Nq ├ N(p & q)10 
 
Since (α) is unquestionable, producing a counterexample to (A) suffices to show the 
invalidity of (β).  Here are Johnson and McKay: 
                                                 
9 See for example David Lewis (1981) and Thomas Flint (1987). 
10 Proof: Suppose Np and Nq.  Introduce the axiom instance □(p ⊃ (q ⊃ (p & q))).  From (α) it follows that 
N(p ⊃ (q ⊃ (p & q))), which, together with applications of (β) on our two assumptions, gives us N(p & q). 
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Suppose I have a coin that was not tossed yesterday.  Suppose, however, that I was able 
to toss it yesterday and that no one else was.  Suppose that if I had tossed it, it might have 
landed “heads” and it might have landed “tails” and it would have landed one way or the 
other…but I should have had no choice about which face it would have displayed.  It 
seems that 
N The coin did not land “heads” yesterday 
N The coin did not land “tails” yesterday 
are both true—for if I had tossed the coin, I should have had no choice about whether the 
tossed coin satisfied the description “did not land ‘heads,’” and [similarly for “tails”].  
But 
N (The coin did not land “heads” yesterday & the coin did not land “tails” 
yesterday) 
is false—for I did have a choice about the truth value of the (in fact true) conjunctive 
proposition…since I was able to toss the coin and, if I had exercised this ability, this 
conjunctive proposition would have been false.  
This story, van Inwagen concedes,11 is undeniably a counterexample to (A), and 
since (β) entails (A) and (A) is invalid, there must exist counterexamples to (β); hence, 
                                                 
11 van Inwagen (2000: 161).  Not everyone is as impressed with this example as is van Inwagen, however.  
Tomis Kapitan, for instance, writes that the difficulty posed by the counterexample is “not insurmountable.  
That unavoidability is not agglomerative does not show that the particular propositions NPo and NL could 
be true and N(Po & L) false…and we need not go through agglomeration to justify the premise N(Po & L) 
since it is true in its own right” (2002: 131-132).  Moreover, rule (β) is not the only transfer principle on the 
market.  Widerker (1987) has suggested that Nq can be deduced from Np and □(p ⊃ q), which principle is 
less vulnerable to criticism than (β); and an indexed counterpart of Widerker’s rule (NS,tp, □(p ⊃ q) ├ NS,tq 
for any agent S and time t) is even more intuitively valid than both the generalized rule and the indexed 
counterpart to (β) (O’Connor 2000a: 9). 
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(β) is not valid.  As van Inwagen has argued that the various versions of the Consequent 
Argument stand or fall together, and that no one should be an incompatibilist without 
endorsing (β), this result seems devastating.12 
There are ways, however, of finessing (β) so as to escape its entailment of (A); so 
the debate continues.  But however (β)-like principles are construed, many compatibilists 
are convinced that they must fail with respect to closure—and since it is widely held that 
arguments for incompatibilism require that the relevant modal operator transfers from 
antecedent to consequent, it is concluded that any version of the Consequence Argument 
must either be invalid or contain false premises. 
In response to this dilemma, John Martin Fischer has argued that contrary to 
popular belief on both sides of the debate, modal transfer principles such as (β) are in fact 
not necessary to show that determinism is incompatible with freedom.  After defending 
his version of the Consequence Argument which makes use of an indexed counterpart to 
rule (β)—the “Transfer Principle” as he calls it—he presents the “Conditional Version” 
of the argument for incompatibilism which, he maintains, assumes only the truth of two 
very plausible principles.  These two principles underwrite premises (4) and (6) above, 
but do not themselves depend upon the transfer of modality from a set of assumptions to 
a conclusion.  They are the “Principle of the Fixity of the Past” and the “Principle of the 
Fixity of the Laws,” spelled out just below: 
                                                 
12 (1983: 57) and (1989).  It should not be thought that van Inwagen admits overall defeat, of course.  After 
conceding the validity of the counterexample, he proceeds to reformulate the Consequence Argument in 
terms of “direct access,” a technical notion of ability meant to avoid this difficulty (see van Inwagen 2000). 
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(FP) For any action Y, agent S, and time t, if it is true that if S were to do Y at t, some 
fact about the past relative to t would not have been a fact, then S cannot at t do Y 
at t.  
(FL) For any action Y, and agent S, if it is true that if S were to do Y, some natural law 
which actually obtains would not obtain, then S cannot do Y.13 
 
According to Fischer, these principles alone suffice to show that causal determinism 
entails our inability to do anything other than what we in fact do, and thus that we do not 
have free will. 
The argument runs as follows.  Consider any action A which S actually performs 
at a time t2.  Let s1 represent the state of the world at t1 and assume that determinism is 
obtains.  Then one of the following conditionals must be true: 
 
(9) If S were to refrain from doing A at t2, s1 would not have been the total 
state of the world at t1. 
(10) If S were to refrain from doing A at t2, then some natural law which 
actually obtains would not obtain. 
(11) If S were to refrain from doing A at t2, then either s1 would not have been 
the total state of the world at t1, or some natural law which actually obtains 
would not obtain.14 
                                                 
13 Fischer (1994: 62). 
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But that S cannot in fact refrain from doing A at t2 is entailed both by the conjunction of 
(9) and (FP) and by the conjunction of (10) and (FL); so it follows that, if (11) is true, 
then S cannot refrain from doing A at t2.  And the result can of course be generalized for 
any action.  The upshot is that 
the Transfer Principle’s role in arguments for incompatibilism is more peripheral than 
some have supposed.  The Conditional Version implies that even if there were some 
strong objection to the Transfer Principle, this would not in itself decisively impugn 
incompatibilism…the incompatibilist’s argument can be developed without Transfer, and 
there is no good reason to suppose that the [alleged] problems with Transfer will 
necessarily infect the reformulated argument. (1994: 63-64) 
 Granting to Fischer that this argument does not tacitly depend upon a modal 
transfer principle relevantly similar to (β) and its indexed counterparts,15 the question of 
how the crucial terms are to be understood arises once again, grinning, as J.L. Austin 
(1956) put it, like a frog at the bottom of the beer mug.  Although there is undeniably a 
considerable amount of appeal to (FP) and (FL), compatibilists have responded by 
arguing that the two principles, correctly understood, do not imply our inability to do 
otherwise and hence do not jeopardize our freedom. 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 Note the structural similarity to standard formulations (e.g., Nelson Pike’s 1965) of the argument for the 
incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, and compare Fischer’s discussion in (Fischer 
1989: 86-96). 
15 Some philosophers might think this to be granting quite a lot, for it might be argued that the notion of 
‘fixity’ is being transferred, or at least underwriting the (distinct) modality employed in the consequent.   
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 According to this line of response, there are two interpretations of an agent’s 
ability relevant to the assessment of Fischer’s two principles: a broad sense, and a 
narrower, causal sense.  The compatibilist’s general strategy proceeds in two stages.  
First, she seeks to show that the intuitive appeal of (FL) and (FP) can be captured given a 
narrow sense to our inability to break the laws or alter the past, but that this sense does 
not entail that we are unable to do otherwise.  Second, she argues that while the broad 
interpretation of our inability to break the laws or alter the past does entail our inability to 
do otherwise, that sense renders (FL) and (FP) false.  Hence, the Conditional Version of 
the incompatibilist argument is either invalid or contains false premises: There is no one 
reading of the critical modality which renders the argument sound.  
Let us consider this strategy with respect to (FL) first.16 The “Local Miracle 
Compatibilists,” as they are called, concede that no agent can perform an action which 
would either constitute or directly cause a violation of the laws of nature.17 In this sense 
we are not “free to break the laws.”  But that fact does not entail that an agent cannot 
perform an action such that, if she were to perform it, it would have been the case that a 
law of nature was violated just prior to the action in question.  To clarify, the Local 
Miracle Compatibilist rephrases (FL) to 
                                                 
16 The first formulation of this argument is found in David Lewis (1981). 
17 I assume there is an important distinction between “directly causing” a violation of the laws, and 
“causally contributing to” a violation of the laws.  For assume a miracle occurs subsequent to the existence 
of creatures capable of free action.  It is possible that the miracle is located somewhere along a causal chain 
or network of chains which includes, prior to the miracle’s occurrence, a free action of some agent.  But 
then the agent’s action might causally contribute to the miracle in a perfectly respectable sense, by 
contributing to certain background conditions within which the miracle takes place such that in the absence 
of those background conditions it would not be a miracle. 
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(CFL) For any action Y, event b, agent S and times t1, t2, and t3 (t1 ≤ t2 ≤ t3), if (1) Y’s 
occurring at t2 is inconsistent with the laws of nature, or (2) Y’s occurring at t2 
would cause some event b’s occurring at t3 and b’s occurring at t3 is inconsistent 
with the laws of nature, then S cannot at t1 do Y at t2.
18 
 
And while (CFL) specifies that agents have no contra-nomic powers, it does not entail 
(FL).  I cannot break the laws, to be sure, but it remains at any rate possible that I perform 
some action entailing that a law of nature would have to have been broken (perhaps 
immediately) prior to my doing it.  Thus, although I have no causal powers over the laws 
of nature, I do have a sort of counterfactual power over them, and this is allegedly all the 
compatibilist needs.19 
Other compatibilists, who are perhaps less willing to countenance even the tiniest 
of miracles, focus their criticism against the second principle, (FP).  These philosophers, 
the “Multiple Pasts Compatibilists,” draw a similar distinction between an agent’s causal 
powers over the past, and his non-causal, or counterfactual powers over the past.  It is 
quite true, they concede, that we cannot, at t, initiate a causal sequence issuing in the non-
occurrence of some event that actually took place prior to t.  This fact is precisely what 
lends credibility to (FP).  But it does not follow that 
                                                 
18 This formulation is found in Fischer (1994: 70). 
19 There is of course an irony in Lewis’s resting his case upon a distinction between counterfactual and 
causal dependence, but it shouldn’t be thought that Lewis has no answers to the charge of inconsistency.  
Here is yet another detail in this complex and wide-ranging debate that I pass over for purposes of space, 
but see Ekstrom (2000: 42-46) on this issue. 
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(FP*) For any action Y, event e, agent S and time t, if it is true that if S were to do Y at t, 
some event e which actually occurred in the past relative to t would not have 
occurred, then S cannot at t do Y at t.20 
 
The contrary is in fact true, according to the Multiple Pasts Compatibilist.  For the truth 
of the “backtracking conditional” ([FP*]’s antecedent), implies that the “cannot”-claim in 
the consequent is false.  Certainly I cannot (causally) bring about a change in the past; on 
that point most are agreed.  But it doesn’t follow that I cannot refrain from doing 
something that is entailed by the conjunction of the past and the laws; it’s just that if I 
were to refrain from doing it, the entire history of the world would have to have been 
different.   
 As several philosophers have pointed out, the debate over which of the two 
principles should be denied is an in-house dispute with little immediate relevance to the 
general worry.21 Multiple Past Compatibilists are ready to deny that local miracles might 
take place, even if it requires them to argue that I can in fact do something such that, if I 
were to do it, the past would have been different “all the way back.”  Local Miracle 
Compatibilist are willing to countenance a miracle or two, so as to escape the wide 
divergence of similarity between the actual world and the counterfactual world in which 
an agent refrains from performing an action entailed by the past and the laws.22 
                                                 
20 Again, the formulation is Fischer’s (1994: 79). 
21 E.g., O’Connor (2000a: 16), Kane (1996: 48ff). 
22 For an excellent discussion of these strategies, see Fischer (1994 chapter 4). 
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But however this controversy might be resolved, it will do precious little by way 
of ameliorating the incompatibilist’s dissatisfaction with the general reply, reliant as it is 
upon an interpretation of ‘ability’ which is simply not what the incompatibilist has in 
mind.  Timothy O’Connor sums up incompatibilist intuitions on this score rather nicely.  
Granting that there is a genuine distinction between the broad and narrow senses of 
ability, O’Connor asks, 
what is the relevance of this distinction to the issue of my ability to act differently from 
the way I will act?  When I wonder what it is now in my power to do, I am wondering 
what is open to me, given the way things are and have been and the laws that constrain 
how things might be…An ‘ability’ to act here and now, the actual exercise of which 
strictly requires a prior condition that is lacking and which I cannot in any way contribute 
to bringing about, is, in the sense at issue, no ability at all. (2000a: 17) 
 So it appears that the attempt to formulate the incompatibilist argument without 
relying upon disputed modal principles leads in the end to the same stalemate that 
motivated the Conditional Version of the argument in the first place.  Various 
hypothetical analyses of ‘ability’, ‘can’, and so forth are in general unacceptable to 
incompatibilists, and compatibilists deny that there is anything more to be had.   
 The last argument we will consider is motivated by the conviction that the 
inevitability of these stalemates is symptomatic of a broader disagreement.  It is clear that 
the lack of progress on these issues is attributable, in part, to the conflicting intuitions 
regarding what these essential terms mean.  But the diagnosis of this conflict reveals a 
deeper problem, and one that has received much less attention in the literature than it 
deserves.   
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The various formulations of the incompatibilist argument we’ve considered 
attempt to demonstrate that determinism entails the absence of alternative possibilities to 
action, and the compatibilist responses are meant to show that determinism does not have 
this untoward implication.  But the almost exclusive focus upon alternative possibilities 
has obscured a deeper condition for free will, one that lies at the heart of incompatibilist 
intuitions and one from which the alternative possibilities condition derives.  According 
to Robert Kane, it is the fact that the incompatibilist takes this condition seriously, and 
the compatibilist does not, which explains the deep-seated conflict of intuitions that 
characterizes the compatibility debate.  Thus, it is the deeper condition, without which 
alternative possibilities and indeterminism would not suffice for free will, that needs 
bringing out into the open. 
 Although the alternative possibilities (AP) condition alone “provides too thin a 
basis on which to rest the case for incompatibilism,” Kane writes, “one can find a second 
criterion fueling incompatibilist intuitions even more important than AP, though 
comparatively neglected” (2002: 407).  Kane calls that second criterion “Ultimate 
Responsibility” (UR): 
 
(UR) An agent is ultimately responsible for some (event or state) E’s occurring only if 
(R) the agent is personally responsible for E’s occurring in a sense which entails 
that something the agent voluntarily (or willingly) did or omitted, and for which 
the agent could have voluntarily done otherwise, either was, or causally 
contributed to, E’s occurrence and made a difference to whether or not E 
occurred; and (U) for every X and Y (where X and Y represent events and/or 
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states) if the agent is personally responsible for X, and if Y is an arche (or 
sufficient ground or cause or explanation) for X, then the agent must also be 
personally responsible for Y. (1996: 35) 
  
Intuitively, the idea is that if an agent is ultimately responsible for an action, then the 
agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient reason or cause or condition for 
that action.  To take Dennett’s (1984) famous example, it may have been the case that 
when Luther made his stand against the Roman Church that he could not have done other 
than he did: his refusal to recant could well have followed determinately from his 
character.  Notice that if this were the case, Luther would not have satisfied the AP 
condition, in that instance, for that action.  But so long as his character and motives (the 
sufficient grounds, in this instance, for that action) were partially formed by him, so long 
as there were points along the history of his life in which he voluntarily performed 
actions which helped to mold his character into what it was, then Luther satisfied UR 
with respect to that action.  His action followed determinately from his character and 
motives, but he is ultimately responsible for it because he is responsible for the character 
and motives from which that action issued. 
 This example shows, as we have indicated, that AP is not a necessary condition 
for every responsible action we perform.  But perhaps surprisingly, neither is AP a 
sufficient condition for free will.  Kane asks us to consider a world in which some actions 
are undetermined and satisfy the AP condition, but in which everyone’s characters, 
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reasons, motives, intentions, purposes are preset by God.23 For example, an assassin 
might successfully kill his target or he might, in those very circumstances, miss the target 
by a little due to an undetermined quantum jump in some relevant muscle or neural 
pathway.  As J.L. Austin and others have shown,24 whether the assassin hits or misses his 
target, it is still something he has done and something for which he can be held 
responsible.  This demonstrates that even if indeterminacy only ever hindered us from 
doing what we were trying to do, the fact that indeterminacy is involved in the causal 
history of an action does not necessarily negate our freedom or absolve us of 
responsibility, pace those philosophers who have argued that free will requires 
determinism.  But, as Kane observes, even if freedom of action can be accounted for 
under this scenario (that is, the scenario in which our wills have been preset by God), 
freedom of will cannot; for it may be undetermined whether an agent will be successful in 
accomplishing whatever he intends to do, but it will never be up to him whether he 
intends to do it.25 The assassin might miss his target or not, but that the assassin will try 
to hit is target is a fact over which he has control:  
According to UR, if agents are to be ultimately responsible for their own wills, then if 
their wills are already set one way when they act, they must be responsible for their wills 
having been set that way…And this means that some of their past voluntary choices or 
                                                 
23 Kane (2002: 410-411). 
24 See J.L. Austin (1956), G.E.M. Anscombe (1971). 
25 Daniel Dennett makes essentially the same point: “The libertarian would not be relieved to learn that 
although his decision to murder his neighbor was quite determined, the style and trajectory of the death 
blow was not.  Clearly, what the libertarian has in mind is indeterminism…prior to the ultimate decision or 
formation of intention, and unless we can provide that, we will not aid the libertarian’s case” (1978: 49). 
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actions must have played an indispensable role in the formation of their present purposes 
and motives. (Kane 2002: 412) 
So although indeterminism and AP may be necessary conditions for free will, 
they do not jointly suffice for it.  And while compatibilist analyses of the terms employed 
in the AP condition might be enough to neutralize Consequence-type arguments, it is not 
so clear that they will be of much help with respect to UR, for UR is meant to entail 
indeterminism more directly, without reference to AP. 
Roughly, acting of “one’s own free will” requires the satisfaction of UR, which in 
turn requires that, at some points in the life history of an agent, the agent performs what 
Kane calls ‘self-forming actions’ (SFAs),26 those choices or actions that contribute to the 
formation of the agent’s character.  That SFAs must be undetermined can be seen by 
noting that if determinism obtains, then the satisfaction of UR requires an impossible 
infinite regress: the agent must be responsible for anything that is a sufficient reason 
(cause or motive) for his actions, and this condition cannot be satisfied unless some of the 
agent’s actions (the SFAs) lacked a sufficient reason—which is to say they must be 
undetermined.   
Now although AP need not be relied upon to argue for incompatibilism, it cannot 
be dispensed with entirely.  For SFAs require more than that the choice be undetermined; 
it must also be the case that whichever way the agent chooses he does so rationally, 
intentionally and voluntarily, rather than merely inadvertently or by accident (as when the 
                                                 
26 Also, “self-forming willings” (SFWs). 
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assassin misses his target).27 And if SFAs require that an agent be able to make one 
choice or another rationally and voluntarily, then SFAs of course require that the agent be 
able to make more than one choice simpliciter.  Thus, if an agent has free will, it must be 
the case that some of the agent’s choices are undetermined, and that AP be satisfied for 
some of the agent’s actions (the SFAs).28 So it remains true that free will requires AP, but 
in a more indirect way than is often assumed; and crucially, according to Kane, the case 
for incompatibilism can be made independently of this particular condition. 
Difficulties can of course be raised for Kane’s argument, but I do not think they 
are independent of the objections that have been raised against his theory of free agency, 
viz., if SFAs are entirely undetermined they do not appear to be within our voluntary 
control—how then can we be responsible for them?  This is an important challenge, but 
as it involves a general problem for libertarian accounts of agency I will postpone 
discussion of it for now, taking it up in more detail in what follows.   
These three arguments, to register my own opinion, are among the best we have 
for any conclusion of philosophical significance.  It isn’t terribly surprising that the 
various versions of the general theme run into technical difficulties (or at any rate do not 
compel assent), but they seem to me no less persuasive for all that.   
Nevertheless, the conviction remains that the arguments must be fallacious and 
that the intuitions motivating them must be confused.  We have seen, for example, that 
compatibilists who have engaged these arguments charge its supporters either with 
                                                 
27 Kane calls these the “plurality conditions.” 
28 Kane calls these two derivations the “dual regress of free will.” 
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relying on invalid transfers of modality or with misusing important terms.  And the same 
sorts of charges are lodged by compatibilists who do not directly address the arguments 
given above.  Although it is no longer commonly claimed that the free will problem is a 
pseudo-problem, generated by a misuse of ordinary language and dissoluble at the hands 
of competent linguistic analysts, the notion that incompatibilist intuitions are in some 
way explainable by linguistic confusion remains popular.  Robert Audi, for instance, 
writes that English modal idiom makes it natural to express a necessary connection 
between antecedent and consequent by placing a ‘must’ before the consequent.  Thus, 
even if incompatibilist thinkers have not explicitly presented arguments committing a 
modal transfer fallacy,  
because English idiom makes it easy to transfer necessities from conditionals to their 
consequents, one can be influenced by this kind of reasoning, or by a related shift in 
meaning, even if one does not formulate the relevant arguments or trade on the 
ambiguities.  The influence of a fallacy—particularly one that is so powerfully reinforced 
by idiom—can survive its recognition. (1993a: 261) 
 But this explanation is very difficult to credit.29 The distinction between the 
necessity of the consequent and the necessity of the consequence is a fairly 
                                                 
29 Interestingly, although Audi maintains that “incompatibilism undeservedly gains from the power of our 
idiomatic ways of expressing certain modalities” (1993b: 23), he admits that “it is odd, insofar as one 
thinks of an action as determined by factors extending backward before one’s birth, to speak of the action 
as free.  It is also odd to speak of an action as both free and causally necessitated” (p. 22).  It is unclear 
whether Audi thinks the ‘oddness’ derives from the influence of idiomatic expression, or whether it seems 
odd for some other reason but that the oddness is further exacerbated by idiomatic expression.  My hunch is 
that it seems odd because there’s a real problem here, and pointing out the careless way in which modalities 
are expressed in everyday language is something of a red herring. 
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straightforward one, and if philosophical clarification falls victim to loose talk that easily 
then there is little hope to be found in philosophical clarification at all.  Moreover, this 
particular distinction has been a philosophical commonplace at least since the middle 
ages, as a glance through the literature makes clear;30 and it’s worth remembering that the 
medievals, who believed almost to a man that determinism poses a serious threat to 
freedom and responsibility, were writing in a much more precise and disambiguating 
language than modern English.   
If, however, the intuitions driving incompatibilism can be explained in this way 
even when incompatibilists are well aware of the relevant modal distinctions, it is hard to 
resist the implication that those who still find compatibilism wanting aren’t the sharpest 
folks in the bunch; and some compatibilists have happily embraced that implication.  
Donald Davidson (1973), for example, has dismissingly suggested that anyone who 
accepts incompatibilism convicts himself ipso facto of philosophical incompetence.  To 
this charge van Inwagen has replied that Davidson’s “attitude evidences very high 
standards of philosophical competence indeed, since among the philosophers who accept 
[incompatibilism] are professors Anscombe, Chisholm, and Plantinga” (1978: 241).  And, 
of course, in addition to van Inwagen’s philosophical favorites the list could easily be 
lengthened to include an impressive array of traditional philosophers and a growing 
number of contemporaries to boot. 
                                                 
30 Three distinctions commonly found in medieval philosophical writing were those between ratio essendi 
and ratio cognoscendi, modality de re and modality de dicto, and the necessity of the consequence and the 
necessity of the consequent.  As Alvin Plantinga points out, these were important pieces of “philosophical 
lore known to every medieval graduate student but disastrously lost in the Renaissance rejection of all 
things scholastic” (1993: 21 n. 36).   
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Why, then, the name calling?  Why the certainty that incompatibilism rests upon 
elementary linguistic or logical confusion?  After all, there does seem to be some 
intuitive force to the arguments for incompatibilism, and the principles and assumptions 
employed in them don’t appear to be obviously mistaken.  Naturally, these arguments 
might be flawed for all that, but, at the very least, there is a case to be made for 
incompatibilism, and the case presented has struck many as being worthy of serious 
consideration.  Yet the convictions remain that the arguments must be flawed, and that 
the incompatibilists are guilty of mistakes ranging from the inexcusably simple to the 
pardonably subtle. 
The reason for this state of affairs, I think, is that libertarians have had an 
immense amount of trouble giving an account of the metaphysics of free agency.  The 
incompatibilist certainly appears to have the upper hand when it comes to defending the 
thesis that determinism negates free will, but she is forced to take a defensive posture 
when asked exactly what libertarian agency would look like and how it might possibly 
secure the kind of freedom that libertarians have argued is required.  How could it be that 
introducing indeterminacy somewhere prior to an agent’s action enhances the agent’s 
freedom rather than undermining it?  For if an act is undetermined it is not determined by 
anything, including all of the agent’s prior motives, desires, beliefs and so on—and if that 
is the case then a “free action” seems to be nothing more than a random, capricious, and 
inexplicable event; certainly nothing that could be considered under the agent’s rational, 
volitional control.  And even granting that an agent’s control isn’t undermined by 
indeterminism, the infusing of indeterminism into the causal stream leading to action 
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doesn’t seem to add anything of value or significance—it doesn’t seem, by itself, to make 
agents free agents.  Furthermore, many of the traditional accounts of libertarian agency 
designed to meet these challenges are flatly inconsistent with a certain powerful and 
widespread conception of the physical world and the place of human agents within it.  
Free will, it’s alleged, requires that we give up on a physicalistic metaphysics and return 
to some pre-scientific ontology whose inventory includes Cartesian spirits and who 
knows what all else.   
It is at this point in the game that some philosophers, initially persuaded by the 
incompatibilist thesis, have thrown in the towel and “gone compatibilist.”  Since it 
appears that no libertarian account has successfully captured the kind of freedom the 
libertarians are after, that sort of freedom must be a will o’ the wisp: a freedom 
compatible with determinism is all we could ever have and all we should ever want.  
Other philosophers, equally unimpressed with the extant theories of libertarian agency 
but unwilling to deny the force of the arguments for incompatibilism, find themselves in 
the awkward position of denying the possibility of free will and the reality of moral 
responsibility, whether determinism is true or not.31 In the end, then, indeterminism 
seems as much of a threat to free will and responsibility as does determinism.  And even 
if that difficulty can be overcome, it seems to many that libertarian free will couldn’t 
possibly be a feature of the world as it is described to us by the natural sciences, and is 
therefore deserving of curt dismissal regardless of the questions concerning its internal 
coherence. 
                                                 
31 For a powerful recent example, see Derk Pereboom (2001). 
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The major problems that the libertarian has to square up to, then, can be outlined 
as follows: 
 
(i) Libertarian free will requires the falsity of philosophical naturalism or 
materialism in any of its varieties—it commits us to a mysterious, pre-
scientific worldview. 
(ii) Indeterminism threatens free agency because it undermines the rational, 
volitional control of the agent. 
(iii) Even if indeterminism does not threaten control, it does not enhance our 
freedom or add to human agency anything of appreciable value. 
 
A further concern, one which might be thought to be implicit in (i), is that it is an 
empirically implausible thesis that macro-indeterminism of the sort allegedly required for 
free will actually obtains.  One might think that (i) includes this concern simply because a 
commitment to philosophical naturalism requires allegiance to a broadly scientific 
outlook on the world, and one might take it that the presuppositions of such an outlook 
are deterministic.  But despite the conceptual association between naturalism and 
determinism, I do want to treat this concern as a further, empirical worry, and so to 
separate it from the problems I’ve outlined above.32 For (i) though (iii), in contrast to the 
question whether some macro-processes are indeterministic, do not express problems 
                                                 
32 For recent work on the relevant empirical questions, see the essays in section IV and VIII in Kane, ed. 
(2002). 
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admitting of empirical solution.  They are instead metaphysical or conceptual; and they 
are the difficulties I will focus on throughout. 
The complaints specified in (i) – (iii) are, in my view, the most—perhaps the 
only—serious and powerful objections to libertarianism.  The libertarian must give an 
account of the nature of free action that is coherent and that we have some reason to buy.  
But the attempts to do so have not met with unmixed success.  It is not uncommon to hear 
that libertarian accounts are either essentially mysterious or downright incoherent, and 
this charge is not without some justification.  Historically, libertarians have often 
appealed to what Robert Kane has called “extra factors” in constructing a metaphysics of 
free action: noumenal selves as with Kant, immaterial egos as with Descartes, and other 
mysterious entities or esoteric faculties introduced to ground indeterministic human 
agency.  Compatibilists understandably view accounts reliant upon such extra factors 
with suspicion and I should like to avoid them.  It will not do to clear up one mystery by 
positing another, for this tact merely reinforces the conviction that libertarian accounts of 
free agency simply restate what libertarians want, rather than providing an illuminating 
answer as to how the freedom that they want could possibly exist.  And there is little to 
be gained by endorsing libertarian theories based upon these kinds of extra factors in any 
case, given the problems I want to address.  For such theories, it has been argued, do not 
adequately answer (ii)—the claim that indeterminism undermines control—and, 
naturally, these sorts of accounts will do nothing to reconcile free agency with a broadly 
naturalistic outlook (i) in any case. 
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Others have been more sympathetic to “extra factor” strategies, conceding that 
some recent libertarian accounts of agency are at least intelligible.  Nevertheless, some 
philosophers who make this concession argue that the accounts, even if coherent, are 
empirically dubious, rest on questionable philosophical assumptions, or at any rate fail to 
provide a basis for agential control.  We will examine some of these recent accounts in 
greater detail below.  The thing to notice for now is that in either case (whether the 
libertarian account is seen as mysterious, empirically dubious, or failing to ground the 
agent’s control over her free choices) the dialectical climate appears to have changed 
considerably: the burden of proof, so it seems, is on the incompatibilist, and if he cannot 
deliver the goods then compatibilism wins the day.33 
I think this is a serious misreading of where the dialectic actually stands.  The 
assumption that compatibilism gives a coherent and plausible account of agency, one that 
                                                 
33 Or so, I think, it is typically assumed.  As noted, some “hard incompatibilists,” the successors of the hard 
determinist position, remain agnostic about whether determinism actually obtains.  Either way, they claim, 
there is no freedom or moral responsibility.  Most philosophers, however, are unwilling to draw that 
conclusion, so most assume that if incompatibilism fails then compatibilism must succeed.  Here I want to 
underscore that I am describing what many philosophers take the dialectical climate to be, not, as I say 
below, what I think the dialectical situation actually is (or what every philosopher thinks it is).  It can be 
contested, for example, that the alleged threat to agency posed by indeterminism is as clearly problematic 
or severe as the threat to freedom posed by determinism.  Or it may be, as Peter van Inwagen argues 
(1999), that although metaphysical freedom is perhaps essentially mysterious, we are condemned (if not to 
be free, then) to believe we are free.  The fact that it is difficult to explain how metaphysical freedom could 
possibly exist does not automatically vitiate the considerations that have led so many to believe that it does 
exist, and indeed that it must exist if we are to be considered responsible for our behavior.  (Neither, I think, 
does it follow from the claim that we have no clear grasp on how consciousness could “arise” from matter 
that all versions of materialism about the mind must be false.)  But independently of these considerations, 
as I hope to show below, an appreciation of the problem of mental causation significantly alters even the 
superficial reading of the dialectic just described. 
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fits smoothly into the “emerging scientific view of the world,” and which provides a safe 
default position in the event that the proffered indeterministic models fail, is unwarranted.  
For there are several serious threats to human agency in general that arise in connection 
with a naturalistic ontology, threats which both the compatibilist and the incompatibilist 
must meet head on.  Chief among these is the problem of mental causation; and without a 
plausible answer to this problem the compatibility debate is a moot issue. 
Jaegwon Kim puts it this way: “Determinism threatens human agency, and the 
challenge of skepticism threatens human knowledge.  The stakes seem even higher with 
the problem of mental causation, for this problem threatens to take away both agency and 
cognition” (1998: 32).  It is precisely because philosophers, whatever their stance on the 
compatibility issue, have not met with much success in securing the causal efficacy of 
mental states in human behavior within the “emerging scientific picture of the world” that 
compatibilist protests against the “panicky metaphysics”—that is, the ‘non-scientific’ or 
‘mysterious’ metaphysics—of certain libertarians ring hollow.  It is often said, for 
example, that agent-causal accounts (those which posit an irreducible, sui generis form of 
causation between the agent and his actions or intentions) are simply a “label for what 
libertarians want,”34 rather than a genuine solution to the problem of how free agency 
might work.  But an analogous complaint can be (and has been) lodged against 
philosophers of mind and action who hold the widespread assumption that mental states 
supervene upon their lower-level physical bases, from which the former inherit their 
                                                 
34 For just one example, Gary Watson writes that “‘Agent-causation’ simply labels, not illuminates, what 
the libertarian needs” (1982: 10). 
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causal powers.  Just as agent-causal accounts (allegedly) do not answer, but merely 
restate the problem they are supposed to solve,  
mind-body supervenience itself is not an explanatory theory; it merely states a pattern of 
property covariation between the mental and physical and points to the existence of a 
dependency relation between the two.  Yet supervenience is silent on the nature of the 
dependence relation that might explain why the mental supervenes on the physical…If 
this is right, mind-body supervenience states the mind-body problem—it is not a solution 
to it. (Kim 1998: 14)35 
Moreover, the mere positing of some dependency relation between the mental and the 
physical, however it’s to be understood, does not immediately shed light on just how 
mental states might inherit the causal potency of their subvenient bases so as to affect the 
body, rather than simply “riding atop” or perhaps being preempted by them.  Indeed, 
most of the literature over the last few decades has been an attempt to avoid just that 
result.  But if the result cannot be avoided then we’ll clearly be at a loss to explain the 
possibility of free action—however it’s construed—at all; for even the simplest 
compatibilism, one that completely ignores the etiology of the intentional states 
                                                 
35 Compare Stephen Schiffer: “…invoking a special primitive metaphysical relation of supervenience to 
explain how non-natural moral properties were related to physical properties [just added] mystery to 
mystery, [covering] one obscurantist move with another.  I therefore find it more than a little ironic, and 
puzzling, that supervenience is nowadays being heralded as a way of making…irreducibly non-natural 
mental properties cohere with an acceptably naturalistic solution to the mind-body problem” (quoted in 
Horgan 1993: 565). 
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culminating in action, requires at least the genuine causal efficacy of those intentional 
states.36 
Just what is at stake here, and how closely is it related to the problem of free will?  
Consider the following remarks of physicist E.H. Walker: 
…for the will to have any meaning, it must be possible for the mind to affect events—for 
the mind to control the body.  The concept of will is not compatible with the classical 
conception of physical processes…[which] would demand that nature grind out blindly 
and automatically the consequences of any initial action.  Any mind attached to such an 
automaton would be only a passive observer.  Such a mind would not be able to control 
any aspect of its body’s behavior…Thus the concept of will demands that before the 
mind comes into play…the physical laws must allow—must specify—a range of 
potentialities as to what the body could do, and the process that selects from that range of 
possibilities which possibility will happen must be clearly outside the prescriptions of 
physical laws.  That is to say, the physical laws must be underconstrained. (2000: 259) 
Walker tells us that if the concept of the will corresponds to anything at all, then the mind 
must be able to affect events; in particular, it must make a causal difference to those 
events involved in the causal sequences issuing in action.  This is surely correct.  But on 
the assumption of physical determinism, he contends, our behavior would be 
exhaustively explicable in purely mechanistic, non-purposive categories.  And that 
amounts to the claim that the mind would not affect events at all but would instead be a 
mere “passive observer,” which would in turn render impossible the exercise of free 
                                                 
36 Something like this picture is advocated by D.M. Armstrong (1968: 129-170), who identifies the 
“operations of the will” with (purposive) mental causes. 
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agency.  Strikingly, physical determinism does not immediately result in a lack of free 
will, at least as far as Walker’s line of thought goes; what it does immediately result in is 
epiphenomenalism, and it is epiphenomenalism that negates the possibility of free will. 
And Walker is not entirely alone; no less a figure than C.S. Peirce evidently 
senses a similar association between these problems, as well.  It will be worth quoting 
him here at some length: 
Necessitarianism cannot logically stop short of making the whole action of the mind a 
part of the physical universe.  Our notion that we decide what we are going to do, if as 
the necessitarian says, it has been calculable since the earliest times, is reduced to 
illusion.  Indeed, consciousness in general thus becomes a mere illusory aspect of a 
material system…The sole reality is the distribution of qualities of matter in space and 
time.  Brain-matter is protoplasm in a certain degree and kind of complication—a certain 
arrangement of mechanical particles.  Its feeling is but an inward aspect, a phantom.  For, 
from the positions and velocities of the particles at any one instant, and the knowledge of 
the immutable forces, the positions at all other times are calculable; so that the universe 
of space, time, and matter is a rounded system uninterfered with from elsewhere.  But 
from the state of feeling at any instant there is no reason to suppose the states of feeling at 
all other instants are thus exactly calculable; so that feeling is, as I said, a mere 
fragmentary and illusive aspect of the universe.  This is the way, then, that 
necessitarianism has to make up its accounts.  It enters consciousness under the head of 
sundries, as a forgotten trifle; its scheme of the universe would be more satisfactory if 
this little fact could be dropped out of sight. (1998a: 187-188) 
David Hodgson likewise sees a relation between the possibility of free will and 
mental causation, arguing that two essential features of classical/relativistic physics pose 
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a threat to them both.  First, and most obviously, there is the thesis of physical 
determinism, which we may understand in this context as the claim that any event at any 
location in space-time is entirely determined by the events within its past light cone 
together with the physical laws; and second, there is the thesis of the locality of 
causation, the doctrine that any event can be affected by another event only if the latter 
does not exist at a location in space-time “outside” of the former’s preceding light cone.  
Here is Hodgson: 
These features of classical physics would leave little room for free will, in any strong 
sense.  If one accepts classical physics, free will must apparently be explained as being 
compatible with determinism.  The only alternative to compatibilism, if sense is to be 
made of free will, would be to postulate that the laws of physics do not have universal 
application and that human free will can cause things to happen contrary to those 
laws…Furthermore, any strong sense of free will requires that mental events, such as 
those involved in decisions and voluntary actions, have efficacy in the physical world.  
Mental events appear to be associated with patterns of physical events spread over 
substantial regions in the brain; so that if the mental events, as such, are to have any 
impact on the world, this would seem to suggest some non-locality in causal 
histories…[Therefore,] classical physics has no place and no role for consciousness.  If 
the development over time of the physical world proceeds according to physical laws that 
admit of no alternatives and engage with physical quantities of mass, electric charge, 
distance, momentum, and so on, then consciousness would seem to be an accidental 
superfluity, having no causal role other than just going along with the developments 
required by physical laws that engage with physical states and events upon which 
consciousness, on this approach, supervenes. (2002: 86, 106) 
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Clearly, a number of assumptions are being taken for granted here, not all of 
which, I would think, are wholly indefensible.  But have the above thinkers thought 
through those assumptions?  Are they quite clear about what they wish to argue, or are 
they simply conflating two distinct issues?  It’s difficult to say—although it is instructive 
to note that Stephen Yablo’s interesting work on the problem of mental causation is in 
part motivated by worries about the purported implications of physical determinism that 
these thinkers seem to have in mind:  
Obviously these remarks [concerning mental causation] cannot hope to resolve all the 
problems that physical determinism has been thought to raise for agency; they are 
directed only at the outright contradiction between agency and determinism’s alleged 
consequence of epiphenomenalism. (1992: 280, n. 63)   
Is there in fact an implication of this sort?  What explains the evident conceptual 
association between the two threats?  In a passage intriguingly similar to the quotations 
above, Sven Walter and H.D. Heckmann write, “we are, if physicalism is correct, no less 
part of the purely ‘mechanistic’ course of the physical world than any other physical 
system obeying the laws of nature, and thus in a certain sense mere ‘automata’” (2003: 
v).  But it isn’t immediately obvious from this contention just which issue these authors 
are worried about.  They are in fact solely concerned with mental causation, specifically 
with the status of intentional explanation in a purely mechanistic-physical world.  But 
there is nothing in the passage itself that suggests which of our two problems they’re 
discussing; indeed, their remarks are nothing more than a truncated version of Walker’s 
observations in connection with free will. 
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 Perhaps it is the heavy overlap between these representative samples—with 
respect to both the terminology and the underlying intuitions—which has led Tyler Burge 
to conjecture that the desire to find a place for mental causes within the network of 
physical causes “probably has its source in traditional dualism, or in libertarian worries 
about free will” (1993: 116).  (The implication of course is that we need not bother 
ourselves with the project if that’s where its motivation is coming from!)  But 
physicalists who are professedly unworried about the implications of determinism have 
hardly heeded Burge’s advice.  Work on mental causation remains a thriving industry.  
But the general sense, it seems, is that no one’s found a very satisfying story to tell about 
it yet.  Could the reason for this general dissatisfaction be that Burge’s suspicions are 
correct?  Might these philosophers be working on a slightly different problem than the 
one they think they’re working on? 
 Attempting to understand intuitions such as those on display in the quotations 
above will involve a further exploration of the connections between the problem of 
mental causation and the problem of free agency—an exploration of the conceptual, as 
well as the dialectical relations with which I am presently concerned.  Exploring these 
further connections will be my task in chapters to come.  For now, a word on 
methodology.  To forestall any misgivings some of my previous remarks may have 
induced, my purpose is not to soften up the reader with a view to arguing for agent-
causation, although I do not think that agent-causal views should be dismissed as lightly 
and easily as they usually are.  My purpose is rather to level the playing field and to 
disallow a tactic which seems to me dialectically unfair.  It is quite true that positing 
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mysterious entities or faculties invented solely for the purpose of salvaging libertarian 
freedom is a suspicious move and, if possible, ought to be avoided.37 But we must keep 
firmly in view which mysteries belong only to the libertarian and which are common to 
us all.   
 In this connection, it will be helpful to attend to Robert Kane’s “Free Agency 
Principle,” which proscribes the appeal to “categories or kinds of entities (substances, 
properties, relations, events, states, etc.) that are not also needed by nonlibertarian 
(compatibilist or determinist) accounts of free agency” (1996: 116).  If the Free Agency 
Principle is satisfied, then “any unsolved problems remaining about incompatibilist free 
will (such as problems about the nature of consciousness) would be problems confronting 
all persons, whatever their positions on free will, and not problems specifically created by 
libertarian theories” (p. 117). 
It is to Kane’s credit that he accepts the terms of such a principle in his theorizing 
and I will adopt the same methodological constraints in mine.  It is important to see, 
however, that this principle not only places restrictions upon the incompatibilist, but that 
it likewise holds the compatibilist accountable—neither side gets an ontological free 
lunch.  We may think that agent-causation (for example) is ontologically extravagant or 
                                                 
37 This, I want to make clear, is a concession for purposes of argument.  In my view, there is no reason to 
think that the arguments for incompatibilism—both at the intuitive and more formal levels—are not 
themselves sufficiently strong so as to justify a few ontological adjustments.  Indeed, it seems to me that 
ontological adjustments are justified for precisely the sorts of reasons that the incompatibilist offers.  But, 
as I hope to show, whatever adjustments needed to be made in order to accommodate free agency can also 
be motivated in large part, if not fully, by considerations that do not appeal directly to the sorts of worries 
with which the incompatibilist is uniquely concerned. 
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even laughable, but as David Velleman aptly puts it, “the proper goal for the philosophy 
of action is to earn the right to make jokes about primitive agent-causation, by explaining 
how an agent’s causal role supervenes on the causal network of events and states” (1992: 
197).  Thus, Laura Waddell Ekstrom’s demand that agent-causal theorists “explain how 
two different forms of causation could systematically interact in a single human being” 
(2000: 98) is fair insofar as agent-causalists posit a form of causation distinct from and 
irreducible to event causation, if it is only the latter that compatibilists need; it is unfair 
however unless she has an answer to the question how mental causes systematically 
interact with physical causes at the neuronal level within a single human being.  If the 
former are to be reduced to or identified with the latter, she must show us how.  If not, 
she must give us an account of the causal efficacy of the mental which harmonizes with 
and adds something to the causes at the level of physiology in virtue of which we may 
affirm that mentality makes a causal difference.  In either case, as Velleman reminds us, 
we must see that an action is something the agent purposively performs, and not 
something that merely happens to him.  If that cannot be accomplished however, we are 
so far forth in no position to dismiss out of hand another theoretical account which 
attempts to provide such an explanation simply because it requires a more populous (or 
less physicalistically respectable) ontology. 
It is my conviction that mental causation is foundational.  Ultimately, a 
metaphysics of free agency must be grounded in and informed by an account of mental 
causation; and without the efficacy of the mental neither a libertarian nor a compatibilist 
account of agency will succeed.  It is my hope that an examination of mental causation 
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will provide us with a little elbow room for pushing the debate in some new directions.  It 
is therefore to the problem of mental causation that I now turn. 
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3. Mental Causation: The Problem and Some Parallels with the Problem 
of Free Will 
Intentional causation is in certain important respects unlike billiard-ball causation.  Both are cases of 
causation, but in the case of desires and intentions, in the case of normal voluntary actions, once the causes 
are present they still do not compel the agent to act; the agent has to act on his reasons or on his intention. 
– John Searle 
 
The problem of mental causation, at least in some of its forms, and the problem of freedom are two 
expressions of the deep metaphysical intuition that our minds, or anyway that we, are an independent 
source of causal effect.  Showing how that could be, how we can be spontaneous (without thereby forgoing 
receptivity), would be to make substantial progress on both fronts at once. 
– David Sosa 
 
The problem of mental causation in its most basic form is this: How is it that what goes 
on in our minds—what we think, believe, desire, intend, etc.—causes our bodies to move 
and enables us to rearrange physical objects in our environment?  How, in particular, are 
the purposive explanations of human behavior, those appealing to reasons and intentional 
psychological states, compatible with or complementary to the mechanistic explanations 
of the same phenomena given to us by the physical sciences?1  
These questions are particularly acute for philosophers who embrace mental 
realism, the view that mentality is a genuine feature of the world, and explanatory 
                                                 
1 This problem can of course be formulated in different ways depending upon the differing metaphysical 
assumptions that frame the way in which we understand the issues.  Here I have tried to set out the basic 
worry in as neutral a way as possible.  That said, some philosophers would argue that the latter question is 
ill-formed, because the mechanistic explanations of bodily movement are explaining something different 
than the purposive or psychological explanation of behavior.  I do not intend to beg the question against 
these ‘dual explananda’ theorists; the question can be rephrased as a request to explain just how these 
explanations are compatible with one another, and what exactly the physical explanation of why my arm 
just moved leaves out. 
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realism, the view that when something is invoked as an explanation for another thing, the 
explanation must be grounded in some objective relation (causation, determination, 
dependence) holding between the explanans and the explanandum.  Depending upon 
one’s views of causation and other ontological commitments, the problem of mental 
causation becomes more or less difficult.  But it has a way of arising under different 
forms within competing metaphysical systems all the same, as we will see. 
My aim in this chapter is, first, to provide an overview of the problem of mental 
causation as it has developed in the literature on the mind-body problem over recent years 
and, second, to relate certain aspects of the problem, and in particular the motivations that 
I take to be driving it, to the problem of freedom.  The problem of mental causation is 
complex and the present chapter is for that reason unavoidably protracted.  Nevertheless, 
a careful consideration of the problem of mental causation is essential, for it is only in 
looking closely at the problem that we will be able to extract the morals I think need to be 
drawn from this story.   
 
3.1 Substantival and “Naturalistic” Dualism 
It is perhaps inevitable that a discussion of this problem should begin with Descartes, as it 
is his failure to reconcile his ontology with the commonsense assumption that the mental 
is causally efficacious which is likely the most publicized.  Descartes’s theory of mind 
was of course that of interactionist substance dualism: the mind is an immaterial 
substance lacking spatial extension which interacts causally with the body, a spatially 
extended substance (or a modification of the spatially extended substance which is the 
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physical world).  Reality is therefore bifurcated into two distinct spheres existing side by 
side, but connected in such a way that events in one domain can be and often are causes 
or effects of events in the other.   
Descartes’s critics were quick to point out that causal interaction between 
immaterial and material substances is only dubiously coherent and that accepting the 
possibility of such a thing would require a lot more in the way of argument and 
explanation than he had so far been able to provide.  In a well-known letter to Descartes, 
Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia writes that “it would be easier for me to attribute matter 
and extension to the soul, than to attribute to an immaterial body the capacity to move 
and be moved by a body.”2 And ultimately, Descartes was never able to show her how 
the attribution of such a capacity could be made plausible. 
Although Descartes was never able to give a convincing explanation, it is to his 
credit that he did not give up on the causal efficacy of the mental.  But it is perhaps 
primarily the fact that substance dualism faces such difficulties in justifying the 
entrenched conviction that the mental is causally efficacious, and in general explaining 
how the mental and the physical are related at all, that it has suffered disrepute in 
contemporary philosophy.3 Mental causation is of course not the only problem faced by 
                                                 
2 Quoted in Heil and Mele (1993: iv). 
3 Actually I think at least part of the reason it suffers such disrepute is just that it isn’t a physicalist theory.  
(Compare David Chalmers: “I suspect that [the negative reaction against dualism] is not grounded in 
anything more solid than contemporary dogma” [1996: 168].)  But in terms of the arguments one hears 
against it (and of course, pointing out that dualism isn’t monism isn’t an argument), that it leads to the 
causal impotence of the mental is likely the most common. 
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the substance dualist, but the problem is viewed by many to be serious enough so as to 
dismiss it as a viable option, whatever its other merits.4 
In the same way, contemporary non-materialist alternatives to substance dualism 
have been no more successful in providing a metaphysical grounding for the causal 
efficacy of the mental.  David Chalmers, for example, writes that 
Consciousness is not logically supervenient5 on the physical, so we cannot claim that a 
physical or functional explanation implicitly involves consciousness, or that 
consciousness inherits explanatory relevance by logically supervening on the properties 
involved in such an explanation.  A physical or functional explanation of behavior is 
independent of consciousness in a much stronger sense.  It can be given in terms that do 
not even imply the existence of conscious experience.  (1996: 179) 
Aware that his ‘naturalistic dualism’ commits him to a form of epiphenomenalism, 
Chalmers responds that epiphenomenalism need not be understood as the view that 
“experience is dangling ‘up there,’ floating free of processing in some way;” rather, a 
more attractive picture of epiphenomenalism still consistent with his theory is that of 
“experience sitting down among the causal cracks” in the underlying physical processes 
(p. 160).   
                                                 
4 For just one example, Michael Tye writes that among the commonsense facts a theory of phenomenal 
consciousness needs to explain is the fact that “phenomenal experience is causally efficacious with respect 
to behavior.”  We are justified in accepting any theory which best explains this and other known facts, and 
“Such a theory,” according to Tye, “will inevitably restrict itself to the physical, given that there are no 
nonphysical causes” (2000: 35). 
5 There is, according to Chalmers, a brute nomological connection between neurophysiological states and 
conscious experiences, but there is neither a logical nor conceptual entailment from one to the other.  
Absent such an entailment, Chalmers argues that phenomenal consciousness can neither be reductively 
explained by, nor identified in any way with, events in the brain.  
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It is not clear to me how Chalmers’s suggestion is to be understood; in particular I 
am not sure how this picture, if it is meant to secure some subtle causal relevance for 
mentality, is much different from one contemporary interactionist proposal that a 
nonphysical consciousness could affect behavior by “filling in the causal gaps” left open 
by quantum indeterminacy in the brain—a proposal he rejects.6 But in the end, while 
admitting that epiphenomenalism is counterintuitive, Chalmers thinks that it “is not 
obviously false, so if a sound argument forces it on us, we should accept it” (p. 159).  
That conscious experience can be coherently subtracted from any causal account of 
behavior, and thus that experience is “superfluous in the explanation of behavior, whether 
or not it has some subtle causal relevance” (ibid.), is implied by his brand of dualism; and 
so ultimately, he says, “Any view that takes consciousness seriously [i.e., is not 
materialistic] will at least have to face up to a limited form of epiphenomenalism” (p. 
158).  
This last is a statement of philosophical priority, and I suppose it is an 
understandable one given Chalmers’s main theoretic concerns.  But my sentiments are 
quite different indeed; they can be summed up in Jerry Fodor’s oft-quoted remark: 
I’m not really convinced that it matters very much whether the mental is the physical; 
still less whether it matters very much whether we can prove it.  Whereas, if it isn’t 
literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, and my itching is 
causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for my 
saying…, if none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe about 
anything is false and it’s the end of the world. (1989: 156) 
                                                 
6 See Chalmers (1996: 156-157). 
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Commenting on this remark, Jaegwon Kim writes that “if mental causation is only an 
illusion, that perhaps is not the end of the world, but it surely seems like the end of a 
world that includes Fodor and the rest of us as agents and cognizers” (1998: 32).  But that 
world—the one that includes us as agents and cognizers—just is the world, or so I am 
convinced, and if naturalistic dualism really does entail the nonactuality of this world 
then I say so much the worse for naturalistic dualism.7 
 
3.2 Type Physicalism and Reductionism 
If dualistic views cannot account for mind-body interaction, perhaps the problem is not 
with the mental realism but rather with the dualism.  We do not seem to run into similar 
conceptual difficulties with physical causation (which is not to say that anyone has an 
unproblematic account of it), so why not identify mental states and properties with 
physical states and properties?  Then there will be no problem fitting mentality into the 
causal network of the physical world. 
This is the approach to the mind-body problem called variously “the mind-body 
identity theory,” “type physicalism,” “type identity theory,” etc., the earliest 
contemporary proponents of which were U.T. Place, J.J.C. Smart, and H. Feigl.8 In words 
reminiscent of Kim’s protest against the supervenience relation as explanatory, Smart 
                                                 
7 I should say that I am sympathetic with Chalmers’s approach to the deep problems with which he is 
concerned.  Nevertheless, that persons are agents in a sense incompatible with epiphenomenalism seems to 
me non-negotiable, and in any case I do not think the considerations he adduces in support of his position 
are sufficiently strong so as to overturn that commitment. 
8 The classic statements are in Place (1956), Feigl (1958), and Smart (1959).  As my discussion is meant to 
cover type identity theories in general, I pass over a discussion of logical or philosophical behaviorism. 
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says, “That [sensations] should be correlated with brain processes does not help, for to 
say that they are correlated is to say that they are something ‘over and above’” the 
underlying physical processes.  Sensations would thus be “nomological danglers,” 
connected to brain processes by novel psychophysical laws irreducible to the laws 
governing microphysical transactions and hence inexplicable in terms of basic physics.  
And the thought that “everything should be explicable in terms of physics…except the 
occurrence of sensations,” seemed to him “to be frankly unbelievable” (1959: 161).   
Notably, near the end of his essay Smart contrasts his materialistic position with 
epiphenomenalism and dualism, using these latter terms interchangeably.  So although 
his primary concern was not with the problem of mental causation, he clearly believed 
that one of the happy upshots of the type identity theory would be that problem’s 
elimination.  There would no longer be a need to explain how immaterial substances 
interact with material ones or how mental properties might be afforded some “subtle 
causal relevance” with respect to their underlying physical correlates, for they would be 
strictly identical and so have all their properties, including their causal powers, in 
common.  Thus, not only would a rejection of dualism lay open the mental to scientific 
investigation, but it would also safeguard it against superfluity. 
Unfortunately, to apply an old adage, “Many an error is taken up by going too far 
from other men’s faults.”  While it seemed natural in light of all of dualism’s attendant 
difficulties to move as far away from it as possible, there were some unanticipated 
problems lurking in the wings for type physicalism.  Trivially, an identification of mental 
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types with physical types entails the reducibility of the former to the latter.9 But it didn’t 
take long for the idea that such a reductionism was feasible to fall into disrepute.  To see 
why, we must take a moment to clarify the concept of inter-theoretic reduction these 
philosophers had, and many still have, in view.  
As far as the principal disputants were concerned, the successful reduction of one 
theory to another depended upon the derivability of the terms and laws of the theory 
targeted for reduction from those of its reducer.  To this end, the primitive predicates or 
properties of the target theory needed to be paired with nomologically coextensive 
predicates or properties of the base theory by way of a set of “bridge laws” or “bridge 
principles,” universally quantified and biconditional in form.  For the type physicalist to 
make good on his claims, then, it must be the case that, necessarily, for any x and any 
mental property M, there is some physical property P such that Mx ↔ Px.  Law-like 
correlations between mental states (if such there be), must be underwritten by the 
existence of fundamental physical laws specifying an appropriate connection between the 
physical states nomologically coextensive with the mental states in question. 
The attack against mind-body reductionism came in two stages: first, Hilary 
Putnam (1967) argued that mental state types are in fact “multiply realizable,” in the 
sense that one and the same mental state type can be constituted by a wide range of 
diverse physicochemical structures, and second, Donald Davidson (1970) argued that 
                                                 
9 Whether the converse implication holds is controversial; in my view it will determined by the account of 
reduction under consideration.  (More on this below.)  I do think, however, that if properties A and B are 
identical, then any reductive strategy worth its salt ought to allow us to say that the one is reducible to the 
other. 
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there are no, nor could there be any, psychophysical bridge laws of the sort which would 
make reduction possible.10 Neither of these arguments represented a self-conscious return 
to ontological dualism, for they are both consistent with (and intended to secure) the 
thesis that mental state tokens are identical to brain state tokens, or in the formal mode, 
that any event with a mental description also falls under a physical description.  Thus, the 
physicalist ontology was retained, but the notion that such an ontology requires 
reductionism was rejected. 
Briefly, I want to summarize these two arguments and see where they lead with 
respect to the problem of mental causation.  Beginning with the second, Davidson argues 
that the mental is anomalous, that is, there are no laws connecting psychological events 
with other psychological events and that, in particular, neither are there any laws 
connecting psychological events with physical events (see 3.3 below).11 The demise of 
analytical behaviorism shows that we cannot definitionally reduce the mental to the 
physical, and Davidson’s psychophysical anomalism entails that a nomological reduction 
via bridge laws is not possible either.  As noted, Davidson did not view the impossibility 
                                                 
10 For the sake of brevity I do not discuss Kripke’s argument from the rigidity of psychological predicates 
to the conclusion that the identity claims of type physicalism are, because not necessarily true, false.  But 
see Kripke (1971) and (1972). 
11 Davidson’s notion of a ‘law’ is the subject of some debate.  For his part, Davidson held that laws must be 
‘strict’, which means at the very least that they must be absolutely exceptionless regularities of the kind 
we’d find in a completed physics, and “as deterministic as nature can be found to be” (Davidson 1993: 8).  
For my purposes, nothing much turns on exactly how this should be interpreted; the main point is that there 
could be no singular causal relations between events, but rather that events can be causally related only 
insofar as they instantiate a strict physical law.  That there are no strict psychophysical or psychological 
laws Davidson evidently believes is an a priori, conceptual truth (see Davidson 1970, 1974). 
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of mind-body reduction as implying dualism, but argued instead for a materialist monism.  
The argument is fairly straightforward: he begins with the assumption that mental events 
enter into causal relations with physical events; since causal relations must be backed by 
laws and since there exist no psychological or psychophysical laws, it follows that causal 
relations involving mental events must instantiate physical laws.  But this means that 
every mental event must fall under a physical event kind, from which it follows that 
every mental event is in fact a physical event or has a physical description.  Davidson’s 
anomalous monism is therefore one of the early forms of nonreductive physicalism: it 
gives us anti-reductionism by way of the anomalousness of the mental, and it gives us 
physicalist monism by way of the assumed causal efficacy of mental events.   
The next antireductionist argument, the argument from the “multiple realizability” 
of mental states, is probably more familiar than Davidson’s argument from the 
anomalousness of the mental.  The classic statement of the argument is Putnam’s, who 
argued that in order for the type physicalist to justify his claims, 
He has to specify a physical-chemical state such that any organism (not just a mammal) is 
in pain if and only if (a) it possesses a brain of suitable physical-chemical structure; and 
(b) its brain is in that physical-chemical state.  This means that the physical-chemical 
state in question must be a possible state of a mammalian brain, a reptilian brain, a 
mollusc’s brain…,etc.  At the same time, it must not be a [physically possible] state of 
the brain of any physically possible creature that cannot feel pain.  Even if such a state 
can be found, it must be nomologically certain that it will also be a state of the brain of 
any extraterrestrial life that may be found that will be capable of feeling pain before we 
can even entertain the supposition that it may be pain. (1967: 228) 
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 Requirements (a) and (b) above have seemed to many to be unreasonably strong.  
Putnam himself thought that the type identity thesis entailing those requirements was 
empirically implausible,12 and others have made the case that, in Kim’s words, it is “an a 
priori, conceptual fact about psychological properties that they are ‘second-order’ 
physical properties, and that their specification does not include constraints on the 
manner of their physical implementation” (1993: 312-313).  
 If mental states are thus multiply realizable, it is clear that the search for 
psychological predicates nomologically coextensive with unique physical predicates is 
doomed, for any mental state could be physically realized in endlessly diverse ways.  
Thus, either a given mental predicate would have to be paired with an infinitely large 
disjunctive predicate, or it would have to be indexed to a specific species or structure type 
(or perhaps more narrowly yet); but in either case, the kind of global reduction envisaged 
by the type physicalist would fail.  These two arguments, the latter in particular, have 
ushered nonreductive materialism into the mainstream of contemporary philosophy of 
mind. 
 How does all of this bear on the problem of interest?  Well, it’s going to take 
some work to see what the multiple realizability of psychological states suggests about 
                                                 
12 Putnam writes, “I am discussing not what the concept of pain comes to, but what pain is, in a sense of ‘is’ 
which requires empirical theory-construction…my strategy will be to argue that pain is not a brain state, 
not on a priori grounds, but on the grounds that another hypothesis is more plausible” (p. 226).  It should 
not be thought that Putnam is entirely alone in viewing the type identity theory as empirically false (or 
dubious); compare Richard Boyd: “…I shall argue that the version of materialism best supported by 
available evidence entails that mental states admit sufficient plasticity in the way in which they are realized 
that it is logically possible for mental states to be nonphysically realized…” (1980: 87). 
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the problem of mental causation.  After all, if the argument from multiple realizability 
just shows that type physicalism is false, we are so far forth left without a positive 
account as to how the mental and the physical are related; and without such an account 
we don’t have anything to criticize.  Happily, things are different with anomalous 
monism; so although anomalous monism is a species of nonreductive physicalism (the 
latter of which we’ll discuss in more general terms below), we will begin with an 
assessment of Davidson’s views.13 
  
3.3 Anomalous Monism 
Particularly germane to our interests is the fact that one of Davidson’s chief motivations 
in advancing anomalous monism was to secure the possibility of free agency:  
Mental events as a class cannot be explained by physical science…But the explanations 
of mental events in which we are typically interested relate them to other mental events 
and conditions.  We explain a man’s free actions, for example, by appeal to his desires, 
habits, knowledge and perceptions.  Such accounts of intentional behaviour operate in a 
conceptual framework far removed from the direct reach of physical law by describing 
both cause and effect, reason and action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent.  The 
anomalism of the mental is thus a necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous. 
(1970: 225) 
                                                 
13 Jaegwon Kim has argued that anomalous monism is just as much a negative thesis as is the multiple 
realization thesis, and that it only begins to give a positive account when Davidson hints at the possibility 
of the mental supervening on the physical (1998: 4-7).  This is true so far as it goes, but we can at least 
begin to criticize Davidson’s views without first formulating a supervenience thesis, and the initial 
criticisms will in fact provide a segue for our discussion of supervenience. 
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Implicit in this paragraph is an assumption about the significance of reductionism, 
an assumption that, at the time of his writing this essay, not many shared with Davidson.  
According to Mark Johnston, whereas “the Australian materialists held that type-type 
physicalism did not itself undermine the idea that people were capable of free or 
autonomous action,” Davidson believed to the contrary that “type-type identity theories 
backed by psychophysical lawlike correlations entailed that there is no free or 
autonomous action” (1985: 409).  For the terms of psychology are essentially 
characterized by intentionality, rationality, coherence, in Davidson’s view, whereas the 
terms of physics clearly are not.  In the same way, the (strict) laws governing physical 
processes are nomic and predictive, but the “laws”—the “undeniably important 
regularities”—describing connections between mental events are essentially normative.14 
Neither the laws nor the terms of physics could therefore possibly capture what is 
distinctive about mentality, or what is essential to our understanding ourselves as agents 
and cognizers. 
Those of a Quinean bent have of course taken the irreducibility of mentality to 
imply the illegitimacy of purposive-intentional explanations of behavior, but Davidson 
saw things quite differently.  The fact that the mental could not be reduced to the physical 
was the very thing that safeguarded its autonomy, as Kim puts it, “by insulating the 
mental from the full impact of physical determinism” (1985: 212).  Thus, one ultimate 
                                                 
14 Davidson writes, “…if you want to call certain undeniably important regularities laws—the familiar 
regularities that link the mental with the mental (as formulated, for example, in decision theory) or the 
mental with the physical—I have no objection; I merely say these are not, and cannot be reduced to, strict 
laws” (1993: 9). 
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goal of psychophysical anomalism is to secure the possibility of autonomous agency; and 
the fact that mental events are causally efficacious, a less controversial requirement for 
agency, plays a central role in his argument for anomalous monism. 
 It is therefore all the more striking that Davidson has been charged with rendering 
the mental causally inert.  Consider an analogy.  Suppose I eat a round tablet in order to 
relieve my heartburn, and suppose my eating the tablet does indeed cause my heartburn 
to be relieved.  What was it about that particular event, my eating the round tablet, that 
made a causal difference to my heartburn’s being relieved?  Well, among other things, it 
was the chemical composition of the tablet.  But the roundness of that tablet was not 
relevant.  Eating a button of exactly the same shape wouldn’t have helped, but eating, 
say, an oval tablet of identical chemical composition would have, other things being 
equal, produced the same result.  
 The worry is that Davidson makes mental properties rather like the roundness of 
the tablet.  He has not been charged, nor could he be, with rendering mental events 
causally inert, for any concrete mental event is token-identical with some physical event 
on Davidson’s account; the claim is rather that the mental properties of mental events 
have no causal role to play under anomalous monism.   
To clarify, it will be helpful to distinguish between two kinds of epiphen-
omenalism, two ways in which the mental might be causally inert.  They are Type-
Epiphenomenalism (Type-Ep) and Token-Epiphenomenalism (Token-Ep): 
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Type-Ep (i) Events can be causes in virtue of their physical properties (in virtue of 
satisfying a physical description), but (ii) events cannot be causes in virtue of 
their mental properties (in virtue of satisfying a mental description). 
Token-Ep (i) Physical events can cause mental events, but (ii) mental events have no causal 
powers—they cannot cause mental events, nor can they cause physical events.15 
 
Davidson has repeatedly denied Token-Ep, and he can do so consistently.  Many, 
however, have argued that he is committed to Type-Ep on the grounds that the 
anomalism of the mental, together with the crucial premises of his argument for 
anomalous monism, entails it.  I shall first present an argument for the claim that 
Davidson is committed to Type-Ep and then criticize a few attempts to exculpate 
Davidson of this charge.   
Davidson holds the following three principles (Cf. Davidson 1980: 208): 
(1) Nomological Character of Causality: For any distinct events, e and e*, e is causally 
related to e* just in case e and e* instantiate, or are subsumed by, a strict law.  
(2) Psychophysical Causal Interaction: Some mental events are causes and/or effects of 
physical events. 
(3) Psychophysical Anomalism: There are no, nor can there be any, strict laws relating 
mental predicates to physical predicates (or events under their mental descriptions 
to events under their physical descriptions).  
                                                 
15 These formulations of Type-Ep and Token-Ep are similar to Brian McLaughlin’s (1989: 109-110), whose 
formulations are in turn inspired by C.D. Broad (1925: 472).  McLaughlin speaks of causal efficacy in 
virtue of being a certain sort of property or falling under mental or physical descriptions, alternating 
between the material and the formal mode throughout his paper. 
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These three principles entail that any mental event entering into a causal relation is a 
physical event, and, on the plausible assumption that all events enter into at least one 
causal relation, it follows that 
(4) Physicalist Monism: All events are physical events.  
Now consider any mental event, e1.  By (3) we know that mental properties are 
irreducible to physical properties, and by (4) we know that e1 is a physical event: So e1 is 
token-identical, but not type-identical, to some physical event or other.  Since e1 is a 
mental event and a physical event, there is at least one mental property, M, and at least 
one physical property, P, such that e1 has M and e1 has P.  Now suppose that e1 causes e2.  
It follows from (1) that e1 and e2 instantiate a strict law.  From (3) we know that there are 
no strict laws relating events of type M to other events.  It follows that e1 does not cause 
e2 in virtue of its mental property, M, but rather in virtue of its physical property, P.  So, 
if (1)-(3) are true, then Type-Ep is true. 
 Davidson and his defenders have responded to this argument in several ways.  
The second response I will consider has a broader significance and will be taken up more 
fully in what follows, so here I’ll focus primarily on the replies that are unique to 
Davidson’s case, both of which concern his views on the nature of causation.   
The relata of causation, in Davidson’s view, are events, and his concept of events 
is purely extensional: events are concrete, spatio-temporal particulars.16 Thus, the causal 
relation is a binary extensional one, and if two events are causally related, the causal 
                                                 
16 At one time Davidson held that two distinct events might possibly occupy the same spatio-temporal 
region, but he appears to have retracted that view under fire from Quine.  In any case, I will here assume 
what I take to be the “standard view” of Davidson’s theory of events, as outlined above. 
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relation holds between them no matter how they’re described.  Davidson’s critics go 
wrong, he alleges, in claiming that events must be related “in virtue of” one or more of 
their properties, or, as it is sometimes put, that c must cause e qua mental event or under 
its mental description, in order to ensure that the mental is efficacious as such.  These 
locutions, says Davidson, are not coherent:  
It is events that have the power to change things, not our various ways of describing 
them.  Since the fact that an event is a mental event, i.e. that it can be described in a 
psychological vocabulary, can make no difference to the causes and effects of that event, 
it makes no sense to suppose that describing it in the psychological vocabulary might 
deprive the event of its potency…Given this extensionalist view of causal relations, it 
makes no literal sense…to speak of an event causing something as mental, or by virtue of 
its mental properties, or as described in one way rather than another. (1993: 12-13) 
Thus, Davidson readily concedes conjunct (ii) of Type-Ep, the claim that one 
event cannot cause another in virtue of its mental properties, but he denies conjunct (i) of 
Type-Ep, for he claims that one event cannot be said to cause another in virtue of its 
physical properties either.   
 Davidson’s defense rests on the claim that his critics have attempted to turn the 
causal relation into a multi-termed intensional relation rather than retaining the binary 
extensional one he favors.  But this, it seems to me, is so much skirting the issue.  For the 
worry is precisely whether (or which of) the properties of events are causally efficacious, 
however they’re described.  Moreover, as Kim points out, 
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What the critics have argued is perfectly consistent with causation being a two-termed 
extensional relation over concrete events;17 their point is that such a relation isn’t enough: 
we also need a way of talking about the causal role of properties, the role of properties of 
events in generating, or grounding, these two-termed causal relations between concrete 
events. (1993a: 21) 
That is, it is entirely coherent and reasonable to ask what it was about a particular event 
that made it the case that that event caused another.  This is just to say that a causal 
relation between two events is not a brute matter of fact that hasn’t anything to do with 
the sorts of events they are, and that some properties of events are relevant to their effects 
while others perhaps are not (recall the round tablet). 
 Surprisingly, Davidson himself tacitly acknowledges that questions of this sort 
make sense, for he asks, “But might it not happen that the mental properties of an event 
make no difference to its causal relations?” (1993: 13), and he answers that the premises 
for anomalous monism are consistent with, but do not entail, that untoward result.  What 
does “making a difference” amount to then?  The answer to this question provides a 
segue to the next line of defense. 
                                                 
17 McLaughlin (1993) makes the same point: “That causal relations are extensional relations between 
events is straightforwardly compatible with the claim that when events are causally related, they are so in 
virtue of something about each.  Indeed, typically, when a particular bears an extensional relation to 
another particular, the particulars are so related in virtue of something about each” (p. 32).  Drawing from 
Davidson’s own example, he introduces the ‘weighs less than’ relation to illustrate.  If a particular 
substance a weighs less than a substance b, then it weighs less than b no matter how it’s described.  But that 
is compatible with, indeed, it is grounded in, the fact that a weighs less than b in virtue of a’s having some 
weight w and b’s having some weight w* such that w < w*. 
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 Clearly, an event e makes a difference to another event e* if e causes e*, or if e 
and e* instantiate a strict law.  Could it be, however, that some events bearing properties 
which do not figure into strict laws are causally relevant to one another because of those 
properties, in a weaker but still respectable sense?  And if so couldn’t mental properties 
enjoy this causal relevance under anomalous monism?  Some philosophers (Horgan 1989, 
Davidson 1993) have looked to the supervenience of the mental on the physical and 
certain counterfactual causal analyses in an attempt to construct an affirmative answer to 
these questions.  Let us look to Davidson’s own line of response. 
  Davidson first formulates his “supervenience defense” in reply to Jaegwon Kim’s 
charge that mentality plays no part in shaping the causal structure of the world under 
anomalous monism.  Anomalous monism, Kim tells us, 
entails this: the very same network of causal relations would obtain in Davidson’s world 
if you were to redistribute mental properties over its events any way you like; you would 
not disturb a single causal relation if you randomly and arbitrarily reassigned mental 
properties to events, or even removed mentality entirely from the world.  The fact is that 
under Davidson’s anomalous monism, mentality does no causal work. (1989a: 269) 
Moreover, to claim that altering an event’s mental properties would thereby alter its 
physical properties, according to Kim, is to admit the existence of psychophysical laws, 
something the anomalous monist can by no means do (ibid.).   
But Davidson argues that his view entails no such thing.  He can hold, he says, 
that altering an event’s mental properties would also alter its physical properties without 
thereby being committed to psychophysical laws.  In order to see this, one need only 
recognize that whereas supervenience entails that any alteration in “a mental property p 
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of a particular event e will be accompanied by a change in the physical properties of e, it 
does not entail that a change in p in other events will be accompanied by an identical 
change in the physical properties of those other events” (1993: 7).  Only the latter 
implication would commit him to the existence of psychophysical laws, but he can and 
does deny it.   
Further, he claims, Kim is mistaken in thinking that the removal of all mental 
properties from the world would have no impact on its causal network.  For consider two 
events with the same physical properties, but one with some mental property and the 
other with that property removed.  “These cannot be the same event,” Davidson argues, 
“since one has a property the other lacks” (p. 8).  But then, on Davidson’s assumption 
that events are individuated by their causes and effects, these events would have different 
causal powers owing to their differing mental properties.  So the mental is causally 
relevant after all. 
I do not wish to discuss whether supervenience is consistent with the absence of 
laws connecting the mental to the physical (I will have more to say about supervenience 
itself in what follows).18 It suffices for now to point out that Davidson and Kim are 
simply talking past each other.  Kim is making a modal point.  He is arguing that there 
would be no causal difference, if Davidson is right, between two physically identical 
possible worlds, one of which is blessed with mental properties and the other of which is 
completely devoid of them.  Davidson responds that his doctrine of supervenience 
implies that two events in this world couldn’t be of identical physical structure and yet 
                                                 
18 But see Kim (1993a), McLaughlin (1985), (1993) and Sosa (1993) on this issue. 
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differ with regard to their mental properties.  But all this is perfectly compatible with 
what Kim has said, and is perfectly consistent with Type-Ep as well; for the 
epiphenomenalist can affirm everything Davidson has said (and more!) about the 
supervenience of the mental on the physical and consistently deny that mental properties 
make any real causal difference whatever.  Indeed, this is what the epiphenomenalist is 
saying.  Now, whether a version of supervenience stronger than Davidson’s, when 
coupled with a counterfactual analysis of causal relevance, could somehow get mental 
properties into the causal picture is a question I will take up in detail below.  For now, a 
word on “nonstrict” laws. 
 Some of Davidsons’s defenders (e.g., LePore and Loewer 1987, McLaughlin 
1989) have argued that mental properties can be causally relevant consistently with the 
theses of anomalous monism because, although the Principle of the Nomological 
Character of Causality specifies that two events c and e are causally related only if they 
instantiate a strict law, it does not follow that two events cannot also be causally related 
in virtue of falling under a nonstrict law.  Exactly what are strict and nonstrict laws is an 
issue for Davidson scholarship.  LePore and Loewer offer this (not idiosyncratic) 
explication: 
Davidson’s notion of a strict law is best explained by contrast with nonstrict laws.  A 
nonstrict law is a generalization that contains a ceteris paribus qualifier that specifies that 
the law holds under “normal or ideal conditions,” where the relevant notions of normal or 
ideal are specified by the theoretical context of the law…In contrast, a strict law is one 
that contains no ceteris paribus qualifiers; it is exceptionless not just de facto but as a 
matter of law. (1987: 631-632) 
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Perhaps more perspicuously, McLaughlin explains that a strict law can be understood in 
terms of the notion of a “closed, comprehensive theory,” where “a theory T is closed iff 
events within the domain of T causally interact only with other events within the domain 
of T,” and “T is comprehensive only if whenever an event within its domain participates 
in a causal interaction, that interaction is subsumed by some law of T.”  Then, taking a 
vocabulary V to be a “minimal vocabulary” of a closed comprehensive theory iff V is the 
vocabulary of such a theory and no proper subset of V is, we can say that “a law is a strict 
law iff it is couched solely in the minimal vocabulary of a closed comprehensive theory 
or it can be derived via bridge laws from laws couched solely in such a vocabulary” 
(1989: 115-116).  And since Davidson apparently thinks that the Principle of the 
Nomological Character of Causality is something like a logical or conceptual truth19 we 
have:  
 
(PC)  Necessarily, for any events c and e, if c causes e then c and e fall under a 
strict law.   
 
Davidson’s defenders are now burdened with showing that (PC) does not entail 
that an event’s being a mental event or falling under a mental type is irrelevant to its 
causal powers.  McLaughlin attempts to discharge the burden as follows. 
 The argument against anomalous monism, as McLaughlin sees things, goes like 
this: 
                                                 
19 See McLaughlin (1985: 115), (1989), and Davidson (1970). 
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(1) (PC) entails that only strictly nomic properties (only those properties 
falling under a strict law) are causal. 
(2) Anomalism implies that no mental property is a strictly nomic property. 
(3) Hence, (PC) and Anomalism imply that no mental property is a causal 
property, or that all mental properties are epiphenomenal. 
 
McLaughlin accepts the validity of the argument and the truth of (2), but maintains that 
(1) is false and that the argument is therefore unsound.  His strategy to show that (1) is 
false (or at least not demonstrably true) requires the introduction of a new principle, 
which he calls the “Exclusion Principle” (p. 125): 
 
(EP) Events are causally related only in virtue of falling under strict laws.  
 
He reasons that if (PC) entails (EP), then, since (EP) entails that “only strictly nomic 
properties are causal,” (PC) does too.  That is, according to McLaughlin (p. 125), (1) is 
true iff (PC) implies (EP).20 But he argues that (PC) does not entail (EP); i.e., that its 
being necessary that any two events are causally related just if they fall under a strict law 
does not entail that the events in question are related “only in virtue of falling under a 
strict law.”  Here is McLaughlin: 
                                                 
20 To forestall confusion, it is McLaughlin who states the biconditional claim after arguing that the 
entailment of (EP) by (PC) suffices for the truth of (1); he offers no reason for us to believe that (1) is false 
if (PC) doesn’t entail (EP).  More on this just below. 
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By an ‘A-making property’, let us mean a property in virtue of which something is A.  
Then, of course, if a logically necessary A-making property is ipso facto the only A-
making property, then [PC] indeed implies [EP]…[But] it is not the case that a necessary 
A-making property is ipso facto the only A-making property.  If one lives in New Jersey, 
then one does so in virtue of living in some county of New Jersey.  But it is not the case 
that one can live in New Jersey only in virtue of living in a county of New Jersey.  For 
one can live in New Jersey in virtue of living in a city of New Jersey…To take an 
example involving logical…necessity, if one is a brother, then one is so in virtue of being 
is [sic] a male sibling.  But one can be a brother in virtue of possessing a property that is 
not identical with the property of being a male sibling.  For example...one can be a 
brother in virtue of being a male with a sister. (pp. 125-126) 
McLaughlin is aware that this argument does not demonstrate that (PC) doesn’t 
entail (EP).  But he contends that the assumption that necessary A-making properties are 
ipso facto the only A-making properties is what “lies behind” the view that (PC) entails 
(EP): “It is hard to see what other reason one might think that the former principle, by 
itself, implies the latter” (p. 125).  And if the assumption is false, as he believes it is, then 
(PC) “leaves open whether falling under a strict law is the only singular causation making 
property” (p. 126). 
 The argument is clever.  Nevertheless, and despite the brief caveats McLaughlin 
provides above, there is an evident weakness.  Even granting the claim that (PC) doesn’t 
entail (EP), for his main argument to go through he needs it to be the case that (1) is true 
only if (PC) entails (EP), not merely that (PC)’s entailing (EP) suffices for the truth of (1).  
After all, it may well be true that (1) is true if (PC) implies (EP), but even if that 
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implication fails, we aren’t licensed in drawing the inference that the entailment specified 
in (1) fails; so for all he’s said so far, we have no reason to believe that (1) is false.  That 
is, what McLaughlin needs is (PC) → (EP) as a necessary condition for the truth of (1), 
not just the one-way implication from (PC) → (EP) to (1).  But I cannot see where he 
attempts to justify the crucial relation.  What he writes on that score is just the following: 
…[EP] implies that only strictly nomic properties are causal.  So if [PC] implies [EP], it 
implies that too.  On the other hand, if [PC] does not imply [EP], it leaves open whether 
properties other than strictly nomic properties can be causal.  [1] is true, then, iff [PC] 
implies [EP]. (p. 125) 
But the conclusion to this line of reasoning just does not follow.  So his argument, I 
maintain, is doubly inconclusive.  He hasn’t demonstrated, by his own admission, that 
(PC) doesn’t imply (EP); but even conceding to him that it doesn’t, he isn’t yet justified 
in claiming that the failure of that implication would falsify the claim expressed in (1). 
But suppose we waive those difficulties.  Still, it isn’t transparent how the 
examples adduced in an effort to undermine the assumption that necessary A-making 
properties are ipso facto the only A-making properties are supposed to relate to nomic-
causal transactions.  The property being a resident of New Jersey is a disjunctive 
relational property; being a male sibling is an existentially generalized relational 
property.  But what reasons do we have to think that disjunctive and relational properties 
enter into the strict laws of a closed comprehensive theory?  Even supposing, for 
example, that there are two laws, A → C, and B → C, why think there are any laws of the 
form (A ∨ B) → C?  Such a law would be a redundant addition to the nomic inventory of 
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a closed comprehensive theory.  And, intuitively, relational or non-intrinsic properties are 
no more appropriate candidates for causally efficacious properties than disjunctive ones. 
 McLaughlin may wish to respond that given a Humean conception of natural 
laws, one according to which laws are simply descriptions of observed regularities, there 
is no reason to suppose that a disjunctive property could not figure into the antecedents of 
certain laws grounding particular causal relations.  But unless we’re already inclined to 
accept a Humean account of causal laws this sort of reply will be unsatisfying.  It would 
be better to see a defense of Davidson that does not rely upon a commitment of this sort, 
or that at least brings out into the open the commitments we will be obliged to accept. 
 Further, even if we concede McLaughlin’s point, I do not see how the way in 
which mental properties enter into causal relations (under anomalous monism) has been 
in any way illuminated.  The strict/nonstrict issue smacks of red herring.21 For whether 
the fundamental physical laws of a world are strict or nonstrict, the important point is that 
they exhaust the laws of that world (as McLaughlin stipulates), and the closure and 
comprehensiveness of the physical domain guarantee that no nonphysical anythings enter 
into these laws, hence into the causal transactions grounded by them.  As long as there is 
a set of fundamental, exhaustive physical laws—whether strict or nonstrict—then 
whether there are laws citing nonphysical properties—and whether these laws are strict or 
                                                 
21 I do not mean to suggest that the distinction between strict and nonstrict laws is unimportant to 
anomalous monism; clearly, it is.  My point is that any defense of the causal relevance of irreducible mental 
properties relying on nonstrict laws is a defense relying on too thin a reed.  As David Lewis pointed out 
some time ago, the suggestion that physical states are causally equivalent to their epiphenomenal correlates 
“exploits a flaw in the standard regularity theory of cause” (1966: 24), namely, that it does not distinguish 
between genuine and spurious causes; I think the remark is equally applicable here. 
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nonstrict—there is a clear sense in which the physical properties are doing the causal 
work and the nonphysical ones are not.  And we’re going to need a reason to justify the 
inclusion of such properties, properties which cannot enter into causal relations, into our 
ontology. 
 To put the point another way, we need to ask what is the motivation for specifying 
that causal relations be grounded by strict laws—laws which govern exclusively physical 
processes—to begin with.  Why does causation entail strict nomic subsumption, 
according to Davidson?  Evidently, it is because only physical properties figure into the 
antecedents of such laws; and the motivation for restricting causation grounding laws 
exclusively to physical properties seems clearly to arise from the conviction that it is only 
the physical properties of particular events that bear the causal weight.  That is, it isn’t 
clear why else anyone would be committed to such a view of causation if it isn’t because 
they are committed to the view that the physical laws exhaust the causal laws.  These 
laws, strictly speaking (sorry), need not be strict in the sense that they are absolutely 
exceptionless, deterministic, etc.  In fact, Davidson recently conceded that these laws 
need only be “as deterministic as nature can be found to be” (1993: 8).  So whether a 
physical event necessitates a given effect or just fixes the objective probability of that 
effect doesn’t matter much.  What does matter is that the probability is fixed or the effect 
is necessitated by its physical antecedents alone: and it is difficult to see, that being the 
case, why we should bother with mental properties in a causal account of the world.   
Indeed, once we take seriously the notion that nonstrict laws ground causal 
relations, the force of the principle specifying that causation requires strict laws becomes 
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obscure at best.  Suppose we attempt to hold them both together.  We are forced to the 
position that a nonstrict law grounds a causal relation only if the events falling under it 
are subsumed by some strict law or other.  But now the initial problem is not deposed, but 
merely resurfaces under a new guise.  For an event falls under a nonstrict law in virtue of 
having a mental property (in the case of interest), but that event enters into causal 
relations only if it is subsumed by a strict law, i.e., only if it has some causally 
efficacious physical property.  Supposing it has no causally efficacious physical property, 
the nonstrict law whose antecedent contains the event under a mental description cannot 
ground any causal relations between it and other events.  However, if that event falls 
under a strict law, then whether or not it falls under a nonstrict law its causal powers are 
entirely unaffected.  So what exactly do we need nonstrict laws for?  Pragmatic, 
explanatory purposes, perhaps?  But the explanatory usefulness of citing mental 
properties was never at issue; if that’s all it took to secure the causal relevance of mental 
phenomena the problems we’re facing never would have arisen, and we’d certainly have 
no need of subtle arguments like the one just rehearsed. 
 Perhaps other moves could be explored in an effort to vindicate Davidson, but I 
am not at all confident about the prospects of any such defense.  I simply do not see how 
anomalous monism can avoid epiphenomenalism.  The fact that a given event token falls 
under a mental description is irrelevant to the causal powers of that event for causal 
relations must be backed by strict covering laws, and there are no strict laws linking 
mental types to mental types or mental types to physical types.  Mental events cause 
things, to be sure, but not in virtue of the fact that they instantiate mental types—not 
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because of their mental properties or content.  At the very least, Davidson fails to provide 
mental properties with a causal role to play. 
Suppose, however, that anomalous monism can indeed avoid epiphenomenalism, 
either by way of the “causal relevance” of mental properties secured by mind-body 
supervenience or via non-strict laws or in some other way.  Does such a causal relevance 
give us the possibility of autonomy or free action, as Davidson assumes?  It is hard to see 
how.  For consider what the anomalism of the mental amounts to: since there are no strict 
psychological or psychophysical laws, there will be no deductive-nomological 
explanations of an agent’s actions in psychological terms.  That is, there will be no 
exceptionless conditionals whose antecedent and consequent contain psychological 
vocabulary, and which would enable us to treat psychology as a predictive science.  Thus, 
even though there is a deductive-nomological argument providing an explanation as to 
why, e.g., my finger is extended in a certain direction, there is no deductive-nomological 
argument constituting a (psychological) explanation as to why I extended my finger in 
just the way that I did. 
 But recall, Davidson’s theory is a version of the token identity thesis, the thesis 
that any mental event token is strictly identical to some physical event token.  In 
particular, all of my desires, beliefs, choices, etc. are identical to physical events in my 
brain, and an ideal physics of the sort described by Davidson holds out to us the promise 
of a complete explanation of my bodily movements, referring only to those physical 
events and the strict deterministic laws they instantiate.  But that means that our inability 
to perfectly predict behavior is not a function of any underlying autonomous control, but 
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rather a function of our ignorance as to how particular mental events are physically 
realized—that is, as to which physical types those mental tokens fall under.  For if we 
knew, in any instance, just how a desire-belief complex (say) was implemented 
neurophysiologically, and if we were aware of the relevant laws relating 
neurophysiological states of that type to other physical events, we would be able to 
predict with perfect accuracy the resulting behavior.  And how could the decision to 
describe our behavior in one way rather than another confer on us any measure of 
autonomy, if our autonomy is indeed threatened by those strict physical laws from which, 
as it turns out, our behavior is not at all exempt? 
 The point is that our inability to conceptually reduce psychological states to 
physical states does not seem to matter much to our autonomy, at least given the rest of 
Davidson’s story.  For take any particular mental event m (of type M, and so throughout), 
and suppose that m is followed by some distinct mental event m*.  Now we know there 
are no strict laws of the form M → M*, but we also know that m is token-identical to 
some physical event p, and that physical events enter into causal relations.  So let us 
suppose that p figures into the antecedent of a strict physical law, P → P*, and that p* is 
token-identical to m*.  Clearly, that m* occurred is guaranteed by the fact that m* is 
token-identical to p* and P → P*.  So what consolation is it that, owing solely to our 
ignorance of the fact that m = p and m* = p*, we could not predict that m* would follow 
from m?  None, unless we are willing to maintain that autonomy consists in our ignorance 
of that which determines our behavior. 
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 That there are no psychological laws gives us a sense in which mental events 
cannot be predicted or explained, but the failure of explainability and predictability owes 
entirely to our epistemic limitations—it is not grounded in a robust, ontological 
autonomy.  And surely the correct inference in this connection is the Spinozistic one.  If 
the appearance of autonomy is merely a function of some conceptual gulf between the 
mental and physical domains, we are left not with free will, but rather with an 
explanation as to why we mistakenly think we have it.  (Similar remarks apply mutatis 
mutandis to the purported anomalism of the mental.)  Mark Johnston captures this point 
forcefully: 
If there are no mental law statements and mental events cannot be explained, in 
Davidson’s sense all that follows is that mental events are not susceptible to explanations 
of a certain syntactic form.  But how can that be crucial to the autonomy of our mental 
lives?  Surely the putative fact that mental events can’t be explained in Davidson’s 
restrictive sense is just a matter of the vocabulary we use to describe events, not at all a 
matter of the extent to which those events are under our control…So the anomalism of 
the mental as formulated by Davidson is just a linguistic feature of certain patterns of 
explanation which has nothing to do with free action or with any putative threat to 
freedom stemming from the availability in principle of a complete characterization of the 
causal network in physical terms. (1985: 419-421) 
In sum, even if Davidson can avoid epiphenomenalism in some way, anomalous monism 
gives us, at best, the illusion of autonomous control.  
The problems faced by the anomalous monist seem to me insurmountable.  Some 
of them the nonreductive physicalist might avoid by denying salient aspects of 
 100
Davidson’s theory.  But although not all of the difficulties specific to Davidson’s view 
necessarily infect alternative nonreductive physicalist accounts, there is a significant 
degree of overlap with respect to the problems that nonreductive physicalists of all stripes 
must face: 
Although token mental events themselves are causally efficacious, are they efficacious 
qua mental?  If not, then it seems we are left with a version of epiphenomenalism, a 
version hardly less objectionable than versions which deny that mental events are causes 
at all.  [This problem] arises not only for Davidson’s anomalism, but also for any 
metaphysical position that denies that mental properties are type-identical to physical 
properties.  The question is whether mental properties are causally/explanatorily 
efficacious, and (if they are) what such efficacy might consist in. (Horgan 1993: 572) 
Horgan is correct.  There is a core or fundamental problem here that is not unique to 
Davidson’s case, one that generalizes in such a way that it can be tailored to any 
particular version of nonreductive physicalism.  Given Davidson’s commitments 
concerning strict nomic subsumption and so forth, a consideration of the problem as it 
confronts the anomalous monist is chiefly a useful means of making the general worry 
stand out in a particularly vivid way.  But the distinctive theses of Davidson’s theory are 
largely inessential as far as this worry goes; they are not needed to get the general 
challenge to nonreductive physicalism off the ground.  It is to this general challenge and 
the various attempts made to answer that we must now turn. 
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3.4 Nonreductive Physicalism in General 
The view that the world is fundamentally physical, together with the conviction that 
mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, is the majority view in 
contemporary philosophy of mind.  Throughout the last few decades a great deal of 
energy has been expended in attempting to prove, and to refute, that these theses leave no 
room for mental properties in a causal account of the world.  To better see how the worry 
arises a few key concepts require clarification. 
What do we mean by these terms, ‘nonreductive’ and ‘physicalism’?  We’ve 
already encountered one sense of ‘non-reducibility’ according to which the absence of 
psychophysical bridge laws connecting mental properties to coextensive physical 
properties entails the irreducibility of the former to the latter.  Let us continue to assume 
this account of inter-theoretic reduction (alternative accounts will be considered below).  
It is in this sense at least that, according to the nonreductive physicalist, 
 
(NR) Mental properties are neither reducible to nor identical with physical 
properties. 
 
‘Physicalism’ has been described in various ways: that all that exists is physical, 
that the physical facts exhaust the facts or that they determine all the facts, and so on.  As 
I’ll be using the term, ‘physicalism’ describes a commitment to the view that the 
elements and properties described in microphysics are fundamental, in the sense that the 
structures, properties and events at the micro-level determine (in some sense) the objects, 
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properties and events occurring at higher levels (e.g., the levels of chemistry, biology, 
psychology).  Of particular importance is the physicalist’s commitment to the causal 
completeness of the physical domain, 
 
(CCP) For any event (object, property) E that has a cause, either E has a 
sufficient physical cause, or the objective probability of E is (entirely) 
fixed by its physical antecedents. 
 
(CCP) amounts to the claim that the network of causal transactions at the physical level is 
complete: there are no “gaps” or “missing links” in any physical causal chains, allowing 
for the intrusion of causes at the macro-level.  As Terence Horgan puts it, “all 
fundamental causal forces are physical forces, and the laws of physics are never violated” 
(1993: 560). 
 Implicit in what was said above (respecting the physical facts “determining” all 
the facts) is the notion that the mental supervenes on the physical.  It is high time to 
discuss this much-bandied term.   
 
3.4.1 Supervenience22 
Supervenience is not by itself a mind-body theory.  To see this, one need only recognize 
that the thesis that the mind depends upon or supervenes upon the body is consistent with 
                                                 
22 Unless otherwise indicated, ‘supervenience’ will be used to designate psychophysical supervenience 
exclusively. 
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several incompatible accounts of the mind-body relation, ranging from the type 
physicalism of the Australian materialists to the property dualism of the British 
emergentists.  The thesis that mental states or properties supervene upon physical states 
or properties, then, is not itself an explanatory theory but is itself in need of an 
explanation.  And it is the explanation given of the supervenience relation that 
distinguishes one mind-body theory from another.  However, the general notion of 
supervenience may remain useful insofar as it defines a minimalist commitment to a 
metaphysics according to which the physical is in some way preeminent.  Depending 
upon precisely how the notion is cashed out, however, it becomes more or less 
physicalistically acceptable.23 
Here is a natural, intuitive way to explicate the supervenience relation: objects 
which are indiscernible with respect to their physical characteristics are indiscernible 
with respect to their mental characteristics.  This rough and ready definition captures the 
requirement that the mental depends upon and is determined by the physical; for any 
                                                 
23 Jaegwon Kim writes that “Acceptance or rejection of the supervenience of the mental on the physical 
leads to the most basic division between theories of the mind-body relation: theories that accept 
psychophysical supervenience are fundamentally materialist, and those that reject it are fundamentally anti-
materialist” (1984: 56; cf. 1998: 15).  These terms are, however, philosophical terms of art.  For example, 
Horgan argues to the contrary that while supervenience can be an important part of a respectable materialist 
theory, “putative supervenience relations that are themselves unexplainable and sui generis [as with British 
emergentism] cannot play such a role” (1993: 566).  Any broadly materialist metaphysics, according to 
Horgan, should eschew the emergentist proposals that emergent (nonphysical) properties add something to 
the “net physical force” and that the patterns of property covariation indicated by the supervenience relation 
are simply brute matters of fact (p. 560).  Thus, pace Kim, supervenience is just too inclusive a notion to 
usefully demarcate materialist and anti-materialist positions, for a “full-fledged” materialism (in Horgan’s 
estimation) requires commitment to the causal closure of the physical (p. 557), whereas supervenience 
alone does not.  I’m inclined to side with Horgan regarding what a robust materialism requires.  
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alteration in a mental characteristic of an object entails an alteration in the physical 
characteristics of that object.  Corresponding to this intuitive description is the following 
definition, generally designated “weak supervenience”:  
 
(WS) Where A and B are two sets of properties, A weakly supervenes on B if and 
only if □(∀x)(∀F∈A)[Fx → (∃G∈B)(Gx & ∀y(Gy → Fy))]. 
 
Weak supervenience specifies that, necessarily, if anything has a property F in A, 
then there is some property G in B such that x has that property (G), and that anything 
that has G also has F.  Equivalently, we can say that, necessarily, if any two objects share 
all properties in B, then they share all properties in A—again, indiscernibility with respect 
to B entails indiscernibility with respect to A.  (WS) (and (SS) below) are customarily 
taken to specify the supervenience of higher level intrinsic properties on lower level 
intrinsic properties.  That is, the properties in A and B are generally restricted to the non-
realtional characteristics of individuals.  I adopt this restriction in what follows. 
 Weak supervenience is, not surprisingly, weak.  Too weak, as it turns out.  For it 
is consistent with weak supervenience that there exist two physically indiscernible 
possible worlds w and w′ which are discernible with respect to higher-order properties 
such as intentional states or phenomenal qualia.  It may be, for example, that in w the 
firing of C-fibers instantiates pain (for all creatures), whereas in w′ the firing of C-fibers 
instantiates a feeling of elation or a distinctive auditory sensation or whatever.  In fact, it 
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is consistent with weak supervenience that a possible world physically indiscernible from 
our own be entirely devoid of any mentality whatever.   
Certainly, weak supervenience is weak enough so as to thwart the possibility of 
reduction, but it appears to be too weak to ground the intuitive notion of determination 
with which we began.  If the physical facts determine the facts, we would expect that 
certain determination relations hold across possible worlds (relative to some accessibility 
condition), a presumptive desideratum for any physicalist theory.  But weak 
supervenience does not support counterfactuals in the way we would expect, if our metric 
of world-similarity is given in purely physical terms.  We could not, for example, say 
with any confidence that although James is not in pain, he would be in pain were he in 
such and such a neural state (for some neural state that determines pain in the actual 
world).  It may be contested that this counterfactual would hold so long as we consider 
worlds most similar to our own not only with respect to their physical characteristics, but 
with respect to their psychological (and other higher-order) characteristics as well.  But 
the point is that a robust physicalist ontology would (I would think) take for granted that 
identity or near-indiscernibility regarding physical characteristics alone would ensure 
identity or similarity regarding supervenient characteristics as well.24 (What else might 
                                                 
24 Compare Michael Tye: “…if a person who is microphysically identical with me, located in an identical 
environment, can lack any phenomenal experiences, then facts pertaining to experience and feeling…are 
not necessarily fixed or determined by the objective microphysical facts.  This the physicalist cannot allow, 
even if she concedes that phenomenally conscious states are not strictly identical with internal, objective, 
physical states.  The physicalist, whatever her stripe, must believe at least that the microphysical facts 
determine all the facts, that any world that was exactly like ours in all microphysical respects…would have 
to be like our world in all respects…” (1995: 23). 
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we mean by “the physical facts determine all the facts”?)  And this inference cannot be 
sanctioned by so weak a supervenience as (WS). 
If we want to avoid the possibility of physically indiscernible worlds differing 
wildly in their distributions of mental properties, our definition of supervenience requires 
strengthening.  As it is a modal feature we’re after—similarity across worlds—the 
strengthened definition evidently must reflect some kind of broadly modal connection 
between the subvenient and supervenient properties themselves.  We can characterize 
“strong supervenience” in a way that makes explicit this required feature: 
 
(SS)  Where A and B are two sets of properties, A strongly supervenes on B if 
and only if □(∀x)(∀F∈A)[Fx → (∃G∈B)(Gx & □(∀y)(Gy → Fy))].25 
 
 Strong supervenience entails weak supervenience but not vice versa, for (SS) 
specifies that A strongly supervenes on B only if, necessarily, anything with a property F 
in A has some property G in B and that necessarily if anything has G, then it has F as 
well.  The modalities involved may be interpreted in various ways depending upon one’s 
theory of what grounds the supervenience relation (a contentious issue) and one’s view of 
the modal status of materialism.  We might understand them to designate logical or 
                                                 
25 In an unpublished manuscript (quoted in Kim 1987: 81), Brian McLaughlin provides a definition of 
strong supervenience equivalent to (SS), but which avoids nested modalities: “For any worlds wj and wk, 
and for any objects x and y, if x has in wj the same B-properties that y has in wk, then x has in wj the same 
A-properties that y has in wk.”  This definition captures the idea that cross-world indiscernibility in B 
entails cross-world indiscernibility with respect to A.  Once again, we are following custom in 
understanding the properties of A and B to be intrinsic or non-relational. 
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conceptual necessity, metaphysical necessity or simply nomological necessity.  We may 
even take the first operator to designate metaphysical necessity, for instance, and the 
second to designate nomological necessity only.  I am inclined to think that a 
metaphysical reading of (at least) the second modality is appropriate, but nothing I say 
below turns on this particular characterization.26    
 (SS) has been explicitly constructed so as to avoid the excessive weakness of 
(WS).  But one appealing aspect of (WS) from the nonreductivist’s point of view is that it 
clearly allows the possibility of nonreducibility.  Now, having strengthened our notion of 
supervenience, we may begin to wonder whether it hasn’t been strengthened too much.  
Davidson, as we saw above, relies upon the weaker notion of supervenience in his later 
writings, apparently fearing that (SS) takes us too close for comfort to necessary 
coextensions across domains; and Jaegwon Kim explicitly argues that (SS) entails the 
possibility of reduction.27 It may seem to some, therefore, that in formulating 
supervenience in a way that explicitly relies upon property-to-property connections 
holding between worlds, we are begging an “important question against those who 
                                                 
26 Some (Seager 1988) have thought that a metaphysical reading of the second modality commits one to the 
view that materialism is necessarily true, and that it should therefore be understood as designating nothing 
stronger than nomological necessity.  But this appears to be a mistake.  As long as the first operator is 
understood nomologically there are possible worlds in which subvenient properties are nonphysical; and 
the second operator, read metaphysically, merely ensures that the physical subvenient properties in question 
metaphysically necessitate (across worlds in which they exist) their supervenient properties.  For an 
argument to this effect see Noordhof (2003). 
27 See Kim (1984: 70ff).  See also his discussion on (SS)’s implications for (apparently Davidsonian) 
autonomy.  For an argument that strong supervenience is equivalent to reduction see Daniel Bonevac 
(1995), and compare David Lewis’s discussion in Lewis (1999). 
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invoke supervenience precisely because of its promise as a dependency relation free of 
commitment to property-to-property connections that smacks of discredited reductionism 
of various sorts” (Kim 1984: 68). 
Various supervenience-based reductive strategies will be explored in the next 
section.  For now, we will see if a distinct notion of supervenience can be given, one 
which avoids the Scylla of making mental properties “brute nomological danglers,” and 
the Charybdis of reductionism.  The most popular candidate for a definition satisfying 
these criteria has been dubbed “global supervenience,” spelled out just below: 
 
(GS) Where A and B are sets of properties, A globally supervenes on B if and 
only if, for any worlds w and w*, if w is indiscernible from w* with 
respect to B-properties, then w is indiscernible from w* with respect to A-
properties. 
 
Notice that (SS) entails (GS) but not the converse.  For suppose there are two 
worlds, w and w*, and two individuals, x and y, in each world, and let F supervene on G.  
The following is consistent with (GS): in w, x has G and F, and y has G.  In w*, however, 
x has G but not F, and y does not have G.  Such a pair of worlds is allowable under (GS) 
because y’s failure to have G in w* entails the physical discernibility of the two worlds, 
so that the resulting discernibility with respect to their supervenient properties (i.e., x’s 
failure to have F in w*) is unproblematic.  But (SS) clearly entails the impossibility of 
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such a scenario, for if F strongly supervenes on G then it could not be that x have G and 
fail to have F.28 So the present formulation is weaker than (SS), as desired.   
Note also that (GS) is compatible with the existence of wide-content mental 
states, whereas (SS) is not.  For (SS) entails that the intrinsic physical features of a given 
creature or structure determine its higher-order properties, and that this determination 
relation will hold across possible worlds.  But (GS) allows for the existence of 
individuals who are intrinsically indiscernible, but differ with respect to the contents of 
their intentional states owing to relevant characteristics of the individuals’ surroundings.  
The content of my desire for water, so the story goes, differs from the content of my 
counterpart’s desire for water, if my counterpart inhabits a world in which the watery 
stuff is composed of XYZ rather than H20.
29 So, initially at least, supervenience thus 
defined appears promising. 
But (GS) as it stands is unacceptable.  For (returning to our original example) we 
have no reason to think that y’s failure to have G (in w*) has to be in any way relevant to 
the supervenience of F on G.  But (GS) allows that, as long as there is some, no matter 
how minute, physical difference holding between a pair of worlds, those worlds may be 
as different as you like with respect to their mental properties.  It could be, consistently 
                                                 
28 This counterexample was first given by Bradford Petrie in his dissertation, Semantics and Physicalism, 
The University of Michigan, (1985).  It is quoted in Kim (1987: 82). 
29 Putnam’s original intention in spinning out the now famous “Twin Earth” examples was to show that 
intension (having the “same thoughts”) does not determine extension (see Putnam 1975).  But some 
philosophers (notably, Tyler Burge 1979) have drawn another moral from these stories, viz., that 
propositional attitudes can vary in content (be different thoughts) even holding fixed every intrinsic detail 
of the intentional states in question. 
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with (GS)’s obtaining, that a world exactly like our own physically, but differing only in 
that the largest rock on the moon is several ounces lighter, has an entirely different 
distribution of mental properties over its creatures or even that it has none at all.  But this 
kind of inexplicable failure of local dependence is precisely the difficulty that led us to 
strengthen weak supervenience in the first place. 
Moreover, (GS) doesn’t even entail (WS).  As long as worlds are physically 
indiscernible then they are mentally indiscernible as well.  Prima facie, that captures the 
cross-worldly notion of dependence we were initially after.  But (GS) is consistent with 
there being random and inconsistent distributions of mental properties on physical 
properties within a given world—a possibility denied by (WS).  For example, it allows F 
to supervene on G in the western hemisphere of a given world, but not the eastern 
hemisphere of that world, so long as any other world physically indiscernible from the 
world in question has the same puzzling mental characteristics.  This latter problem could 
be eliminated by defining supervenience as the conjunction of (GS) and (WS); however, 
since (GS) & (WS) do not entail (SS) (although they are entailed by it), the first problem 
persists.  That is, we are left with the initial problem raised for (GS)—that it does not 
ground a robust (enough) form of dependence on the physical.  For this, it seems that 
nothing less than strong supervenience will do. 
To take stock: a “materialistically acceptable” (to use Horgan’s phrase) theory of 
supervenience seemingly must render the relation between subvenient and supervenient 
properties materialistically explainable, in the sense that the supervenience relation 
should not be sui generis or inexplicable in principle given the resources of basic physics.  
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Thus, an adequate explication of dependence upon the physical requires that whatever 
depends upon the physical depends upon it with some kind of modal force, ensuring that 
any physically possible world relevantly similar to the actual world with respect to its 
physical characteristics, is relevantly similar to the actual world regarding its mental 
characteristics as well.30 So, an adequate characterization of supervenience (from the 
nonreductive physicalist’s point of view) must be strong enough to ground physical 
dependence, but weak enough so as to avoid the specter of reductionism.   
The questions surrounding the conditions for reduction—are nomic coextensions 
sufficient, or must we have outright identities? are (potentially infinite) disjunctive 
properties suitable candidates for a reduction base? etc.—are subtle and complex.  I 
propose to bracket these questions and take them up in detail in a subsequent section.  For 
present purposes we can simply assume stringent requirements for reduction, according 
to which (given the phenomenon of multiple realizability) mental properties are not 
identical with, and therefore cannot legitimately be reduced to, physical properties.  I am 
further going to assume that the nonreductive physicalist can accept (SS) (or a suitably 
modified version to allow for wide-content states) without running afoul of his anti-
reductionist commitments.  Now, having made these concessions, the nonreductivist has 
the following challenge to face. 
                                                 
30 Any form of supervenience satisfying these desiderata Horgan dubs “superdupervenience.”  His own 
account, “Regional Supervenience,” is essentially the conjunction of (GS) and (WS) restricted to intrinsic 
properties (1993: 571ff.).  As such, he does not avoid the problem that worlds which are nearly physically 
indiscernible can vary widely with respect to their mental properties.  For discussion of global 
supervenience characterized as a relation guaranteeing that physically “pretty much similar” worlds have 
“pretty much similar” mental characteristics (meant to meet this difficulty), see Kim (1987: 89ff). 
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3.4.2 Causal/Explanatory Exclusion 
Actually, there are three challenges to face, only one of which is perfectly general.  First, 
as we have seen, if we assume that the mental is anomalous and that causation requires 
subsumption by a strict law, then it is apparent that mental properties are not causally 
relevant.  But not all nonreductive physicalists are committed to these assumptions.  
Second, if we think that intentional content is broad, in the sense that the mental states of 
physical duplicates can vary in content depending upon broader social and environmental 
facts, we are faced with this difficulty: the causal properties of events and states 
intuitively must be intrinsic properties, rather than extrinsic or relational properties.  So if 
the contents of my beliefs and desires do not depend on anything intrinsic to me it seems 
that my beliefs and desires do not cause my behavior because they have the contents that 
they do, but rather because they are the sorts of (token) physical states that they are.31 
But, again, not every nonreductive physicalist is committed to this kind of content 
externalism.  
I have said everything I want to say about anomalous monism, and I will not 
discuss the second problem here.  A comprehensive theory of mind will need to say 
something about this issue, of course.  But (making no pretense of offering such a 
comprehensive theory) I am going to focus on the following problem instead, because it 
                                                 
31 Another way of framing this difficulty arises from computational models of the mind.  In these models, it 
seems clear that it is the syntactic features, rather than the semantic features, of a given creature/structure’s 
states that are causally relevant to behavioral output.  For a nice (and characteristically amusing) discussion 
about relational properties and causal efficacy, see Fodor (1987 chapter 2), and see Fred Dretske (1988) for 
an attempt to solve the problem by construing mental states as ‘structuring’, rather than ‘triggering’ causes. 
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is common to both parties to the broad/narrow content dispute, and it arises whether we 
think the mental is anomalous or not.  Thus, if the nonreductivist cannot answer this 
(following) problem, the difficulties particular to Davidson and his followers and those 
particular to (nonreductivist) defenders of broad content are rendered moot. 
So here is the problem.32 Suppose that all entities and events are (physical) 
elements of a causally complete physical system, and assume that mental properties are 
not reducible to physical properties (assume the conjunction of (NR) & (CCP)).  Assume 
that eliminativism is false; that is, assume that mental properties are real properties, first-
class ontological citizens that make a causal difference.33 Now take any mental event, E, 
and suppose that E (being a physical event) has some physical property, P, upon which 
(an instance of) a mental property, M, nonreductively supervenes.  Last, assume that E 
causes a distinct mental event, E*.  Since E* is a mental event, it instantiates some mental 
property, M*, and since all events are physical events, E* has some physical property P*.  
Given (CCP) we know there is a complete causal explanation for E* relying exclusively 
on E*’s physical characteristics, viz., P is a (total) cause of P*.  
                                                 
32 I have chosen to formulate the argument in terms of supervenience rather than physical realization, but a 
parallel argument relying upon the notion that any instance of a mental property is realized (implemented, 
executed) in a physical state of a physical system can be given.  My choice to formulate the argument in 
terms of supervenience is based on the fact that the physical realization thesis pretty clearly entails 
supervenience, and that an argument based upon supervenience has a wider scope of applicability.  The 
classic statement of the argument, which does not rely upon much in the way of heavy metaphysical 
baggage, is in Malcolm (1968). 
33 It seems to me a very reasonable principle that to be real is to have causal powers.  Purported entities or 
properties that have no causal powers at all could not enter into true causal explanations of occurrences in 
the world; it is difficult to see why we would countenance them at all. 
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Now, where does M fit into the explanation of why E caused E*?  What causal 
work is there for M to contribute?  Suppose we say that M caused M*.  But by our 
assumption, M* supervenes upon P*, so this instance of M* is dependent upon, and 
entirely explained by, this instance of P* (or the fact that E* has P*).  The physical facts 
determine all the facts.  Had M not preceded M*, M* still would have been instantiated so 
long as P* were instantiated.  The supervenience explanation, therefore, threatens to 
eclipse any explanation citing M as the cause of M*.  Suppose then that M caused M* by 
causing P*.  Then it must be the case that M* caused P*.  But, by our assumption, P* has 
a sufficient cause in P (or in the fact that E has P).  Can M then be thought of as the cause 
of P?  Evidently not, for M supervenes upon, and is therefore dependent upon, P itself.  
And it is reasonable to suppose that if this instance of M is determined by (and 
explainable in terms of) this instance of P, then M does not itself determine (or provide 
an explanation for) this instance of P.  Thus, causal explanations of E* citing M are 
excluded by explanations of E* citing P.  Hence, if the physical level is causally 
complete, and if mental properties are not identical with or reducible to physical 
properties, then mental properties are causally, and explanatorily, irrelevant.34 
                                                 
34 Kim has given variations of this argument (the “Explanatory Exclusion” argument) in a number of 
places; see his (1989a), (1998, chapter 4), (2005, chapter 2).  To see how this applies to anomalous monism 
even granting McLaughlin’s “nonstrict law” defense, note that a nonstrict law grounds a causal relation 
between c and e only if there is some strict law subsuming c and e.  It follows that c causes e in virtue of c’s 
having a mental property m only if c causes e in virtue of c’s having a physical property, p.  Since c’s 
having p suffices for its production of e, c’s having m is neither causally relevant to e nor relevant to a 
causal explanation of e. 
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One step of the argument in particular needs a little discussion.  Specifically, the 
claim that M cannot be thought of as the cause of P is grounded in the contention that M 
supervenes on P, and “is therefore dependent on P.”  But nothing in the definitions of 
supervenience we’ve considered entails the kind of dependency that rules out P’s 
depending upon M, even if M supervenes on P.  That is, M’s strongly supervening on P 
does not obviously rule out the possibility of M’s causing P.  But I think this difficulty 
can be met in a number of ways.   
First, I doubt very much whether any physicalist would want to defend the claim 
that nonphysical properties (or supervenient properties in general) cause their subvenient 
bases.  This looks like a direct violation of (CCP), the causal completeness of the 
physical, which is constitutive of the physicalist position.  Moreover, definitions of 
supervenience are in general motivated by the view, as we’ve seen, that the physical 
determines or is responsible for the existence and characteristics of all higher level 
phenomena.  If this intuitive notion of determination is missing from our definitions of 
supervenience, it looks like it’s going to need to be built in rather than exploited when 
we’re in a bind.  For although the formal definitions do not reflect it, I take it that the 
asymmetric dependence of supervenient upon subvenient properties is a desideratum, 
indeed the motivation, for physicalist theories of supervenience.  So again, it is hard to 
see how this (admittedly valid) technical objection could get nonreductive physicalism 
off the hook.  If there is a difficulty in the argument, a genuine show stopper, I do not 
think it is that (SS) leaves open the possibility that supervenient properties cause or 
determine the subvenient ones.  Third, very few philosophers are comfortable advancing 
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the view that P is overdetermined, that is, that P is (sufficiently) caused both by M and by 
its physical antecedent P0, for the reason that, given (CCP), P0 yields P in any case and M 
simply looks to be irrelevant.  The denial of such overdetermination is crucial to the 
conclusion that irreducible mental properties lack a causal role to play in the physical 
world.  For if we assume that physical events are not the products of widespread and 
systematic overdetermination of mental and physical properties, then the causal 
completeness of the physical domain leads to the causal closure of the physical domain, a 
doctrine which specifies not only that the physical domain is causally complete in itself, 
but also that the intrusion of higher-level, nonphysical causes in physical causal 
sequences is inadmissible.  Perhaps the overdetermination alternative ought to be given a 
serious try, but my sense is that it represents an ad hoc or somewhat panicky response to 
the problem.  In any case, that position has very few defenders and does not look very 
promising.  The causal exclusion argument, within the constraints of nonreductive 
physicalism, is powerful. 
The upshot is what Jaegwon Kim has amusingly called “Descartes’ Revenge”: 
nonreductive physicalism, just as Cartesian dualism, founders on the rocks of mental 
causation.  The options for the physicalist, if this argument is valid, are rather stark: they 
are reductionism or outright eliminativism. 
 
3.4.3 Causal Realism and Explanatory Practice 
It is perhaps unfortunate that Kim originally dubbed the foregoing argument the 
“Explanatory Exclusion” argument, rather than the “Causal Exclusion” argument (the 
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latter of which he appears to favor in more recent writing).  Given Kim’s realism about 
the nature of causal explanation, of course, causal exclusion and explanatory exclusion 
amount to the same thing: for c is relevant to a causal explanation of e when, but only 
when, there is an objective causal connection holding between c and e.  I accept this 
constraint on causal explanation.  Other philosophers, however, do not.  So the 
considerations seemingly entailing that mental properties are not causally relevant to 
behavioral output do not immediately vitiate (for these philosophers) the explanatory 
power or legitimacy of those mental properties, as they are invoked in folk-psychological 
discourse. 
Here I would like to discuss some nonreductivist replies to the causal exclusion 
argument which make use of a more relaxed notion of causal explanation.  Given my 
fundamental agreement with Kim on matters of explanation it will not be surprising that I 
do not find these responses convincing, but I must admit I do not know exactly how to 
directly argue for explanatory realism.  I am doubtful that the disagreement is nothing 
more than a brute clash of intuitions, but I do not expect that anyone not initially 
convinced of, or at any rate favorably disposed toward, the realist nature of causal 
explanation will find my protestations against the following replies entirely compelling.  
We’ll see. 
Tyler Burge (1993), Lynne Rudder Baker (1993), Robert Van Gulick (1993) and, 
if I understand her, Jennifer Hornsby (1993), all argue in a similar vein that the 
entrenched explanatory practice of citing reasons as causes shows us that there is no real 
explanatory exclusion problem, and that the nonreductivist therefore has nothing to fear 
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from the argument just rehearsed.  The details of their stories differ, of course, but the 
point of commonality between them all is the insistence that the problem of mental 
causation is dissoluble when we give up causal or explanatory realism. 
Tyler Burge, to begin with, seems to concede both psychophysical supervenience 
and the principle of physical causal closure.35 With respect to the exclusion problem, 
however, he claims that “Materialist metaphysics has been given more weight than it 
deserves.  Reflection on explanatory practice has been given too little” (p. 97).  In 
Burge’s estimation the metaphysical theses employed in the exclusion argument (and in 
similar arguments leading to the same conclusion) are vastly less well-supported than the 
more ordinary grounds we have for rejecting epiphenomenalism, and in this he is clearly 
right.  He goes on to conclude that worrying about epiphenomenalism is symptomatic of 
a mistaken set of philosophical priorities, and that if our philosophical priorities assign 
explanatory practice to a higher echelon than metaphysical theorizing the problems of 
mental causation will simply disappear.  Such a reassignment of priorities is essential 
because the metaphysically-minded philosopher is forced to admit that “materialism has 
failed to illumine mental causation,” an ironic state of affairs in that “such illumination 
has been advertised as materialism’s chief selling-point” (p. 103).  But because we cannot 
                                                 
35 “There are surely some systematic, even necessary, relations between mental events and underlying 
physical processes.  We have good reason to believe that mental processes depend on underlying physical 
processes” (p. 116).  “There are no gaps in…physical chains of events.  So, for example, there are 
underlying, gapless neural processes that are instances of the laws of neurophysiology; and the mental 
events would not occur if some such processes did not occur.  I have no serious doubts about this view” (p. 
98).  I say he “seems” to concede these points because Burge remains somewhat noncommittal on the 
metaphysics in other areas of his discussion. 
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understand causation involving mental or intentional properties in terms of the properties 
characterized in the physical sciences, it would be more fruitful to take a “less 
metaphysical attitude,” one which allows for the legitimacy of mentalistic explanations 
even when we believe that physical processes are closed in such a way that they “need no 
supplementation from the outside” (p. 102).36   
Echoing Burge, Baker argues that given the metaphysical picture of any 
significant materialism, and that of nonreductivism in particular,  
the problem of mental causation is insoluble.  We simply have no answer to  
the question ‘How can mental events, in virtue of having mental properties, make a 
difference to behavior?’ because the very assumptions that generate the question render it 
unanswerable. (p. 77) 
The trouble caused by the exclusion argument can be avoided, however, if we reject 
explanatory realism by “rethinking the notion of causation” (p. 91).  Instead of taking as 
our starting point a metaphysical doctrine about objective causal relations, we should 
focus on explanations that “have been found worthy of our acceptance” (p. 92): 
If we put aside the metaphysical picture and begin with the explanations that work, 
causation becomes an explanatory concept.  This presents a sharp contrast to the 
metaphysical picture, which subordinates explanation to causation, where causation, in 
turn, is conceived as an ‘objective relation’ in nature. (p. 93)  
                                                 
36 Burge’s paper is characteristic of his work; it is wide-ranging and carefully argued.  Much more needs 
saying about his overall position, but this word of caution should suffice.  Burge does not embrace all of the 
materialist doctrines employed in the present formulation of the exclusion argument (in particular, he 
denies the token-identity thesis), and he thinks that there are versions of materialism less susceptible to the 
present difficulties.  But what is at issue here is simply his view on the nature of explanation, which can be 
usefully isolated and discussed in general terms.  
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And of course, if causation itself is an explanatory concept then there is little danger that 
the imbedded purposive explanations of action, so essential to our understanding 
ourselves as agents, will be jeopardized by recondite metaphysical dogma.  The problem 
of mental causation simply “melts away.” 
 The theme is repeated in Van Gulick: we should reject the “almost theological 
realism” about causal laws that permeates the mental causation literature, and simply 
“interpret ‘causal relevance’ so that a property [is] causally relevant if it [is] appropriate 
or useful to invoke it in a causal explanation” (p. 245).  Then, since “it is far from 
obvious that only causally potent properties can be usefully invoked in causal 
explanations” (ibid.), we can embrace both the causal closure of the physical and the 
efficacy (or relevance) of the mental with a clear conscience.37  
 While some philosophers have sought to avoid the difficulties raised by the 
exclusion argument without abandoning realism about causation or explanation, the 
philosophers discussed above are clearly in agreement, in fact if not in principle, with the 
assessment of John Heil and Alfred Mele: “We confront a dilemma.  Either we concede 
that ‘purposive’, reason-giving explanations of behaviour have only a pragmatic standing, 
or we abandon our conception of the physical domain as causally autonomous” (1993: v).  
Given this dilemma, I think these philosophers would agree that Terrence Horgan’s 
remarks in connection with the difficulty of framing the doctrine of mind-body 
                                                 
37 Van Gulick is not arguing ad hoc, but claims that theories and the laws they contain are in general 
“cognitive constructs” which should be “assessed pragmatically in terms of the roles they are designed or 
expected to fulfill” (p. 246). 
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supervenience in a “materialistically acceptable” way are equally applicable in the 
present context.  He urges that 
materialistically-minded philosophers should be exploring irrealist ways of 
accommodating higher-order discourse…[such as] Preservative irrealism, which would 
treat higher-order discourse as quite legitimate and perhaps indispensable, while also 
repudiating its apparent ontological commitments…[allowing it] to be true even in the 
absence of any corresponding properties or facts. (1993: 581) 
And if such a preservative irrealism is tenable, it appears that the nonreductivist’s 
troubles with mental causation can be met. 
Here is what I take to be a line of response that would occur pretty quickly to any 
metaphysically-minded philosopher: 
I am unsympathetic to this program.  But on at least one point, I concur with all these 
thinkers.  There is a certain sense in which the threat of epiphenomenalism has an air of 
make-believe, in the same way that the problem of other minds and the possibility of 
solipsism do.  But this point merely underscores the fact that we all believe the mental 
really does affect our behavior and that this belief is so entrenched as to be virtually 
unshakable, which was never in dispute.  Pointing out that epiphenomenalism isn’t really 
a threat, in the sense that it might for all we know be true, does not imply that 
epiphenomenalism poses no threat to a given system of metaphysics that evidently 
commits us to it.  And it is the metaphysics with which we have to do.   
Furthermore, even supposing that we focus solely on explanatory practice it isn’t 
clear that the difficulty disappears.  Explanation is essentially an epistemic activity meant 
to clarify or render intelligible some event or state of affairs.  That is to say, the purpose 
of explanation is to remove puzzlement about why something occurred or why it is the 
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way it is.  But when two or more explanations are offered for the same explanandum we 
naturally want to see, in keeping with the goal of explanation, whether the explanatia are 
compatible or whether they’re in some salient way exclusive.  If they are exclusive, at 
least in the sense that they use entirely disparate resources to account for the phenomenon 
in question, confusion will likely remain until one of them is seen to be superfluous.  
When it comes to explanation, less really is more: a plurality of explanations usually 
contributes to, rather than ameliorates, the initial puzzlement.38 
But this reply (which, by the way, I think is full of good philosophical sense), 
overlooks a significant fact about the impact that a denial of explanatory realism would 
have on the dialectical climate that has characterized the contemporary mind-body 
debate.  For this reply to the exclusion argument, if successful, can be used without 
prejudice and to the same effect in exculpating and revitalizing Cartesian dualism, as 
well.  The primary reason for the downfall of Descartes’s view, tradition has it, was his 
failure to reconcile substance dualism with his insistence that the mind and body are 
‘intermingled’ and causally connected.  This story is endlessly repeated in introductory 
texts and is frequently alluded to in serious philosophical literature of all sorts.39 But 
                                                 
38 Jaegwon Kim develops this line of reasoning in (among other places) his (1989b: 254ff).  In his (1998), 
he makes the stronger claim that “two or more explanations can be rival explanations even though their 
explanatory premises are mutually consistent and in fact all true, if they purport to explain (in particular, 
causally explain) a single explanandum” (p. 65, his emphasis). 
39 E.g., Churchland (1984), Carter (1990), Jacquette (1994), Kim (1998).  The presupposition that 
“whatever has causal powers is ipso facto material,” as Fodor (1987: x) puts it, has been the central plank in 
arguments for materialism (such as Lewis’s 1966) and acts as a methodological constraint in much 
contemporary theorizing.  According to Michael Tye, for example, a theory of consciousness must account 
for the fact that consciousness is causally relevant to behavior, so any such theory must “inevitably restrict 
itself to the physical, given that there are no nonphysical causes” (2000: 35). 
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given an account that makes room for the efficacy or relevance of nonphysical properties 
by relaxing the intuitive requirements for causal explanation in this way, what principled 
reasons do we have for thinking that a nonphysical substance or event couldn’t have 
equally respectable effects on the physical world?  If this response to the exclusion 
problem is powerful enough to vindicate mental properties then it seems frankly too 
strong for physicalist scruples, for it is likely that what has historically been considered 
the most powerful objection to substance dualism—and the “chief selling point” of 
materialism—will no longer get off the ground. 
Review for a moment a version of the ‘causal interaction’ problem faced by 
Descartes and his followers, constructed along similar lines as the exclusion argument 
above.40 
 
(1) No mental event is token- or type-identical to any physical event. 
(2) Every event that has a cause has a sufficient physical cause; i.e., there are 
no causal gaps in any physical processes. 
(3) Physical events are not systematically overdetermined by mental and 
physical causes. 
(4) Mental events, therefore, being nonphysical, are epiphenomenal or 
causally irrelevant with respect to physical events.  (1) - (3)     
                                                 
40 Actually, complaints against causal interactionism are most often formulated along these lines: “It’s hard 
to see how such different substances could be related.”  No doubt there is a problem here, but this seems to 
me a lazy way to express it. 
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(5) So, mental events are explanatorily irrelevant: they cannot be legitimately 
invoked in a causal explanation of behavior. (4) 
 
Historically, of course, the dualist was at pains to deny (2).  But such a denial was 
difficult in light of the following sort of reply: “For any physical event you pick, I can 
show you a physical cause sufficient for it.  So, if you want mental events to be causally 
relevant to behavior, you had better find a way to identify them with particular physical 
events.  And once you’ve done that you’ve given up your dualism.”  But the upshot of the 
foregoing is that the interactionist dualist need not deny (2) at all, since rejecting 
explanatory realism successfully blocks the inference from (4) to (5).41 And, according to 
the explanatory irrealists, (4) alone is not the sort of difficulty that should call into 
question a system of metaphysics. 
So, to take stock, if the exclusion argument poses a real dilemma, the 
nonreductivist has two options: (a) Deny the causal exhaustiveness of physics, or (b) 
Deny explanatory realism.  Option (a), for obvious reasons, is not a live option for the 
physicalist.  The doctrine that the physical domain forms a comprehensive, closed system 
is arguably what constitutes the physicalist position.  It is at any rate essential to it, and 
there’s not much point in calling yourself a ‘physicalist’ once you give it up.  What has 
gone unnoticed however is that (b) is no more live an option for the physicalist than (a).  
Once we have conceded that nonphysical properties enjoy all the causal relevance we 
                                                 
41 Or perhaps the Cartesian need not contest the evidence we have for (2), on the grounds that mind-body 
interaction of the Cartesian variety is consistent with it.  For an interesting suggestion along these lines, see 
E.J. Lowe (2003). 
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could want them to have, then, so long as the dualist has some motivation for positing 
these additional entities, it becomes entirely obscure what all the fuss about substantival 
dualism comes to.  For if being physical is not a requirement of being causally or 
explanatorily relevant to physical processes then the causal interaction problem can be 
dismissed, and physicalism as a metaphysical account of the mind-body relation loses 
much of its dialectical advantage.  In fact, if we reconstrue the relevant notions of 
causation and explanation along the lines suggested by Baker, we are in danger of 
rendering physicalism, or a key tenet thereof, not only disadvantaged but incoherent: 
If we accept paradigm cases of explanation in the sciences and in everyday life, and if we 
take the notion of explanation to be prior to that of causation, then the idea of a ‘complete 
cause’ [as specified in the principle of the causal autonomy of physics] hardly makes 
sense. (Baker 1993: 94)42 
Embracing (b), to all intents and purposes, is tantamount to embracing (a).  And I take it 
that this is not the sort of result that most defenders of nonreductive physicalism are 
willing to abide. 
 We can agree with the explanatory irrealists that there is a sense in which 
epiphenomenalism need not be taken seriously: it ought not keep us up at night.  But 
there is another sense in which it should be taken seriously indeed, for it allows us to 
judge how well a mind-body theory explains the facts to which we are pretheoretically 
committed.  With respect to its role, epiphenomenalism is analogous to the challenge of 
                                                 
42 Lest I misrepresent her, Baker is aware of the fact that her irrealist attitude toward causation leaves us 
neither “with dualism, nor materialism, nor any other comprehensive metaphysical doctrine,” because it is 
explanatory practice, and not any system of metaphysics, that “earns its keep” (1993: 94). 
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skepticism, which can be a useful touchstone in evaluating epistemological theories even 
if we are already convinced that people know all sorts of things.  The question in the 
latter case is whether the epistemological theory under consideration has anything useful 
to say about how we know things in spite of the skeptical challenge, taking for granted all 
the while that we really do know the things that the skeptic maintains we do not.  And, in 
precisely the same way, the job of the metaphysician is to show how the mental causally 
relates to the physical, taking for granted all the while that it really does.  But pointing 
out that we are committed to the reality of mental causation and trumpeting the 
illuminating nature of mentalistic explanations does not suffice to vindicate a mind-body 
theory which cannot account for either.  To the contrary, this is precisely the sort of thing 
that calls a theory into question.  To a system of metaphysics, if not to us, the threat of 
epiphenomenalism is very real indeed.  (Just ask Descartes.) 
Here, then, is the moral of the story so far forth.  Challenges to nonreductive 
physicalism such as the exclusion argument must be met in such a way that the chief 
impetus for a physicalist mind-body account is not removed or impugned.  This rules out, 
in my view, any defense of nonreductive physicalism relying upon explanatory irrealism.  
So the challenge must be faced head on.  But here too, care must be taken that the replies 
advanced on behalf of nonreductivism could not be employed mutatis mutandis by 
defenders of alternative, non-physicalist accounts.  Causal and explanatory relevance 
must be strong enough to motivate the physicalism, but weak enough to avoid the 
“epiphenomenalism reductio” without allowing any Cartesian parasites to come along for 
the ride.  Whether the appropriate balance can be struck remains to be seen. 
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Perhaps the foregoing remarks suffice to undermine the viability of the “easy way 
out,” explanatory irrealism response to the problem of mental causation.  But whether 
they do or not, I do not think the sorts of metaphilosophical considerations I’ve adduced 
really get to the heart of the issue.  For our ultimate concerns lie with something much 
deeper and more important than the features that make for an adequate metaphysical 
theory of mind, or the general conditions that must obtain for causal explanation to count 
as legitimate.  Put plainly, there is something of value, something that we want to be true 
about ourselves; and that something is missing if, as a matter of fact, what goes on in our 
minds doesn’t really make a difference to what we do.  Whatever exactly this elusive 
something is, I think our fear of losing it will not be abated even if the metaphysical facts 
could never persuade us to abandon our explanatory practices and even if it would be 
irrational or psychologically impossible for us to do so.   
There is an obvious parallel between the mental causation and the free will 
debates at this point, and I think lingering over it for a moment will help to unearth some 
of the deep conceptual ties between the problems of mental causation and freedom that 
we noted in the last chapter.   
In his influential (1963) article, “Freedom and Resentment,” P.F. Strawson argued 
that the truth or falsity of determinism is not in the end relevant to our moral practices, 
nor to the feelings and attitudes we experience as participants in interpersonal 
relationships.  It does appear that in blaming or praising, or in feeling gratitude, 
admiration, indignation or resentment toward a person, we express our commitment to 
the belief that that person is an appropriate target for these attitudes.  We presuppose that 
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they really are responsible for what they do.  And it also appears that the thesis of 
determinism threatens this presupposition and calls into question the appropriateness or 
fittingness of the personal-reactive attitudes that express it.  But Strawson maintained, 
first, that these features of our moral and personal lives are so entrenched in our common 
nature that we probably could not give them up in the wake of a (perhaps any) theoretical 
discovery.  And he argued, secondly, that the question whether it would be rational to 
continue on in these practices, in light of the discovery of determinism’s truth, is a 
question that cannot be raised without betraying one’s failure to recognize the central role 
these practices and attitudes play in life as we know it.  Our commitment to the reactive 
attitudes and our moral practices is, so to speak, insulated from criticism.  For they are 
too much a part of what we are, as humans, to ever be extricated from our lives; they are, 
as Strawson puts it, “part of the general framework of human life, not something that can 
come up for review…within this general framework” (1963: 55). 
Compatibilists have always had much to say about the purported implications for 
our moral practices should the general thesis of determinism be correct.  It has often been 
pointed out that reward and punishment, praise and blame, are powerful means of 
regulating and influencing the behavior of others in socially desirable ways, so there 
would be no reason to give up (and good reason to retain) our present moral practices 
under those circumstances that incompatibilists think would vitiate them.  And even if 
there are theoretical problems about the compatibility of determinism and responsibility, 
it could well be more rational on a practical level—in view of the projected devaluing or 
enrichment of our lives—to put aside our theoretical scruples for all intents and purposes.  
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These are familiar points.  Strawson’s essay, though, points toward the conclusion that 
these justifications of our moral practices are both unsatisfying and misguided.  They are 
unsatisfying because they leave untouched “the pessimist’s [incompatibilist’s] justified 
sense that to speak in terms of social utility alone is to leave out something vital in our 
conceptions of these practices” (p. 63).  They are misguided because they are so 
dominated by “objectivity of attitude” that they appear to justify the incompatibilist in 
thinking that the something vital has been left out of the picture because of determinism, 
whereas the truth or falsity of that doctrine is neither here nor there.  It will be worth 
quoting Strawson here at some length: 
The vital thing can be restored by attending to that complicated web of attitudes and 
feelings which form an essential part of the moral life as we know it, and which are quite 
opposed to objectivity of attitude.  Only by attending to this range of attitudes can we 
recover from the facts as we know them a sense of what we mean, i.e. of all we mean, 
when, speaking the language of morals, we speak of desert, responsibility, guilt, 
condemnation, and justice.  But we do recover it from the facts as we know them.  We do 
not have to go beyond them.  Because the optimist [compatibilist]  neglects or 
misconstrues these attitudes, the pessimist rightly claims to find a lacuna in his account.  
We can fill the lacuna for him.  But in return we must demand of the pessimist a 
surrender of his metaphysics. (p. 64) 
Strawson counsels a general reorientation in perspective from an ‘objective’ or 
‘metaphysical’ standpoint, to a normative or first-person standpoint.  We are to fix our 
focus, not on any metaphysical speculation, but rather on the sorts of practices we 
actually engage in when we feel admiration, resentment or indignation toward a person—
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and also when we withhold those feelings—for it is these practices, and the complex web 
of attitudes which attends them, that in some sense constitute moral responsibility.  
According to Strawson, we can scarcely imagine what life would be like were we to 
surrender our moral practices, and we are very likely psychologically incapable of 
foreswearing the adoption and expression of the attitudes that express our moral 
judgments.  And crucially, because the appropriateness of adopting these attitudes is 
gauged in everyday life by considerations the acceptability of which is independent of 
any metaphysical theorizing, we can and should, at least in this context, give up on the 
metaphysics.    
But the pessimist-incompatibilist will surely feel that he’s being asked to 
surrender something more than his metaphysics, I think.43 There is no reason he could not 
agree that a (consequentialist) justification can be given for our moral practices, 
irrespective of the truth or falsity of determinism.  Further, even if the consequentialist-
type justifications of these practices ring hollow (passing over, as they do, questions of 
desert and the like), he may think it plausible that it would be rational to continue 
engaging in these practices for other, pragmatic reasons.  And nothing’s to stop him from 
agreeing with Strawson that the joint truth of determinism and incompatibilism might be 
entirely impotent, practically speaking—that a recognition of this truth would not 
substantively alter our form of life—and that in the typical cases where the 
appropriateness of moral judgments is at issue we do not pause to ponder the possibility 
                                                 
43 He may even harbor the suspicion that certain metaphysical assumptions are being presupposed, if only 
implicitly, in our judgments concerning the fittingness of the reactive attitudes in particular cases.  
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of causal determinism.  But of course, these considerations take nothing away from the 
fact that “we don’t want to be puppets” (Susan Wolf 1981: 404)44 and the incompatibilist 
fears that this is what the truth of determinism reduces us to, regardless of what 
rationality or consistency or our psychological (in-)capacities imply about how we would 
act or what we should believe in light of the fact that we are thus determined:  
The fact that we don’t have to change our values is of little solace if it may be the case 
that we are, now and forever, incapable of realizing our values.  The fact that we don’t 
have to think that our lives are meaningless is of little comfort if, for all that, our lives 
may actually be meaningless. (ibid.) 
Again, the dialectic is a familiar one.  The thing I am concerned to point out for 
the present, however, is just how seamlessly Strawson’s suggestion that we abandon the 
metaphysics in favor of reflection upon our ordinary moral experience merges with the 
position of the explanatory irrealists (about mental causation), and how natural the 
incompatibilist response is to both parties.  Significantly, the considerations to which 
Strawson calls our attention in arguing that determinism is strictly irrelevant to our actual 
moral practices, reactive attitudes and self-conception, could be brought to bear with the 
same degree of force against those who think epiphenomenalism is something worth 
worrying about.  Indeed, the overlap is already evident from the discussion above.  This 
suggests that the Strawsonian line provides us with reasons to think that determinism 
doesn’t matter to our freedom and responsibility only to the extent that it provides us with 
                                                 
44 Better: We want not to be puppets.  Talk of puppets is, of course, largely rhetorical flourish.  The 
underlying intuition is that the truth of determinism would mean we are something less than we take 
ourselves to be: “Without free will, we seem diminished…Determinism seems to undercut human dignity, 
it seems to undermine our value” (Nozick 1981: 291). 
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reasons for thinking that epiphenomenalism doesn’t really matter to these things either.  
And insofar as compatibilism aspires to be a theory of what it is to be free, I think that is 
a damaging result for compatibilism.   
No doubt this associating of determinism with epiphenomenalism will seem too 
quick.  But we should ask: When determinism has done its work, exactly what remains 
for epiphenomenalism to take away?  It seems there must be something left over for the 
possibility of epiphenomenalism to threaten—witness those philosophers visibly 
unsympathetic to libertarianism who think that the impotence of the mental would mean 
“the end of the world” (Fodor 1989: 156), or who could “no more believe” that the mind 
doesn’t matter than they “could fly” (Horgan 1989: 64).  But I admit that if I try to 
specify just what it is, I find myself using terminology indistinguishable from that which 
typically expresses libertarian worries about the significance of determinism.  Perhaps a 
thought experiment will help.  Imagine yourself coram Deo, and suppose that God lays 
before you the choice between two worlds to inhabit.  In both of these worlds, the same 
physical and mental sequences occur, your thoughts, experiences and bodily behavior are 
qualitatively identical.  The worlds are deterministic and are indistinguishable from one 
another in all but the following respect: in the first world epiphenomenalism is false, and 
in the second, it is true.45 I have no doubt that I would unhesitatingly choose the world in 
which my beliefs, desires and intentions are causally potent, and I am confident that most 
others would as well.  But I’m really not sure why.  I want epiphenomenalism to be false 
                                                 
45 I realize that the worlds will not contain all and only “the same” events if events are partly individuated 
by their causal histories.  But I do not think this point makes any difference here. 
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because I want some measure of control, some sphere of influence in which I direct the 
course of events.  But this is exactly how the libertarian would respond were she given 
the choice between inhabiting a deterministic world or a world in which there is free will.  
And, according to the libertarian, we are no better off in the first world than the second in 
those respects. 
But it is possible I’m just not creative enough to see the difference between these 
worlds, or it may be that the values we associate with the existence of mental causation 
and with free will are so vague that, although they are distinguishable, it is difficult to 
distinguish them in practice.  So alter the thought experiment slightly.  Suppose, this 
time, that you are presented with a choice between those two worlds as before, but that 
God refrains from telling you which world is which.  You must choose arbitrarily.  Or 
suppose that God informs you that you are now in one or the other of these worlds, but 
again, He refrains from telling you which.  Wouldn’t it be surprisingly easy, after a little 
reflection, perhaps, to resign yourself to the thought that it doesn’t much matter anyway?  
That you might as well be in either of the worlds?  That, after all, the considerations to 
which Strawson calls our attention are equally applicable, and just as comforting (or 
distressing), wherever we happen to be?  To the extent that this is a reasonable response, 
it suggests that the historical association between determinism and epiphenomenalism 
that we noted in the last chapter is not simply a confusion, and that Burge’s contention 
that worries about epiphenomenalism probably have their roots in “libertarian worries 
about free will” (1993: 116) is not far off the mark.  The doctrine of epiphenomenalism 
has a decidedly counterintuitive ring—but that fact does not illuminate why most of us 
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greet a serious consideration of its being true with horror.  We do want it to be false, 
something will have been lost if it turned out to be true.  But it is hard to see what this 
would be if it isn’t just the sort of freedom and responsibility that Strawson fails to 
secure. 
 
3.4.4 Causal Relevance and Counterfactual Dependence 
I wish now to discuss another popular response to the exclusion argument, one that we 
briefly touched on in connection with anomalous monism, which involves construing 
causal relevance in terms of counterfactual dependence and exploiting the notion of 
supervenience (or some other notion equally suited to the task of grounding the truth of 
the counterfactuals in question).  Although we have discussed this strategy in brief, its 
popularity warrants a more thorough treatment. 
 Let’s begin by examining the counterfactual account of physical causation, and 
move on from there to its application to the problem at hand.  Counterfactual accounts are 
broadly Humean.  Recall that Hume defined a cause as “an object followed by another, 
and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the 
second.  Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second had never 
existed” (1993: 51).  But this is not the same definition twice stated; the first definition 
represents the “constant-conjunction-over-kinds-of-objects” account, an account which 
has enjoyed a degree of popularity up through the twentieth century, whereas the second 
identifies causation with the notion of counterfactual dependence. 
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 This second definition equating causal and counterfactual dependence suffered 
neglect until relatively recently for understandable reasons: since no one knew exactly 
what to do with counterfactuals (they cannot easily be understood in terms of any other 
conditional because they are neither truth functional nor equivalent to strict entailment, 
neither can they easily be thought of as truncated arguments of a kind), it didn’t appear 
that employing them in theoretical accounts of causation would be particularly helpful.  
But with the advent of David Lewis’s and Robert Stalnaker’s work on the logic and 
semantics of counterfactuals, philosophers found they had new and powerful tools to 
apply to an analysis of causation. 
 Lewis (1983) himself proposed a counterfactual theory of causation according to 
which causal dependence and counterfactual dependence were coextensive, as follows: 
 
(CD) e causally depends on c iff (~Oc □→ ~Oe), 
 
that is, c causes e just in case, if c hadn’t occurred then neither would have e.  Lewis’s 
account gives us the intuitively right results in a number of cases.  But some philosophers 
(Kim 1973, Tooley 1987, Koons 2000) have rejected the account because of (among 
other reasons) counterexamples to both the sufficiency and necessity of counterfactual 
dependence in clear instances of causal transactions.   
 With respect to counterfactual dependence as a necessary condition, it is clear that 
cases of redundant causation, such as preemption and simultaneous overdetermination, 
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raise prima facie difficulties for Lewis’s account.  For suppose that c in fact causes e, but 
that the occurrence of c preempts a distinct potential cause, c′, of e.  In the absence of c, 
c′ would not have been preempted and would have continued on its trajectory 
culminating in the occurrence of e, thereby falsifying the counterfactual.  This difficulty 
can be met by assuming that events are fragile, in the sense that their causal histories are 
essential to them (for then c′ would have caused some other event e′ rather than e), but 
such a response seems to empty the counterfactual account of content, trivializing the 
thesis.  Moreover, if we assume that events are thus fragile, it becomes clear that 
counterfactuals of the form (~Oe □→ ~Oc) are verifiable in any instance where c causes 
e (a result which can be derived, incidentally, independently of the fragility assumption), 
making difficulties for causal directionality.46    
 And there are troubles for counterfactual dependence considered as sufficient for 
causal dependence as well.  Suppose, for example, that an event c causes two distinct 
events, e and e′.  We know that if c hadn’t occurred, then neither would have e, but we 
also know that if e weren’t to occur then it would follow that c wouldn’t have occurred, 
and from the non-occurrence of c we may infer the non-occurrence of e′.  So it looks as 
though e′ is counterfactually dependent upon e, even though, ex hypothesi, e did not 
cause e′.  Further, there are examples of clearly epiphenomenal processes that satisfy 
                                                 
46 The fragility of a given event could be defined more weakly, so that only the exact time or the exact 
manner and intrinsic details of an event are essential to it.  But these adjustments will spuriously count non-
causes as causes in many instances.  To use Lewis’s own example, one member of a firing squad (of ten, 
say) might refrain from firing at a criminal, thereby altering the exact time and intrinsic details of the man’s 
death.  But it seems a strain to count our marksman as a cause of the criminal’s death. 
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counterfactual dependence.  Consider the mirror reflection of two colliding billiard balls.  
If the reflection of ball 1 had not moved in the way it did, the reflection of ball 2 wouldn’t 
have moved in the way it did either.  But the reflections of these balls are not causally 
related, the apparently causal process is a mere epiphenomenon of the real causal process 
occurring between the balls themselves.47 
 Not surprisingly, these difficulties (particularly the latter sort) resurface when the 
counterfactual account is invoked to secure the causal relevance of nonphysical 
properties in a causally closed world.  Philosophers who have attempted to make use of 
the counterfactual account of causation in this connection include LePore and Lower 
(1987), Horgan (1989), and others.  The accounts are very similar, but I shall focus on 
Horgan’s because his requirements for causal relevance include those put forth by LePore 
and Loewer and the difficulties with his approach involving those requirements will 
transfer to theirs as well. 
 Horgan defines a notion of ‘quausal relevance’, according to which a property F 
of c is quausally relevant to an effect e and property G of e if c qua F causes e qua G, or 
                                                 
47 This example is due to Jonathan Edwards.  It is quoted in, among other places, Kim (1993).  It should be 
noted that Lewis wanted to extend his theory to cover cases of ‘chancy’ causation so that it would be 
compatible with an indeterminate (at some level) universe. The probabilistic account runs thus:  
(CCD) e has a chancy causal dependence on c just in case:  
∃x∃y∃t((O(c,t) & Cht(e) = x) & (~O(c) □→ Cht(e) = y) & x >>y). 
In other words, just if c significantly raises the probability of e.  But (CCD) runs into difficulties precisely 
similar to those faced by (CD).  Imagine the following case of preemptive overdetermination.  There are 
two distinct potential causes, c and c′, of e.  e has a probability of .7 on c, and a probability of .3 on c′.  
Suppose c′ preempts c, and chancy-causes e.  Then c′ chancy-causes e despite the fact that c′ significantly 
lowers the probability that e. 
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if e has G “in virtue of” c’s having F.  His aim is to show that mental properties are 
quausally relevant to physical causal transactions, that is, that events qua mental are 
causally relevant to other events (qua physical or mental).  Horgan, LePore and Loewer 
are all three concerned to show that Davidson’s anomalous monism does not entail the 
causal irrelevance of mental properties.  But any account exculpating anomalous monism 
would certainly be powerful enough to vindicate alternative nonreductive accounts with 
less stringent views on the nature of causal relations, as they realize.  If, however, they 
fail to get mental properties into the causal network on these less stringent accounts they 
will likewise have failed to defend anomalous monism, and the failure will be of a 
broader significance.  So I am going to present the gist of the counterfactual defense 
without any special reference to the distinctive theses of anomalous monism.   
Horgan’s suggestion runs as follows (1989: 50): 
For any two events c and e and any two properties F and G, c qua F causes e qua G iff: 
(i) c causes e; 
(ii) c instantiates F; 
(iii) e instantiates G; and 
(iv) the fact that c instantiates F is explanatorily relevant to the fact that e occurs and 
instantiates G. 48 
                                                 
48 One further proviso that Horgan and LePore and Loewer mention is that the properties, F and G, in 
question, must be “logically and metaphysically independent” (Horgan, p. 58).  The proviso “is intended to 
exclude cases in which the connection between F and G is conceptual/metaphysical rather than causal, e.g., 
c’s being the cause of e is [causally relevant] to e’s being caused by c, when c does cause e” (LePore and 
Loewer, p. 635). 
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Condition (iv) is of course the crucial one.  Horgan reasons that what is required for the 
satisfaction of (iv) is “a wider pattern of counterfactual dependence of the occurrence and 
non-occurrence of events with property G upon the occurrence or non-occurrence of 
events with property F” (p. 58).  He, as well as the other defenders of the counterfactual 
relevance defense, is quite aware of the difficulties faced by counterfactual accounts of 
causation.  They maintain, however, that these problems all involve some “familiar kind 
of non-standard feature which makes problems for analyses of causation generally” 
(Horgan, p. 56) and since they are “problems which confront every account of causation” 
(LePore and Loewer, p. 635) they propose to bracket the difficulties for present purposes.  
Of course, philosophers who are suspicious about counterfactual accounts in general will 
surely be hesitant to bracket these difficulties.  As Robert Koons writes, “if we have no 
reason to believe that counterfactuals can capture the essence of causation, we have little 
reason to accept that such counterfactuals can provide a sufficient condition for causation 
in disputed cases.”49 But suppose that we go ahead and bracket them all the same. 
 Having made these concessions, we can turn to Horgan’s explication of (iv).  He 
explains that (iv) is satisfied if and only if the following counterfactuals hold:  
(a) Fc □→ Ge; and (b) ~Fc □→ ~Ge.  In evaluating (a) and (b), we look to the set, 
P[c,e], of ‘pertinently similar worlds’, where each member of P[c,e] contains a situation 
pertinently similar to the situation in which c causes e in the actual world.  This set of 
                                                 
49 Teleological and Mental Causation seminar lecture (April 2003). 
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world provides the similarity metric allowing us to appraise the counterfactuals along 
Lewis/Stalnaker lines. 
 Horgan does not undertake the task of giving a systematic account of what 
determines the class of pertinently similar worlds (relative to some causal transaction), 
nor does he attempt to explain what standards govern the transworld pertinent-similarity 
relation.  But neither are we left wholly with our intuitions in the matter, for he maintains 
that, typically, when a mental event c causes another event e, the following principle, 
which he calls “Supervenient Relevance,” holds for the salient mental and physical 
properties (F and G) in question: 
 
(S.R.) For any world w in P[c,e], if c* is the event in w that is pertinently similar to c of 
the actual world W, then (i) c* instantiates F in w, and (ii) c* causes (in w) an 
event e* that both instantiates G and is pertinently similar to c [sic –  e] of W. (p. 
61) 
 
Principle (S.R.) expresses the “supervenient relevance” of F and G, which is crucial to 
the defense.  It is “of no small importance,” says Horgan, that “mental properties are 
supervenient, in the way here described;” for the notion of supervenience is the best 
contender for the modal principle needed to ground the claim that “there could not occur 
an event c* (or an event e*) which is pertinently similar to the actual world’s cause (or 
effect) and yet lacks the property F (or G)” (p. 72, n. 31).  Jerry Fodor’s remarks reveal a 
similar assessment of the importance of supervenience: “mind/brain supervenience 
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(and/or mind/brain identity) is…the best idea that anyone has had so far about how 
mental causation is possible…if mind/brain supervenience goes, the intelligibility of 
mental causation goes with it” (1987: 30, 41).   
 So we evidently need supervenience for the counterfactual defense to fly.  And 
the notion of supervenience particularly well suited to this task is that of strong 
supervenience.  Recall the definition of strong supervenience given above: 
 
3.. Where A and B are two sets of properties, A strongly supervenes on B if 
and only if □(∀x)(∀F∈A)[Fx → (∃G∈B)(Gx & □(∀y)(Gy → Fy))]. 
 
Now we are in a position to see how (SS) complements (S.R.), allowing us to verify the 
relevant counterfactuals, (a) and (b).  With these tools in place, we can construct a 
counterfactual defense of the relevance of mental properties as follows.   
 Suppose that a mental event c causes some event e; and suppose that the property 
in virtue of which c is a mental event is F, and that e is a physical event of type G.  Let us 
say that c is a physical event of type F*, and that c’s being F* makes it the case both that 
c is F and that c causes e.  That is, we assume that the physical property F* is a member 
of the set of properties upon which the class of mental properties strongly supervenes, 
and we further assume that this instance of F* both determines the instantiation of F, and 
grounds the causal relation between c and e.  Now: How is the fact that c has F—a 
nonphysical property—causally or explanatorily relevant to e’s having G?  According to 
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Horgan, we can establish its relevance (and thereby satisfy condition (iv)) by verifying 
the claims (a) Fc □→ Ge and (b) ~Fc □→ ~Ge, as follows.  Suppose ~Fc.  Then, by 
(SS), we know that c cannot instantiate any physical property that nomologically 
guarantees the instantiation of F.  But F*, we have supposed, is one such property.  So if 
~Fc, we are licensed in concluding that ~F*c.  But F* was what made it the case that c 
caused e (or what made it the case that e had G), and, since we’ve bracketed out 
overdetermination and the like, ~F*c gives us ~Ge.  So, (~Fc □→ ~Ge), or (b), is true, as 
desired.  And, for similar reasons, the closest set of pertinently similar worlds in which 
Fc are worlds in which Ge, which verifies (a), or (Fc □→ Ge).  Hence, given (SS) and 
our scheme for evaluating counterfactuals, it is quite possible for mental events qua 
mental to be causally and explanatorily relevant to physical transactions, which means 
that (iv) is satisfied and the threat of epiphenomenalism has been deposed.   
 Now I have presented a very skeletal summary of Horgan’s defense, neglecting to 
mention all of the characteristic subtleties and provisos that typify a carefully constructed 
argument.  I have done this in part to avoid too much prolixity, but mostly because I think 
it is pretty obvious that the nonreductivist can get the counterfactuals he needs in some 
way or other and it just doesn’t seem worth arguing about.  So I am simply going to 
assume that if counterfactual relevance suffices for causal (hence explanatory) relevance, 
then the Horgan-LePore-Loewer defense is successful, and I am likewise going to ignore, 
at their bidding, the “non-standard feature” problems that beset counterfactual analyses of 
causation.  
 143
 But counterfactual relevance doesn’t suffice for causal (hence explanatory) 
relevance.  I hinted at this in connection with anomalous monism, but the point warrants 
reiteration and clarification: We do not need to invoke any theoretical difficulties 
involving cases of redundant causation and the like in order to see that certain properties 
can be counterfactually relevant to a given causal transaction precisely because they are 
epiphenomena of the properties that are responsible for the causal transaction in question. 
Suppose for example that whenever I turn on my sprinkler a rainbow appears over 
my lawn, and suppose further that the climate in which I live is such that my lawn is 
nourished only when I turn on my sprinkler.  It follows that if a rainbow hadn’t appeared 
over my lawn, my lawn wouldn’t have been nourished.50 Now we can concede for 
purposes of argument that the appearance of the rainbow could be, under certain 
contrived conditions, relevant to my knowing that the lawn’s been nourished.  But it just 
seems clear that the rainbow is not causally relevant to the nourishing of the lawn, and I 
take it that it is the clear kind of causal relevance, the causal relevance with some oomph, 
that those who are worried about mental causation are after.  And counterfactual 
relevance just lacks the oomph.  Thus, as David Robb points out, “neither nomological 
nor counterfactual dependence is enough to secure the causal relevance of a property, 
mental or otherwise,” because cases like the one above can arise in which “an effect 
depends nomologically or counterfactually on a property, but only because that property 
is itself a mere result, an epiphenomenon, of the properties that do the real causal work” 
(1997: 181).  And if all the “causal relevance” that a mental property can have is the sort 
                                                 
50 This sentence is not intended to express a back-tracking conditional. 
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of relevance enjoyed by the rainbow, then the distinction between causally relevant and 
epiphenomenal properties seems to be a distinction without a difference.51 
 Further, to take up again the theme we uncovered in our discussion of explanatory 
irrealism, if the counterfactual story constitutes a successful defense of nonphysical 
properties then it seems equally suitable to the task of securing the relevance of 
nonphysical events as well.  That is, if the counterfactual defense saves nonreductive 
physicalism, I see no reason why it couldn’t be employed to the same effect by the 
interactionist substance dualist.  All we need to do is define a principle specifying an 
appropriate modal nexus between (nonphysical) mental and physical events.  Here’s one 
for starters.  Suppose we define a “Cartesian Intermingling” relation along the lines of 
(SS), thus: 
  
(CI) Let A be a set of mental states and B be a set of physical states; then the 
states in A intermingle with the states in B iff: □(∀x)(∀M∈A) (x is a mental 
substance & x is in M) → ∃y∃P∈B(y is a physical substance & y is in P & 
□(∀number n of z’s) if there are at least n z’s such that z is a physical 
substance & z is in P → there are at least n u’s such that u is a mental 
substance and u is in M))). 
 
                                                 
51 If my “rainbow” counterexample is unconvincing, consult the examples provided in Robb (1997) and 
Van Gulick (1993). 
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And now the Cartesian can simply mimic the reasoning of Horgan above.  How is 
a mental substance S’s having M, a nonphysical event, at all relevant to the physical 
effects issuing from the neural states of the physical body P with which S allegedly 
intermingles?  After all, there seems to be an unbroken causal chain leading from 
neurological events in P to the physical effects in the external world; so how can mental 
events fit in the picture?  Answer: Suppose the mental event in question hadn’t occurred, 
that is, suppose S had not been in state M.  Then P wouldn’t have been in the neural state, 
N, that it in fact was, on the strength of (CI).  But then the physical events which were 
caused by N likewise wouldn’t have occurred, or at least wouldn’t have been the same 
sorts of events they in fact were.  So S’s being in M was causally relevant to the physical 
processes here considered.  So nonphysical events are causally relevant to physical 
events.  QED. 
(CI) is, perhaps, not exactly what the Cartesian is after—although Descartes is 
clear enough that “Whenever this part of the brain [i.e., the part where the ‘common 
sense’ is said to reside] is disposed in the same manner, it presents the same thing to the 
mind, even if the other parts of the body are able meanwhile to be related in diverse 
ways” (1993: 56-57).  But the point is that if this is all the Cartesian has in mind he 
cannot be charged with the causal irrelevance of nonphysical events.  Which means that 
Cartesian dualism is compatible with every physical event’s having only physical events 
in its causal history after all, and the causal interaction problem has been solved.  And 
there’s no reason to stop with Descartes!  Leibniz, for instance, could simply appeal to 
the doctrine of divinely pre-established harmony in order to ground the appropriate 
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mental to physical counterfactuals, thus showing that his parallelism52 doesn’t have the 
implausible consequences he himself was quite willing to embrace.  So here is the upshot 
of the counterfactual defense just rehearsed: if it’s successful, nobody gets to be an 
epiphenomenalist!  And that just doesn’t seem like the right result.  Causal relevance, at 
least if we want to motivate the physicalism, cannot come this cheap. 
 Here again there is a parallel between the mental causation and free will debates 
that is worth our consideration.  Terence Horgan claims that the nonreductive physicalist 
is committed to a “kind of compatibilism” about the two claims that physical causal 
processes are inviolate, but that nonphysical properties make a causal difference anyway.  
And he proceeds to cash out their compatibility by recourse to counterfactual 
conditionals.  His choice of words in describing the commitments of nonreductive 
physicalism is probably not intended to suggest anything about the free will problem, but 
I think it is suggestive.  For the reasons that we (or I, anyway) find counterfactual 
analyses of causal relevance wanting in this context are the same reasons for which 
counterfactual or conditional analyses of freedom and ability seem so inadequate.53  
Our present concern is with mental properties.  The worry is that simply pointing 
to certain mentalistic counterfactuals isn’t enough to show that such properties actually 
                                                 
52 Or a crude version of it anyway.  It seems likely that Leibniz, at least in the later years, was a 
thoroughgoing phenomenalist, and it is not clear to me that he was committed to any standard form of 
epiphenomenalism. 
53 In what follows I simply try to draw up an analogy between the counterfactual strategies in both 
domains; I do not claim that the compatibilist about free will and determinism is somehow committed to 
the ‘counterfactual relevance’ approach to the problem of mental causation. 
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get into the causal picture in any interesting way, since the very conditions that make the 
counterfactuals true seem to preclude their having any real causal relevance.  Indeed, 
some time before the mental causation debate picked up the momentum it has today—
and long before the counterfactual relevance defense had been explicitly formulated—
counterfactual relevance alone was commonly viewed, not as an indication of a causal 
relation, but as an indication of its absence.  According to Paul Meehl and Wilfrid Sellars, 
for example, the mere counterfactual relevance of a higher-level property H to a lower-
level property L “is at least part of what is meant by calling H an epiphenomenon.  And, 
indeed, if there were no other difference between H-situations and non-H-situations [than 
that the former are also L-situations whereas the latter are not], H would be 
epiphenomenal” (1956: 242).  And C.D. Broad noted in like fashion that the truth of 
mentalistic counterfactuals (in the circumstances Horgan describes) is precisely what 
would allow the epiphenomenalist to maintain that some physical event couldn’t have 
occurred unless a given mental event preceded it, and “consistently deny that these 
[mental events] have any effect on the movements of our bodies” (1925: 117).54   
And now consider our choices and actions.  One compatibilist suggestion we’ve 
encountered is that we have all the freedom we could want because our actions are 
counterfactually dependent upon the choices or volitions that lead to them.  But again, the 
conditions that ground the counterfactuals, according to the determinist, are facts about 
the history of the world conjoined with certain natural laws.  Just as mental properties are 
                                                 
54 Norman Malcolm makes essentially the same remarks in his (1968, section 8), but argues that, despite 
appearances, epiphenomenalism necessarily lacks the resources to ground the counterfactuals in question.  I 
think this claim is mistaken, but I do not think anything of substance hangs on the question. 
 148
relevant to physical effects because had they been different their physical correlates 
likewise would have been different, and this latter difference would suffice for a 
difference in physical effects, in a similar way, my actions are “up to me” or dependent 
upon by my choices because, had I chosen differently, the world would have to have been 
different in some salient respect and this difference in the world would have sufficed for 
some difference in my behavior.  Now I have urged that we’re missing something crucial 
in the first case—that the counterfactuals in question might be true but they are not, for 
all that, true for the right reasons.  And precisely the same thing can be said respecting 
counterfactual analyses of freedom.  The insights of Broad, Meehl and Sellars can in fact 
be easily assimilated by the libertarian in his rejection of compatibilist-conditional free 
choice.  To say that my choices are “up to me” only in the sense that, if the appropriate 
causal antecedents had been different prior to the formation of my choice I would have 
chosen differently, is at least part of what is meant by saying that the choice wasn’t up to 
me.  And the counterfactual analysis of freedom is precisely what would allow us to 
affirm that we “could have done otherwise” and consistently deny that we were able or 
free to do anything other than what we in fact did.  (Recall O’Connor’s words: “An 
‘ability’ to act here and now, the actual exercise of which strictly requires a prior 
condition that is lacking and which I cannot in any way contribute to bringing about, is, 
in the sense at issue, no ability at all” (2000a: 17).) 
But just what is missing from these analyses, then?  In the first case, even if we 
grant the truth of the mentalistic counterfactuals the relevance of mental properties with 
respect to our actions appears pickwickian at best, for they clearly do not bring about or 
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contribute to or produce the underlying physical processes that themselves suffice for any 
of our actions.  A complaint like this one can of course be lodged against any Hume-
inspired view of causality, simply because such views tend to ignore the productive 
element of our concept of causation and leave us with a ghostly surrogate.  But this 
general worry carries a special significance in the present context, in that mental 
properties (in their guise as “supervenient causes”) appear to be all the more ghostly; and, 
given their central role in the production of action, they need to provide the agent with a 
more robust “foothold” if he is to bring about changes in the world.  Indeed, Jaegwon 
Kim seems to me entirely correct in holding that 
[If] there is no productive causation anywhere, then there is no mental causation 
anywhere and the fear, common among philosophers and nonphilosophers alike, that 
physicalism, or physics, takes away human agency, would be amply warranted.  Why do 
we care about mental causation?  Because, first and foremost, we care about human 
agency.  To save agency, however, we need the productive concept of causation: we want 
agents, in virtue of the beliefs and desires and intentions they hold, to cause their limbs to 
move in appropriate ways and thereby produce changes in their physical surroundings.  I 
don’t think the kinds of dependencies that can be captured by counterfactuals alone 
would be enough to do the job. (Kim 2002: 675) 
It may be the case, he continues, that there are only “‘constant conjunctions’ or functional 
relationships (perhaps with modal force of some kind) in basic physics”—but if that is so, 
and if agency exists at all, it would need to be true that productive causality “emerges,” as 
he puts it, at higher macro-levels (p. 677).   
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Although I am less sanguine than Kim about the prospects of counterfactual 
analyses of causation even in the case of basic physics, I think his priorities are 
unquestionably correct.  Whatever else an action may be it is the production of an agent, 
something that he does or makes happen.  Understanding this special relation between an 
agent and his actions in purely event-causal terms is already difficult enough, but when 
the intentional states we take to be the crucial causal components of actions are relevant 
to them only in the way here envisaged—as counterfactually relevant because “linked,” 
after a manner, with the underlying physical causes—it becomes even harder to see how 
a sequence of neural impulses and muscle movements could amount to a doing. 
 This assessment may help to shed some light on what is missing from the 
conditional analysis of freedom, and it should also help us to see from another angle how 
the problems of mental causation and free will overlap.  It is natural to associate the idea 
of an agent’s producing or bringing something about with the notion that he is the source 
or the originator or author of it, in the sense that it was up to him then and there whether 
he would bring the thing about or not.  (I do not claim that such ‘agential production’ 
cannot be instantiated in a deterministic world—I’m not sure that can be shown—only 
that, and I think this is a significant fact about us, we do tend to connect the ideas of 
production and ultimate origination in our thinking about human agency.)55 If, as the 
                                                 
55 Recall Thomas Reid’s dictum that “power to produce any effect, implies power not to produce it” (1969: 
35).  Compare also John Searle: “…the sense that ‘I am making this happen’ carries with it the sense that ‘I 
could be doing something else’” (1984: 95), and Randolph Clarke: “When an agent acts with free will, she 
is able to do other than perform the action that she actually performs; she has a choice about whether she 
performs that action; what she does is up to her.  On such an occasion, the agent determines, herself, what 
she does; she is an ultimate source or origin or initiator of her behavior” (2003: 15). 
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libertarian believes, determinism removes such authorship because determined agents 
cannot be viewed as the ultimate originators of their acts, it is no wonder that an analysis 
of freedom consistent with determinism should pass over what might be considered the 
definitive ability of free agents, the ability to be the creators and sustainers of their own 
ends and purposes (Kane 1996).  By libertarian lights, it is this distinctive involvement of 
the agent in authoring his decisions and, consequently, his actions, which the conditional 
analysis of freedom fails to respect.  Just as mental states are not “behind” their effects in 
the right sort of way when their relevance to action is merely counterfactual, neither are 
agents “behind” their choices in the right sort of way if the latter are the inevitable results 
of all that has come before.  If agents are thus physically determined then instead of 
beings actors in the world, they take on the appearance of poor victims (or, as the case 
may be, lucky beneficiaries) of circumstances over which they really have no say; they 
appear, in a word, epiphenomenal.   
It is for this reason, as Galen Strawson has argued, that serious reflection on the 
thesis of physical determinism should leave one with the impression that the agent-self—
our concept of which “is of a profoundly libertarian cast” (1986: 97)—simply disappears 
from the scene, engulfed in that relentless tide of events.56 A sustained confrontation with 
the possibility that physical determinism is the sober truth, Strawson writes, “should have 
the effect of erasing any sense of the presence of a freely deciding and acting ‘I’ in one’s 
thoughts; for—so it seems—there is simply no role for such an ‘I’ to play” (pp. 96-97).  
The same effect is achieved, I claim, at an apparently lower level of analysis, when we 
                                                 
56 See also Derk Pereboom (2001), John Bishop (1989), J. David Velleman (1992). 
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consider the possibility that what occurs in the minds of agents bears only a 
counterfactual relevance to the physical goings-on we think of as their behavior.  
Whether or not absence is the right way to characterize the status of agents in the first 
case or of mentality in the second, it does appear that both agents and their minds take on 
a paler, less significant, more ghostly hue.  And, once more, this stripping of genuine 
agency from the world can be achieved equally well from either of two routes.  
Determinism or epiphenomenalism, no matter; the end result is the same.   
It may reasonably be urged in response to all this that insofar as the absence of 
genuine agency in Strawson’s scenario is brought about by physical determinism, it 
would be unduly optimistic to assume that a satisfactory solution to the problem of 
mental causation—one that goes beyond the mere counterfactual relevance of the mind—
will allow us to see how the ideal of agent-as-free-originator-of-his-acts could be 
satisfied.  The threats posed by epiphenomenalism and determinism may be similar, it 
might be thought, but not so similar that an adequate response to the first will in any way 
illuminate the problems for agency posed by the second.  I expect that this will be a 
common response to the idea that the problems of mental causation and free agency are 
as intimately intertwined as I’ve suggested; the assessment of John Bishop, for example, 
is fairly typical: 
Solving [the mind-body] problem alone [is] not enough: the reconciliatory naturalist57 
must also solve the problem of natural agency.  For, it is part of our self-conception as 
persons that we are initiators—agents whose actions make a difference to the course of 
                                                 
57 A reconciliatory naturalist is one who seeks to reconcile our commonsense view of ourselves with the 
findings of natural science. 
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events and who may be held responsible for the kinds of difference we make.  So, even if 
we completely understood how mentality has its place in physical nature, it would be a 
further step to explain how a natural system can be a responsible agent. (1990: 282)58 
But I demur from Bishop on this latter point; I think to the contrary that part of 
what it would be for a mind-body theory—and so a theory of mental causation—to be 
satisfactory, is precisely that it would contribute to our understanding of how agents 
might possibly be free actors.  Any account of mental causation that fails to illuminate 
this could not rightly be regarded as a “complete understanding” of the mind and its place 
in nature.  I sympathize, of course, with the intuition that no sequence of events—even if 
connected by robust, productive causal ties—could obviously amount to an agent’s 
acting.  But I do not see that the possibility of action is to be pursued anywhere else than 
in the nature of the mind and its relation to the body; after all, once these things have 
been exhaustively explained where else are we supposed to look?  And it seems to me, 
moreover, that no solution to the problem of mental causation will ultimately satisfy 
anyway unless it is constructed in clear view of the reason(s) why it matters to us that the 
apparent efficacy of mentality is a real phenomenon.59 
 
                                                 
58 Compare J. David Velleman: “Just as the mind-body problem is that of finding a mind at work amidst the 
workings of the body, so the problem of agency is finding an agent at work amidst the workings of mind” 
(1992). 
59 David Sosa states the point eloquently: “The problem of mental causation, at least in some of its forms, 
and the problem of freedom are two expressions of the deep metaphysical intuition that our minds, or 
anyway that we, are an independent source of causal effect.  Showing how that could be, how we can be 
spontaneous (without foregoing receptivity), would be to make substantial progress on both fronts at once” 
(1999: 5). 
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3.4.5 The Special Scientific Reductio 
No discussion of the causal exclusion argument would be complete without a look at one 
objection that has been voiced by virtually everybody who’s had a stake in defending 
nonreductive physicalism.  I have in mind the complaint that the causal exclusion 
argument, if sound, entails the causal impotence not only of the mental, but also of all of 
the properties appealed to in the special or autonomous sciences.  If the most fundamental 
layer of the world, the layer consisting just of the particles and properties of 
microphysics, is causally complete and inviolate, making no room for the intrusion of 
higher level causes, then the causal exclusion argument applies with equal force to the 
apparent causal processes appealed to by chemists, biologists, geologists, et al.  And that 
result, it is urged, should tip us off that “something is rotten in Denmark” (McLaughlin 
1989). 
 I concede there is an intuitive amount of force to this objection, but I should think 
that this untoward result does not imply that what’s rotten in Denmark is the reasoning of 
the causal exclusion argument: Quite possibly it’s one or more of the principles or 
commitments that gets the causal exclusion argument going and makes it such a 
challenge in the first place.  But I think the objection can be met in at least two ways.  
First, we might just accept that in the end, the regularities observed by the geologist, for 
example, are explainable without remainder in terms of the relations between the physical 
constituents of the geological objects and properties in question.  Unquestionably, it’s 
useful to appeal to geological properties and laws.  But to infer from the explanatory 
utility of these laws that there is some special level of geological causation would seem 
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unduly anthropocentric.  Why should nature care what we find explanatorily useful?  
How obvious is it anyway, that there really are fundamentally new causal powers at play 
in the various special sciences (especially the non-biologically based ones), when the 
properties invoked in those sciences are understood to be just mereological constructions 
of basic elements?  Why not think that the assumptions of the causal exclusion argument 
really do give us reason to question the efficacy of apparent causal processes occurring at 
all of the levels above physics, and not just at the level of psychology?  Surely there is 
something counterintuitive and revisionistic about this consequence.  It’s easy to point 
out that this result seems unintuitive and even easier to make fun of the lurking 
“Geoepiphobia!” (Fodor 1989); but neither of these responses does much in the way of 
showing where or how the exclusion argument goes awry.  
Moreover, and more importantly, to point out in defense of mental properties that 
if they’re not efficacious for the reasons adduced in the exclusion argument, then 
geological properties aren’t efficacious either, is hardly to argue from the greater to the 
lesser.  It’s much less troubling to grant that geological properties do not have their own 
special, distinctive and irreducible causal powers, than it is to maintain that mentality is 
in the same boat—that what it’s like to act is through and through illusory and that 
common sense psychology is a fiction.  Why is that?  David Sosa offers these revealing 
remarks: 
Whatever sort of independence the chemical (or biological, or geological, or…) domain 
has from the physical, that independence is not ground for the applicability of the 
distinctive set of concepts that characterize the mental.  “Normativity” may serve to 
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indicate the complex of properties that constitute the possibility of human dignity and 
disgrace, or of admiration and resentment.  Our philosophical problem is precisely that 
the physical world seems, intuitively, ill-suited to be understood in those terms.  None of 
the special sciences (other than those that themselves implicate psychological concepts, 
such as, for example, sociology) clothe the physical world in concepts that suit it better 
for such an understanding.  But psychological properties clearly do. 
Sosa continues: 
Suppose we were to solve the exclusion problem for the (non-psychological) special 
sciences, suppose we were to show how chemical explanations could maintain their full 
significance…even alongside more basic explanations couched in the vocabulary of 
physics.  Such a “solution,” however, could not simply transfer over to the case of the 
psychological.  If the explanatory relevance of the mental, in relation to the physical, 
were like that of the chemical, this would threaten the distinctive character of the mental.  
Any solution to the mind-body exclusion problem should be disanalogous to any solution 
to whatever chemical-physical exclusion problem there might be. (2001: 12-13) 
 My sympathies are with Sosa.  Much more needs saying about the distinctive 
character of the mental than what little I’ve already said, and I intend to take up that task 
below.  For now, though, I think we have adequate reason to say that geology (and the 
like) is in a category far too dissimilar from psychology to be usefully appealed to when 
the causal relevance of mental properties is at stake.  For our concerns are not in the end 
merely with causal relevance (although we clearly need it) but with causal relevance of a 
salient sort.  Even, however, if we restrict our focus to causal relevance simpliciter, the 
special scientific eduction does not provide us with any clues as to how this more 
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fundamental metaphysical challenge might be met.  It seems to me nothing more than the 
protest that psychological properties simply can’t be irrelevant to the physical processes 
involved in our behavior, that epiphenomenalism simply must be wrong, which we 
already knew independently of any considerations about the potency of mountains and 
minerals.  This response does not, then, provide us with an answer to the problem.  It 
simply reaffirms the conviction that an answer must be out there and that somebody 
needs to find it. 
* * * 
In this chapter we’ve conducted a whirlwind tour of the problem of mental 
causation, examining how it arises in competing metaphysical systems and analyzing 
various purported solutions to it.  My aim has been not only to motivate the importance 
of the problem (and with it the related conviction that a metaphysics that gives us an 
account of the causal efficacy of the mental is worth buying even if it means making 
some ontological adjustments), but also to unearth some of the subtler connections 
between that problem and the problem of free will.  Since nonreductive physicalism is the 
most widely held position on the mind-body relation, I have lingered over the problem as 
it confronts nonreductivist theories in specific forms (such as anomalous monism), and in 
general.  I do not think that anyone has discovered a successful solution to the problem as 
it confronts nonreductive physicalism.  Indeed, I think it is primarily the failure to 
satisfactorily resolve this problem that is responsible for the re-emergence (sorry) of 
emergentism, and also for the reappearance of reductionist views as serious contenders.  
Before leaving the present chapter, therefore, I want to examine the solution to this 
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problem that a reductive, type physicalism is meant to provide.60 I will argue that, while 
reductionist views about the mind are both more robust and defensible than may typically 
be assumed, they do not, in the end, provide us with a genuine solution to the problem of 
mental causation. 
 
3.5 Reductionism Revisited 
There is something attractive about the ontological simplicity of reductionism, especially 
for those philosophers whose tastes run to desert landscapes.  And many have thought 
that reductive physicalism, if it can be made to work, would solve the problem we’ve 
been dealing with.  If mental states and properties (in all their glory) just are physical 
states and properties, then the problem of mental causation seemingly reduces to the 
problem of causation simpliciter.  Naturally, we would still be left with all sorts of work 
to do, but mental causation would at least be no less mysterious than physical causation, 
we’re told, and theorists could either turn their attention to the latter or at any rate rest 
assured that there is no special difficulty about the former. 
 But isn’t reductionism dead?  For the successful reduction of one theory to 
another requires that the predicates of the theory targeted for reduction be definable in 
terms of unique, nomologically coextensive predicates in the lower-level reducing theory; 
i.e., that higher-level properties are reduced to lower-level ones only when there exists an 
appropriately modalized biconditional “bridge law” relating the properties in question.  
                                                 
60 I shall consider a few emergentist solutions to the problem of mental causation (together with some 
possible upshots of that doctrine for the metaphysics of freedom) in an appendix. 
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And this is just what the multiple realizability of mental properties shows us is not 
possible.   
 But there is a lot to be gained if mental types are reductively identifiable with 
physical types.  Consequently, some philosophers have attempted to reconcile the 
phenomenon of multiple realizability with mind-body reductionism, either by trying to 
show how the foregoing view of theoretic reduction (associated with Ernest Nagel 1961) 
is consistent with the type identity theory, or by calling Nagel’s account of reduction 
itself into question.  In this chapter we’ll examine these strategies for salvaging type 
physicalism.  Along the way, however, I want to question just how reductionism is 
supposed to be related to property type identifications.  We will have to get clearer on 
what property types are supposed to be and how various reductionist strategies are 
relevant, or not, to the type identity thesis.  To find our way into these thorny issues, we 
will begin with the question whether a given mental property can be legitimately reduced 
to the disjunction of its possible physical realizers, and what the ontological status of 
such a disjunction might be. 
 
3.5.1 Disjunctive Properties and Nomic Kinds 
What is it for a physical property to realize a mental property?  Talk of realization is not 
metaphysically neutral, for it connotes a conception of mental properties according to 
which they are in some sense constituted by physical properties (such as neural states).  
When a mental property is realized in a physical property of some creature, that mental 
property is in some sense nothing above and beyond its physical realizer.  For example, 
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the mental property in question can be extrinsically defined in terms of its causal role, as 
per functionalism, so that a physical (or non-mental) property counts as being a mental 
property because it plays the causal role specified.  Relatedly, mental properties can be 
thought of as second-order properties—properties of first-order properties—where the 
first-order properties are physical and have the second-order property by virtue of their 
relations to inputs, outputs, and other mental properties.  In either case (although in the 
latter case there need be no commitment to type physicalism) we have a paradigm 
example of the mental property being “realized by” or “implemented in” the appropriate 
physical property. 
I take it that what the type identity theorist wants (or what she needs) is a way of 
specifying the relation between mental properties and their physical realizers which 
ensures that the latter “capture” everything about the former—that is, we need a way of 
showing that what mental properties are can be specified, without remainder, in the terms 
describing their physical realizers.  As we’ve seen, something like the following principle 
was advocated by the identity theorists of the mid-twentieth century: 
 
For each mental kind predicate M, there is some unique, nomologically 
coextensive physical kind predicate P such that, as a matter of law, for any x, x 
has M at a time t iff x has P at t. 
 
But this principle fell into disrepute in the wake of Putnam’s and others’ 
arguments for the multiple realizability of the mental.  It is now commonly believed that, 
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although a creature’s having a given physical property P suffices for the instantiation of 
the mental property M which P realizes, having P is not necessary for the instantiation of 
M, since M can be realized by physical states diverse from P.  For example, pain could 
well be realized in humans, squirrels and Martians, but the physical realizers of pain are 
likely widely diverse in each of these species, resulting in a disjunction of physical states 
every disjunct of which realizes the same type of mental property, pain.  Since there is a 
disjunction of distinct physical realizers for any mental state, there will be no “unique, 
nomologically coextensive physical kind predicate” with which it can be paired.  Hence, 
it is thought that the reductionist program is no longer tenable.   
Here is a thought that might occur pretty quickly to anyone wishing to safeguard 
mind-body reductionism: why not take the disjunction of every physical property that 
realizes a given mental state, and let that be the nomologically coextensive physical kind 
predicate?  That is, why don’t we just say that mental properties are identical to their 
coextensive physical disjunctions?  If the disjunction includes every possible physical 
realizer of a particular mental property, it may well have infinitely many disjuncts.  But 
no matter, it will in any case be true that the disjunction is, as a matter of law, 
coextensive with the mental property, in the sense that any one of the disjuncts suffices 
for the instantiation of the mental property, and moreover, the instantiation of that mental 
property guarantees the instantiation of at least one of the physical properties in that 
disjunction.  Once we allow disjunctive predicates to be physical kinds, it follows that the 
reductionist principle above can be met despite the phenomenon of multiple realizability. 
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Hilary Putnam seems to anticipate this move, noting that “the brain-state theorist 
can save himself by ad hoc assumptions (e.g., defining the disjunction of two states to be 
a single ‘physical-chemical state’), but this does not have to be taken seriously” (1967: 
228).  However, as Jaegwon Kim complains, Putnam gives us no hint as to why a 
disjunction strategy cannot be given serious consideration: “If there is something deeply 
wrong with disjunctions of the sort involved here, that surely isn’t obvious; we need to go 
beyond a sense of unease…and develop an intelligible rationale for rejecting them” 
(1992: 316). 
Kim’s complaint has not gone unheeded.  Jerry Fodor’s classic paper on 
reductionism and the special sciences contains the seeds for something like the following 
line of response: the reduction of a special science such as psychology to physics 
requires, as we’ve seen, bridge laws that connect psychological kinds with physical 
kinds.  In order to underwrite a given psychological law, S → S*, therefore, it must be the 
case that there are physical kinds P and P* such that 
 
(1) S ↔ P 
(2) S* ↔ P* 
(3) P → P* 
 
(1) and (2) are “bridge laws” and (3) is a “proper law,” a law subsuming causal 
transactions between instances of P and P*.   
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Now, the story continues, any predicate appearing in any law (whether the law is 
a bridge law or a proper law), must be a kind predicate—that is, a predicate picking out a 
natural kind, whether psychological, physical, or whatever.  But the “problem all along 
has been that there is an open empirical possibility that what corresponds to the kind 
predicates of a reduced science may be a heterogeneous and unsystematic disjunction of 
predicates in the reducing science” (1974: 127).  This is a problem, according to Fodor, 
because such a disjunction of predicates could not itself be a natural kind.  And since 
heterogeneous and unsystematic disjunctions of predicates are not themselves kinds, they 
are not fit to appear in the antecedents or consequents of proper laws or bridge laws, for 
“a necessary condition on a universal generalization being lawlike is that the predicates 
which constitute its antecedent and consequent should be kind predicates” (ibid.). 
The kernel of the idea is that all natural kinds are nondisjunctive, and only natural 
kinds are nomic.  So, any disjunctive predicate either corresponds to no existent property, 
or corresponds to a property that never enters into law governed causal transactions.  
Given multiple realizability, we will not find bridge laws connecting kinds as specified in 
(1) and (2).  We will instead have to read ‘P’ and ‘P*’ as possibly infinitary disjunctions 
of physical kinds.  Perhaps this relationship between S and S* and P and P* is enough for 
a “bridge statement” or “bridge principle,” a useful empirical generalization of some kind 
between the two theories.61 But in any case, bridge statements are not bridge laws!  And 
neither could (3) any longer be considered a law, since there are no laws of the form, for 
                                                 
61 I take it that this is what it means to be a “bridge statement” or a “bridge principle.”  Fodor employs the 
first locution, Kim the latter, but neither (so far as I’m aware) spends much time explaining what these are 
supposed to be. 
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example, “(either the irradiation of green plants by sunlight or friction) causes (either 
carbohydrate synthesis or heat)” (p. 128).62 The upshot is supposed to be that since the 
identification of two property types requires that one can be reduced to the other, and 
since they cannot be so reduced for lack of connecting laws, mental types cannot be 
identified with physical types. 
There is something intuitively appealing and instructive in this.  Nevertheless, any 
theorist wishing to identify mental properties with disjunctive physical properties could 
surely complain that Fodor has given us no reason for disallowing such a reductive 
identification, but has simply insisted that we cannot do so.  For he has told us only that 
disjunctive properties are not natural kinds because they are not fit to figure into laws, 
which seemingly just pushes the question back one step: why can’t disjunctive properties 
figure into laws?  To reply that they cannot figure into laws because they aren’t natural 
kinds wouldn’t provide much of an answer.  We need to hear a rationale for thinking that 
(a) disjunctive properties cannot be natural kinds, or that in any event (b) they cannot be 
causally efficacious.  Giving such a rationale will require giving a story, perhaps 
eventually about laws, but certainly about the nature of properties and kinds.  We will 
need to know in the first instance whether property types can be disjunctive and, if they 
                                                 
62 Fodor suggests that ‘it’s a law that —’ defines a non truth functional context, so that even though the 
irradiation of green plants causes carbohydrate synthesis, and friction causes heat, the disjunctive law given 
above cannot be derived.  One untoward implication of analyzing natural kinds in terms of being fit to 
figure into natural laws is that natural kinds may turn out not to be natural kinds essentially.  For if we 
assume that the laws holding in the actual world hold contingently, then those properties figuring into laws, 
though they are natural kinds in the actual world, will not be natural kinds in some other possible world 
with different laws. 
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can’t, why they can’t.  This question clearly needs to be taken up before we ask whether 
disjunctive properties are natural kinds.  
The core of Fodor’s protests against “wildly disjunctive” properties involves two 
traditional roles that property types are meant to play.  First, they are to account for the 
resemblance of concrete particulars that have similar characteristics—they are meant to 
solve the “One Over Many” problem.  Second, usually it is the properties of objects or 
events that are taken to ground their causal powers; events are causally related in virtue 
of the sorts of events they are.  Fodor’s implicit suggestion is that disjunctive properties 
fail on both counts: they play no role in grounding genuine similarity and neither are they 
causally efficacious.  Let’s examine both of these charges. 
Begin with the view that property types are universals, abstract entities that are 
wholly present in every particular falling under the universal.  Are there any disjunctive 
universals?  I think it’s clear that some disjunctive predicates don’t correspond to any 
properties.  Take the predicate, ‘a toaster or a woodchuck’, for example.  Any object 
which is either a woodchuck or a toaster will be truly described by this predicate and, if it 
has a corresponding universal, any of those objects will fall under this purported 
universal.  But this universal certainly does nothing to explain the intrinsic resemblance 
between toasters and woodchucks: if there are any similarities that need accounting for, 
being a toaster or a woodchuck clearly is not one of them.   
So some disjunctive property types are ill-suited to the task of grounding the 
resemblance of resembling particulars.  Are those disjunctive physical properties that are 
candidates for a reduction base properties of this sort?  If we take the lesson of multiple 
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realizability seriously I think we have to concede they are.  Even adopting reasonable 
restrictions on the sorts of physical structures capable of implementing mental properties 
(such as those suggested by Ned Block 1997) they will still vary widely with respect to 
their intrinsic features.  This consideration clearly carries over whether we conceive of 
property types as universals or sets of exactly similar tropes or whatever.   
But what if disjunctive properties are needed to account for certain causal 
relations?  D.M. Armstrong (1989) and others have rejected disjunctive property types on 
the grounds that their instances could make no difference to the causal powers of a 
concrete particular.  But interestingly, an argument has been offered by Alan Penczek 
(1997) to the effect that we have good reason for allowing certain disjunctive properties 
into our ontology, and the reason is precisely that some of them are causally efficacious.  
And if causation requires subsumption by a law (even a ceteris paribus one), then it looks 
as though certain disjunctive properties should count as kinds for all intents and purposes, 
in which case we may have a way of legitimizing the reducibility of higher-level 
properties with disjunctive physical properties after all. 
Unfortunately, although I agree with Penczek that having a causal role to play 
justifies the admission of properties into our ontology, his defense of causally efficacious 
disjunctive properties is flawed on several levels.  First, he relies upon a counterfactual 
account of causation, according to which c causes e if it’s true that: if c had not occurred, 
then e would not have occurred either.  He notes that there are unresolved difficulties for 
counterfactual analyses of causation, but claims, without warrant, as it seems to me, that 
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if disjunctive properties come out causally efficacious on a counterfactual account then 
they should “meet alternative criteria as well” (p. 205).63   
Second, his examples of causally efficacious disjunctive properties admit to 
various alternative interpretations.  Drawing on an example of Stephen Yablo’s (1992), 
he asks us to imagine a pigeon named Sophie who has been conditioned to peck at red 
things and at triangles.  We’re to imagine that Sophie is presented with a red triangle, 
which causes her to peck.  Penczek claims that the causally relevant property in this case 
was red or triangle for the following reason: if the triangle had not been red, Sophie still 
would have pecked, and if a nontriangular red object had been presented to Sophie, again, 
she would have pecked anyway.  So, red alone wasn’t the causally relevant property, and 
neither was triangularity alone.  Furthermore, suggesting that Sophie pecked in virtue of 
the object’s being red and triangular “would be misleading, at best, since it suggests that 
neither the redness nor the triangularity is by itself sufficient for this effect.  Keep in 
mind that it is possible to condition a pigeon to peck specifically at objects that are both 
red and triangular” (pp. 205-206).  Only when Sophie has been so conditioned would it 
be appropriate to say that she pecked in virtue of the object’s being red and triangular, 
because in that case redness and triangularity would be jointly sufficient for the effect. 
I disagree.  I think saying that Sophie pecked “in virtue of the object’s red and in 
virtue of its being triangular” is misleading at worst.  There is a perfectly good sense in 
which both of these properties caused her to peck: it is a case of simultaneous 
                                                 
63 To get a feel for the difficulties faced specifically by counterfactual analyses of causal relevance, see 
David Braun’s (1995).  It is instructive to note that Braun does not hold that no disjunctive property can be 
causally relevant, and that his criticisms of counterfactual analyses are independent of that possibility. 
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overdetermination, where both properties were sufficient for the pecking and, as it turns 
out, both simultaneously caused her to peck.64 Penczek’s contention that this response is 
misleading calls our attention to the fact that “both properties caused her to peck” could 
be taken to mean that it was a case of joint causation, as he describes it.  But this is a 
point about causal explanation, not causation.  And the confusion is cleared up easily 
enough simply by saying, “both caused the pecking in that both were sufficient for it and 
the pecking was simultaneously overdetermined.”  I doubt, in paradigm cases of this kind 
of overdetermination, such as two assassins’ bullets piercing their victim’s heart 
simultaneously, we would be tempted to say that the victim’s death was caused by the 
disjunctive property, either being a firing of assassin 1’s gun or being a firing of assassin 
2’s gun.  Why should this case be any different? 
I think if we’re going to admit disjunctive properties into our ontology we are 
going to have to hold that they have no unique causal powers, but that any instance of 
that disjunctive property will have causal powers identical with whichever disjunct is 
realized on that occasion.  But here again, there seems to be no reason to countenance 
disjunctive property types, since any given instance of that type will be a property in its 
                                                 
64 It could just as well be a case of preemption.  The mechanism causing her to peck which was triggered by 
the redness could have been thrown into operation prior to whatever mechanism would have responded to 
the triangularity, or vice-versa.  (I assume these mechanisms would just be different neural pathways or 
something of that sort; if it’s one and the same neural pathway that responds to both properties it might 
have to be simultaneous overdetermination.)  Of course, we couldn’t say that just one or other of the 
preempting properties was the causally relevant one given Penczek’s criterion for causal relevance, but that 
just seems to tell against his criterion.  Overdetermination is a problem for counterfactual analyses, not a 
possibility to be exploited when employing them. 
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own right whose causal powers are entirely unaffected by its falling under the disjunctive 
predicate in question.   
Since disjunctive property types fail to give us causal relevance as well as genuine 
resemblance, it does not seem reasonable to think there are any such things.65 The only 
reason I can think that one might countenance them is if one were under the impression 
that there must be a corresponding property for every predicate.  But that seems 
implausible enough, and it’s patently false with regard to some predicates.  Must we think 
there are impossible properties simply because there are predicates such as round-
square?  Should we really think there is a property, being ten feet away from the 
shabbiest hotel at which a famous Texan once slept or being a vacuum cleaner or…?  
These properties seem idle and useless. 
Note, however, that these considerations against disjunctive properties need not 
tell against a Nagelian reductive strategy making use of disjunctive predicates.  If the 
aims of reduction are theoretical and predictive, the concerns with the unity of science 
and so forth, then I think the legitimacy of their admission is at least arguable.66 There 
remains the much-discussed problem of the “non-projectibility” of laws citing disjunctive 
predicates, a problem I will not discuss here.  However, if answers to this problem are 
                                                 
65 This may seem a rather bald claim, or one for which I’ve not spent sufficient time arguing.  I hope that 
I’ve at least given some reason for my rejection of disjunctive properties in general, but for further 
arguments against them see David Lewis (1983), D.M. Armstrong (1989), Alex Oliver (1996). 
66 Of course, if you are interested in a more robust notion of reduction with nontrivial ontological 
consequences, I think you’d have to resist such a move.  It seems right that if we want conceptual and 
ontological simplification rather than, say, predictive usefulness only, we are going to have to contend for 
the out-and-out identity of the properties in question. (See Robert Causey 1977 for arguments along these 
lines.) 
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forthcoming then making use of disjunctive predicates for certain purposes seems to me 
arguably legitimate, or at least innocuous, and theoretical reduction could go forward.   
But assuming the Nagelian paradigm of reduction, what exactly would be the 
ontological consequences or commitments if we paired mental predicates with disjunctive 
physical ones?  I cannot see how we would be committed to the claim that mental 
property types have been in some way identified with these strange disjunctive properties, 
even granting that the strange disjunctive properties exist.  We would have bridge laws of 
the form □∀x(Mx ↔ (P1x ∨ P2x ∨…∨ Pnx…)), which, we can grant, may end up being 
predictively useful.  But laws of this sort simply report a nomological coextension of 
properties, saying nothing about why they are coextensive or how the events satisfying 
those predicates are related.  The mere obtaining of a bridge law of this kind gives us no 
explanation as to why it obtains, and no justification for thinking that terms in the base 
theory somehow explain the ones in the reduced theory.  It could be that they’re identical.  
It could be a brute matter of fact, as unsatisfying as that may be.  It could be that they 
stand in some Cartesian relation, or any number of other things.  But unless we have a 
further explanation as to why the properties in question are coextensive with some kind 
of necessity, why would anyone think we’re committed to type physicalism on the basis 
of these sorts of reductions?  
 Questions of commitment aside, there are also a few more positive reasons to 
resist the identification of mental types and disjunctive physical types—reasons to which 
we’ll recur more fully below.  First, if you think that there just aren’t any disjunctive 
types and you proceed to identify mental types with them, you’ve got yourself a form of 
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eliminativism.  We may still have a concept of, for example, pain, but we’d be forced to 
the conclusion that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as pain.  This, I take it, is 
something like Kim’s present position.  And secondly, we seem to have given up on 
mental causation, since any instance of a disjunctive type will have just the causal powers 
of whichever disjunct is instantiated at that time—the mental type itself will have no 
unique causal powers.  I do not see, that being the case, that this theory constitutes a 
significant advance over any of the nonreductivist theories of mental causation on the 
market.67   
So I think the debate about Nagel reduction and disjunctive physical predicates 
and so forth is, while perhaps intrinsically interesting, not of crucial importance to the 
questions at hand.  If this kind of reduction eventually succeeds and illuminates scientific 
theories in various ways then it’s okay by me.  But the ontological significance of such 
reductionism is obscure at best.  The type identity theory will have to be defended in 
some other way, its adequacy decided on other grounds.  
 
                                                 
67 Another point worth considering (although qualia aren’t my main concern) is this: If you think there are 
indeed disjunctive property types and you identify mental types with them, then, unless the given type’s 
disjuncts have some intrinsic feature in common, then we will have to conclude that there may be no 
intrinsic feature two individuals share when they are in the “same mental state.”  It is for this reason that 
Kim believes his position cannot account for “raw feels” and the like, because phenomenal qualia, in his 
view, resist functionalization.  This, I realize, is a contestable claim; but it is an issue that any defender of 
this picture will have to deal with. 
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3.5.2 Species-Specific Reductions 
Suppose we find it dubious that disjunctive properties exist or that, considered as 
predicates, they are simply too heterogeneous and unwieldy to be fit for any predictive 
science.  Why not then restrict our domain, so that the bridge laws are not universally 
general but are rather indexed to a particular group of organisms or structure types?  
Suppose for example that pain (M) is realized in intrinsically distinct physical states in 
humans, dogs and reptiles, P1, P2 and P3 respectively.  Then instead of taking the 
disjunction of these physical states as our nomologically coextensive base for M, we 
restrict our talk to humans alone, yielding bridge laws of the form □∀x(x is human → 
(Mx ↔ P1x)).  Why isn’t this reduction enough? 
 First, given the apparent plasticity of brain functions as evidenced by, for 
example, recovered stroke victims, these laws may still be too specific.  But waiving that 
problem, the same considerations discussed above transfer to this suggestion as well.  It 
seems to me that species-specific bridge laws will likely be of more theoretical interest 
and predictive use (some time in the future) than the ones involving disjunctive 
properties, if what we’re primarily worried about is human psychology and neurobiology.  
If that’s what we want out of reduction, I see no reason not to let the reduction go 
through.  But once more, the holding of such laws does nothing to establish the 
metaphysical thesis that the mental properties cited on the left hand side are in fact 
identical to the physical properties cited on the right: we have a coextension holding with 
some kind of modal force, but this is patently not enough to yield identity.  In fact, if the 
bridge laws are meant to hold contingently and if the mental and physical terms appealed 
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to in the laws are rigid designators, then, as Kripke has plausibly argued, the properties 
picked out by the terms could not be identical.  This is so because if x = y then x and y are 
necessarily identical, which means the bridge law relating x and y could not be 
contingent, but would itself have to be necessary, with a necessity stronger than 
nomological necessity.  And again, for the reasons given above, the existence of such 
laws would seemingly do nothing to simplify our ontology or to explain higher-level 
phenomena in terms of lower-level, physical phenomena.  So there is no reason to think 
that these reductions could help the type physicalist any more than the positing of 
disjunctive properties. 
  
3.5.3 Functionalized Reductions 
From my perspective the foregoing, Nagel-inspired accounts of reduction aren’t really 
worth arguing over when it’s the metaphysics that is at issue.  But there is a model of 
reduction with more bite, one that gets closer to the heart of what the type physicalist 
needs.  Here is David Lewis on the difference between the Nagel-style reductions 
discussed above and the kind to be discussed in this section: 
Theoretical advances make it possible to simplify total science by positing bridge laws 
identifying some of the entities discussed in one theory with entities discussed in another 
theory.  In the name of parsimony, we posit those bridge laws forthwith.  Identifications 
are made, not found…[But this is] a bad picture of psychophysical identification, since a 
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suitable physiological theory could imply psychophysical identities—not merely make it 
reasonable to posit them for the sake of parsimony. (1972: 249)68 
But how could a physiological theory imply these type identities?  Very roughly, in order 
to reductively identify a higher-level property with a lower-level one, we can 
functionalize that higher-level property—that is, we can specify just what role in the 
causal nexus that property, under its higher-level description, plays—and then find the 
lower-level property that fits the specification.  We specify, for example, that heat is 
typically caused by such and such and typically causes so and so, and then we find, at the 
lower level, that it is mean molecular kinetic energy that does this job.  We discover, that 
is, that mean molecular kinetic energy is heat.  Similarly, in the case of psychology, we 
specify the typical causes and effects of pain (say) and its relation to other mental states, 
and then discover, at the lower level, that it is C-fiber firing that does the job in the neural 
network: that C-fiber firing is pain. 
I’m going to look now at the version of functionalism that relies on reductive 
identifications of this sort, the sort of functionalism advocated by David Lewis, D.M. 
Armstrong and Jaegwon Kim.  According to this theory we can identify mental state 
types with brain state types in roughly the way outlined above.  The possibility of making 
such identifications follows from a general thesis about the meaning of theoretical terms, 
                                                 
68 In the same vein, Kim argues that the functionalization model of reduction stands “in sharp contrast to 
Nagelian reduction with bridge laws taken as auxiliary premises.  These laws are standardly conceived as 
empirical and contingent, and must be viewed as net additions to our theory about the reduction base, 
which means that the base theory so augmented is no longer a theory exclusively about the originally given 
base domain.  This is why bridge laws only enable inductive predictions, whereas functionalization makes 
theoretical predictions possible” (1999: 14). 
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that “they are definable, functionally, by reference to causal roles.”  If they are so 
definable, then the functionalized reduction of a psychological property will follow this 
schema (ibid.): 
 
(1) Mental state M = the occupant of causal role R (by definition of M). 
(2) Neural state N = the occupant of causal role R (by the physiological 
theory). 
(3) ∴ Mental State M = neural state N (by transitivity of = ). 
 
In order to get a wholesale reduction of psychology to neurobiology, according to 
Lewis, we can  
think of common-sense psychology as a term-introducing scientific theory…Collect all 
the platitudes [we] can think of regarding causal relations of mental states, sensory 
stimuli, and motor responses…Include only the platitudes which are common knowledge 
among us—everyone knows them, everyone knows that everyone else knows them, and 
so on.  For the meanings of our words are common knowledge, and…[the] names of 
mental states derive their meaning from these platitudes. (p. 256) 
After having collected the bundle of platitudes that constitutes our common-sense 
psychological theory T, we can simply write them all out in a (very large) conjunctive 
sentence.  Some of the platitudes in T are of the sort that caused trouble for the analytic 
behaviorists: there will be some psychological predicates ineliminably including other 
psychological predicates in their definiens, and the first psychological predicate will be 
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included in their definiens too.  But we can avoid reference to mental states altogether by 
introducing a Ramsey-sentence, which replaces all the terms of T with (second-order) 
variables, and says that there is a set of physical states satisfying the resulting open 
sentence.  The Ramsey-sentence of T can then be written, ∃X1…∃Xn(T(X1…Xn)).  And the 
predication of a psychological term P to an individual y can be understood as follows: 
∃X1…∃Xn(T(X1…Xn) & Xj(y)), where Xj is the variable that replaced P. 
 It is important to note that although second-order variables are being employed, 
the type identity theorist does not intend that mental states should be understood as 
second-order states.  Rather, the mental states posited by the psychological theory are 
first-order, physical states, picked out by the psychological predicates in T.  Moreover, 
the physical states with which the mental states are being identified will be picked out 
non-rigidly by the psychological terms in our common-sense theory.  That is, the 
identities this kind of functionalist wishes to find are, according to Lewis, “contingent 
identities”—pain is C-fiber firing (let’s say) but it might not have been, “Pain might not 
have been pain”:  
If pain is identical to a certain neural state, the identity is contingent.  Whether it holds is 
one of the things that varies from one possible world to another.  But…I do not say that 
here we have two states, pain and some neural state, that are contingently identical, 
identical at this world but different at another.  Since I’m serious about the identity, we 
have not two states but one.  This one state, this neural state which is pain, does not differ 
from itself at any world…What’s true is, rather, that the concept and name of pain 
contingently apply to some neural state at this world, but do not apply to it at another. 
(Lewis 1980: 218) 
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On what appears to be a widespread conception of his position,69 Lewis is taken 
to identify mental properties with first-order physical properties, such as neural types.  As 
I note below, Lewis’s theory is subtler than this; the interpretation is correct so far as it 
goes but it is only half of the story.  However, since this understanding of his position is 
fairly prevalent, and since Jaegwon Kim (1998: 103-106) explicitly advances this picture 
of the relation between mental and physical properties, I shall first consider the merits of 
this approach before moving on to a slightly different version of reductive functionalism. 
One immediate ontological implication of the property-type identifications just 
described is not only that the “same” mental properties can be different things from world 
to world, but, since multiple realizability is meant to be a this-worldly phenomenon, those 
mental characteristics that we are tempted to count as being of the same sort will very 
likely have to differ from species to species after all.  If that’s correct, then it seems to me 
that the present view amounts to a kind of mental irrealism bordering on outright 
eliminativism.  Mental concepts are retained, mentalistic discourse remains meaningful—
both Kim and Lewis are explicit on these points—but the mental properties have, in a 
certain sense, just disappeared.70 Part of the considerable appeal of functionalism, from 
                                                 
69 See George Bealer (1997), Sydney Shoemaker (1981) and (2001), David Papineau (2001).  It may be that 
these authors are well aware of the distinction Lewis draws between what mental states are and what it is to 
be in those states (see below), but do not consider the distinction to be of crucial importance given the 
features of his theory they want to address. 
70 It may be contested that a reductive identification of this kind does not entail the “disappearance” of 
mental properties, because the functionalization model could be a kind of “conservative” or “retentive 
reduction” rather than a kind of “eliminative reduction.”  But I think the distinction here is mainly verbal.  
Whatever else may be said of it, the functionalization model is designed to give us a sparser ontology: 
“Central to the concept of reduction…is the idea that what has been reduced need not be countenanced as 
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my perspective, is that it allows us to hold that intrinsically dissimilar individuals or 
structures are fully capable of instantiating one and the same mental property.  But if the 
present theory is correct, there is (or need be) no such property two physically discernible 
individuals have in common when they seem intuitively to be in the same mental state—
the most we can say is that a given predicate applies to the both of them, not that, as I 
should like to think, the predicate which applies to them applies in virtue of the mental 
property we pretheoretically want to say that they share.  Some “properties” may indeed 
be no more than shadows cast by predicates, but beliefs, desires and pains are not very 
promising candidates for “properties” of this sort.   
The inadequacy of this stance now under consideration becomes clearer (in my 
view) when it is conjoined with an additional feature of David Lewis’s overall position.  
He argues that what is needed to account for our intuitions about mental states is a 
“mixed theory,” one which allows that an atypical member of our species (or a 
“madman,” as he puts it) could be in pain when he’s in the right brain state—the one 
which is pain for us—even if the typical causes and effects of pain are absent, but which 
also allows another individual in a different species to be in pain in the absence of the 
brain state that is pain for our species, and precisely because the latter individual is in a 
state which plays the causal role that pain typically plays for us.  So mental expressions 
or terms (such as ‘pain’) are taken to be only non-rigid designators of particular brain 
                                                                                                                                                 
an independent existent beyond the entities in the reduction base…From an ontological point of view, 
reduction must mean reduction—it must result in a simpler, leaner ontology” (Kim 1999: 15).  As Kim 
notes, whether we understand reduction to be conservative or eliminative, “Either way we end up with a 
leaner ontology” (ibid.), so when a property is functionalized and identified with a lower-level property, it 
is most natural to conclude that the property “has been reduced—eliminatively” (p. 18).   
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states, but also only contingently connected with their characteristic or defining causal 
roles.71 However, as Sydney Shoemaker has pointed out, this notion of population-
relative psychological states has seemingly unacceptable consequences.  For, 
corresponding to our atypical individual, we can imagine a member of our species who, 
by some freak of nature, is physically indistinguishable from a Martian (say), or a 
Martian freak who’s physically indistinguishable from us; indeed, Lewis’s thought 
experiment rests upon the possibility of such freaks of nature.  But, Shoemaker says, 
If Lewis holds that the Martian freak lacks pain, because it lacks the state which among 
Martians plays the causal role definitive of pain, he will hold a view which it ought to be 
difficult for a materialist to stomach—that a creature could fail to be in pain despite being 
physically indistinguishable from a creature which is in pain.  This puts the property of 
being in pain in the company of such manifestly non-intrinsic properties as that of being a 
Baptist inhabitant of a state whose Governor is a Methodist, and offhand this seems to be 
just the sort of property it is not. (1981: 100-101)  
“On the other hand,” Shoemaker continues, “if Lewis assigns the Martian freak to our 
population because of his physical similarity to us, it becomes unclear on what basis his 
madman is assigned to our population” (p. 101).  That is, it is not at all clear why the 
                                                 
71 Lewis writes: “the concept of pain…is the concept of a state that occupies a certain causal role, a state 
with certain typical causes and effects…If the concept of pain is the concept of a state that occupies a 
certain causal role, then whatever state does occupy that role is pain…But the concept of pain is not the 
concept of [the neural state that is pain].  (“The concept of”…is an intensional functor.)  The concept of 
pain, unlike the concept of that neural state which in fact is pain, would have applied to some different state 
if the relevant causal relations had been different…In short, the concept of pain…is a nonrigid concept.  
Likewise the word “pain” is a nonrigid designator.  It is a contingent matter what state the concept and the 
word apply to.  It depends on what causes what” (1980: 218). 
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human freak ought to be considered in pain simply because his C-fibers are firing while 
he’s hanging around a particular group of people rather than another.  It is a plausible 
thesis that extrinsic or external features do play a role of some kind in individuating 
mental states, but the sort of relativity exhibited in Lewis’s picture is, I think, 
unacceptable to those of us who see the connection between brain states and mental states 
as being much tighter than this.72 
 However, Michael Tye has made me sensitive to the fact that Lewis’s theory need 
not lead to (all of) the difficulties outlined above, since Lewis should be understood as 
distinguishing between mental states as either first-order states (states, that is, that are 
identifiable with first-order physical states), or mental states as being second-order 
functional states.  We’ve seen that pain, for example, must be identified with a first-order 
characteristic of some kind.  But this does not entail that the attribute of having pain (or 
being in pain) should likewise be thought of as a first-order physical state.  For, according 
to Lewis, there is a distinction between pain—a first-order state (one that is both physical 
and mental)—and being in pain—a second-order functional state:   
Here I mean to deny all identities of the form α is identical with the attribute of having 
α where α is an experience-name definable as naming the occupant of a specified causal 
role.  I deny, for instance, that pain is identical with the attribute of having pain.  On my 
theory, ‘pain’ is a contingent name—that is, a name with different denotations in 
                                                 
72 A further difficulty for Lewis’s position (which I pass over for purposes of space) has been presented by 
George Bealer (1997), who argues that the present theory cannot deliver the right results respecting the 
content of our thoughts when we are self-consciously aware of our own mental states.  For an interesting 
integration of Bealer’s insights with the problem of mental causation, see Robert Koons (2004). 
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different possible worlds—since in any world, ‘pain’ names whatever state happens in 
that world to occupy the causal role definitive of pain.  If state X occupies that role in a 
world V while another state Y (incompatible with X) occupies that role in world W, then 
‘pain’ names X in V and Y in W.  I take ‘the attribute of having pain’, on the other hand, 
as a non-contingent name of that state or attribute Z that belongs, in any world, to 
whatever things have in that world the state named in that world by ‘pain’.  (I take states 
to be attributes of a special kind: attributes of things at times.)  Thus Z belongs in V to 
whatever things have X in V, and in W to whatever things have Y in W; hence Z is 
identical neither with X nor with Y. (1966: 164-165)73 
Given the distinction just drawn, pain is of course something quite different for us vis-à-
vis what it is for the Martians—that much is a consequence of multiple realizability; but 
it remains true that both we and the Martians are in pain when, for example, our C-fibers 
are firing and their D-tubes (those tiny cavities in their feet) are inflated.  This is so 
because to be in a mental state is to instantiate a second-order functional property, 
although mental states are reductively identifiable with those physical states bearing the 
appropriate relations between inputs, outputs and other mental states.  If we adopt this 
distinction then there appears to be no funny business at all regarding the retention of 
mental concepts in the absence of corresponding properties; for so long as we’re willing 
to maintain that second-order mental states are as the functionalist describe them, it is as 
legitimate on this picture to say that physically dissimilar organisms really can instantiate 
                                                 
73 The quotation is extracted from a 1969 footnote appended to Lewis’s “An Argument for the Identity 
Theory” (1966); see the reprint in Rosenthal, ed (1971).  My comment above concerning the non-rigidity of 
mental expressions should, therefore, be understood as restricted to the concept or name of a mental state 
designating the state itself, rather than the attribute of having that state. 
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the very same mental states as it is on any other picture allowing for multiple 
realizability. 
 Does this reply defuse the first problem we noted for reductive functionalism?  
Perhaps; but if it does it does so at a price.  The first counterintuitive implication I noted 
above was that, on a standard interpretation of Lewis (or on Kim’s theory), we end up 
retaining mental concepts but forfeiting any robust account of mental properties.  On this 
picture, we can say of two relevantly dissimilar creatures that they are in pain when they 
instantiate the state that is pain in their respective environments or species, but it’s 
possible that (despite the co-applicability of the mental predicate) they have no natural 
properties in common at all.74 On the other hand, if we distinguish between first-order 
physical states and second-order functional states as suggested, and maintain accordingly 
that the mental properties shared by physically dissimilar creatures are second-order and 
functional, rather than first-order and physical, we can accommodate the intuitions about 
multiple realizability that make functionalism so attractive.  This view is subtler, and it 
constitutes an advance over the view identifying mental states with first-order physical 
properties and leaving it at that.  However, on this picture, I do not think we will be able 
to provide a satisfying solution to the very problem that the reductionists have wielded 
with such force against opposing, nonreductive views, since it seems to have been 
insisted all along that an adequate solution requires the causal potency of the sharable 
mental properties—that is to say, the mental properties Lewis identifies as second-order 
                                                 
74 I follow Lewis in restricting the term ‘natural properties’ for those properties “whose sharing makes for 
resemblance, and the ones relevant to causal powers” (1983: 347).  See also Lewis (1999: 291ff.). 
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functional properties—themselves.  And if these properties are not to be identified with 
their first-order physical realizers—which looked for all the world to be what the 
reductionist was after in the first place—I believe the same problem crops us again.75 
 Now Lewis would not agree with this assessment at all: 
Non-rigidity means that [a mental state] M is different states in different possible cases; 
variation would mean that M was different states in different actual cases.  But don’t we 
think that there is one property of being in the state M—one property that is common to 
all, actual or possible, of whatever kind, who can truly be said to be in state M?—There 
is.  It is the property such that, for any possible X, X has it just in case X is in the state that 
occupies the M-role for X’s kind at X’s world.  The gerund ‘being in M’ can be taken, at 
least on one good disambiguation, as a rigid designator of this property.  However, this 
property is not the occupant of the M-role.  It cannot occupy that or any other causal role 
because it is excessively disjunctive, and therefore no events are essentially havings of it.  
To admit it as causally efficacious would lead to absurd double-counting of causes… 
Since the highly disjunctive property of being in M does not occupy the M-role, I 
say it cannot be the referent of M.  Many disagree.  They would like it if M turned out to 
be a rigid designator of a property common to all who are in M.  So the property I call 
‘being in M’, they call simply M; and the property that I call M, the occupant of the M-
                                                 
75 Indeed, it looks to be precisely the problem that (according to the exclusion argument) confronts any 
nonreductive functionalist.  In Shoemaker’s words, this brand of functionalism appears to entail that 
“mental states—the instantiations of mental properties—won’t themselves be the causes of the things we 
take them to cause,” and that, moreover, “the view is threatened with incoherence if it says that mental 
properties are defined by their causal roles, and yet that the properties that occupy these causal roles are not 
the mental properties which those roles define or individuate” (2003: 1-2).  See also Ned Block (1990), 
Prior, Pargetter and Jackson (1982), Jaegwon Kim (1998: 51-56) for similar arguments. 
 184
role, they call ‘the realisation of M’.  They have made the wrong choice, since it is absurd 
to deny that M itself is causally efficacious. (1999: 307) 
Well it is absurd to deny that M itself is causally efficacious, but I’m not sure it’s much 
less absurd to deny that M is what two individuals have in common when they’re both in 
pain.  In order to accommodate multiple realizability, it looks like we need second-order 
mental properties capable of instantiation in lots of saliently different creatures with 
minds; but as Lewis rightly points out, those sorts of properties are pretty clearly causally 
irrelevant.  And that means (to look at it the other way around) that the properties doing 
the causal work aren’t the sharable properties “common to all who are in M”—it looks 
like we won’t get both features we want at once. 
At this point the reader is likely experiencing a strong sensation of déjà vu.  For 
how could this be considered a solution to the exclusion problem?  How does it save 
mental causation?  Why is the response given by Lewis a legitimate one for the type-
physicalist but not for the anomalous monist, for example, who can just as truly claim 
that mental states (or events) are causes, even if he cannot say the same on behalf of the 
mental properties any individual would instantiate if she were the subject of that mental 
state?  The possibility that these mental properties—the ones that second-order functional 
properties stand in for on Lewis’s account—are causally irrelevant has been the worry all 
along, and finding a way to secure their relevance has been the challenge so forcefully 
presented against the reductionist’s opponents.  But if Lewis’s response suffices to quell 
reductionist scruples, then, I think, the reductionist had better be prepared to give up the 
exclusion argument against nonreductivism.  (Perhaps Lewis himself would be, as 
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evidenced by this conciliatory remark: “They [the nonreductivists] have made the wrong 
choice…Still, their mistake is superficial.  They have the right properties in mind, even if 
they give them the wrong names” (ibid.).) 
 As I see it, then, the overall problem for type-physicalism can be put in the form 
of a dilemma: on the unrefined version of Lewis’s view (or on Kim’s theory), I and the 
Martian—insofar as we’re typical members of our respective species—need have no 
genuine properties in common when it’s true to say of both of us that we’re in pain; on 
the refined version, we can both bear the same mental properties, alright, but if we do 
then those properties won’t make a causal difference.  Neither of these options seems 
credible. 
 So I am not confident that reductive physicalism offers much of a solution to our 
problems.  But notwithstanding the above criticisms, there seems to be a deeper and more 
general reason to be skeptical about the prospects for finding a satisfying answer to our 
problems from within this theory.  If it does provide us with a kind of solution, one might 
think, then it is not the sort of solution most of us have been looking for; for it does not 
adequately address the fundamental concerns that motivate the problem and make it so 
compelling in the first place. Compare the following candid remarks of Jaegwon Kim, 
who seems to appreciate the force of this complaint: 
Ultimately we are likely to face the following choice: either embrace the realization [i.e., 
reductionist] view and save mental causation, or insist on the unique and distinctive status 
of mental properties…but be prepared to give them up as causal powers.  The paradoxical 
thing about this is that the choice offered may only be an illusion of choice, for the two 
options may in the end collapse into one.  If you choose the former, you may lose what 
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makes the mental distinctively mental; and what good is it, one might ask, if you save 
mental causation but end up losing mentality in the process?...If you choose the latter, 
again you may lose the mental, for what good is something that is causally impotent?  
Why should we bother to save belief and desire, or qualia, if their presence or absence 
makes no difference to anything else and we can’t use them to explain anything? (1993b: 
366-367) 
And, perhaps more starkly yet: “all roads branching out of physicalism may in the end 
seem to converge at the same point, the irreality of the mental.  This should come as no 
surprise: we should remember that physicalism, as an overarching metaphysical doctrine 
about all of reality, exacts a steep price” (1998: 119-120).   
Kim’s comments (which are by no means idiosyncratic) seem to amount to the 
following worry: When mental types are identified with physical types in this way, it 
isn’t easy to find any residue of mentality left at all, precisely because in “Identifying 
mental phenomena with physical phenomena, we saddle the former with the causal 
properties of the latter; but common sense sees mental phenomena as possessed of 
distinctive causal properties” (Yablo 1992: 250, n. 15).   That is, there is evidently some 
essential feature, or cluster of features, of mentality that resists capture under this theory 
of mind.  And in the absence of these features any solution to the problem of mental 
causation will preserve, at best, the letter of mental causal efficacy while giving up on the 
spirit. 
I hasten to add that I do not have in mind “raw feels” and those related mental 
phenomena that tend to get the majority of the press, but rather something which is, as I 
see things, of more crucial importance to our understanding of ourselves and our place in 
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the world, and which is therefore more intimately connected to the problem of free will.  
Recall Donald Davidson’s insights about the significance of reductionism for agency and 
personhood, which I’d briefly touched upon in a previous section: To the extent that 
Davidson resisted mind-body reductionism he was motivated to do so, as Jaegwon Kim 
insightfully puts it, in order to “insulat[e] the mental from the full impact of physical 
determinism” (1985: 212).  But what is this “full impact of physical determinism,” and 
why would Davidson of all people have been bothered by it?  Given the motivations here 
in view, it cannot be that reductive identity theories are problematic mainly insofar as 
phenomenal qualia resist functionalization or whatever, but rather because what is of 
distinctive value and importance about our mental lives—whatever it is that could 
possibly serve as ground for human dignity and normativity—is simply ill-suited to be 
understood in mechanistic or electrochemical terms.  There is, as Davidson (1974) 
famously put it, “no echo” of psychology in physics, no residue of the special, normative 
and purposive elements essential to mentality in those mechanical processes governed by 
strict physical law.  Here is one Davidsonian intuition that I think is both eminently 
respectable and hard to shake—and it is an intuition that evidently cuts across the 
incompatibilist/compatibilist line.  If Kim is correct in thinking that  
The shared project of the majority of those who have worked on the mind-body problem 
over the past few decades has been to find a way of accommodating the mental within a 
principled physicalist scheme, while at the same time preserving it as distinctive—that is, 
without losing what we value, or find special, in our nature as creatures with minds 
(1998: 2), 
then it looks as though the mind-body problem is still with us. 
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It would be too quick to claim that the problem of mental causation is insoluble.  
But it is noteworthy that the difficulties involved in framing an adequate solution are 
mirrored, so to speak, in the case of another problem which many have claimed to be 
insoluble, the problem of free will.76 What sustains resistance to reductionism in the case 
of the mind is (by Davidsonian lights) a commonsense understanding of the kind of 
creature we are, an understanding that operates in a “conceptual framework far removed 
from the direct reach of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason and 
action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent” (Davidson 1970: 225).  Our theorizing 
begins with such a commonsense conception and then seeks, so far as possible, to 
harmonize or integrate that conception within the natural order as it is described to us by 
contemporary scientific theory.  But there are no conceptual guarantees that such a 
project will be successful.  And if it seems that we, or at any rate that certain essential 
features of the kind of thing we are, do not “merge” smoothly with the natural world in 
the way that physicalist or reductionist views envisage, then (depending upon the strength 
of our commitment to the commonsense picture) it is the physicalist or reductionist 
approach that we must reject: 
We will not be bullied into blocking out a whole dimension of intellectual experience for 
the sake of a neat fit between some preconceived physicalist theory and the data left in 
                                                 
76 To borrow an observation of David Sosa’s (1999), it is intriguing how naturally the foregoing quotation 
from Kim reads as a description of the problem of free will when the relevant terms are substituted: “The 
shared project of the majority of those who have worked on the free will problem over the past few decades 
has been to find a way of accommodating freedom within a principled physicalist scheme, while at the 
same time preserving it as distinctive—that is, without losing what we value, or find special, in our nature 
as creatures with freedom.” 
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view.  We are mental beings at least as surely as we are physical beings, and if our mental 
lives are not reducible to the physical, then so much the worse for any preconceived 
physicalism. (Ernest Sosa 1984: 271) 
But, of course, the challenge has been all along that we are physical beings at 
least as surely as we are mental beings, and we need to see just how it is that we fit into 
the natural order without foregoing or leaving behind the commonsense commitments 
that make it so difficult to see how we possibly could.  We may yearn to have a kind of 
“exemption from nature, something that permits us to elevate ourselves above it, rather 
than our own special way of living an animal life” (to adapt a phrase from John 
McDowell 1994: 88), but yearning for such an exemption doesn’t make us exempt; and 
one of the lessons the problem of mental causation teaches is that too much exemption is 
not at all a good thing.   
We might, therefore, make our beginning at the other end and work our way 
“upward,” as it were, maintaining allegiance to the “third person perspective” and 
perhaps taking on a related willingness to revise (or possibly ignore) “the data left in 
view.”  But in taking this tact, we never seem to reach a sufficiently high level—we find 
that we are left with either an explicitly eliminativist theory or something else that looks 
an awful lot like one. 
These contrasting orientations and their respective pitfalls show up, too, in the 
debate over free will.  Here as well, we might begin with a commonsense understanding 
of ourselves as free, responsible agents, and then reject any metaphysical picture (such as 
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reductionism or philosophical naturalism) that appears uncongenial to that commitment.77 
The strategy is a risky one, however, not so much because it makes us vulnerable to 
charges of obscurantism (or “panicky metaphysics”), but rather because we end up 
appearing too noumenal, in a way, too disconnected with the rest of the world of which 
we’re clearly a part. 
However, we fare no better by assuming that we are just parts of the world and, 
like any other (macro-level) physical system, under the governance of deterministic law.  
It is supposed to be a selling point of compatibilism that it allows us to begin with this 
assumption and then derive or identify free agency from within its constraints.78 But what 
it eventually identifies as free agency seems pretty clearly to fall short of what we’d had 
in mind; here again, if the guiding assumption doesn’t lead us to hard determinism—or 
eliminativism about free will—it leaves us with a theory of free will that looks only 
verbally different. 
These facts indicate, I think, that the problem of freedom is, like the problem of 
mental causation, a special case of the mind-body problem, that the solutions to these 
problems are bound up together.  I do not think we can frame an adequate theory of free 
agency without finding a solution to the mental causation problem, and overcoming the 
hurdles involved in understanding how mental causation is supposed to work could not 
but illuminate to some extent, at least, how agents could be free.   
                                                 
77 For some recent examples of this reaction, see Peter Unger (2002) and Hugh McCann (2003). 
78 See Richard Double (1996) who argues that compatibilism is, for this reason, methodologically superior 
to libertarianism. 
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In the final chapter I will try to make good on this claim.  But before closing this 
chapter I want to pull these disparate threads into some semblance of cohesion, and 
briefly explain where I think all this leaves us.  Recall that one main problem that 
libertarians have had to face is the complaint that free will requires the falsity of 
philosophical naturalism, or materialist views of the mind.79 Insofar as this charge is 
lodged by anyone other than a hard determinist or eliminativist about freedom—if it is 
lodged by a compatibilist who thinks we really are free agents—then the assumption 
underwriting this accusation should now appear doubtful indeed.  It may be, as O’Connor 
claims, that if the “empirical facts…weigh in, ultimately, in favor of a thoroughgoing 
reductionism,” then we’ll be forced to admit that “free will is an illusion” (2000a: 125).80 
But if this is so, I want to urge, it is only because a thoroughgoing reductionism is 
incompatible with agency simpliciter.  Recognizing this fact removes, for me, much of 
the force of the present objection: Of course naturalism or reductionism or whatever 
removes the possibility of free will if it cannot accommodate mental causation (and 
therefore action), but in that case, it seems to me, naturalism has very little to recommend 
it anyway.  If, on the other hand, materialism of one variety or another is (despite 
whatever appearances there may be to the contrary) quite compatible with a robust, 
agency-grounding mental causation, then O’Connor’s pronouncements—to say nothing 
of the confident assertions of many compatibilists—are in my view too hasty.  At least 
                                                 
79 Our (i) from chapter 2. 
80 Actually, anything less than a strong form of emergentism would mean free will is an illusion according 
to O’Connor, so his position regarding the conditions for the actuality of free agency is not quite as 
restrictive as the quotation suggests.  See also C.D. Broad (1962), Galen Strawson (1986), Derk Pereboom 
(2001) for similar assessments. 
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with respect to the mind and its place in nature, libertarians and compatibilists are 
squarely in the same boat. 
So this is the dialectical situation as I see it.  Return to Kane’s (1996: 116) Free 
Agency Principle, and recall that (as I’m interpreting it) the Principle specifies that 
libertarian theorizing must be constrained in such a way that the libertarian cannot 
justifiably be charged with positing substances, properties, relations and the like which 
are introduced solely for the purpose of “salvaging” libertarian intuitions; she must “play 
fair,” and content herself with only the sorts of resources that the compatibilist needs too.  
In examining the problem of mental causation, it’s been my intention to earn the right to 
provide the libertarian with a little more elbow room than the Free Agency Principle may 
initially seem to allow.  Since compatibilists and libertarians alike need the mind to make 
a distinctive sort of difference in the world it is open to us to construct a theory of mental 
causation that will be friendly to the possibility of libertarianism, but which is also well-
motivated on independent (or, better, common) ground.81   
That is one strategy that the libertarian is well within her rights in pursuing, but 
there are alternatives to it as well.  We might, instead of actually constructing (or 
attempting to construct) a theory of mental causation that captures all of the features we 
want such a theory to capture, try to specify with greater precision just what those desired 
features are, and then see how they might be put to use in aid of the libertarian’s case.  
That is, we could seek to uncover to some extent what characteristics a satisfying or 
                                                 
81 See Timothy O’Connor (2000b) and William Hasker (1999) for two such attempts, and consult the 
appendix on emergentism and agent-causation. 
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successful theory of mental causation would attribute to mental causes, what threats 
would need to be avoided if the theory is to work—keeping in clear view the reasons why 
we care that our minds make a difference—and subsequently help ourselves to those 
characteristics in our theorizing about free agency.   
Such a strategy seems superior to the first one for the following reasons.  First, 
our inquiry will be conducted at a higher level of abstraction, and so will allow us to ask 
how free agency might exist under any theory of mind that eventually succeeds in 
supplying the features needed for mental causation, without forcing us to wed ourselves 
to any particular theory on the market.  This lack of commitment82 is a clear virtue of the 
present strategy, in my view, since no extant theory of mental causation I know of is very 
satisfactory.  Second, we can in good conscience (and consistently with the Free Agency 
Principle) avail ourselves of pertinent recent work in the philosophy of mind, insofar as 
that work has application to problems in which both compatibilist and incompatibilist 
philosophers have a stake.  Third, and relatedly, since the pertinent work on which I’ll 
draw is being conducted under naturalistic assumptions, we will be able to move forward 
without surreptitiously smuggling in entities, relations and so forth that might bolster the 
suspicion that libertarianism needs a “spookier” ontology than naturalism allows (or at 
any rate a spookier one than compatibilism needs).  Last, it is my hope that the present 
strategy will allow us to more clearly demarcate which problems the libertarian faces qua 
                                                 
82 The “lack of commitment” is of course not total, but qualified.  If we are to show how free agency might 
be realized in the natural order, we must be committed, at least, to the general ontological constraints 
imposed by naturalism.  But that fact, in itself, does not imply that we must pick any particular theory on 
the mind-body relation presently on the offing. 
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libertarian, and which he faces just qua action theorist or philosopher of mind, for 
example. 
That is the strategy I will pursue throughout the remainder of this work.  But there 
is one other strategy (if it can be called that) that bears mentioning at this point.  I noted 
above that some have declared the free will problem insoluble; and among those who 
have declared it insoluble are those who believe that free will must exist anyway, or at 
any rate that we cannot help believing that it does.  Notoriously, this kind of 
mysterianism has its defenders in the writings of philosophers concerned with other 
problems as well, most notably the problem of consciousness.  The perplexity attending 
both problems and the terminology used to describe that perplexity are, I think, 
intriguing.  Compare, for example, Colin McGinn: 
Consciousness is rooted in the brain via some natural property of brain tissue, but it is not 
explicable in terms of electrochemical processes of the familiar kind…it is the very 
unknowability of this property that generates all our perplexities…I maintain that we 
need a qualitative leap in our understanding of mind and brain [in order to understand 
consciousness], but I also hold that this is not a leap our intellectual legs can take. (1999: 
29) 
and Peter van Inwagen: 
Everyone really believes in metaphysical freedom, whether or not he would call it by 
name…[but the problem of metaphysical freedom] seems to me so evidently impossible 
of solution that I find very attractive [the] suggestion…that there is something about our 
biology, something about the ways of thinking that are “hardwired” into our brains, that 
renders it impossible for us humans to dispel the mystery of metaphysical freedom.  
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However this may be, I am certain that I cannot dispel the mystery, and I am certain that 
no one else has in fact done so. (1998: 194). 
Or again, compare N.S. Sutherland’s attempt to define ‘consciousness’ for the 
International Dictionary of Psychology: 
The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of 
what consciousness means…Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is 
impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it evolved.  Nothing worth reading 
has been written about it. (quoted in Chalmers 1996: 3) 
with the equally bleak assessment of Thomas Nagel: 
I change my mind about the problem of free will every time I think about it, and therefore 
cannot offer any view with even moderate confidence; but my present opinion is that 
nothing that might be a solution has yet been described.  This is not a case where there 
are several possible candidate solutions and we don’t know which is correct.  It is a case 
where nothing believable has (to my knowledge) ever been proposed by anyone in the 
extensive public discussion of the subject. (1986: 112)83 
Let me be clear: I do not think the mere fact that two problems have been declared 
insoluble gives us reason to suppose that those problems are linked in any interesting 
way.  In the cases at hand, however, I do believe there is an important link that needs 
exploring, one that I think will help shed some light on the second and third main 
                                                 
83 And, once more, Colin McGinn: “We don’t even have a single possible explanation of [what causes 
consciousness].  It is not that we know what would explain consciousness but are having trouble finding the 
evidence to select one explanation over the others; rather, we have no idea what an explanation of 
consciousness would even look like.  The problem is not lack of evidence; it is lack of concepts, of 
conceptual framework.  We are facing a problem that points to an enormous hole in our conceptual 
resources, a theoretical blindspot of epic proportions” (1999: 61-62). 
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problems for libertarianism we identified above.84 I will take up that task below.  For 
now, I only want to point out that a full-blown mysterianism may also have dialectical 
upshots for the defender of free will.  At the most extreme, we might argue with Colin 
McGinn that 
Free will is mental causation in action, the mysterious interface between mind and action.  
Once we admit that we have no good understanding of this kind of causation, recognizing 
that we cannot subsume it under our understanding of physical causation, then we can 
continue to believe in free will without being able to explain it. (1999: 167-168) 
More modestly, it is perhaps worth pointing out that if we really are no worse off with 
respect to free will than we are with respect to other puzzling features of our mental lives, 
then that fact, when brought to the fore, should make us take a hard look at the 
equitability of the explanatory standards to which the libertarian is being held.   
  But whatever virtues the mysterian stance toward either of these problems may 
possess, I think it is to be avoided unless all else fails.  Perhaps all else will fail; but 
before we rest in that conclusion much more work remains to be done. 
                                                 
84 You will recall that the second and third main problems for libertarianism ((ii) and (iii) of chapter 2) are 
that indeterminism either threatens freedom by undermining the rational, volitional control of agents, or at 
any rate it does nothing to enhance their freedom. 
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4. Mechanism, Purpose and Agency 
The brain secretes thought just as the liver secretes bile. 
– Karl Vogt 
 
If we came to believe in mechanism we should, in consistency, give up the ascribing of action, even in a 
qualified way. 
– Norman Malcolm 
 
It would be nice if we could embrace causation at many levels, including the 
psychological, biological, and so on, and also cross-level causation, both downward and 
upward, all of them coexisting in harmony.  And it is important to us to be able to have 
trust in the causal efficacy of our beliefs and desires, emotions and consciousness, and to 
believe in our powers as agents in the world—all this without reducing mentality to mere 
patterns of electrical activity in the brain.  But these are only a wish list—the starting 
point of the mental causation debate. (Kim 2003: 172) 
Having canvassed the mental causation debate, we’ve found that locating a causal role for 
mental states and properties is a difficult task.  Corresponding to Kim’s wish list, we have 
seen that any adequate theory of mental causation must account for the following facts: 
(a) mental events have causes and effects, (b) mental properties of mental events are (in 
some satisfying way) relevant to their causes and effects, (c) the mind is possessed of 
distinctive causal powers—powers of a sort that ground the essential features of human 
agency.  (I shall specify in this chapter what I believe these features to be.) 
To take stock: philosophers who incline towards a physicalist view of the mind-
body relation generally account for (a) with the thesis of token-physicalism, the view that 
every mental event token is identical to some physical event token or other.  These 
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philosophers have had a rough time accounting for (b); it has not been easy to see how an 
irreducibly nonphysical property could have respectable affects on a network of events 
when all of the candidate causal roles in that network have, so to speak, already been 
cast.  Those who accept reductionist theories of mind can perhaps account for (b) but 
have, among other problems, a difficult time accounting for (c).  For on this view, it 
seems that we are in danger of losing those intuitively essential and distinctive aspects of 
mentality which are of particular relevance to agency and personhood and, therefore, the 
sort of mental realism to which we are pre-theoretically committed.  Furthermore, it 
remains unclear that reductive physicalism, at least in some of its varieties, genuinely 
escapes the challenge Kim has put to the nonreductivists.1 If all this is right, then what is 
prima facie the most promising materialist theory as regards the problem of mental 
causation—and therefore the possibility of agency of any kind—may not be as safe a 
resting place for compatibilism as it may initially have appeared to be.   
 We are now in a position to apply our findings to the issue of free will.  In this 
chapter, I shall briefly recount what I take to be the most interesting and important 
similarities between the issues of mental causation and freedom, both as to the structure 
of the philosophical problems of mental causation and freedom, and as to the views of 
mental causation and free will constructed in response to them.  I shall then explain, in 
part on the basis of these similarities, the historical association between the threats of 
determinism and epiphenomenalism and I will argue that the association is justifiable.  In 
particular, I will try to make plausible the claim that any variety of mental causation 
                                                 
1 Recall our discussion of David Lewis (1999) in the last chapter. 
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worth wanting (as Daniel Dennett (1984) put it in another connection) must be 
indeterministic, a variety according to which not all mental events are causally 
determined by prior conditions.  In effect, I will employ the findings of the forgoing 
chapters to argue for the incompatibility of robust agency and determinism.  I shall try to 
argue that determinism cuts deeper than is typically assumed, threatening not merely our 
freedom but our status as agents simpliciter.  Arguments for incompatibilism being what 
they are, I do not expect very many philosophers will find the argument entirely 
persuasive.  But however that may be, the following discussion will place us in a position 
to argue for the second thesis of this chapter, which is this: an adequate theory of mental 
causation, one that extends to a theory of the connection between mental causes and 
human action, will provide us with all of the resources we need to construct an adequate 
theory of free will, given the assumption that determinism is false.  That is, we will be 
able to defend the libertarian conception of free will against the three main challenges to 
it as outlined in the second chapter, using no more than the tools likewise needed to 
account for compatibilist free agency.  I turn now to the link between determinism and 
epiphenomenalism. 
 
4.1 The Determinism/Epiphenomenalism Link Explained 
Let us revisit the twin dilemmas we noted in the first chapter, letting Kim and Davidson 
stand in as representatives of two contrasting positions.  Recall that if Kim is right, then 
unless reduction goes through mental causation is impossible.  Yet if Davidson is right, 
then unless reduction fails mental causation is impossible.  Of course, a theory of mental 
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causation should be just that—a theory of mental causation.  And it has been hard to see 
how we can capture both elements at once.  I believe it is this sort of problem that moves 
Kim to write that we are “ultimately…likely to face the following choice: either embrace 
[reductionism] and save mental causation, or insist on the unique and distinctive status of 
mental properties…but be prepared to give them up as causal powers.”  He continues: 
“The paradoxical thing about this is that the choice offered may only be an illusion of 
choice, for the two options may in the end collapse into one.”  If you choose the latter 
you may “lose the mental, for what good is something that is causally impotent?”  Yet if 
you choose the former, “you may lose what makes the mental distinctively mental; and 
what good is it, one might ask, if you save mental causation but end up losing mentality 
in the process?” (1993: 366-367) 
To make our way into the overlap between the present problem and the problem 
of free will, recall once more how aptly Ryle’s formulation of the latter problem2 
characterizes our current dilemma.  Davidson has trouble seeing how our knowledge of 
higher-grade human conduct could be squared with the hypothesis that that conduct is, 
after all, of a piece with the behavior of machines.  Yet our world is a physical world for 
all that, and to the degree that the mind can’t be described in terms drawn from the 
categories of mechanics we face a disconnect between mind and world in the form of 
isolated irrelevance.  What’s wanted is of course a reconciliation of the mental with the 
                                                 
2 “The problem of the Freedom of the Will was the problem how to reconcile the hypothesis that minds are 
to be described in terms drawn from the categories of mechanics with the knowledge that higher-grade 
human conduct is not of a piece with the behaviour of machines” (Ryle 1949: 20).   
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mechanical, rather than a peculiar kind of severance between the two; but by Ryle’s 
lights, finding such a reconciliation is what the free will problem is all about. 
Further, we have in a number of places observed Kim’s insistence that what is at 
stake in the problem of mental causation is the possibility of agency.  It is in fact “first 
and foremost” because “we care about human agency,” he says, that we care about the 
causal powers of the mind at all (Kim 2002: 675).  But it is equally, and quite explicitly, 
the case with Davidson that his opposing stance on the question of reduction is motivated 
by the desire to safeguard human agency, by “insulating the mental from the full impact 
of physical determinism” (Kim 1985: 212).  Here is Davidson: 
Mental events as a class cannot be explained by physical science…We explain a man’s 
free actions, for example, by appeal to his desires, habits, knowledge and perceptions.  
Such accounts of intentional behaviour operate in a conceptual framework far removed 
from the direct reach of physical law by describing both cause and effect, reason and 
action, as aspects of a portrait of a human agent.  The anomalism of the mental is thus a 
necessary condition for viewing action as autonomous. (1970: 225) 
Thus a parallel dilemma emerges upon closer inspection.  On the one hand, if reduction 
fails then free agency is impossible.  On the other hand, if reduction goes through, then 
free agency is impossible.  But, once more, a theory of free agency should be just that.  
And the trick, as before, is to get both elements at once. 
 This parallel dilemma, together with the associations uncovered in the previous 
challenge, seem to me to strengthen Sosa’s (1999) contention that the standard positions 
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on free will and mental causation are closely related.3 Let us begin with an association 
which seems natural enough to begin with, that of reductive physicalism and hard 
determinism.  (I wonder: would there be anything especially odd about renaming these 
positions ‘hard physicalism’ and ‘reductive determinism’?)  Somewhat crudely put, 
reality is constituted by physical particles and their aggregates marching to the beat of the 
laws.  In this world there is no room for free action and neither is there room for mental 
causation—not at any rate without relinquishing “the unique and distinctive status of 
mental properties,” as Kim has it—and we’d better be content with what we can get.  But 
what dissatisfies about these approaches is the same in either case.  Mental causation sans 
the mentality is not a variety of mental causation worth wanting; and agency in the 
absence of freedom is a poor substitute for the real thing.   
 By way of response, we can opt for what Sosa (1999: 11) aptly describes as an 
“intermediate realist” approach as exemplified by Davidson—that of nonreductive 
physicalism and soft determinism: robust mental causation without forsaking physicalism 
and freedom without abandoning determinism.  Here again, the approaches seem 
unsatisfactory for intriguingly similar reasons.  To be told that mental properties count as 
causal because they supervene upon physical processes, but where any event within such 
a process has already a sufficient cause in its physical antecedents, immediately appears 
suspect; and the charge that this is only verbally different from epiphenomenalism needs 
                                                 
3 Sosa examines the relations between hard determinism and reductive physicalism, soft determinism and 
nonreductive physicalism, and libertarianism and dualism.  See also Jessica Wilson (2003).  Here I shall 
add a brief analysis of eliminativism and hard incompatibilism, and mysterian positions on either problem, 
and my analysis of what supports their relation will differ in some respects from Sosa’s. 
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an answer.  Analogously, to be told that our actions count as free because they depend 
upon our choices, but where any such choice is the inevitable result of a causal chain 
whose beginning antedates even our existence, likewise appears suspect; and the 
Spinozistic alternative looms.  What dissatisfies about the one is that “mental causation” 
isn’t grounded in anything particularly mental; what dissatisfies about the other is that 
“free action” isn’t grounded in anything particularly free.  
 By way of response, we can opt for an intermediate realist approach as 
exemplified by Davidson—that of nonreductive physicalism and soft determinism: robust 
mental causation without forsaking physicalism and freedom without abandoning 
determinism.  Here again, the approaches seem unsatisfactory for intriguingly similar 
reasons.  To be told that mental properties count as causal because they supervene upon 
physical processes, but where any event within such a process has already a sufficient 
cause in its physical antecedents, immediately appears suspect; and the charge that this is 
only verbally different from epiphenomenalism needs an answer.  Analogously, to be told 
that our actions count as free because they depend upon our choices, but where any such 
choice is the inevitable result of a causal chain whose beginning antedates even our 
existence, likewise appears suspect; and the Spinozistic alternative looms.  What 
dissatisfies about the one is that “mental causation” isn’t grounded in anything 
particularly mental; what dissatisfies about the other is that “free action” isn’t grounded 
in anything particularly free.  
 We have seen how the tension stands out in an especially vivid way on 
Davidson’s theory.  He finds freedom enough in the putative fact that our actions cannot 
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be predicted or explained when statements describing those actions are given a certain 
syntactic form.  There can be no deductive-nomological explanations of behavior 
couched in mentalistic vocabulary, and psychology will therefore never be a predictive 
science.  Of course, Davidson’s theory is a version of the identity thesis, which means 
that when it is described in the vocabulary of physics our behavior is as predictable in 
principle as anything else.  Davidson is quite explicit on the point (cf. Davidson 1974).  
But how could the decision to describe our behavior in one way rather than another 
confer on us any measure of autonomy, if our autonomy is indeed threatened by those 
strict physical laws from which, as it turns out, our behavior is not at all exempt?  Why 
not conclude instead that we are left, not with free will, but rather with a plausible 
explanation as to why we thought we had it?  And an exactly similar question arises with 
respect to the purported anomalism of the mental. 
 There is more to be said about compatibilism and nonreductive physicalism; I’ll 
pause to recount just one further analogy I find particularly telling.  One popular 
nonreductivist approach to mental causation involves construing causal relevance as 
counterfactual dependence and then exploiting the notion of psychophysical 
supervenience.  Mental properties can make a difference to physical effects because, had 
any given mental property not been instantiated, the subvening physical state (at least) 
nomologically sufficient for it wouldn’t have been instantiated, and in that case the 
physical effects produced by the subvening physical state would not have occurred.  
Thus, some physical events depend counterfactually upon mental properties, from which 
we are invited to conclude that the latter are causally relevant after all.  Yet as Wilfrid 
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Sellars remarked some time ago, the mere counterfactual relevance of a higher- to a 
lower-level property “is at least part of what is meant by calling” that higher-level 
property “an epiphenomenon” (Meehl and Sellars 1956: 242); and C.D. Broad noted in 
like fashion that the truth of these mentalistic counterfactuals is just what would allow the 
epiphenomenalist to say that some physical event wouldn’t have occurred unless a mental 
event had preceded it, and “consistently deny that these [mental events] have any effect 
on the movements of our bodies” (1925: 117).  Hear an echo in this of a familiar 
compatibilist approach to freedom.  We are ‘free to do otherwise’ because, on any 
occasion of (free) choice, had we chosen differently, either the past would have been 
different or a law would have been violated just prior to the formation of that choice; and 
that alteration in the past or that hiccup in the laws would have ensured a difference in 
behavioral effect.  Thus, our actions depend counterfactually on our choices, from which 
we’re invited to conclude that we are free to do otherwise after all.  Yet the insights of 
Broad and Sellars seem equally applicable here.  To say that my choices are ‘up to me’ 
just in the sense that, had the relevant causal antecedents differed prior to the formation 
of my choice, I would have chosen differently, is at least part of what is meant by saying 
that my choices aren’t up to me.  And a counterfactual analysis of freedom is precisely 
what would allow the hard determinist to affirm that we ‘could have done otherwise’ and 
consistently deny that we were free to do anything other than what we in fact did.  In both 
cases the statements expressing those counterfactual dependencies may well be true, and 
in both cases we are left with the palpable sense that they are not true for the right 
reasons.   
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The association of dualism with libertarianism is a natural one too, if for no other 
reason than the historical libertarian penchant for relying on spiritual entities and esoteric 
powers to defend their view of free will.  Even the less radical forms of agent-causation 
currently on the offing require a strong form of emergentism coupled with ‘downward 
causation’,  which amounts to the denial of both physical causal closure and (probably) 
mind-body supervenience, two essential tenets of physicalism.  Maybe that’s no real 
surprise.  The notion that supervenient mental states are nomologically guaranteed by 
their subvening physical states, but where prior mental states make no difference (save 
perhaps counterfactually) to the subvenient physical states in question, sounds 
suspiciously like another possibility that libertarians are at pains to avoid—the possibility 
that our decisions are guaranteed by natural laws conjoined with antecedent conditions, 
but where we have no say about, and can make no difference to, what those laws or 
antecedent conditions are.4 True, there is an intriguing recent libertarian approach 
(‘causal indeterminism’) that avoids the dualistic elements of traditional libertarianism 
and tries to make do with indeterministic causal processes involving mental events 
realized in the brain.  I myself will try to defend this view in what follows.  But I fear that 
                                                 
4 Note also: just as the worry that physical causes ‘screen off’ mental causes can be expressed by saying 
that neurophysiological explanations eclipse reasons explanations, so too can the worry that the past and 
the laws conspire to remove our freedom be expressed in terms of behavioral explanations citing those 
factors rendering superfluous explanations of behavior appealing to the agent’s volition: “If a free action 
were determined by past circumstances, given the laws of nature, there would be an explanation for why 
the agent acted as he or she did that was other than, or went beyond, saying that the agent caused the doing 
or the doing otherwise here and now.  This further explanation would be in terms of the relevant past 
circumstances and laws of nature, whose existence could not in turn be explained by saying that the agent 
caused them to be what they are by acting here and now” (Kane 1989: 121). 
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this exception is one of those exceptions that proves the rule.  If anything, causal 
indeterminism has met with a warmer reception among compatibilists than it has among 
the majority of libertarians, who seem to view it as offering what we might call a 
compatibilist kind of freedom in an indeterministic world.5 So to that extent the analogy 
I’m trying to draw bears up. 
Again, the pitfalls of these approaches are as similar as they are familiar.  The 
dualist tells us that the mind causally interacts with the body, and the agent-causalist 
insists that persons (enduring substances) freely cause their intentions.  In both cases we 
feel that they have more or less described the phenomena at issue, and in neither case 
have they met with much success in explaining how these things might be.6 So Gary 
Watson: “‘Agent-causation’ simply labels, not illuminates, what the libertarian needs” 
(1982: 10).  Replacing ‘agent-causation’ with ‘causal interactionism’ and ‘libertarian’ 
with ‘dualist’ leaves us with a common complaint; and the appeal to ‘active powers’ 
doesn’t help in the one case much more than ‘animal spirits’ did in the other.   
Frustrated discontent with the standard positions on either problem sometimes 
culminates in these final positions: mysterianism about the mind and (you guessed it!) 
mysterianism about free will.  According to the one neither dualist nor materialist 
theories really capture the nature of mind, and it’s likely no theory ever will: we currently 
lack, and probably always will lack, the conceptual resources required for the task (cf. 
                                                 
5 William Hasker provides a nice example of this sort of reaction.  After dismissing Robert Kane’s (1996) 
causal indeterminist theory as “basically a compatibilist strategy” (1999: 97), he proceeds to argue for a 
peculiar form of substance dualism and agent-causation.   
6 Is this because we implicitly expect to be given mechanistic explanations, whereas this is not what these 
theorists are (or should be) attempting to provide? 
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McGinn 1999: 29).  According to the other, neither compatibilist-determinist nor 
libertarian-indeterminist theories adequately account for free will.  Here as well it’s been 
suggested that “there is something about our biology, something about the ways of 
thinking that are ‘hardwired’ into our brains, that renders it impossible for us humans to 
dispel the mystery of metaphysical freedom” (van Inwagen 1999: 194).  Now in both 
cases we face a choice.  With respect to the mind-body problem we can swallow the 
bitter pill of eliminativism, and regarding the problem of freedom we can grit the teeth 
and embrace so-called ‘hard incompatibilism’,7 essentially eliminativism about free will.  
Or we could “solve” both our problems in one fell swoop by adopting a stance which is, 
if no more theoretically satisfying, then at any rate more therapeutic.  Colin McGinn 
draws the connection and delivers the attendant good news: 
Free will is mental causation in action, the mysterious interface between mind and action.  
Once we admit that we have no good understanding of this kind of causation, recognizing 
that we cannot subsume it under our understanding of physical causation, then we can 
continue to believe in free will without being able to explain it. (1999: 167-168) 
Now what explains the naturalness of these relations and what, in particular, 
explains the historical link between the threats to freedom and mental causation, a link 
that survives in current literature as well?  Why, for example, does Tyler Burge contend 
that the impetus to find a causal role for the mental “probably has its roots in traditional 
dualism, or in libertarian worries about free will” (1993: 116)?  Why might Norman 
Malcolm say that ‘mechanism’—by which he means epiphenomenalism—ought to be 
                                                 
7 The phrase is Derk Pereboom’s (2001). 
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understood as a “special application of physical determinism” (1968: 45)?  What explains 
C.S. Peirce’s assimilation of necessitarianism with what he calls “the mechanical 
philosophy,” and his conviction to the effect that the truth of determinism would entail 
the superfluity of the mind (cf. Peirce 1998a: 187-188), etc.?   
 I want to offer as an explanation the following possibility: determinism and 
epiphenomenalism render agents powerless to an equal degree; for whether determinism 
or epiphenomenalism is at issue, it will be true that: 
 
(D/E) There exists a set of conditions C (state of the world in the distant past-subvenient 
physical states) such that a determination relation D (nomological-metaphysical) holds 
between C and the class of mental states Ψ, and for any member m of Ψ, and any agent S, 
it is not the case that S has the power to alter, causally or otherwise, either the obtaining 
of D or the membership of C in virtue of having m. 
 
Now if our status as agents is imperiled by (D/E) on one reading of it—that is, when we 
are concerned with mental causation—it isn’t obvious to me why our status as agents 
shouldn’t be jeopardized to the same degree on the other reading, when the question is 
simply whether all our behavior is determined.  Accordingly, what I want to try to argue 
is that to be an agent is, in part, to be such that not all of one’s mental states are 
determined by conditions with respect to which none of our mental states is causally 
relevant.  That is to say, insofar as we are agents, beings whose minds “make a 
difference,” freedom is an essential characteristic of our minds, and mental causation—at 
least in the cases in which we are most interested—amounts precisely to the exercise of 
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that freedom.  A corollary: if determinism is incompatible with freedom, then 
determinism would in a certain sense render the problem of mental causation insoluble.   
The claim sounds extravagant—couldn’t the mind be active in a deterministic 
world?  But the extravagance might be mitigated when we reflect on our sense that not 
just any solution to the problem of mental causation will do.  What sustains Davidson’s 
resistance to reduction, for example, is the worry that reductionist accounts of mental 
causation leave something important unaddressed; something about the mind needs to be 
“insulated” from physical determinism.  It may be urged that whatever seems threatening 
about physical determinism arises in connection with the physicalism, not the 
determinism per se.8 To some extent this may be true, but as a general matter I am not so 
sure.  For to whatever degree one is inclined to oppose mind-body reduction, one is 
clearly inclined to do so on the grounds that something about mentality makes it worth 
distinguishing from the physical, despite the hazard immediately confronted in the form 
of causal exclusion.  My suggestion is that one such antireductionist motive is the 
implicit sense that some mental events are free in a way incompatible with their being 
determined, physically or otherwise.  Here compare David Papineau’s remark that “…we 
can accept determinism as such without accepting physical determinism, and so without 
accepting the completeness of physics,” but still, we “might feel…that a realm of 
deterministic mental forces would scarcely be worth distinguishing from the general run 
of physical forces, given that they would lack the spontaneity and creativity that is 
                                                 
8 No doubt this is Davidson’s view.  Perhaps it is also Kim’s; it is “physicalism,” according to him, that 
“exacts a steep price” (1998: 120). 
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normally held to distinguish the mental from the physical” (2001: 19).  To the extent this 
remark has a ring of plausibility, it expresses the sort of intuition I’m trying to mine.  The 
question is whether freedom—like rationality, intentionality, and the rest—is a relevant 
distinction of the mind, so that the general thesis of determinism would rule out the sort 
of mental causation we are after.   
I do not see how this could be decisively demonstrated (in any non-question 
begging way).  Here I shall content myself with the lesser project of trying to make it 
plausible.   
A traditional argument has it that reason or rationality or rational action requires 
exemption from determinism.9 I will not pursue that line.  Instead I want to focus on the 
notions of purposiveness and goal-directed behavior, keeping in view Ryle’s dictum that 
higher-grade human conduct is not of a piece with the behavior of machines, and 
Levine’s maxim (noted in chapter 1) that purposive activity, of a sort incompatible with 
total governance by “mindless laws of nature,” sets apart the minded from the mindless.  
I believe it is here that we will find the root of the worry that determinism renders us 
‘automata’—beings who act (react?), perhaps, but not sufficiently differently from mere 
machines.  
Now the notion of purposive behavior is clearly a teleological notion, and the 
traditional antithesis of teleology is of course ‘mechanism’.  You’ll recall that that term 
entered the philosopher’s lexicon on the heels of the modernist rejection of final 
                                                 
9 A classic presentation of the idea may be found in C.S. Lewis (1960); it seems to have found a 
contemporary champion in (surprisingly enough) John Searle (2001). 
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causation in favor of efficient causation, the sole causal category of the New Science.  
Descartes was found of assuring us that final causes are “utterly useless” in physics, and 
it seemed to Spinoza anyway a short step from that assumption, together with the idea 
that everything that happens is governed by the principles of mechanics, to the conclusion 
that freedom and purpose and the rest are just bad fictions.10 It is Leibniz who stands out 
as the striking exception, as the one Rationalist who sought to uphold the mechanical 
science without disparaging the notion that teleological categories are genuinely 
explanatory, really applicable to the physical world.11 Of course, Leibniz was a 
determinist par excellence.  All the same, what his picture offers is the possibility of 
preserving teleology or purpose as ineliminable features of the world, even if all goals, 
ends, and so on are predetermined and (in some sense) realized through the principles of 
mechanics.  Evidently there is at least a model according to which determinism does not 
threaten the notion that some events—including human actions—occur for a purpose, and 
the vague worry that a deterministic world must be a ‘mechanistic’ world, a world 
without purpose, thus appears unfounded. 
And so it is.  Yet the compatibility of determinism with purposive human 
behavior—of the sort which is a species of higher-grade human conduct—is arguably 
superficial, and Leibniz forces us to clarify why that might be.  Note first that in 
Leibniz’s system all of the purposes for which we act, all the ends toward which are 
                                                 
10 See Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy IV and Spinoza’s Ethics I, props. xxxii-xxxiii and the 
Appendix. 
11 See Leibniz’s Discourse on Metaphysics XIX, XXII. 
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behaviors are directed, are preset by God,12 so that God’s active will has at least as much 
explanatory significance with respect to our actions as do the purposes we form so to act.  
But the availability of two distinct explanations generates a familiar tension: which of 
these explanations is the weightier, the ones citing divine decree or the ones appealing to 
the agent’s choice?  Does either of them screen off or make redundant the other?  Do we 
act in virtue of God’s choices, or in virtue of ours?  I take it as evidence both that we feel 
this tension and that we’re inclined to see the former explanation as excluding the latter 
that on Leibniz’s (or any other deterministic view) the problem of become more difficult 
to resolve.13 Here it does seem that all of the choices that ultimately matter, all of the 
mental causation that could distinguish an agent as making the difference—in a way that 
confers ultimate causal responsibility for what’s been done—are really God’s and not our 
own.  And to the extent we’re inclined to say our choices lose their significance in such a 
world, I think we reflect the intuition that something distinctive about the mind has been 
lost.  
I suggest that what has been lost is our pretheoretic notion of human behavior as 
purposive in a special sense.  Of course our behavior may be determined and goal-
directed—directed even by conscious beings whose intentions express the goals in 
question—and so purposive in that sense.  But something important is missing; it remains 
easy to feel that agents in a Leibnizian world are acting automatically, grinding out 
sequences which contribute in some way to the ends of the whole, but having no purposes 
                                                 
12 This may be strictly speaking inaccurate given Leibniz’s view of essences; here I shall simply allow 
Leibniz to stand in as my “standard” theological determinist. 
13 A point also made by Sosa (2001). 
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of their own.  And indeed, this worry points to an etymological irony I’ve been 
suppressing throughout.  ‘Mechanism’ is supposed to be antithetical to teleology, but 
machines are among the paradigm instances of objects the proper functioning of which 
guarantees the fulfillment of a certain goal, and their behavior may therefore be 
legitimately described in purposive terms.  But clearly, the sense in which machines 
operate purposively isn’t the sort of purposiveness we want out of purposive human 
behavior, and I suspect that the chief reason for this is just that machines do not so much 
have purposes as determinately carry out the purposes of someone else. 
There is a lesson in this that overreaches the concerns of the theodicist; remove 
God from the picture and we do not yet regain what we were missing in any obvious way.  
It is a distinctive form of purposive behavior, one incompatible with total governance by 
“mindless laws of nature,” if Levine is right, that sets apart our conduct from the behavior 
of mindless things.  Yet this can be the case only if the sense in which we act purposively 
is different in this respect from the behavior of machines— 
Were the ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room for development, for 
growth, for life, and consequently there would be no personality.  The mere carrying out 
of predetermined purposes is mechanical. (Peirce 1998b: 214). 
If we are to act purposively in a way that distinguishes human agency from the purposive 
behavior of machines, then, it isn’t enough that we function properly according to a given 
design plan or blueprint (wherever these things came from), it must rather be that we 
sometimes act for purposes of our own choosing.  And the only way this might be is if we 
are, even if partly machines, in part designers as well. 
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 That is what I take the fundamental intuition to be.  But it might reasonably be 
objected that all we have done is reiterated the claim that the mind is free only if 
determinism is false, or only insofar as we are the “ultimate creators and sustainers of our 
own ends and purposes” (Kane 1996: 4); and although having a mind might not enable us 
to do that it hardly follows that we don’t have minds or that having a mind doesn’t enable 
us to do anything at all.  So we still haven’t made sense of the idea that the threats of 
determinism and epiphenomenalism are intertwined.   
 This is an understandable response, and I agree that minds are different from 
machines in many other important respects as well—including additional respects crucial 
to human agency.  But what is being overlooked is the fact that one of the principal 
motivations driving work on the issue of mental causation is that “we want agents, in 
virtue of the beliefs and desires and intentions they hold, to cause their limbs to 
move…and to bring about changes in their physical environment” (Kim 2002: 675, my 
emphases), a motivation stemming from the “deep metaphysical intuition that our 
minds—or anyway that we—are an independent source of causal effect” (Sosa 1999:5).14 
At the end of the day we want to see how the agent or self—our concept of which is of a 
“distinctively libertarian cast” (Strawson 1986: 97)—can make a salient difference to the 
world of which it is a part.   
                                                 
14 Compare John Searle: “Intentional causation is in certain important respects unlike billiard-ball 
causation.  Both are cases of causation, but in the case of desires and intentions, in the case of normal 
voluntary actions, once the causes are present they still do not compel the agent to act; the agent has to act 
on his reasons or on his intention” (2001: 231). 
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What threatens this possibility in the first instance is that physical states co-
occurring with mental states are calling all the shots, determining the operations of the 
mind without being influenced by the mind in return.  But what is so essential about the 
determining physical states being co-occurrent with the mental states in question?  Why 
should it make a difference to the distinctive involvement of the mind if its operations are 
fixed to the same effect merely by prior physical states and conditions?  In the case of 
mental causation (as we typically think of it) the threat comes from below, and in the case 
of free will the threat comes from behind, but the difference in their relative locations 
doesn’t make them any less the same threat.  Why do we want the mind to make a 
difference?  Because we want some measure of control, some sphere of influence in 
which we, in virtue of our mental powers, direct the course of events.  I don’t know how 
else to put it.  But that terminology is flatly indistinguishable from terminology which 
typically expresses libertarian worries about determinism.  The essential source of the 
worry in either case is that something’s determining the mind to be the way it is, 
preventing it (preventing us) from playing a unique role in shaping the contours of our 
world.  We can express this worry—as we do in the free will debate—by saying that our 
actions must be up to us, or we can express it—as we do in the mental causation debate—
by saying that the mind must be causal as such, but in either case we are yearning for the 
absence of independent determining conditions over which our minds have no influence 
at all.  In both cases we want to be able to say that for some of our actions, “the final 
explanation” for their occurrence “is given by the intentional explanation of my 
action…My reason for doing it is the whole reason why it happened, and no further 
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explanation is either necessary or possible” (Nagel 1986: 114), and in both cases the 
threat is that we are so situated in the world that such final explanations are in principle 
unavailable. 
 It won’t have escaped your notice that I have reverted to speaking of physical 
determinism, physical states and the like, but this was merely for expository purposes.  It 
is after all physical determinism and psychophysical supervenience that provide the 
starting points for our problems of free will and mental causation.  But the same 
problems can be formulated without any special physicalistic assumptions.  Jonathan 
Edwards’s quasi-Cartesian theory of divine conservation, according to which God 
continually recreates the world from moment to moment, threatens the efficacy of the 
mind just as effectively as the causal autonomy of physics, a point not lost on Kim.15 And 
theological determinism, analogously, leaves us no better off than physical determination 
when it comes to the possibility of the mind’s being a source of causal effect. 
What we need a theory of mental causation to deliver, I contend, is the power of 
agents to produce and guide their actions, in virtue of their choices, so as to satisfy their 
purposes, a theory that will allow us to hold with Aristotle both that “the origin of 
action—its efficient, not its final cause—is choice, and that of choice is desire and 
reasoning with a view to an end” (Nicomachean Ethics 1139a31-2) and that “The stick 
moves the stone and is moved by the hand, which is again moved by the man; in the man, 
however, we have reached a mover that is not so in virtue of being moved by something 
                                                 
15 “Edwards’s dictum”—that “vertical determination excludes horizontal causation”—is according to Kim 
the “fundamental idea” behind the causal exclusion argument (Kim 2005: 36). 
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else” (Physics VIII, 256a6-8).  And if a theory of mental causation must deliver that, then 
we will not have solved the problem of mental causation without having stumbled upon a 
solution to the problem of free will.  
 
4.2 Three Essential Components of Agency  
The foregoing argument is not likely to move the compatibilist.  And even if what I have 
said is right, it hardly solves the free will problem.  But this was not my intent.  My 
concern was with the question what it would take to solve the problem.  Now, if there is 
anything in the argument given in the previous section, the good news is that a solution to 
the free will problem would take nothing more than a solution to the mind-body problem!  
The bad news, I suppose, is that it would take nothing less.   
Still, I think we can do more than simply subsume the traditional problem of 
freedom under a new framework.  For even though the compatibilist will surely not agree 
that exemption from determinism is a requirement on any variety of mental causation 
worth wanting, it does not follow that she will disagree with the libertarian as to what is 
required for human agency simpliciter.  In fact there are at least three features that 
libertarians and compatibilists will agree are essential to agency, and I shall present these 
below.  I will then explain how a close consideration of these features of agency may 
help with the main challenges to libertarianism in the following three sections. 
 Let us begin by reviewing the three most formidable challenges to the viability of 
a libertarian position on free will:  
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(i) Libertarianism requires the falsity of philosophical naturalism or materialist 
theories of mind—it is committed to an essentially mysterious metaphysics. 
(ii) Indeterminism threatens free agency by undermining the agent’s control over 
her actions. 
(iii) If indeterminism does not undermine agential control, then neither does it 
enhance our freedom or add to human agency anything of appreciable value.   
  
As I have said, I believe that a more fruitful way of approaching these problems 
should begin by reorienting the discussion toward an examination of those conditions 
which are essential to agency simpliciter—toward those features, that is, that any realist 
about action will be concerned to secure, whatever her stance on the compatibility of 
freedom and determinism.  Our analysis in chapter 3 and in the previous section has 
revealed at least these three features to be of crucial importance to agency.  First, 
 
(i*) Mental states (such as intentions) are causally efficacious.   
 
Compatibilism after all offers us free action by way of the agent’s deterministic control of 
her behavior through choice.  If we are to have such freedom, then, our choices must be 
relevant to behavioral output; they must “make a difference” to what goes on in the 
world.   
But although the mind must be a source of causal effect if anyone ever acts, its 
causal efficacy must not come at the expense of subsuming its operations under 
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‘mechanistic’ laws, if such laws are indeed of a form that would strip mentality of its role 
in grounding genuine agency.  For in the paradigm cases, anyway,  
 
(ii*)  Intentional human behavior is purposive, that is, guided by the agent with a 
view toward the attainment of her goals.  
 
Indeed, as we will see in the next section, (ii*) arguably specifies a distinction not just 
between agents and non-agents, but also between creatures with minds and creatures 
without them.  So there are at least two reasons for compatibilists and libertarians to 
endorse (ii*). 
Yet what distinguishes an action from a mere happening isn’t just that it admits of 
a certain variety of purposive description, but also that it has a special kind of etiology, 
for  
 
(iii*) Actions, as opposed to mere happenings, are produced or brought about by 
the agents whose actions they are.   
 
And if such agential production does not require a sui generis form of causation obtaining 
between agents and their actions (or intentions), as the agent-causalist has it, then the 
genesis of any act must of course find its location in the mind.  (Where else are we 
supposed to look?) 
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 Now some philosophers may contest the assumption that feature (iii*) of agency 
is one that is grounded in the operations of the mind, or in the interaction between mind 
and body.  We noted John Bishop’s remarks to this effect in the last chapter, and J. David 
Velleman voices much the same intuition in the passage just below: 
The problem of agent-causation lingers even if the mind-body problem can be made to 
disappear.  For let there be mental states and events in abundance…and let them be 
connected, both to one another and to external behaviour, by robust causal relations; still, 
the question will remain how the existence and relations of these items can amount to a 
person’s causing something rather than merely to something’s happening to him, albeit 
something mental…Just as the mind-body problem is that of finding a mind at work amid 
the workings of the body, so the problem of agency is that of finding an agent at work 
amid the workings of mind.  (1992: 196) 
But I think my disagreement with Bishop and Velleman on this point is mainly verbal.  
Neither of these theorists, in attempting to resolve the problem, endorses anything like 
agent- (or non-occurrent or immanent) causation.  Rather, they both specify certain types 
of processes involving mental states and dispositions (such as the disposition to engage in 
practical reasoning, in Velleman’s case) and identify them as the types of processes 
which constitute (or realize) the agent’s role in bringing her actions about.  I shall argue 
below that their solutions do not ultimately satisfy the very strong intuitions that motivate 
their work on the issue in question.  But however that may be, given their actual 
responses to the problem it seems to me they do not believe that we have to look 
somewhere beyond the interaction of mind with body for a solution.  And, of course, 
regardless whether one thinks that a solution to the “problem of agent-causation” should 
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be sought here or elsewhere takes nothing away from the fact that (iii*) remains an 
essential component of agency.  A specification of the agent’s role in action is needed 
whatever one’s view about the compatibility of freedom and determinism, and where we 
eventually find it matters little.  If it requires a kind of substance-causation that is not 
constituted by causation between events and states, then so be it.  If not, we need a 
specification of which types of (event-) causal process constitute agential production and, 
in addition, a way of assuaging those powerful intuitions to the effect that such a 
specification could not, in the nature of the case, be articulated. 
 To sum up, then, the following are essential components of agency that both 
compatibilists and libertarians endorse: 
 
(i*) Mental states (such as intentions) are causally efficacious.   
(ii*)  Intentional human behavior is purposive, that is, guided by the agent with a 
view toward the attainment of her goals.  
(iii*) Actions, as opposed to mere happenings, are produced or brought about by 
the agents whose actions they are.   
 
All of (i*)-(iii*) are at issue in the mental causation debate and all are immediately 
relevant to the possibility of free agency, however the latter is construed.  I think if we 
dial in on this common ground, then not only will we avoid some of the familiar 
stalemates that typify the free will debate, but we will also more sharply demarcate which 
philosophical challenges are unique to the libertarian position—which problems, that is, a 
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libertarian conception of freedom itself creates—and which are the difficulties the 
libertarian must face simply qua action theorist.  The idea is to address the principal 
challenges to libertarianism (as specified in (i)-(iii) above) by examining the necessary 
components of any adequate theory of action (as specified in (i*)-(iii*) above) and 
putting the resources needed to secure those components to work in aid of the 
libertarian’s case.  With these pieces in place, I now turn to challenge (i) to 
libertarianism. 
 
4.3 A Naturalistic Theory of Free Will? 
I have claimed that the main problems for libertarianism can be addressed by focusing on 
the conditions essential to agency simpliciter, and that the first of these problems is that 
libertarian free will is inconsistent with a naturalistic view of agents and their place in the 
world.  But how could this challenge, problem (i) for libertarianism, be solved at all, in 
view of my previous analysis which has libertarianism bound up with dualism?  Isn’t this 
just an admission that libertarian freedom couldn’t be consistent with a “non-mysterious,” 
naturalistic ontology?  I do indeed think that there is both historical and even some 
conceptual justification for the associating of dualism and libertarianism.  But this 
association may be due in part to the libertarian’s concentration on those features of 
agency in general which tend to resist easy naturalistic analysis, and not in the first 
instance because libertarianism considered as a distinctive position concerning the nature 
of freedom is inconsistent with naturalism.  There is at least some support for this 
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contention in the interesting remarks of Thomas Reid, who was about as dualistic a 
libertarian as one could reasonably hope to find: 
[If matter] require only a certain configuration to make it think rationally, it will be 
impossible to show any good reason why the same configuration may not make it act 
rationally and freely…[Those who] reason justly from the system of materialism, will 
easily perceive, that the doctrine of necessity is so far from being a direct inference, that 
it can receive no support from it. (1969: 367) 
What I want to argue, accordingly, is that if the libertarian view of free action is truly 
inconsistent with a naturalistic metaphysics, then the inconsistency does not derive from 
libertarianism’s distinctive conception of what it is to act freely, but rather from 
libertarianism’s common conception of what it is to act.   
To explain.  We have already noted that one major difficulty for naturalistic 
theories of mind is accounting for the possibility of mental causation, and we have 
likewise noted that this challenge is one that anyone concerned with the nature of agency 
must face—the problem of mental causation, Kim reminds us, “threatens to take away 
both agency and cognition” (1998: 32), and it seems safe to say that there is no generally 
received story about how mental causation works.  (Indeed, I would say that the 
unavailability of any widely accepted naturalistic theory of mental causation is in part 
responsible for the re-emergence of emergentism as a serious contender in the mental 
causation debate and the philosophy of mind generally.)  So condition (i*) on agency 
remains in need of a naturalistic account.   
Yet we have also seen that action requires something in addition to the bare 
efficacy of the mind; it essentially involves the purposeful guidance of certain bodily 
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movements, a condition which requires that the mind interact with the body in the right 
sort of way.  This is our condition (ii*) on agency, and here as well a naturalistic 
orientation presents us with a challenge.  One of the challenges I want to discuss has 
received a good deal of airtime within the domain of action theory, and I shall turn to it in 
just a moment.  The other challenge comes in the form of reconciling this condition with 
the first condition on agency, or providing a naturalistic theory of mental causation 
without jeopardizing the possibility of providing a naturalistic accounting for (ii*).  For 
while it is true that purposive activity of a certain kind distinguishes agents from non-
agents, it is clear that the possibility of such purposive guidance must derive from having 
a mind that operates, causally, in a distinctive way: 
…I am a rational, intelligent creature.  I do not merely react to my environment in a 
reflexive, mindless way, but rather I plan, deliberate (at least on occasion), and generally 
try to act in a way that is rationally connected to the attainment of my goals.  We might 
add, as a part of this feature, the very fact that I have goals.  Objects that clearly lack 
minds, such as tables and chairs, or even plants and sufficiently lower animals, do not, I 
presume, share this feature.  Their behavior, if such it could be called, is totally governed 
by—is predictable and explicable in terms of—mindless laws of nature. (Levine 2001: 3) 
If we think of Levine’s “mindless laws of nature” as something like Davidson’s “strict 
laws,” we can perhaps better see both what motivates antireductionism (from at least one 
standpoint), and what jeopardizes the causal relevance of the mind given an 
antireductionist stance (which will in turn explain why (i*) and (ii*) are hard to jointly 
satisfy in a naturalistically acceptable way). 
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To take the second phenomenon first, suppose we begin with the assumption that 
mental states are not identical to physical states (for reasons involving the multiple 
realizability of mental properties, for example).  Now if all of our behavior is “totally 
governed by,” and so “predictable and explicable in terms of…mindless laws of nature,” 
then our behavior is explicable in just the same way that the behavior of any mindless 
thing is explicable.  And in this case it begins to look as though having a mind (or 
instantiating mental properties) doesn’t matter, at least insofar as the mind does not 
influence or effect the movements of our bodies.  For these movements are already fully 
explained by the relevant physical, “mindless” laws.  The prima facie tension between 
complete physical explanations and reasons explanations of the same phenomenon was 
nicely captured by Norman Malcolm (1968).  Suppose we wish to explain the movement 
of a man making his way up a ladder, for example, by saying that he wanted to retrieve 
his hat and believed it was on the roof; and suppose that there exists a complete physical 
explanation of these movements.  Since the latter explanation proceeds without reference 
to his goals or intentions, Malcolm argued, 
the movements of the man on the ladder would be completely accounted for in terms of 
electrical, chemical, and mechanical processes in his body.  This would surely imply that 
his desire or intention to retrieve his hat had nothing to do with his movement up the 
ladder…If every movement of his was completely accounted for by his antecedent 
neurophysiological states (his ‘programming’), then it was not true that those movements 
occurred because he wanted or intended to get his hat. (p. 133) 
 This result may be avoided if mental properties are just physical properties, for 
then there would be no justification for the claim that the man’s desires and intentions 
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had “nothing to do” with his movements.  But here we confront the first phenomenon, the 
putative nomological irreducibility of the mental implicit in the passage quoted from 
Levine.  After all, it will perhaps be of little consolation to discover that, although the 
mind is causal, it can no longer serve as ground for the purposiveness of human behavior 
in quite the way Levine’s passage suggests.  No doubt the mind’s operations could be 
described teleologically—neurophysiological process are after all biological processes, 
and talk of “proper functions” and “purposes” and the like have been very difficult to 
dispense with in biological explanation.16 But the project since Darwin’s day, at least, has 
been to show how the apparently teleological may be reduced to the mechanical.  That is, 
the project is to provide an explanation for the appearance of purpose and design that 
involves no commitment to anything like “final causation,” or at any rate no commitment 
to any sort of process fundamentally different from the types of causal process at work in 
basic physics.  Perhaps this is not especially troubling when it comes to explaining the 
“purposive” activities of the heart or kidney, but we encounter conceptual resistance of a 
stronger kind when an identical analysis is offered with respect to the operations of the 
mind: 
There is nothing normative or teleological about Darwinian evolution…Darwin’s account 
shows that the apparent teleology of biological processes is an illusion.  It is a simple 
extension of this insight to point out that notions such as ‘purpose’ are never intrinsic to 
biological organisms (unless of course those organisms themselves have conscious 
intentional states and processes). (Searle 1992: 51-52) 
                                                 
16 See the essays in Allen, Bekoff and Lauder, eds. (1998). 
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Searle’s parenthetical remark is illustrative of the kind of concern that Levine and 
Davidson, among others, have called to our attention in various ways.  The worry moving 
all these thinkers, I believe, is that if we are eventually successful in providing a 
reductive account of all psychological phenomena in purely mechanistic terms, we will 
be hard pressed to identify anything as inherently purposive in the way that most of us 
take intentional action and related mental processes to be.  But then, so the worry goes, 
the justification for evaluating higher-grade human conduct in normative categories will 
be placed in doubt.  John Searle echoes this Davidsonian theme just below: 
A symptom that something is radically wrong with the [naturalizing the mind] project is 
that the intentional notions are inherently normative.  They set standards of truth, 
rationality, consistency, etc., and there is no way that these standards can be intrinsic to a 
system consisting entirely of brute, blind, nonintentional causal relations.  There is no 
normative component to billiard ball causation. (1992: 51) 
This is of course not to say that we could not take an “intentional stance” toward 
mechanical systems, as Daniel Dennett proposes.  Perhaps we could.  Very likely we’d 
have to with respect to some systems.  But taking such a stance would be a pragmatic 
choice—even if it is one that would be psychologically forced on us, in the reflexive case 
at least—requiring no difference in kind between intentional and non-intentional systems 
in order to support the choice with a metaphysical rationale.17 
                                                 
17 So Dennett writes, “Wholesale abandonment of the Intentional is in any case a less pressing concern than 
partial erosion of the Intentional domain, an eventuality against which there are no conceptual guarantees at 
all.  If the growing area of success in mechanistic explanation of human behaviour does not in itself rob us 
of responsibility, it does make it more pragmatic, more effective or efficient, for people on occasion to 
adopt less than the Intentional stance toward others” (1973: 183-184). 
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The notion of purposiveness expressed in (ii*) leads to a related challenge, more 
often discussed by philosophers of action than philosophers of mind.  The claim in 
question may be simply stated: causal theories of action cannot be made to cohere with 
our conception of action as a teleological phenomenon, and we should therefore pursue 
non-naturalistic alternatives to agency.  To take one example, Scott Sehon (1997) argues 
that teleological explanations of behavior are not reducible to causal explanations, and 
that the inability of causal theories of action to explain what it is for an agent to act for a 
goal or purpose forces us to call the viability of naturalistic accounts of mind and agency 
into question.18  
It is obvious why the teleological aspects of our mental nature are more often (and 
more explicitly) discussed within the domain of action theory.  Intentional action is 
paradigmatically goal-oriented, directed by the agent toward the satisfaction of some end 
she deems desirable.  When I want a beer and believe I can get one by walking to the 
kitchen, I walk to the kitchen in order to get the beer.  When little Johnnie wants to get a 
rise out of his sister and believes that depositing a toad in her bed will produce the 
desired effect, he puts the toad in his sister’s bed in order to annoy her, etc.  In general, 
explanations of intentional action conform to something like this schema: S A-ed in order 
to bring it about that B, where B is a state of affairs represented by a relevant desire of 
S’s, and A is a bit behavior believed by S to have some chance of making the desired state 
                                                 
18 See also Wilson (1989), McCann (2003). 
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of affairs obtain.  So our common-sense way of understanding, rationalizing and 
describing action is shot through with teleology. 
However, our resources for understanding teleology in a materialistically 
respectable way seem to be limited to identifying or specifying certain sorts of causal 
process to which teleological explanations can (in some sense) be reduced.  A broad class 
of naturalistic projects in the philosophy of action therefore assume that teleological 
explanation is a species of causal explanation, which of course must be assumed if we are 
to preserve our pretheoretic way of viewing action as teleological while at the same time 
understanding it in a way congenial to materialist theories of mind.  Indeed, Scott Sehon 
is entirely correct in holding that “the primary motivation for giving a causal analysis of 
teleological explanations lies in the allure of squaring our commonsense conceptions of 
mind and agency with a naturalistic, scientific perspective on the world” (1997: 196).  If 
this reconciliatory project should prove impossible of fulfillment, however, then a 
familiar dilemma looms: we will be forced to either an eliminativist view of action 
(insofar as action is essentially teleological and there really is no such thing as teleology), 
or we’ll have to give up on the naturalistic presuppositions that make causal analyses of 
action so appealing.   
We turn finally to condition (iii*) on agency, the condition specifying that actions, 
as opposed to mere happenings, are produced or brought about by the agents whose 
actions they are.  Here as well it has been urged that any naturalistic construal of agency 
necessarily ignores the role of the agent in bringing her actions about; naturalism, it has 
been argued, entails that the agent no longer acts, but merely provides the backdrop or 
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arena within which certain happenings take place.  The concern is expressed nicely by 
John Bishop: “Of course action differs from other behaviour in that the agent brings it 
about, but the problem is how to accommodate such bringing about within a naturalist 
ontology” (1989: 69).  And it is skepticism about the possibility of ever meeting this 
challenge that moves N.M.L. Nathan to claim, strikingly, that “materialism is false if 
anyone ever performs an action” (1975: 501).   
What emerges from the above is of some import for the defense of libertarianism 
as a viable position on free agency.  For we have seen that with respect to each of the 
essential components of (any kind of) agency, arguments have been presented by various 
theorists to the effect that that feature of agency is not compatible with naturalism.  Now 
if these theorists are right, then libertarian free will does indeed require the falsity of 
philosophical naturalism—but then any respectable compatibilism does as well, and 
problem (i) for libertarianism loses its force.  That is, under these assumptions we shall 
be forced to admit that the charge expressed in (i)—that libertarianism isn’t consistent 
with naturalism—is a charge the libertarian cannot avoid.  But so what?  For under these 
assumptions the reason(s) that libertarianism is inconsistent with naturalism is the very 
same reason(s) compatibilism is inconsistent with naturalism: either naturalism rules out 
(i*) mental causation, or naturalism rules out (ii*) the purposiveness of intentional 
behavior, or naturalism rules out (iii*) the production of actions by agents.  And if that is 
so, one wonders whether naturalism has very much to recommend it after all.19 
                                                 
19 Compare Jerry Fodor: “…if we can’t get both the causal responsibility of the mental and an argument for 
physicalism, then it seems to me that we ought to give up the argument for physicalism” (1989: 156). 
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But suppose that compatibilist free agency is indeed consistent with naturalism.  
Then naturalism must not rule out the essential elements of agency as specified in (i*)-
(iii*).  That is, there must exist a naturalistic solution to (i*) the problem of mental 
causation and, since “any adequate account of our mental powers must extend to a theory 
of their connection with action” (Audi 1993: 1), it must be a solution that illuminates both 
(ii*) what it is to act purposively and (iii*) what it is for an agent to originate or bring 
about an act.  If such a theory is in principle available, then I say we have all of the tools 
required in order to understand how free will can be realized in the natural order, given 
the assumption that determinism is false.20 A coherent naturalistic theory of libertarian 
free will would therefore be possible, and challenge (i) to libertarianism—the claim that 
libertarianism requires the falsity of naturalism—will have been shown to be false. 
That is our goal.  But the realization of this goal obviously depends on the 
possibility of answering the second and third major problems for libertarianism, using 
only those resources which are likewise needed by the (naturalistically-minded) 
compatibilist to explicate the notion of intentional action as behavior that the agent brings 
about on purpose or for a reason.  I shall now turn to the question how we may approach 
problems (ii) and (iii) in light of conditions (ii*) and (iii*), beginning with the former 
problem. 
 
                                                 
20 More strictly, provided that indeterminism sometimes obtains at certain crucial loci along the causal 
pathways from deliberation, to intention formation, to the performance of an intentional act. 
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4.4 Indeterminism and Control 
A well-worn objection to indeterministic conceptions of free agency has it that so far 
from augmenting our freedom, indeterminism would threaten our freedom, for 
undetermined events are simply random events and random events by their nature are not 
“up to” anybody or within anyone’s control.  So if an event, such as an action or the 
formation of an intention to act, were left undetermined by its causal antecedents, then no 
one at all could be said to have brought it about for a purpose.  No one, that is, could be 
said to have exercised agential control over its occurrence, since its occurrence would be 
due simply to chance.  This is our problem (ii), and it seems to be an especially daunting 
one.  In this section I shall examine a few arguments to the effect that indeterminism 
would vitiate the control of agents over their actions—i.e., that determinism is required 
for control.  I shall argue that the sort of control agents exercise over their actions when 
they act intentionally (on purpose, for a reason) is not undermined by indeterminism, or 
at any rate no one has shown this to be so.  I then consider the claim that there is a sort of 
control that goes beyond the kind of control exemplified in cases of intentional action, 
and this sort of control is unavailable to agents unless determinism obtains.  I will argue 
that if there is a kind of control answering to this description, it is not a kind of control 
needed for free (and non-random or uncontrolled) agency. 
 Let us begin by admitting the obvious.  Indeterminism surely can undermine 
control.  Suppose for example that I decide to perform a given action, begin trying to do 
it, and find my body, to my great surprise, moving in ways precisely different from the 
ways I’d intended it to move as a result of some large-scale quantum hiccup.  That would 
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be a case in which I have lost control.  There is of course an analogue in the deterministic 
setting.  An agent may intend to not look nervous, begin trying to not look nervous, 
become nervous as a result and, consequently, display nervous behavior; all this may 
happen via a deterministic causal path from the intention to the behavioral output, and in 
this case, too, the agent does not exercise control.  But this matters little, for critics who 
claim that indeterminism undermines control do not wish to say that all of our behaviors 
are controlled if they are determined, but rather (taking first the strongest version of the 
challenge) that none of our behaviors is controlled if they are undetermined. 
But this stronger version of the objection is clearly too strong.  For suppose an 
agent forms an intention to A, and his intention deterministically causes (in the right way) 
the A-ing, and suppose this sequence of events constitutes a paradigm case of agential 
control.  The type of causal sequence in question may be realized in an indeterministic 
world as well.  Indeterminism implies nothing about what causes what, nor does it imply 
anything about the causal route between a token cause-event and a token effect-event.21 It 
may be objected that even if an event c causes some effect e by way of the same type of 
causal path taken in a deterministic world, still, given that the connection between c and e 
is probabilistic, c might not have caused e.  And if c is an intention or choice, for 
example, and e is an appropriate behavioral effect, it would seem that the agent whose 
intention it is cannot ensure that e will occur given c, and thus cannot be said to control 
his behavior even if the actual path between c and e happens to be the same as the path 
between c and e in the deterministic world.  I shall discuss this objection more fully 
                                                 
21 See Randolph Clarke (1995: 129-130, 137 n. 2) for discussion. 
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below.  For now it is sufficient to note that whether an agent exercises control is in the 
first instance a matter of what actually happens, what actually causes what, not what 
might have happened or what might have caused what.  What we need before us, then, is 
some idea about what kinds of causal process constitute agential control, which sorts of 
causal processes are such that, when they actually occur, the agent exercises control over 
her actions.  The objection is after all that indeterminism vitiates or removes control, and 
to begin our assessment of the objection it seems right to ask for an elucidation of the 
conditions under which an action can legitimately be said to be controlled by the agent 
who performs it.  These, I believe, must come in the form of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for human behavior to count as intentional. 
The notion of intentional action is difficult and elusive, but it is generally agreed 
that an action intentionally performed is an action performed for a reason, and guided by 
the agent toward a desired end.  The exercise of such guidance is crucial to intentional 
behavior, and the main challenge to our understanding how an agent’s guidance of her 
behavior can be captured in causal terms arises from the possibility of deviant or 
wayward causal chains between intentions and matching behavior.  Roughly, the concern 
is that an agent may form an intention to perform some action A in order to bring about 
some state of affairs S, and that very intention may in fact cause the agent to A and S to 
be brought about as a result, but the causal trajectory between the intention and A may be 
such that it precludes the agent from exercising control over what she does, rendering her 
action unintentional.  The intention in question might produce in the agent a state of 
nervousness or surprise, for example, a state which subsequently causes her to 
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temporarily lose control over her behavior but, fortuitously, also causes her body to move 
in just the way she had intended it to.  In such a case, the agent no longer performs the 
action intentionally or on purpose, for she does not guide or control her behavior in the 
right way.22 
 A classic example of the phenomenon is provided by Davidson, who asks us to 
consider the following scenario: 
a climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on a 
rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself of 
the weight and danger.  This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to 
loosen his hold, and yet it might be the case that he never chose to loosen his hold, nor 
did he do it intentionally. (Davidson 1973: 79) 
According to Davidson, intentions are belief/desire complexes.  The case above may 
therefore be easily recast so that the climber’s intention to loosen his grip causes the 
matching behavior,23 and most examples of deviance do precisely this.  Robert Audi, who 
also holds that intentions are reducible to beliefs and wants, offers a similar case: 
An agent’s arm is, unbeknownst to her, temporarily paralyzed.  She wants to greet a 
friend and believes that waving is an appropriate way to do so.  Her having that desire 
and belief just happen to affect a nearby machine, causing it to emit radiations that just 
happen to so affect her brain that her arm is caused to wave. (Audi 1986: 526) 
                                                 
22 Here I shall focus on the fundamental problem of primary deviance (sometimes called ‘antecedential 
waywardness’), leaving the issues of secondary (or ‘consequential’) and tertiary deviance (cf. Mele 1997: 
6-8) for another day.  
23 See for example John Bishop (1983: 64). 
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And for an example in which the intention itself (supposing intentions are not reducible 
to other mental states) is the cause: 
A philosopher intends to knock over his glass of water in order to distract his 
commentator.  However, his intention so upsets him that his hand shakes uncontrollably, 
striking the glass and knocking it to the floor. (Mele 1992: 182) 
The recipe for cases of deviance should now be evident.  The appropriate mental state (or 
the having of that state) causes the appropriate behavior, but in the wrong way, resulting 
in behavior that is not intentional.  Insofar as we wish to analyze intentional behavior as 
behavior with an appropriate causal ancestry, the trick is to say precisely what sort of 
ancestry it needs to be. 
Now the problem of causal deviance has been much discussed, and the amount of 
energy expended in an effort to solve it—by specifying the “right way” in which 
intentions must cause matching behavior if the behavior is to be intentional—has been 
considerable.  But the significance of the issue of deviance for our purposes is this.  It is 
clear, first, that the search for necessary and sufficient conditions for non-deviantly 
caused or intentional action is, at least in part, the attempt to explain how agential control 
might be captured in event causal terms, for a case of causal deviance is just a case in 
which the agent no longer controls or guides her behavior toward the end she had 
intended to bring about.24 As one might expect, there is no generally accepted solution to 
                                                 
24 Cf. Brand (1984), Thalberg (1984), Clarke (2003, chapter 3).  In some cases of deviance it seems just as 
natural to say that the agent “does not act intentionally because he is not the originator of his bodily 
movements” (Bishop 1983: 68, my emphasis), even though his intention figures causally in the production 
of the movements matching the content of his intention.  I have no interesting quarrel with this sort of 
analysis, but the fundamental issue in the deviance problem is, it seems to me, the issue of control. 
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the problem.  But strikingly, none of the proposals which seem to enjoy the most 
widespread support among causalists require that the causal sequence from intention to 
action be deterministic.25 Indeed, I know of no serious causal analysis of intentional 
action produced in response to the problem of deviance that does.  The proposed 
conditions are explicitly adeterministic, meant to be consistent with both deterministic 
and indeterministic conceptions of agency, a reflection of the fact that reasons 
explanations are adeterministic as well.26 And the import of this fact for the defense of 
libertarianism is clear: if what it is to control one’s actions is capturable in conditions the 
obtaining of which is independent of the truth or falsity of determinism, then the claim 
that indeterminism undermines control is, so far forth, without support.  So until we hear 
more about just what this control indeterminism allegedly undermines is—where the 
analysis given suffices for purposive, intentional behavior—we may justifiably reject as 
unfounded the notion that indeterminism threatens agential control.27 And, as long as any 
of these (naturalistic) theories of action provide sufficient conditions for (ii*), then, 
                                                 
25 Searle (1983), Audi (1986), Bishop (1989), Mele (1992), (1995), Mele and Moser (1994), Enç (2003).  
Interestingly, Peacocke’s (1979) conditions for intentional action, according to which behavioral effects 
must be in a specified sense ‘sensitive’ to their intentional causes, bear a striking similarity to the 
libertarian notion that agents must have the “ability to do otherwise.”  The so-called Frankfurt-style 
examples (Frankfurt 1969) have been employed in the same way against Peacocke to show that the 
counterfactual “had the agent not intended to do A, he would not have done A”—a claim entailed by 
Peacocke’s conditions—may not be satisfied in a case of genuine intentional action.  See Enç (2004: 153-
154) for discussion. 
26 Ginet (1989), Mele (1997) 
27 And with it the claim that reasons explanations must be contrastive explanations, which is just a way of 
reiterating (in epistemic categories) the idea that we act for reasons just if we are determined so to act. 
 239
contrary to claim (ii), agents may exercise the relevant capacities of control over their 
actions without being determined to act in just the ways they do. 
Now, I will be the first to admit that more remains to be said on this score.  It is 
reasonable to think, for example, that although a minimal sort of agent-control is present 
in any case of intentional action (or action for a reason—I take these to be equivalent), 
there is an additional kind of control provided by deterministic theories and unavailable 
to theories espousing nondeterministic causation.  For example, it may be urged that an 
action cannot count as rational (or fully rational) unless it is deterministically caused; for 
in the absence of deterministic causation there will be no contrastive explanation as to 
why the agent acted as she did rather than not, and such explanations, and the sort of 
agential control that undergird them, are required for (fully) rational action.  Or one might 
hold, relatedly, that any undetermined action would in the final analysis be too chancy or 
lucky for an agent to exercise full, complete control over its occurrence, so that unless an 
agent’s acts are determined they cannot be held responsible for them.   
Let me make a few points in response.  First, it is apparent that Carl Ginet (1989), 
Timothy O’Connor (2000a) and especially Randolph Clarke (1995, 1996, 1997, 2003), 
among others, have successfully shown that indeterminacy need not eradicate rationality 
in action.  It may be, as Clarke (1996, 2003: 39-49) contends, that indeterminism does not 
in itself render contrastive explanations (or contrastive rational explanations) unavailable.  
But it seems to me very doubtful that such explanations are required for rational action in 
any case.  What the critic of libertarianism ultimately has in mind when voicing this 
objection is simply that the availability of contrastive explanations signals the presence of 
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determinism in the causal process eventuating in action or choice.  However, the point 
about contrastive explainability is relevant to the issue of control only to the extent that 
the unavailability of such explanations entails a diminishment of control over (or 
rationality in) the action to be explained.  That is to say, the failure of contrastive 
explainability matters to the rationality of and control over action only if indeterminism 
diminishes rationality or control.  This is of course the question at issue, and without a 
specification of the crucial notions that supports the critic’s contention, we will have 
simply reverted to the original charge that indeterminism undermines the agent’s rational 
control over what she does.  The demand for a certain sort of explanation is, as it seems 
to me, more or less a roundabout way of getting at the nature of control, which is not a 
matter of explanation but a matter of causation:  
It is along causal lines that information by which we guide our actions flows to us from 
the world and is reflected in our beliefs; and it is along causal lines that the power of our 
desires, guided by our beliefs, enables us to change the world.  Our freedom and our 
rationality come not from escaping these causal lines, but from traveling them in the right 
ways, from the right kinds of motivational sources, to reasonable ends.  (Audi 1993: 31) 
And what the critics need to show is that the “right ways” Audi speaks of are unavailable 
unless determinism obtains. 
A similar point applies to the claim that full, complete, absolute control requires 
determinism.  In much of the literature the qualifications (“full,” “complete,”…) are 
simply italicized and are subjected to no new or further elucidation.  It may be that we are 
just meant to “see” the problem.  Well, I do understand the worry, and I think it needs an 
answer.  But once it has received a reasonably close and careful analysis, especially one 
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making use only of the tools at the disposal of any action theorist or philosopher of 
science, then just reiterating the original objection with more rhetorical force gives the 
libertarian nothing new to which he can respond. 
Yet there will remain at least a residual impression that the causal upshot of an 
indeterminate process must be in some significant sense a matter of chance.  We have to 
concede this is true.  If an event is left undetermined by its immediate antecedents then 
there is straightforwardly “some chance” that it will not occur given those very 
antecedents.  However, the notion of ‘chance’ calls for clarification, for it is not the case 
that all undetermined events are chancy in just the same sense (cf. Ekstrom 2003).  In 
some cases ‘chance’ may just stand in for ‘undetermined’.  But if ‘chance’ is so used, we 
ought to bear in mind that there is no ordinary language support licensing the inference 
from ‘undetermined’ to ‘uncontrolled’ (as Kane (1999: 223) has rightly noted), and there 
will be a certain danger of prejudicing the case, or of falling into important equivocations, 
by using the more ambiguous ‘chance’ in place of the technical notion expressed by 
‘undetermined’.   
To provide an example, consider Peter van Inwagen’s presentation of the worry 
with which we are presently concerned: 
If indeterminism is to be relevant to the question whether a given agent has free will, it 
must be because the acts of that agent cannot be free unless they (or perhaps their 
immediate antecedents) are undetermined.  But if an agent’s acts are undetermined, then 
how the agent acts on a given occasion is a matter of chance. (2000: 10) 
So far so good.  But the inference subsequently drawn by van Inwagen—“And if how an 
agent acts is a matter of chance, the agent can hardly be said to have free will” (ibid.)—
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requires explanation.  Naturally, an agent’s undetermined acts will be such that there is 
some chance that those acts do not occur, for the agent might have done otherwise with 
respect to each of them.  But this is to reiterate the point that the actions are not 
antecedently determined.  To get the desired conclusion that agents whose acts are 
undetermined cannot be said to perform them freely (presumably because they lack the 
requisite control over them), we need something like the following construal of ‘chance’, 
offered by van Inwagen in another work: “What I shall mean by saying that an event is a 
‘chance’ occurrence, or a state of affairs a ‘matter of chance’ or ‘due to chance,’ is this: it 
is not a part of anyone’s plan; it serves no one’s end; and it might very well not have 
been” (1995: 50).  It is at this point, I believe, that our focus on the notion of 
purposiveness (ii*) will be of particular value.   
Notice that van Inwagen’s specification of ‘chance’ involves the presupposition 
that chance events serve no end or purpose; intuitively, they just happen for no good 
reason.  If all undetermined events are chance events in this sense, then I agree with van 
Inwagen that undetermined actions would not be free, for they would not be such that the 
agent performs them purposively.  The notion of purposive behavior, as we have seen, is 
a teleological notion, and if indeterminacy signals the absence of genuinely goal-directed 
processes then it seems to me that indeterministic conceptions of agency are doomed 
from the start.  Thankfully, however, there seems to be no reason to think that one and the 
same causal process could not be both indeterministic and goal-directed, or teleological.  
Robert Koons’s (2000) account of causation may be usefully applied in this context, as 
may Berent Enç’s theory of intentional action (2003, 2004).  On Enç’s theory, the 
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specification of the “right way” in which intentions must cause matching behavior 
explicitly involves the satisfaction of certain teleological constraints; and he, like the 
authors mentioned above, allows for probabilistic causation in the production of 
intentional action consistently with satisfying those constraints. 
To motivate his account, Enç argues that there is a specific kind of causal 
deviance that cannot be avoided unless we look beyond the structure of the causal 
pathway from intention to behavior, to the system within which the causal process takes 
place.  The reason we must thus shift our focus is that two causal processes may be of an 
identical structure, but in one system the causal process will be wayward while in the 
other system it will not, and the reason for this is that the one system, but not the other, 
will achieve what it is supposed to do in the way it is supposed to do it.  To see the point, 
compare the following two cases, the first of which represents a standard case of causal 
deviance: 
Suppose that an actor has been criticized in the past for not doing nervous scenes well.  
On the opening night of a new play, because his part requires it, he intends to appear 
nervous, yet his intention causes him to be nervous, and as a result of his nervousness he 
ends up appearing nervous. (Enç 2004: 154) 
Now assume that there is a specific structural feature of the causal paths that normally 
(i.e., non-waywardly) lead from intention to behavior, and call the requirements on that 
structural feature R.  In cases like the one above, R is violated even when the matching 
behavior is caused by the right intention, so the behavior is waywardly caused.  But 
consider now a second version of the above scenario, in which  
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the actor can exploit the way R was violated in the original scenario and incorporate it 
into his action plan.  He will know that just forming the intention to appear nervous will 
result in his thinking of delivering his lines as if he were nervous, whereupon his 
personality will make him nervous, and this will yield the intended result.  In this case the 
actor’s appearing nervous will be caused by this intention to be nervous, and the causal 
path will be identical to the causal path of the first scenario, yet in this second version he 
will be appearing nervous intentionally.  One and the same path is wayward in the first 
scenario and normal in the second. (ibid.) 
The upshot suggests a general argument.  Whenever we are presented with a 
theory of non-wayward causation that requires that R be satisfied by the causal pathway’s 
structure, there will be two systems that have identical causal pathways, both violative of 
R, but where one pathway counts as wayward and the other does not.  Both systems of 
course achieve what they are supposed to given the intentions that initiate them, but in the 
one case what is supposed to be done is achieved in the way it is supposed to be achieved, 
whereas in the deviant case what is supposed to be done is not achieved in the right way. 
The argument proceeds by showing that for some system doing what it is supposed to do 
by violating R is not that system’s doing it in the way it is supposed to do it, whereas for 
another system doing that same thing again by violating R is that second system’s doing 
it in the way it is supposed to do it…In summary, the way a system is supposed to do 
something is not capturable by stipulating certain structural requirements on the causal 
path. (p. 155) 
The proper response to this argument in Enç’s estimation (and here I agree) is to 
“turn to the system in which the causal chain is being evaluated and develop a theory of 
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what should count as a normal chain relative to the well functioning of the system” (ibid.)  
The general idea is to construct an account of “normal” causal chains around the concept 
of executing a (teleo-)function, or of a system’s doing something that it is supposed to do 
in the way it is supposed to do it.  Notoriously, the notion of a proper function is 
somewhat more difficult to apply to natural systems than to designed artifacts, but recent 
work in the philosophy of science, the philosophy of mind and epistemology provides us 
with resources enough to begin.28 Here I shall not try to develop a theory of proper 
functions, for whichever theory eventually succeeds may be applied to the following 
formula: 
(W) An intention to do A causes a behavioral output in the way it is supposed to if and 
only if for any intermediate link (X) from the intention to the behavior, the fact that a 
tokening of that intention causes a token X is explained by the fact that under the 
circumstances, that type of X would generate that kind of behavior. (Enç 2004: 158)29 
The conditions in (W) may be satisfied whether the causal process involved is 
deterministic or nondeterministic, for what does the “explaining” in (W) is that the types 
those intermediate links fall under are subsumed by causal laws, either deterministic or 
probabilistic (ibid.).  And whenever the conditions are satisfied, the causal pathway from 
intention to action subserves the well-functioning of the system.  Suitably filled out, this 
                                                 
28 See Millikan (1989), Enç and Adams (1992), Plantinga (1993), Allen, Bekoff and Lauder, eds. (1998). 
29 To see how (W) applies to the second actor scenario, note that the fact that the actor’s intention to appear 
nervous causes him to think of delivering his lines as if he were nervous is explained by the fact that he 
knew thinking this way would cause him to appear nervous.  That, as Enç puts it, is “the whole ‘point’ of 
the actor’s intentionally generating this thought” (p. 159).  See Enç (2004: 158-165) for tests of (W) against 
additional cases of deviance. 
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approach not only provides an adequate theory of intentional action but also makes 
explicit, and seeks to provide a metaphysical grounding for, the inherent teleological 
nature of human action. 
With this sketch in hand, return to van Inwagen’s charge that undermined actions 
would be ‘chancy’ in such a sense that they serve no purpose or end.  Granting that Enç’s 
(or some similar) theory proves viable, we have at our disposal an account of intentional 
action—and so of agential control—consistent with undetermined events being the result 
of teleological processes, and this allows for a subclass of undetermined events, some of 
which are actions, to which van Inwagen’s characterization of ‘chance’ does not apply.  
For our actions (and our intention-formations) may satisfy the requirements specified in 
(W) without their having been determined by their causal antecedents, and the 
satisfaction of those requirements guarantees that such actions are produced with an end 
in view.  The significance of this point is worth pondering.  What is intuitively 
objectionable about indeterminism in action in large part derives from the notion that all 
undetermined occurrences are random or pointless, that they happen for no good reason.  
However, there is nothing in probabilistic or nondeterministic causation that renders 
either the processes suffused with indeterminism, or the causal upshots of such processes, 
random or pointless in this way.  Agents may indeed still act, act for good reasons, and 
they may guide their actions toward goals in the absence of causal determination.  There 
is therefore no reason we have yet uncovered that forces us to the conclusion that 
determinism provides for some valuable or essential feature of human behavior which 
cannot likewise be had if determinism fails to obtain. 
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Note also that if a causal theory of action such as the one sketched above 
succeeds, we will be able to answer the skepticism of the non-causalists30 regarding the 
possibility of a causal theory of action capturing the teleological nature of action.  But 
just as importantly for our purposes, an explicitly teleological characterization of 
intentional action (given in causal terms) may help to mitigate the worry some have had 
concerning what Robert Kane (1989) calls “teleological intelligibility” theories of free 
will (of which his own is an example), namely, that explanations of undetermined actions 
which seek to display them as teleologically intelligible (or as fitting into meaningful 
sequences) are more or less ex post facto rationalizations of occurrences resulting from 
processes that are “really just” random.   
To provide an example of the kind of charge I have in mind, consider Richard 
Double’s (1988) attack on the possibility of rational free choice.31 Double asks us to 
consider two cases in which an agent is deliberating between alternative choices.  In the 
first case the agent’s choice is determined by its antecedents and in the second it is not.  
As it happens, the choices he must chose between in both cases are answers to a problem 
in his logic textbook, but since Double’s argument is meant to generalize to any instance 
of undetermined choice I will simply represent the alternatives as ‘A’ and ‘B’.  Here is 
Double: 
                                                 
30 By ‘non-caualists’ I mean those philosophers, such as Sehon (1997) and Wilson (1989), who embrace 
what Mele (2000) has dubbed ‘anti-causalist teleologism’.   
31 There is more to be said about Double’s strategy than what I shall say here, but his argument overlaps 
with issues that seem to me most useful to take up in connection with objection (iii) to libertarianism in the 
next section.  All the same, he means to argue that indeterminism would diminish the sort of control 
available to us in deterministic worlds, so certain features of his argument require discussion here. 
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In Case 1 we make the following stipulations.  My deliberative process will proceed 
through consciously accessible states for which I produce a completely adequate 
protocol…Although I may or may not decide on the correct [read, most rational] answer, 
because I am subject to determinism each subsidiary decision I make en route to my final 
choice is a causal product of my previous deliberative states. 
 In Case 2 I am faced with the same [choice]…My reasoning process has 
delimited my choice…to either [A] or [B], but my continued reflections do not uniquely 
determine which [alternative] I shall select.  That is, I can adduce reasons for [choosing A 
or B], but my will is not determined in either direction by my reasoning.  In an instant I 
select [A] owing to an indeterministic emission of a beta particle from an atom in my 
brain.  Had the particle been emitted a nanosecond before or later I would have selected 
[B].  (1988: 62) 
Double proceeds to argue that in Case 2, as opposed to in Case 1, the agent’s decision is 
not rational, because in Case 2, 
since my choice between the two [alternatives] was not caused by some logically salient 
reason, my choice cannot be reasonable.  This obvious fact might tend to be obscured by 
the possibility that afterwards I might ardently defend the rationality of my decision by 
offering reasons in support of selecting [it].  To all observers (including myself) my 
selection seems reasonable; after all, I did have my reasons.  But, in response to this, we 
must note that the stipulation that my choice owed to quantum indeterminacy rather than 
my reasoning process demonstrates that such post facto rationalization is worthless. 
(ibid.) 
Double claims that reasons explanations of choices in indeterministic contexts are 
“worthless”—ex post facto—because undetermined events in the brain couldn’t possibly 
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amount to “logically salient” considerations in favor of the choice.  Indeed, Double’s 
description of the case encourages us to view indeterminacy not just as a threat to rational 
choice, but as a positively malicious Entity in its own right: 
In Case 2 I did not choose arbitrarily between the two equally attractive alternatives.  
Instead, my deliberations took me up to the point of equilibrium between [A] and [B] and 
then “chance intervened”—the next thing I knew I had chosen the former. (p. 63) 
Evidently indeterminism is no simple pest, but is rather a Powerful Agent let loose in the 
world (no doubt God has His reasons) whose sole purpose is to disrupt the deliberations 
of agents and insert decisions into their minds with such a force that it renders them 
temporarily unconscious. 
 A number of replies could be made at this point.  But here I think it is most useful 
to compare Double’s argument concerning ex post facto rationalizations with the 
analogous worry of the non-causalists, that explanations of intentional action (given a 
causal construal of the phenomenon) are merely ex post facto rationalizations of 
occurrences resulting from processes that are “really just” mechanistic neural processes, 
processes that couldn’t possibly contribute to the rationality of a choice.  How plausible 
would we find the following argument? 
Suppose my reasoning process has delimited my choice to either A or B.  In an instant I 
select A owing to a deterministic neural firing in my brain.  Had the neural firing 
occurred a nanosecond before or later I would have selected B.  Now since my choice 
between A and B was not caused by some logically salient reason, my choice cannot be 
reasonable.  This obvious fact might tend to be obscured by the possibility that afterwards 
I might ardently defend the rationality of my decision by offering reasons in support of 
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selecting it.  To all observers (including myself) my selection seems reasonable; after all, 
I did have my reasons.  But, in response to this, we must note that the stipulation that my 
choice owed to deterministic neural firings rather than my reasoning process 
demonstrates that such post facto rationalization is worthless.  
I think very few philosophers, including Double, would consider this line of thought to be 
of much merit.  The obvious response to it is of course that those neural firings realize 
mental states, and they are therefore legitimate parts of the process of deliberation that 
led to the ultimate decision.  By specifying that the indeterminism “comes from” some 
external, non-mental event, and “intervenes” within the agent’s reasoning process (a 
common tactic), Double not only creates a caricature of sophisticated causal indeterminist 
views,32 but foists upon their proponents a set of philosophical problems that any 
philosopher of mind or action has to confront.  If there is some insuperable difficulty with 
the notion that our choices are caused, in part, by the activities of atoms in our brains, 
then I do not see how the activities of those atoms being deterministic or indeterministic 
has anything especially to do with the question whether our choices can be considered 
rational or within our control given those causes.  Nor is there any good reason, if a 
naturalistic theory of mind is successful in capturing the nature of mentality, to think that 
just because the causal influence of material particles is involved in our deliberative 
processes the ultimate results of those processes are therefore irrational, ex post facto, 
aimless, or worthless.  Provided that the deliberative process or “effort of will” leading up 
                                                 
32 For example, on Kane’s view, which is the most sophisticated of its type and the ultimate target of 
Double’s critique, we are not to view the deliberative processes or “efforts of will” leading up to a decision 
as running along smoothly until they are interrupted or punctuated by some discrete undetermined event, 
but we are rather to think of the processes themselves as indeterminate. 
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to and terminating in a decision is realized in or in some other way harmonious with the 
neurological causes, merely pointing to the causal influence of material entities (quantum 
or otherwise) is hardly an argument against the rationality of or control over the choice 
thus produced.  On the other hand, if what is objectionable about the influence of these 
particles is that their causal powers are exercised in an undetermined way, then Double 
ought to come right out and argue against indeterminism without relying on the 
supposition that the indeterminacy is generated at the level of microphysics—after all, if 
it is indeterminism itself that undermines rationality and control it shouldn’t matter 
whether it comes from a mental or a non-mental source.  But if there are no impressive 
arguments for the deleterious effects of indeterminism simpliciter on action or 
deliberation, then focusing on the operations of physical particles is either irrelevant or 
misleading, in just the same way that it is irrelevant or misleading, given a (naturalistic) 
causal theory of action, to focus on neural firing patterns without bothering to mention 
that they implement mental states which exercise their (purposive) causal influence 
through them. 
The ex post facto charge against causal indeterminism, and against causal theories 
in general, then, are of a piece.  Both charges enjoy the same degree of force, and I think 
they will stand or fall together.  Similarly, the claim that any undetermined event must 
occur for no good reason, or pointlessly, ignores the possibility that undetermined actions 
may be the result of genuinely goal-directed processes (if genuinely goal-directed 
processes can successfully be specified in causal terms at all).  It seems, then, that a 
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closer focus on condition (ii*) on agency provides us with additional resources for coping 
with problem (ii) for libertarianism. 
But still more needs to be said.  In specific, a powerful objection against event-
causal libertarianism has received much discussion in recent literature, and it concerns 
the question whether undetermined decisions would be simply a matter of luck.33 What 
we are to imagine is that two identically situated agents (or an agent and her counterpart) 
with identical psychophysical pasts are both deliberating as to whether they should do A 
or B.  (Let us suppose, although it isn’t strictly necessary, that A is the moral thing to do 
whereas B is the self-interested thing to do.)  With respect to both agents, the same 
reasons and motivational preferences are informing their deliberations, they are making 
precisely the same effort to sort things out and arrive at a decision, and the decisions that 
will ultimately terminate their deliberations are undetermined by their efforts.  Now what 
are we to think of the agent who happens to decide to perform A?  Can we legitimately 
say that she has acted in such a way so as to be morally responsible, or praiseworthy for 
her decision given that she might just as well have chosen self-interestedly, as did her 
counterpart?  Isn’t it just a matter of dumb luck that she chose as she did?  And if so, how 
could she be thought of as having exercised the sort of control over her decision required 
for genuine desert?   
This, the “luck objection,” is perhaps the most powerful form of the claim 
expressed in (ii).  But let us begin our assessment by recalling what the objector is 
claiming.  What is not being argued here is that indeterminism would not enhance our 
                                                 
33 See Alfred Mele (1998), Robert Kane (1999), Almeida and Bernstein (2003). 
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control or make us more free (that is challenge (iii), and will be taken up below); rather, 
the argument is designed to show that indeterminism diminishes or removes the sort of 
control agents have over their actions in deterministic worlds.  Moreover, the argument 
specifically concerns the sort of control that agents must exercise if they are to be morally 
responsible for their behavior.  Nothing in the argument depends on the idea that 
undetermined actions cannot be controlled in at least one important sense—the agents 
still have reasons, choose as they do for those reasons, and their actions may certainly be 
non-deviantly caused, etc.—the crucial assumption is instead that if S is from some 
perspective just lucky with respect to whether she performs A, then S cannot be 
responsible for having performed A.  This claim, however, is one that the compatibilist 
should hesitate to endorse. 
Why so?  Consider an analogy from political philosophy.  John Rawls (1971) 
asked us to imagine ourselves in a state of ignorance with respect to the conditions of our 
birth, including such things as our social and economic status, natural talents and so on.  
He then invited us to consider how we would rationally prefer the state to be structured 
given our ignorance as to these conditions.  Since we would have no idea how well we 
fared in the natural and social lotteries (that is, whether the circumstances of our birth 
place us in an advantageous or disadvantageous position with respect to the acquisition of 
various goods), we should endorse certain principles of justice ensuring that everyone 
gets “a fair go,” so that no one undeservedly gains from, or is undeservedly hampered by, 
circumstances that they played no part in creating.  But why should our either benefiting 
from or being limited by the circumstances of our birth matter to whether we deserve the 
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goods we are able to acquire given those circumstances?  Well, intuitively, because those 
circumstances are the results of lotteries; we just find ourselves in a given family, social 
class, or whatever, and it makes no sense to say we deserved to be born in those 
conditions.  It was just a matter of luck, good or bad as the case may be. 
I do not wish to defend a Rawlsian conception of justice here.  My point is that 
Rawls’s thought experiment would have no force at all, no relevance to questions of 
justice or desert, if there were not something in the notion that we lack the kind of control 
over our circumstances that contributes to desert if we had nothing to do with what those 
circumstances are.  If we benefit from those circumstances, it was just lucky; if those 
circumstances hamper us, it is a matter of bad luck.  And indeed, some measure of that 
initial luck seemingly diffuses throughout the history of our lives.  Social programs aimed 
at rectifying the lottery-induced inequities at later stages in life, such as when a person 
seeks employment or education, for example, would hardly be thought justifiable 
otherwise.  But it is a natural extension of this insight to hold that if our initial 
circumstances, together with our genetic dispositions, formative experiences and 
environmental influences, jointly determine the shape of our characters, which in turn 
determines the actions we opt to undertake on any occasion, then some degree of that 
initial luck (good or bad) likewise affects our lives at any point of choice.   
Incompatibilists have typically sought to mitigate the effects of such luck by 
arguing that our characters are not wholly formed by these influences, but that some room 
is left for the influence of the agent in making herself the person she will be.  However, it 
remains true that agents are limited in various ways by the circumstances of their birth 
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whether determinism or indeterminism obtains.  Moreover, regardless of the truth or 
falsity of determinism, agents will throughout their lives encounter situations that they 
played no part in creating or over which they have no control, and their being in such 
circumstances might be lucky or unlucky.  They may find themselves, morally speaking, 
in the right place at the right time, or the wrong place at the wrong time, and whether they 
do or not will be out of their hands.34 (I therefore find it ironic that some philosophers, as 
we shall see below, have traded on the existence of just these varieties of luck in an 
attempt to undermine libertarianism in particular.)   
Now with respect to what we make of ourselves given our initial circumstances, 
the compatibilist will naturally not agree that any “room left over” for the agent to 
contribute to her character requires the failure of causal determination.  Nor, in general, 
will she want to say that we can never exercise responsibility-conferring control when we 
find ourselves in lucky or unlucky circumstances.  It is sufficient for responsibility and 
control that agents, given both their current circumstances and the initial conditions that 
determine the history of their lives, remain able at various points in their lives to act on 
the basis of reasons and preferences they endorse, and in the absence of coercion, 
compulsion and the like.  The luck that comes before therefore does not matter, and the 
lucky or unlucky circumstances we encounter throughout our lives do not decisively 
mitigate the responsibility of agents for what they do within those circumstances either.   
Well, why do these forms of luck not matter?  Why is it that the conditions 
determining our characters and the unanticipated situations within which we happen to 
                                                 
34 See Nagel (1979) on moral luck. 
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find ourselves—we may call these initial luck35 and circumstantial luck respectively—do 
not erode the sort of control required for moral responsibility from a compatibilist 
perspective, given the evident fact that these things are in no way within our control?  
The issue of moral responsibility is a large one, but even on the least sophisticated 
compatibilist approach36 the answer must begin with a focus upon what the agent actually 
does given his reasons, or whether the decision he eventually arrives at is the result of a 
deliberative process meeting certain standards of intelligibility, receptiveness to relevant 
considerations, and immunity to various forms of coercion, compulsion and 
manipulation.  To be sure, the agent’s character might well have been very different than 
it is had the circumstances of his birth been different, and he may never have performed 
some dastardly (or praiseworthy) act he deterministically performed had he not found 
himself, by sheer luck, in a certain place at a certain time; but to this the compatibilist 
must reply that “one is responsible for what one actually does—even if what one actually 
does depends in important ways on what is not within one’s control” (Nagel 1979: 35).  
Any compatibilist theory must then allow for the non-negligible influence—indeed, the 
deterministic influence—of factors beyond the agent’s control, and to that extent for luck, 
without admitting that such factors vitiate the responsibility of agents who act 
intentionally, knowingly, and in the absence of coercive force. 
                                                 
35 What I am calling “initial luck” Nagel calls “constitutive luck.”  Here I shall set aside a further sort of 
moral luck (which might be called resultant) that depends on the ultimate consequences of the decisions we 
make, but see Nagel (1979: 28-32).   
36 The most sophisticated compatibilist approach is developed by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza 
(1998), and everything I say here will be compatible with their position. 
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Now the existence of initial and circumstantial luck certainly does raise difficult 
moral puzzles.  But it is important to recognize that the puzzles they raise are just puzzles 
tout court, not problems confronting the libertarian uniquely.  This may seem an obvious 
point, but the fact is that these varieties of moral luck have been smuggled in to 
arguments against indeterministic conceptions of free agency, which tends to leave one 
with quite the opposite impression.  Let me illustrate the point with an argument 
produced by Almeida and Bernstein (2003) in an effort to undermine Robert Kane’s 
causal indeterminist theory of freedom.   
On Kane’s view, an agent is (directly) free and responsible in the performance of 
an act when he acts with “plural voluntary control.”  For our purposes it is enough to 
know that if an agent has plural voluntary control over a pair of alternative acts, then he 
is able to perform either of the two acts intentionally (for reasons), without coercion or 
compulsion, and because he most wants to perform that act when he decides to do so.  
What is ingenious about Kane’s account is that it directly confronts a problem we only 
hinted at above: that an agent might freely and rationally perform some action A, have the 
ability to perform an alternative act B, but the choice to perform B given the agent’s 
reasons and motives would have been irrational.  His freely performed action in this case 
would merely be one-way rational, whereas libertarian freedom clearly requires more; 
what is needed is rational, free action, whichever way the agent decides to act.  And this 
is just what Kane’s account is designed to provide, for when an agent satisfies Kane’s 
plurality conditions, either way he chooses to act he will act with rational, voluntary 
control.   
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Yet Kane’s theory is clearly not immune to the luck objection.  The argument 
from luck typically begins by situating psychophysically identical agents in identical 
environments, and confining the offending indeterminism to the deliberative processes of 
the agents.  However, Almeida and Bernstein think that so confining the indeterminism is 
unwise, presumably because Kane’s account can handle the standard luck objection with 
a certain degree of plausibility.37 But since Almeida and Bernstein think that “by 
presenting an example in which indeterminism is situated solely in the mind of the agent, 
it allows Kane to avoid confronting a pervasive problem” (2003: 107), they believe that 
locating the indeterminism elsewhere will throw a pervasive problem for Kane into relief.  
But what is this pervasive problem for Kane?  According to Almeida and Bernstein,  
We need to consider whether, quite generally, plural voluntary control is sufficient for 
moral responsibility in contexts of indeterminism.  As we have noted, Kane focuses his 
discussion primarily on the interesting counterexamples…[involving] how identically 
situated, psycho-physical twins might responsibly differ in choice or action…[Let us 
instead] imagine that there are two recovering addicts who are psycho-physically 
identical.  Each addict inhabits a distinct possible world, w1 and w2.  Assume…that w1 
and w2 are indeterministic worlds identical up until time t.  At time t in w1 our 
recovering addict finds himself in a part of town notorious for drug dealing.  At time t in 
w2, of course, our recovering addict finds himself in the very same part of town.  But the 
worlds diverge indeterministically just after t.  In w1 our recovering addict, quite against 
the odds, encounters not a single drug dealer, and his struggle between the desire to stay 
                                                 
37 Almeida and Bernstein, although obviously skeptical about the viability of a Kanean position, consider 
his response to the standard luck objection “ingenious” (2003: 105). 
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clean and the desire to backslide is decided in favor of staying clean.  In w2 our 
recovering addict encounters several dealers, and his struggle between the desire to stay 
clean and the desire to backslide is decided in favor of backsliding.  Each of our 
recovering addicts…has plural voluntary control, but the addict in w2 was 
unquestionably lucky, while the addict in w2 was not.  That the area was free of drug 
dealers at the particular time he was passing by has absolutely nothing to do with the 
character and mindset of the struggling addict.  Even those agents who possess plural 
voluntary control over what they do are not fully responsible for what the do, since the 
struggle between desires is decided in large part by luck or undetermined events beyond 
their control. (p. 107) 
 I am confused as to why the authors believe this is a (pervasive!) problem for 
Kane.  More generally, I do not know why the story should make us suspicious of 
libertarianism or attracted to compatibilism.  It is obvious that one could recast the story 
so that the salient sequences of events unfold in two deterministic worlds.  And it is 
obvious that the circumstantial luck involved in the scenarios would affect the decisions 
of our pair of struggling addicts in the deterministic version as well.  Clearly, if 
determinism is true it would not cease to be the case that the “struggle between desires is 
decided in large part by luck” or “events beyond their control,” it would only cease to be 
the case that the events beyond their control would be “undetermined events.”  But why 
on earth should that make a difference to whether the individuals in our story are lucky, 
in control, or to be praised or blamed for how things turn out? 
 In fairness it should be noted that Almeida and Bernstein’s stated aim is to 
“consider whether, quite generally, plural voluntary control is sufficient for moral 
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responsibility in contexts of indeterminism,” and we may concede for purposes of 
argument that the story about the addict casts doubt on the idea that plural voluntary 
control is always sufficient for moral responsibility.  But it should not escape our 
attention that this has nothing to do with the stipulation that the story plays out in a 
context of indeterminism.  Moral luck, as Nagel rightly noted, is a widespread 
phenomenon, and arguments such as Almeida and Bernstein’s can easily generalize to 
show that any theory fails to provide sufficient conditions for responsibility.   
To see this, consider how well our best compatibilist theories would fare if they 
were compared against the addict scenario.  Take Fischer and Ravizza’s (1998) theory of 
responsibility, for instance, which does not require that agents possess plural voluntary 
control, but requires instead that agents possess guidance control, where guidance control 
is to be analyzed (roughly) in terms of an agent’s actions being the product of an internal 
process that is responsive to reasons in an appropriate way.  There is no impediment to 
our addicts possessing guidance control since it is stipulated that they have plural 
voluntary control, which entails that they act for reasons they endorse and that they do 
not act compulsively.  (They are struggling addicts, but they are not subject to irresistible 
desires for the drugs.)  Armed with this brief sketch, let us look to Almeida and 
Bernstein’s assessment of Kane’s plurality conditions: 
Consider the recovering addict in w1 insisting that his plural voluntary control over his 
choice to stay clean confers on him the full responsibility for doing so.  We would not 
respond with unalloyed congratulations.  He happened to be very lucky that his desire to 
stay clean defeated his desire to backslide.  Had the more probable sequence of events 
taken place, as it did in w2, our fortunate addict would have returned to his old habits. 
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 But notice that in indeterministic worlds there will not be many cases in which 
plural voluntary control over our actions is sufficient for moral responsibility.  The 
strength and significance of our desires is a function of circumstances over which we 
have no control.  Whether our lives are directed according to one desire or another is a 
matter of the chancy set of challenges we happen to face.  Embracing a virtuous desire to 
help another hardly makes us praiseworthy if, by sheer chance, the temptation to lead us 
away was not so strong.  Embracing a vicious desire to help oneself hardly makes us 
blameworthy, if fortuitously, the lure of beneficence happened to be weak. (pp. 107-108) 
It is evident, I think, that the same evaluation could be thought to tell against Fischer and 
Ravizza’s theory simply by substituting ‘guidance control’ for ‘plural voluntary control’, 
‘deterministic’ for ‘indeterministic’, and giving ‘chancy’ and later ‘chance’ an epistemic 
gloss.  Do we then have a general argument against the possibility of determined agents 
possessing the requisite kind of control for moral responsibility?   
No.  Or at any rate not one that would impress many compatibilists.  Any 
compatibilist theory must allow for the non-negligible, and even deterministic, influence 
of factors beyond the agent’s control, and to that extent for luck, without admitting that 
such factors vitiate the responsibility of agents who act intentionally, knowingly, and in 
the absence of coercive force.  But at least this much responsibility may be had by agents 
whose actions are non-negligibly influenced by the luck that stems from indeterminacy in 
their deliberative processes, even granting that such “luck” is relevantly similar to initial 
and circumstantial luck vis-à-vis the agent’s degree of control.  For regardless of the kind 
of luck at issue, we have already seen that agents may act intentionally or on purpose, in 
light of their reasons, and in the absence of external constraint or internal compulsion.   
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As I see things, then, even if we allow the inference from ‘undetermined’ to 
‘lucky’, the crucial assumption of the luck objection—that if S is from some perspective 
just lucky with respect to whether she performs A, then S cannot be responsible for having 
performed A—is an assumption that the compatibilist cannot rely on to derive the desired 
conclusion that no one can be responsible for their undetermined acts.  Neither should the 
guiding idea implicit in the assumption, that if S is from some perspective just lucky with 
respect to the performance of A, then S does not exercise control over A, be 
unhesitatingly accepted by the compatibilist, and for the same reasons.  What is needed is 
a rationale displaying the distinctively control-undermining character of the “luck” 
involved in the performance of an undetermined act.  From some perspective 
undetermined actions may indeed be lucky, but the same is true of many of the actions 
we perform in deterministic worlds.  The objector’s task must be to show why just this 
particular form of luck undermines responsibility and control (regardless of the fact that 
an agent may act intentionally and purposefully in the absence of determinism) whereas 
the other forms of luck that influence our behavior do not.  But the only way to do that, as 
far as I can see, is to argue that agents whose acts are undetermined do not exercise even 
a minimal form of control over those acts; and to advance that objection we will need to 
see more in the way of argument than has so far been produced.  I conclude that if 
undetermined acts are lucky, then they are lucky in a way that should bother the 
libertarian, not the compatibilist; for indeterminism does not diminish the control agents 
would have if determinism were true. 
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Clearly, however, this line of reasoning will be of little consolation to the 
libertarian if nothing more can be added.  Most libertarians believe that compatibilist 
construals of responsibility and control do not amount to enough responsibility and 
control.38 To discover that indeterminism leaves us no worse off with respect to these 
things than does determinism is an important plank in the overall defense of 
libertarianism.  But if indeterminism leaves no room for anything better then the defense 
of libertarianism is surely incomplete. 
 
4.5 Production, Origination, and the Phenomenology of Agency 
Supposing that challenge (ii) can be met, then, we are not yet out of the woods.  For even 
if indeterminism does not entail that our actions are simply random or capricious, still, we 
seem intuitively to have fallen short of the robust notion of freedom that we were after.  
What makes libertarianism compelling, to the extent it is, is that it offers us the 
possibility of self-determination, ultimate responsibility for at least some of the things we 
do and some of the choices we make.  Determinism threatens the possibility of this kind 
of freedom, screening off the alternatives before the agent has the opportunity to exercise 
his capacity of choice—but even if the failure of determinism makes room for freedom, 
mustn’t there be something in addition to the mere absence of determination by prior 
conditions, something that “fills the gap” that indeterminism pries open so that we can act 
                                                 
38 In fact I am wary of saying that libertarianism ought to “enhance” or “increase” control, despite the 
frequency with which these phrases are used.  There is probably some good sense according to which this is 
true.  But I prefer to think that what libertarianism adds is the possibility of originating, or being the 
ultimate source of, some of one’s actions.  
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with free will?  And how, one might ask, can a theory of freedom making use solely of 
indeterministic event causes ever deliver that?  At best, such a theory would amount to a 
compatibilist kind of freedom in an indeterministic world, and libertarianism will have 
fallen short of satisfying our expectations. 
This, our problem (iii) for libertarianism, is a very serious one, but I do not think 
it is unanswerable.  Here again I suggest that we look to the common ground between 
libertarians and compatibilists in order to formulate a response, in this case by asking 
what it would take to satisfy condition (iii*) on agency.  That is, our first order of 
business will be to ask how it is possible in general that agents produce their actions, 
rather than simply being the locus of reflexes or mere happenings.  Provided such an 
explanation is forthcoming, I will argue, it may be that we can squeeze more mileage out 
of “mere indeterminism” than we had thought.   
But how will a focus on condition (iii*) be of any use if the fundamental issue is 
whether indeterminism might be of help in enhancing our control?  That is, if our 
concern is no longer with the question whether control is diminished by indeterminism, 
isn’t the question now whether indeterminism somehow augments our control, or 
provides us with additional powers of some kind?  This is how many philosophers view 
the issue, and it is of course a particularly pressing question if one believes that 
compatibilism does not allow for the degree of power or control required for moral 
responsibility or genuine desert: 
[If] causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, then it is no remedy simply to 
provide slack in the causal net by making the causal history of actions indeterministic.  
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Such a move would yield one incompatibilist requirement for moral responsibility—lee 
way for decision and action—but it would not supply another—sufficiently enhanced 
control. (Pereboom 2001: 39) 
Whatever the implications of determinism for desert really are, the implications of 
[causal indeterminist theories] for desert are, it seems, the same.  The truth of a [causal 
indeterminist view] provides for a type of ultimate control that is absent from any 
deterministic world, and that ultimacy secures a type of openness.  But the ultimacy and 
the openness provided by such a view are wholly negative: they are entirely a matter of 
the absence of a determining cause of a certain sort.  The positive agential powers 
secured by such a view are just those provided by a good compatibilist account.  And if 
compatibilist accounts fail to provide an adequate grounding for desert, this shortcoming 
is to be remedied not just by subtracting something from those views but by (also) adding 
something, some additional positive agential powers to determine what one decides and 
does. (Clarke 2000: 37) 
 The passages from Pereboom and Clarke express a very natural and plausible 
reaction to causal indeterministic varieties of libertarianism.  Neither of these 
philosophers is impressed with arguments purporting to show that indeterminism would 
decrease our control.  Indeed, they both hold that indeterminism is consistent with a very 
“impressive sort of control in action;” but as long as our actions are the products of 
indeterministic event-causal processes, they hold, “then agents would have no more 
control over their actions than they would if determinism were true” (Pereboom 2001: 44, 
46). 
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 In response, I want to argue that control is not really the phenomenon at issue.  
That is not to say there is no difficulty at all here: the problem Clarke and Pereboom are 
getting at is very real, but I suggest that the fundamental issue before us is not happily 
expressed by saying that what is needed is an augmentation of power or control.  What 
lies at the root of our present problem is instead the notion of agential production (iii*).  
Admittedly, agential control and agential production are intimately bound up with one 
another.  They are both essential to agency, and in any case of genuine action both are 
exercised; it is therefore very natural for us to speak of them in one breath.  But I believe 
that separating these notions, and focusing particularly on the latter in connection with 
problem (iii), will be a more fruitful way forward.  For problem (iii) for libertarianism, if 
it can be answered in the absence of agent-causation at all, can be answered only by 
arguing that the role of the agent in originating, or authoring his actions, is, like his 
exercise of control, ontologically constituted by the right sorts of sequences of events. 
 To soften up the beach, let us look more closely at the position of Pereboom and 
Clarke, both of whom agree that problem (iii) can be solved if and only if individuals 
possess a power to produce their free actions by way of a causal capacity that cannot be 
reduced to causation among events.  According to Pereboom what an agent-causal theory 
adds that causal indeterminist theories cannot provide is “sufficiently enhanced control,” 
where such control enhancement amounts to the “capacity to be the origin of one’s 
decisions and actions” (p. 39).  This originative capacity and control enhancement may 
be simultaneously secured by “simply positing, as a primitive, agents who have the 
ultimate control that cannot be secured by event-causal libertarianism—agents who can 
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be the sources of action in a way that…confers moral responsibility” (p. 55).  Clarke 
likewise draws the connection between control enhancement and the possibility of being 
a source or originator of one’s acts in the passage just below: 
The presence in the indeterministic world of a chance that is absent from the 
deterministic world does not by itself give the indeterministic agent a further ability.  To 
have a better variety of control over her behavior than that exercised by her deterministic 
counterpart, an agent in an indeterministic world must have a further power to determine 
which of the actions, each of which she might perform with control, she will actually 
perform.  Such a power does not appear to be possible as long as all the causes of an 
agent’s actions are events.  If there is an account of free will that accords agents a power 
of this sort, it is an account on which agents are in a literal sense non-event causes of 
their free actions. (1995: 136) 
And when an agent’s power is thus enhanced by virtue of her agent- (“non-event”) causal 
capacity, she is “strictly and literally,” rather than in a merely “figurative, interest-
relevant sense” the “originator of her actions” when she freely acts (Clarke 2003: 101). 
Evidently, then, only an irreducible agent-causal capacity can secure both the 
enhanced control (or “further powers”) needed for an adequate libertarian theory, and the 
possession of such a capacity enables agents to be the ultimate sources or originators of 
their acts—the fundamental libertarian desideratum—a possibility that must remain 
unrealized otherwise.  Or so it seems plausible to assume. 
But let us look into the issue more closely.  Is it really the case that an agent-
causal capacity would enhance control, or, more importantly, would provide the sole 
means by which agents may be genuine originators of their acts?  Notice first that there 
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exists a “very impressive sort of control” that agents exercise directly over their actions, 
which is itself a form of control constituted by event causal sequences: “Any action at 
all…is an exercise of some type of direct control by the agent, and the proximal causation 
of that action—its being caused in a non-deviant way by the agent’s having…a certain 
intention—is at least part of what constitutes the direct actional control in that instance” 
(Clarke 2000: 26).  There are of course agent-causation scruples to the contrary.  Our 
ability to identify cases of deviantly caused behavior while remaining ignorant as to the 
necessary and sufficient conditions on an event-causal path’s being “normal” may be 
explained, some have held, by our possession of an irreducible agent-causal concept: 
Indeed, a brief consideration of how we actually respond to…deviant cases suggests that 
this may well be true.  “He didn’t let go intentionally, even though his intention to let go 
caused him to lose his hold, because his nervousness prevented him from controlling his 
grip” is a reasonable off-the-cuff account of the deviance in Davidson’s rock-climber 
case, and it makes appeal to a notion of maintaining control which may well have agent-
causal presuppositions. (Bishop 1983: 68)39 
Interestingly, however, Clarke and Pereboom do not see things this way.  
Whereas other philosophers sympathetic to agent-causation have viewed it as necessary 
for genuine actional control, they do not.  Nor do their agent-causal intuitions run as deep 
                                                 
39 Compare Enç: “The ease with which these [wayward] counterexamples are found and the pretheoretical 
intuitions that enable us to separate out actions from mere behavior without any reference to event 
causation have encouraged Cartesians to maintain that no general naturalist account can be given for this 
right way.  They have argued that this fact by itself is enough to undermine naturalism in action theory—
naturalism understood as the thesis that necessary and sufficient conditions for what counts as an 
intentional act can be formulated in terms of the causal connections among mere events” (2004: 152). 
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as those of Nicolas Nathan (1975) or Richard Taylor (1966), for instance, who have 
argued that an irreducible agent-causal power is required just to distinguish actions from 
mere happenings.40 Quite apart from questions about freedom or control enhancement, 
these theorists hold, agent-causation is needed to explain the agent’s basic role in 
controlling or guiding as well as in producing that behavior, our conditions (ii*) and 
(iii*).  But Clarke and Pereboom do not think agent-causation is required for either of 
these things, for they maintain that individuals may still bring about and control their 
actions in purely event-causal worlds.  As Kane and Chisholm have rightly noted, “few 
would deny the existence of agent causation in the broadest sense—agents act and 
thereby bring things about.  The matter of dispute is whether or not agent causation can 
be fully interpreted in terms of event causation” (Kane 1989: 124).  But on the 
assumption that agency may be realized in the natural order we, as well as Clarke and 
Pereboom, are already committed to the notion that at least this broadest form of agent 
causation may indeed be fully interpreted in terms of event causation.  That is, 
individuals may “strictly and literally” control their actions, and, insofar as any action is 
produced or brought about by an agent, agents may presumably “strictly and literally” 
produce certain of their behaviors as well, all in the absence of agent-causation. To deny 
                                                 
40 Taylor writes, “In describing anything as an act there must be an essential reference to an agent as the 
performer or author of that act, not merely in order to know whose act it is, but in order even to know that it 
is an act at all…Another perfectly natural way of expressing this notion of [myself as an active being] is to 
say that, in acting, I make something happen, I cause it, or bring it about” (1966: 109, 111).  Chisholm, too, 
seems to have agreed (at one time) that “We must say that at least one of the events that is involved in any 
act is caused, not by any other event, but by the agent, the man” (1966: 29).  Against these philosophers, 
Clarke holds that “agent causation should be seen as required for acting with free will, but not for acting” 
(1993: 202).  For a concurring opinion, see the discussion in O’Connor (2002a: 49-55). 
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either of these claims, I maintain, is tantamount to admitting that “strictly and literally” 
action requires agent-causation, which neither Pereboom nor Clarke is prepared to admit. 
 The question we should now ask is whether the fact that agents have the ability to 
(strictly and literally) produce and control their actions without the aid of an agent-casual 
power gives us reason to hope that agents might also, strictly and literally, be the sources 
or originators of their actions without the aid of an agent-causal power.  I shall try to 
argue for an affirmative answer to this question.   
In what remains of this section, I will first explain why I do not believe that an 
agent-causal power as Clarke describes it would enhance or lessen our control, and I will 
argue that the only role it plays in his account is (in a certain sense) the role of a causal 
producer.  I shall then argue that, if we act at all in the absence of an agent-causal power, 
the role of causal producer has already been filled.  I will conclude that the agent-causal 
capacity is therefore ineffective with respect to control enhancement and unnecessary for 
agential production, and that we may indeed be the sources or originators of our actions 
without it.  Roughly stated, I will argue that if an agent (iii*) produces and intentionally 
controls (ii*) her actions, in virtue of her choices (i*), and in the absence of antecedent 
determining conditions, then she is the source (or originator) of that action, and she acts 
with direct free will.  Finally, I shall attempt to explain why my conclusion will seem 
utterly wrong.  I will argue that the apparent impossibility of being a genuine locus of 
creative activity in the world is a function of the way we think about action.  Specifically, 
I will argue that causal indeterministic varieties of libertarianism will always look 
unsatisfactory for the same reason that causal theories of action will always look 
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unsatisfactory, namely, because we cannot represent the experience of action from a 
third-person perspective, and our concept of action ineliminably includes certain features 
of the experience of action.  This, however, is a conceptual problem, not an ontological 
one.  Our world may contain action, and even free action, without it’s looking that way 
from the “outside.”  So much for the action plan.  Let us turn now to Clarke’s agent-
causal theory. 
It will be best to start by examining what agent-causation does not add to agency, 
according to Clarke.  Agent-causation, we may concede, is a good thing; but like other 
good things there can be too much of it.  One way this might be is if rational action (or 
acting for reasons generally) requires that decisions be caused, in the right way, by 
pertinent reason-states.  Granting that this is the correct way to think about acting for 
reasons, as Clarke believes it is, there is a danger that in exercising one’s agent-causal 
powers one might “interfere” with the causal process from reason states to decisions in 
such a way that the resulting decision is no longer rational.  Clarke is fully aware of this 
danger.  His effort to construct an “integrated” agent-causal theory, one according to 
which every free action is both agent-caused and (nondeterministically) event-caused by 
the reasons that rationalize it, is motivated by the desire to incorporate the causal 
indeterminist’s account of acting for reasons with the “enhanced control” we get by way 
of agent-causation.  As it turns out, a successful integration of this sort requires that the 
agent does not, so to speak, get too much in the way of things.  To see why, we will need 
to examine Galen Strawson’s (1986, 1994) argument against the possibility of free, 
rational action.   
 272
Strawson and Clarke are in agreement that any rational action must admit of a true 
explanation in terms of the reasons the agent actually has for so acting, and the 
availability of such explanations requires that reasons and actions be appropriately 
related.  (The best candidate for the requisite relation, let us continue to assume, is that of 
causation.)  Moreover, we may assume with Strawson that a true rational explanation is a 
full explanation if and only if “it gives, while citing only [the agent’s] actual reasons, a 
full account of what it was about [the agent], mentally speaking, that made it the case that 
he performed the action he did perform” (Strawson 1986: 36).41 The agent’s reasons (or 
what it is about the agent, mentally speaking) may indeed causally determine his action 
without jeopardizing the rationality of that action, but then, Strawson argues, his action 
might not be freely performed.  If his action is to be freely performed, then some of his 
reasons must be undetermined (or his total reason state must leave the subsequent action 
undetermined—we will pursue this possibility below).  Strawson assumes, as will we, 
that reasons are belief/desire complexes.  Since we do not wish our beliefs to be left 
undetermined by the world around us, if indeterminacy is to be relevant to our freedom 
we should say that it is the desire component of our reason states that is left undetermined 
by external conditions.  However, says Strawson, it is no help to our freedom if our 
desires are just undetermined.  It must be that we are able to determine, or choose, some 
of the desires upon which we act.  But now a familiar difficulty looms.  If we are to be 
                                                 
41 By “made it the case” Strawson simply means that the reasons causally bring about the decision, not that 
they causally determine it (see Clarke 1997: 48 n. 24).  Similarly, when Strawson speaks of reasons being 
“fully determinative” of an action he does not require that the reasons deterministically cause the action, 
but rather that citing those reasons is “all there is to it” (p. 38) when it comes to explaining the act. 
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both free and rational in our actions, then we must be self-determining with respect to 
some of our desires, and the desires with respect to which we are self-determining must 
themselves have been explicitly chosen by us.  Yet if we choose these desires freely and 
rationally, the desires in question must have been chosen on the basis of some or other 
principle of choice, P.  And P, if we were self-determining with respect to our choosing 
of it, must have been freely and rationally chosen by us, which requires again that our 
adoption of P was based on some prior principle of choice, P*.  And so on; an infinite 
regress ensues, rendering rational free action impossible. 
Now neither Strawson nor Clarke believes that our actions could not be 
probabilistically caused consistently with their being rational, but they both agree that 
more is needed than nondeterministic event causation for genuine free will.  Bracketing 
independent concerns about agent-causation, for the moment, we must ask why a 
traditional agent-causal view could not be of help with the current problem.  Couldn’t we 
hold that an agent’s reasons for A-ing might incline her to A, without necessitating her to 
A, and that whether she As or not depends on whether she agent-causes just that act in 
light of the reasons she actually has?  Would this not provide a model of action that is 
both free and rational?  Such a maneuver does not solve the problem.  When an agent 
decides on one course of action over another course of action she also had reasons for, if 
she is to be rational in so choosing she must base her decision on some further principle 
of choice.  And in this case we are caught up in our regress all over again.  On the other 
hand, 
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[If the agent] does not have any such further desires or principles of choice, then the 
claim that it exercises some special power of decision or choice becomes useless in the 
attempt to establish its freedom.  For if it has no such desires or principles of choice 
governing what decisions it makes in the light of its initial reasons for action, then the 
decisions it makes are rationally speaking random: they are made by an agent-self that is, 
in its present role as decision-maker, entirely non-rational in the present vital sense of 
‘rational’: it is reasonless, lacking any principles of choice or decision.  The agent-self 
with its putative, freedom-creating power of partially reason-independent decision 
becomes some entirely non-rational (reasons-independent) flip-flop of the soul. 
(Strawson 1986: 53-54) 
Whatever the agent-cause might contribute to action, then, it would evidently not 
contribute to the possibility of securing both freedom and rationality in action.  And since 
it seems right to say that free will (or a free will of any value) should confer the ability to 
act both freely and rationally, it appears that agent-causation will be of no use in 
establishing the possibility of free will. 
 We are now in a position to understand what moves Clarke to construct a theory 
of agent-causation that represents (in some respects) a significant departure from 
traditional agent-causal accounts.  We have seen that causal indeterminist theories can 
provide at least as much agential control as can their compatibilist rivals, and that 
indeterminism need not undermine rationality in action.  Further, Clarke notes, “If an 
agent whose action is nondeterministically [event-] caused…acts freely solely in virtue of 
that nondeterministic causal production, then Strawson’s challenge has already been met” 
(1997: 45), for we will have combined rationality, freedom and indeterminism into a 
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successful account of free will.  The trouble is of course that such an account does not 
suffice for the enhanced control needed for genuine free will, in Clarke’s estimation.  
Somehow, we need to combine the rational explicability we get from an event-causal 
view with the enhanced control we get from agent-causation, without letting either of 
these things jeopardize the other.42   
 And this is just what Clarke seeks to provide: a theory of free will that secures a 
“variety of agent-control” the having of which ensures that an agent whose actions are 
left open by their causal antecedents (as on the causal indeterminist view) has “some 
further causal power to causally influence which of the actions she might perform she 
will actually perform,” such that when she exercises this power she is “an uncaused cause 
of her behavior, an originator of that behavior in a strict and literal sense” (1997: 45, 46).  
So far the specifications stated do not differ substantially from those of the traditional 
agent-causal accounts, which hold that the agent and nothing else causes her actions.  But 
as Clarke notes, such traditional theories do not have recourse to the attractive account of 
causal-rational explanation that appears to be needed for rational free action.  Clarke, on 
the other hand, can avail himself of this account, since according to him any free action 
“is caused by the agent and nondeterministically caused by prior events” (p. 46): 
Such a view may be illustrated as follows.  Suppose…that on some occasion, there is a 
nonzero probability that a prior event R1 consisting in an agent’s having (or acquiring) 
                                                 
42 As Clarke puts it: “The conclusion that an undetermined free action can be adequately rationally 
explained can be avoided only if the requirements for the variety of agent-control that constitutes freedom 
include more than mere indeterminism, and only if the additional requirements somehow get in the way of 
adequate rational explanation” (1997: 44). 
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certain desires and beliefs will nondeterministically cause event A1, a certain action…; 
and suppose that there is, as well, a nonzero probability that a prior event R2 consisting in 
the agent’s  having (or acquiring) certain other desires and beliefs will cause event A2, a 
certain alternative action, instead.  Then, given all prior conditions, it is genuinely open to 
the agent to perform action A1 and genuinely open to her to perform…A2.  Now suppose 
that whichever of the available actions the agent performs, that action will be performed, 
and it will be caused by her possessing the reasons that favor it, only if the agent causes 
that action.43 Finally, suppose that, in fact, the agent causes A1.  The action that she 
performs is caused by her, and it is nondeterministically caused by R1.  On this view, the 
agent’s acting with free will consists in her action’s being caused, in this way, by her and 
by her having certain reasons. (pp. 46-47) 
Let us defer the question whether Clarke’s account provides for enhanced control until 
we achieve a better grasp on his proposal.  Specifically, we will first need to see just how 
his theory escapes Strawson’s impossibility argument (if it does). 
 Would an agent’s exercise of a Clarkean causal power to “influence” which action 
she performs amount to a non-rational “flip-flop” of the soul, as Strawson has it?  
According to Clarke it would not.  Recall that it suffices for full rationality in action if 
there is a true explanation in terms of reasons the agent actually had for so acting, one 
that indicates all of what there was about the agent, mentally speaking, that causally 
brought it about that she performed the action she did.  The agent herself is a cause of her 
action, yet she is “not ‘something about the agent, mentally speaking’; she is not a feature 
                                                 
43 The “only if” is evidently grounded in the fact that the agent’s exercise of her causal powers in this (or 
any other) instance is nomologically “tied” to the event causal process culminating in her action. 
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of herself.  All of the mental features of the agent that causally bring about her action are 
her reasons,” and citing those reasons “is all there is to giving a full rational explanation 
of the action” (p. 49).  Her exercising her agent-causal power therefore does not help 
explain “why the agent did what she did; the reasons-explanation that cites the desires and 
beliefs that caused the action does that” (ibid.), and there is thus no reason to suppose that 
agent-causation must “get in the way” of causation by reasons.   
But would not the agent-cause be a non-rational cause of some kind, if it inserts 
itself into an event-causal process that itself provides a full rational explanation (which 
already includes all conditions that are relevant to the rationality of the choice) for the 
agent’s actions?  No again: “agent causation does not interfere with the event-causal 
explanation of the action, for agent causation does not interrupt or divert the ordinary 
causal route from reason to action” (p. 50).  Yet if this is so, one is likely to wonder, how 
can we make sense of the agent’s having some “special power of decision or choice” 
(Strawson 1986: 53) by virtue of which she determines which of the acts open to her 
given her reasons she will actually perform, or which of her reasons she will make 
effective?  This query contains a false presupposition, however,  
for the agent-causal view does not attribute to free agents any special power of decision 
or choice…The agent does not decide which decision to make, and she need not decide 
which reasons to make effective; she causes a certain decision or action, one which is 
made or performed only if it is caused by certain reasons. (Clarke 1997: 51) 
Well, what about the complex event, the agent’s causing of her action, or the agent’s 
exercising of her causal power so as to produce some decision?  Is this event rationally 
explicable at all, or must we say that it was “rationally speaking” random?  We need not 
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say this, according to Clarke, for if we suppose that there is such a complex event, it 
would seem that “what causes it are…just the events that cause the action.  Like the 
action…it is nondeterministically caused by prior events, and providing complete 
information about the causal process that produced this complex event fully explains why 
it occurred” (pp. 51-52).  Thus, we are told, the agent-causal account here proposed 
allows for genuine free will without jeopardizing the rational explicability of freely 
performed acts. 
 At this point the causal indeterminist might be forgiven for thinking that Clarke 
has come over to his side.  For, to summarize the distinctive features of his theory, we 
may note that (a) an agent causes a given act only if her reason states cause that act, and 
(b) when an agent’s reason states cause a given act, the agent causes that act, and (c) in 
causing a given act, the agent does not disrupt or interfere with the event-causal process 
that brings about that act, nor does she exercise a further power of choice or decision in 
producing her act in addition to the one constituted by the event-causal process in 
question, and (d) what causes the agent’s causing of her act, if anything causes it, are just 
the events that cause the act.  And isn’t this just what the causal indeterminist is saying? 
 Clarke thinks not, for although it is “event causation by the agent’s reasons [that] 
makes available rational explanation of the action,” it is the irreducible agent-causal 
power that “helps to ground the agent’s [enhanced] control over her behavior” (p. 50), 
and we have already seen Clarke’s insistence that it is just this sort of enhanced agent-
control that causal indeterminism cannot supply. 
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 Legitimate doubts can be raised, however, about the contention that such an 
agent-causal capacity in any way enhances the control that agents already enjoy on a 
causal construal of action.  We are informed that “in (literally) causally bringing about 
one in particular of the open alternatives, the agent exercises causal influence” over 
which of the alternative actions open to her she will in fact perform, and that the ability to 
exercise this causal influence amounts to “a valuable variety of control unavailable in 
worlds where all causes are events” (Clarke 1997: 47).  But surely there is reason to find 
it dubious, even granting the coherence of the story, that the additional causal factor 
Clarke posits has much of anything to do with control.  If what is intuitively 
objectionable about causal theories of agency is that event-causal processes simply “go 
on their way,” as it were, without any entity standing at the ready to alter or somehow 
direct the path taken by those events in accordance with her will, then Clarke’s agent-
causal theory clearly does not avoid this worry.  For it is stipulated that the agent leaves 
the event-causal processes entirely untouched.  Neither is it obvious why the agent’s 
distinctive (substance-) causal contribution to the performance of an act confers any 
greater degree of control over what she does if, for whichever act she causes, she causes 
that act only if her reasons cause that act anyway.   
Perhaps it will be objected on Clarke’s behalf that the agent’s role is to 
“influence” precisely which of the acts she performs among the alternatives open to her, 
and that the exercise of this causal influence is the better variety of control Clarke has in 
mind?  I think this is indeed what Clarke wants to say.  But recall, it is necessary and 
sufficient for an agent to cause a particular act that that act is caused by her reasons, so 
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that she “influences” the performance of an act A when and only when her reasons cause 
A, and without either interfering with the causal sequence from her reasons to A, or 
altering the causal potentiality of those reasons to produce A.44 Under such circumstances 
I find it very difficult to attach any definite meaning to the claim that the agent 
“influences” which act she will perform—unless, of course, her causal influence is 
constituted by the event-causal process, but in this case we already know the agent’s 
influence or control has not been sufficiently enhanced.  And if we say this additional 
causal influence just is her agent-causing, along with her reasons, whatever action those 
reasons causally produce, it seems quite credible to respond that the additional causal 
influence does not amount to anything we would pretheoretically recognize as an 
augmentation of control.  I will not go so far as to say that Clarke’s agent-cause is simply 
otiose,45 but I will say that even if it makes a distinctive causal contribution in any 
instance of free action, it is not a causal contribution that enhances or augments control.  
At the very least, we stand in dire need of a specification of just what this control is that 
the agent-cause adds; and without such a specification Clarke’s crucial contention that his 
theory enhances agential control cannot be favorably evaluated. 
 The result is a damaging one given Clarke’s assimilation of control enhancement 
with the possibility of being a genuine originator or source of one’s actions.  He has 
argued that a causal indeterminist theory of free will fares no better than any good 
compatibilist approach with respect to the degree or variety of control agents have over 
                                                 
44 For an explicit presentation of the latter stipulation see Clarke (2003: 144). 
45 Carl Ginet (2002: 397) has made this charge, arguing that either the agent-cause renders the agent’s 
reasons causally unnecessary or the event-causes render the agent-cause causally unnecessary.  
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their actions.  And he has further argued that given the enhanced control provided by his 
agent-causal theory, agents may be the originators of their actions in a way they could 
not be on a causal indeterminist account, and in just the way needed to ground their 
responsibility for what they do.46 Given this wedding of enhanced control with an agent’s 
thus being a (literal) originator of her actions, he clearly believes that agents are genuine 
originators of their actions only if they act with enhanced control.  But we have seen no 
reason to suppose that the agent-causal capacity Clarke describes in any way enhances 
our control.  Must we not then conclude that the present theory fails to secure its goal of 
conferring on agents the power to be ultimate originators of their actions? 
 Sticking to the terms of the argument, yes, we must.  But it seems plausible to say 
that a deeper motivation for the agent-causal theory remains untouched, even if having an 
agent-causal capacity (of the sort Clarke describes) does not enhance control.  We can get 
at this deeper motivation, somewhat ironically, by supposing that my analysis has been 
flawed, and that Clarke’s account really does enhance our control in a significant way.   
To begin, return to Clarke’s claim that causal indeterminist theories do not secure 
a greater degree of control than is secured by their deterministic rivals.  Intuitively, we 
may put the general worry by saying that if a libertarian theory provides just as much 
control as a compatibilist theory does, then that libertarian theory does not adequately 
capture the nature of free will.  Let us suppose, then, that causal indeterminist theories 
provide for some degree of control C, and that since C is no greater than the amount of 
                                                 
46 In fairness, Clarke admits that “there is room to doubt that agent causation contributes in any respect to 
agent-control,” and he does not think he has “established that it does” (1997: 56, n. 21). 
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control conferred by a comparable compatibilist approach, causal indeterminism fails as 
an account of free will.  Turn now to Clarke’s own account, in which agent-causation is 
added to the causation of actions by events whenever a free act is performed, and let us 
now suppose that this account provides for a greater degree of control, C+, than any 
purely event-causal model of free action, compatibilist or incompatibilist.   
It does not follow that Clarke provides us with a successful account of free will.  
For notice that, according to Clarke, there is nothing in the notion of substance-causation 
that rules out the possibility of such a thing occurring in a deterministic world.47 Since 
individuals may agent-cause their actions (simultaneously with their reasons causing 
those actions) in purely deterministic worlds, and since the mere addition of substance-
causation to the event-causal processes culminating in action suffices for enhanced 
control on Clarke’s account, it would seem, by parity of reasoning, that the addition of 
substance-causation to an analogous compatibilist theory would likewise increase the 
deterministic agent’s control to C+.48 For the determined agent, like Clarke’s agent, will 
directly bring about her actions, insofar as they are concurrently caused by her reasons in 
an appropriate way.  It is true that the deterministic agent will not be able to do otherwise 
when she acts, whereas Clarke’s agent will, but the same comparison can be made 
between deterministic and indeterministic agents on purely event-causal models of 
freedom.  The reason having such an ability is not enough to rescue causal 
                                                 
47 See Clarke (1995: 126), (2003: 156-163). 
48 One rather strange upshot of this is that in some deterministic worlds agents exercise more control over 
their actions than they do in worlds where event-causal models of libertarianism correctly depict the 
activities of agents.  Some philosophers will of course be happy to endorse this claim, but I am not sure that 
Clarke would be. 
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indeterminism, according to Clarke, is that whichever act the agent performs she will not 
perform it with a greater degree of control than her deterministic counterpart.  Yet Clarke 
is committed to the claim that the deterministic agent who acts with an agent-causal 
power, and therefore acts with control of degree C+, does not act freely, whereas his 
agent, who acts with that same degree of control, does act freely. 
How could this be?  I am not sure what Clarke would say to this challenge.  
However, he offers the following interesting remarks when discussing the possibility of a 
compatibilist (integrated) agent-causal view analogous to his own, and it will be worth 
our while to attend to them: 
On both of the indicated agent-causal views, agents (because they are substances) are 
uncaused causes of their actions.  Nevertheless, the non-libertarian version does not 
provide in any straightforward sense for agents’ originating or initiating their actions.  
Such an account allows that each instance of agent causation—if not itself causally 
determined by events that occurred long before the agent in question existed (and hence 
over which that agent has never had any control)—is made inevitable by these events as 
they causally determine the action that is agent-caused.  In contrast, the libertarian 
integrated account…provides in a straightforward sense for agents’ originating or 
initiating their free actions…Because there is this absence [of antecedent determining 
conditions], on the libertarian version alone, we get origination, in a straightforward 
sense, of actions by their agents. (2003: 163) 
 A few points need to be made here.  First, there is no justification for saying that 
the determined agent does not straightforwardly initiate his acts—he is after all an 
uncaused cause of them, and what more does initiation take?  Perhaps he does not count 
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as an initiator because any action he causes is also caused by events, so he is not the sole 
cause of any of his acts?  But the same is true on Clarke’s theory; in neither case can we 
say that the agent and nothing else causes her acts, so the concept of initiation must not 
involve the complete absence of event-causes.  But I do not wish to enter into a 
terminological dispute: something has been added to the determined agent in the above 
scenario, and if it is not the ability to “initiate” his acts we may say that it is the ability to 
causally produce them (our condition (iii*)) in a “straightforward sense.”  Surely Clarke 
must allow that much.   
But these matters aside, Clarke is correct, it seems to me, when he says in the last 
sentence that on the libertarian version alone we get origination.  For what stands in the 
way of origination on a deterministic view is not that agents cannot produce their actions 
(whether or not such agential production is a matter of event- or agent-causation), but 
rather that which actions they shall produce is already implicit (“made inevitable”) in the 
past.  Here it is just the obtaining of causal determination, not the possibility of producing 
one’s acts, which stands in the way of ultimate origination.  And now we are in a position 
to appreciate this last point.  Notice what is left out of Clarke’s discussion: there is no 
mention whatever of enhanced control.  To be sure, the determined agent’s actions are 
made inevitable by antecedent conditions “over which that agent never had any control,” 
but that is just a consequence of determinism.  The control with which that agent 
performs his act, then and there, is not of a different variety than the control with which 
Clarke’s agent acts—unless the absence of determinism can, in itself, make a difference 
to the enhancement of control.  Yet if it is insisted that Clarke’s agent does act with an 
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enhanced degree of control for just this reason, then we can argue mutatis mutandis that 
agents enjoy a greater degree of control than determined agents on causal indeterminist 
theories of free will. 
Evidently anticipating this reply, Clarke writes that the above line of reasoning  
is not available to defend an event-causal libertarian account.  For even with its 
requirement of indeterminism, we do not get an origination or initiation of actions by 
their agents in anything other than a figurative or interest-relative sense.  What we get in 
this regard differs from what can be secured by a rival compatibilist account only by an 
absence (on the libertarian view) of determining causes. (p. 164) 
This, I believe, is the real challenge to causal indeterminism.  But there are three crucial 
things to notice about what has emerged.  First, the challenge makes no mention of the 
augmentation of control, and so does not pass through any purported implication relation 
between enhanced control and origination.  Second, the main downfall of causal 
indeterminism is revealed to be that it cannot provide for “origination” or “initiation” in 
the “straightforward” sense, but only in the “figurative” or “interest-relative” sense.  And 
third, the reason it cannot provide this is fundamentally because event-causal theories do 
not allow substances to be causes. 
 The question therefore comes down to this: does the causal production of action, 
the bringing about of actions by agents, require the existence of substance- or agent-
causation?  That is, is it the case that strictly and literally producing or bringing about an 
action entails the existence of a causal relation holding between agents and their actions, 
where this causal relation cannot consist in the right sorts of agent-involving events 
causing, in the right way, the action in question?  If it does, then libertarianism naturally 
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requires it too, and causal indeterminism is done for; but causal indeterminism would be 
in this case “done for” simply because the causal indeterminist espouses an event-causal 
theory of action, and event-causal theories of action turn out not to satisfy condition (iii*) 
on agency.  On the other hand, if, pace Taylor (1966), Nathan (1975) and others, the 
satisfaction of condition (iii*) on agency does not in itself require agent-causation, then 
agent-causation would appear to provide nothing more than what the causal indeterminist 
version of libertarianism can provide.  For the causal indeterminist could say with as 
much propriety as the agent-causalist that free agents, when confronted with a set of 
alternatives, may directly bring about, for reasons they most want to act on when they act, 
the action they choose to perform “then and there;” and in so doing these agents are 
literally initiators or originators of their acts. 
I myself cannot say with any certainty that agential production can consist solely 
in event-causal processes of the right kind.  It seems to me perfectly reasonable to say 
that it cannot.  The difference between a wink and a blink, or a doing and a reflex, may 
ultimately consist in the fact that the agent himself causes events of the first kind, but not 
the second, and that’s it.   
 Although I have no argument showing that (iii*) may in fact be satisfied by 
certain kinds of event-causal process, I offer an instance of transcendental reasoning that 
will guide our discussion through the remainder of this section: People sometimes 
perform actions; actions, as opposed to mere happenings, are brought about by the agents 
whose actions they are; some version or other of philosophical naturalism provides an 
accurate depiction of the physical world and all organisms within it; all causation is 
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event-causation, and every event has a cause; so, condition (iii*) is in fact satisfied by 
certain types of event-causal process, and without recourse to either agent-causation or 
the ability of agents to escape the causal influence of prior events.  I am not certain that 
this is true.  But if it is, I believe we need an explanation as to why it may look to be 
false.   
 To focus our inquiry, let us bear in mind that the difficulty in its purest form lies 
with the notion of an agent’s  production of her action in particular—her ability to act 
rather than merely to react, if you like—and not primarily in questions concerning 
control, indeterminism or determinism.  These are all intimately related, I grant.  And just 
as we have seen Clarke and others assimilate the notion of origination (or causal 
production in the absence of deterministic influence) with the notion of control, it will 
come as no surprise to see compatibilists drawing a similar association: 
We (normal, adult human beings) think of ourselves as being in control of most of our 
daily acts and thoughts.  Our relationships to our activities are, by and large, agential.  If 
indeterminism really does rob us of control over many, if not all, of our mundane 
physical or mental activities, then we are not the prime movers that we believe we are.  
Without control, we are more like inert vessels for the events of the world than their 
active origins. (Almeida and Bernstein 2003: 94) 
And if one agrees with Almeida and Bernstein that indeterminism does indeed reduce our 
control, then whether the indeterministic events producing49 our behavior are taken to be 
                                                 
49 It is instructive, I believe, to note how often in this debate philosophers speak of events producing an 
agent’s behavior when criticizing their opponent’s view, and agents producing their behavior when 
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pertinent mental states or “alien,” external events, our status as prime movers is 
threatened to the same effect: “After all, once the indeterminism sets in—be it as a 
product of motives and character or by the spinning of a roulette wheel—the agent 
disappears from the scene” (p. 100). 
 The free will literature is of course replete with disappearing agents.  It is striking, 
I think, and informative, to compare the foregoing disappearing agent case with the one 
described by Strawson, who asks us to undertake a thought experiment which 
consists simply in the rigorous application of the belief in determinism to the present 
course of one’s life: one does one’s best to think rapidly of every smallest action one 
performs or movement one makes—or indeed everything whatsoever that happens, so far 
as one is oneself concerned—as determined; as not, ultimately, determined by oneself; 
this for a minute or two, say. 
 This should have the effect of erasing any sense of the presence of a freely 
deciding and acting ‘I’ in one’s thoughts; for—so it seems—there is simply no role for 
such an ‘I’ to play.  It may even be strangely, faintly depressing; or it may give rise to a 
curious, floating feeling of detached acquiescence in the passing show of one’s 
psychophysical being; a feeling, not of impotence, but of radical uninvolvement.  Or 
alternatively the feeling may be: I am not really a person; there isn’t really anyone there 
at all. (1986: 96-97)50 
                                                                                                                                                 
discussing their own view, even if both their own view and their opponent’s view happen to endorse event-
causal theories of agency. 
50 Compare Dennett’s description of the “unreflective compatibilist’s” view of decision making: “On such a 
view, the agent does not seem in any sense to be the author of the decisions, but at best merely the locus at 
which the environmental and genetic factors bearing on him interact to produce a decision.  It all looks 
terribly mechanical and inevitable, and seems to leave no room for creativity or genius” (1978: 52). 
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As sympathetic as I am to Strawson’s incompatibilist intuitions, however, I believe the 
agent’s disappearance in both this case and the previous one involves a more fundamental 
problem, one stemming from our being situated within an event-causal nexus from which 
we cannot coherently imagine escaping, but within which we likewise cannot imagine 
being a source of genuine activity. 
“Our conception of a person as an agent is a conception of something with a 
causal power…[a power] to initiate series of events containing some we want.  An action 
is the exercise of such a power, and a person’s actions are the events at the start of those 
series she initiates” (Hornsby 1993: 164).  No doubt Hornsby is correct, but the question 
is how such initiation is possible given that the agent’s initiation of any action is itself a 
matter of her pertinent mental states’ being caused by prior events.  What sense can be 
attached to the claim that we “initiate” anything under these circumstances? 
Philosophers attracted to causal theories of action have sought by various means 
to specify how the “agent’s causal role supervenes on the causal network of events and 
states” (Velleman 1992: 197) eventuating in her actions, so as to avoid the need to posit 
any primitive agent-causal capacity.  Laura Ekstrom’s interesting theory, for example, 
has us look to the agent’s preferences, where a preference is “a desire formed by a 
process of critical evaluation with respect to one’s conception of the good” (2000: 106), 
and asks us to consider those preferences, together with the evaluative faculty from which 
they are formed, as partly constitutive of the self, making the causal results of these 
things in a certain sense agent caused.  In a somewhat similar vein, J. David Velleman 
(ibid.) suggests that the agent’s causal role may be realized by certain mental states, such 
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as the disposition to engage in practical reasoning, which can be thought of as playing the 
agent’s functional role.  John Bishop (1983, 1989), on the other hand, argues that our 
notion of agent causation may well be conceptually primitive, and so not amenable to 
reductive analyses like the ones above; nevertheless, he claims, any instance of agent 
causation could still be constituted by event-causal processes, and once we have the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for intentional action continuing to hold out for 
irreducible agent-causation is simply unreasonable.  
It is difficult to assess the viability of these proposals.  Certainly it seems strange 
to think of such things as preferences and capacities as being constitutive, even partly, of 
a human being, and it likewise seems peculiar to think of persons as having any 
“functional role” at all.  Moreover, although I agree with Bishop that a resolution of the 
problem of causal deviance must surely remove some of the wind from the agent-
causalist’s sails, it is not clear to me that such a resolution would render any remaining 
agent-causation intuitions unreasonable.  But in any event, after all is said and done, at 
least some residue of the problem appears to remain.  After all, if the fundamental source 
of the difficulty is that causation between events and states—intuitively, just occurrences 
or happenings—does not obviously amount to a doing, then adding more events and 
states, or suggesting that they be viewed in one way or another, is not likely to help.  
Viewed far enough from the outside, nothing of agency seems to remain within this 
network of events, for both the agent and her putative initiating powers are swallowed up 
in the relentless tide of occurrences: 
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Something peculiar happens when we view action from an objective or external 
standpoint.  Some of its most important features seem to vanish under the objective gaze.  
Actions seem no longer assignable to individual agents as sources, but become instead 
components of the flux of events in the world of which the agent is a part. (Nagel 1986: 
110) 
As I have said, libertarians will need to contend with this difficulty insofar as they believe 
in action.  But any action theorist espousing a naturalistic form of compatibilism must 
confront the challenge as well, for the “essential source of the problem is a view of 
persons and their actions as part of the order of nature, causally determined or not” 
(ibid.).   
My suspicion is that problem (iii) for libertarianism amounts at least in part to an 
illicit transfer of problem (iii*)—a problem for the libertarian just qua action theorist—to 
libertarianism itself, as though compatibilism could afford to remain silent on the issue.  
But however that may be, an appropriate response to either problem must begin with a 
close examination of the source of our discomfort, which I believe to be the gap between 
what it is like to act, and what we are eventually told action is.  
“[Anyone] seriously concerned with the philosophical problem of freedom must 
be concerned with the cognitive phenomenology of freedom,” says Strawson (1986: 55).  
To this I would add that anyone concerned with the philosophical problem of action must 
do the same.  For it is part of our conception of ourselves as agents that we are somehow 
initiators or producers, and this feature of our conception of agency, I submit, is one that 
we come by from the internal point of view, in experiencing what Carl Ginet (1990) has 
dubbed the “actish phenomenal quality.”  This phenomenal quality, like any other, resists 
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easy description, but we may begin by noting that there are “three especially central 
elements of the phenomenology of doing: (i) the aspect of self-as-source, (ii) the aspect 
of purposiveness, and (iii) the aspect of voluntariness” (Horgan, et al. 2003: 323).   
All of these elements of the phenomenology of doing present us with puzzles, but 
the most puzzling, to my mind, is the first of the three, which represents us as being in an 
important sense the sources of what we do.51 Putting aside for a moment the metaphysics 
and focusing solely on the “phenomenology of doing,” it is clear that “ordinary actions 
are not experienced as transeunt causal processes consisting of a mental event’s causing a 
bodily motion.”  Instead, when you voluntarily clench your fist, for example, you 
experience your arm, hand and fingers as being moved by you yourself, rather than 
experiencing their motion as…being transeuntly caused by your own mental states.  In 
seeking out an apt word to capture this distinctive phenomenology of self as source, one 
can hardly do better than ‘immanent’—a term whose etymological resonances make it at 
least as suitable for expressing the distinctive phenomenal character of agency as it is for 
expressing Chisholm’s view of agency’s metaphysical character. (Horgan, et al. 2003: 
329) 
In considering ourselves from the “external” or third-person perspective, however, it is 
hard to resist the impression that the belief to which this element of our experience gives 
rise is just false, if not incoherent.  Indeed, it seems to me that our intuitive descriptions 
of the agent’s role in “bringing her actions about,” or of being the source of them, would 
be flatly unintelligible to a cognizant being who (per impossible?) had never acted at all.   
                                                 
51 I take the phenomenology of the experience of action to be inherently intentional, presenting to agents, in 
experience, themselves as voluntary behaving individuals. 
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What makes it so difficult to see how condition (iii*) on agency could be satisfied 
on a naturalistic, causal construal of action, I believe, is that our thinking about action 
unavoidably involves this phenomenology of action—in particular, it involves that aspect 
of the phenomenology of doing which presents ourselves, to ourselves, as in a very strong 
sense the sources of what we do—and this feature of the phenomenology of action is one 
we cannot subsume under non-phenomenal concepts.  I would like to think that this is 
just what Berkeley was getting at when he wrote that “We may not, I think, strictly be 
said to have an idea of an active being, or of an action, although we may be said to have a 
notion of them” (1961: 209).  If such notions as these have no corresponding ideas (in 
Berkeley’s sense) then it seems to me that no causal analysis of action—even one that 
successfully avoids the problem of deviance—will fully capture our notion of actions as 
events brought about by the agents whose actions they are.  
Are we forced into an error theory, or eliminativism about action, then?  Must we 
say that condition (iii*) on agency corresponds to nothing that takes place in the world, if 
the world is roughly the way we take it to be?  No.  For recall, first, that we have assumed 
that naturalism is not incompatible with agency simpliciter and, since (iii*) is an essential 
element of action, agential production must in fact consist in event causal processes of a 
kind that can, and often do, take place in the natural order.  So the reluctance we feel in 
identifying any action with a given series of mental and physical events must find its 
explanation not in the fact that agential production requires an anti-naturalist ontology, 
but rather in the fact that a familiar sort of gulf obtains between our experience of 
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action—and therefore our conception of it—and our conception of what goes on in a 
world of events when we act. 
The gulf in question is similar to the celebrated “explanatory gap” between brain 
states and conscious experiences, but it is not quite the same.  Nagel spoke truly when he 
wrote that 
my doing of an act—or the doing of an act by someone else—seems to disappear when 
we think of the world objectively.  There seems no room for agency in a world of neural 
impulses, chemical reactions, and bone and muscle movements.  Even if we add 
sensations, perceptions, and feelings we don’t get action, or doing—there is only what 
happens. (1986: 111) 
It is hard to see how neural events and their subsequent reactions could constitute an 
agent’s bringing about of an act, but the task becomes no easier when we help ourselves 
to all the mentality we want.  Mental events, too, when considered from a third-person 
perspective, appear equally as lifeless and inactive.  (To that extent, then, I think 
Velleman (1992) and Bishop (1990) are correct.)   
However, this conceptual problem, as perplexing as it is, need not commit us to 
holding that agential production is impossible, nor indeed that it is naturally impossible.  
Whether the phenomenology of agency itself gives us reason to suppose that full-blooded 
action occurs in the world is a question I will not take up.  It is a familiar point that 
experience may mislead, and I will not attempt to argue that in this case it does not.  
Certainly it seems wrong to say that a mental event’s “having this intrinsic phenomenal 
quality is sufficient for its being an action” (Ginet 1997: 89).  On the other hand, it seems 
plausible to assume that this element of our experience of action serves some function 
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(perhaps providing us with “updates,” so to speak, as to the status of our control), and I 
doubt it is wholly irrelevant to a metaphysical assessment of the phenomenon to which it 
is attached.52 Note, finally, that there “is a difference between (i) not experiencing your 
own agency as involving purely transeunt causation of bodily motion, and (ii) 
experiencing your own agency as not involving purely transeunt causation of bodily 
motion,” so it is at least arguable that your “immanent-generation phenomenology does 
not really present your own behavior to you as not being a product of purely transeuntly 
causation,” which opens the possibility that “when your behavior is transeuntly caused in 
the right way, it is thereby immanently generated by you” (p. 335).   
Thus, if we embrace the notion, as I do, that the experience of action is 
intentional, and therefore has veridicality conditions, we are not forced to say that our 
experience of action is misleading or inaccurate unless something like agent-causation 
obtains.  The possibility remains, therefore, that whatever residual problems there are 
with respect to (iii*) are at bottom a conceptual, not ontological.  And if this is the case, 
then neither agential production nor the possibility of free will is imperiled by an 
exhaustively event-causal metaphysics. 
Granting that this is so, challenge (iii) to libertarianism begins to look less 
formidable.  The notion that the theoretical function of indeterminacy is to provide 
“gaps” in causal chains within which agents, hovering somewhere above those gaps, 
make their presence known by determining the outcomes on the gaps’ far sides is 
                                                 
52 Compare Robert Kane’s (1996: 182-183) remarks concerning the relevance of phenomenology to 
freedom and control. 
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probably too simplistic a way to put the intuitive worry expressed in (iii), yet I think 
something like this picture is probably at the bottom of it.  But if agency is a matter of 
event causation at all then the agent is already involved in the production of action, not 
by way of exerting an irreducible force from outside of the causal process, but in virtue of 
the right involvement of his deliberations, intentions and reasons within the process itself.  
An agent’s bringing about an act is constituted by the process in question, and no further 
involvement of the agent is necessary or possible. 
If this is the right way to understand agency generally, I want to argue, then we 
should begin to view indeterminacy as more of an asset than a liability.  For what is 
missing from a deterministic account of free agency need not be either the agent’s 
control53 over or production of her behavior—this is only to grant that action could occur 
in a deterministic world—but rather the possibility of being the final or ultimate source of 
one’s purposes, a possibility undercut by the obtaining of prior determining factors which 
have as their final or ultimate source something else: 
When an agent acts with free will, she is able to do other than perform the action that she 
actually performs; she has a choice about whether she performs that action; what she does 
is up to her.  On such an occasion, the agent determines, herself, what she does; she is an 
ultimate source or origin or initiator of her behavior. (Clarke 2003: 15) 
                                                 
53 ‘Control’ is ambiguous between what John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (1998) have dubbed 
‘guidance control’ and ‘regulative control’, where the former does not require the having of alternative 
possibilities (and so does not require indeterminism) but the latter does.  When I say an agent may control 
her behavior in a deterministic world, I have nothing stronger than guidance control (or something like it) 
in mind. 
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If determinism is false then Clarke’s commonsense description of free will may be 
satisfied even in a naturalistic world of event causes—as long as persons can act in such a 
world to begin with.  For what makes an agent who acts with free will free is not merely 
that she produces her actions (iii*) in virtue of her choices (i*) and guides them with a 
view to an end (ii*), but rather that she is the “ultimate source” or “origin” of her 
purposes, a possibility which may be realized when which end she adopts is not 
antecedently determined, and so does not have an ultimate cause or explanation in 
something other than what she decides to do “there and then.”  To claim that in such a 
case nothing at all is ultimately responsible for the agent’s adopting a particular end or 
forming a given intention is to forget that the agent herself has purposefully produced, in 
light of her reasons, the intention expressing that end.  Nothing about indeterminism rules 
that out, and nothing but indeterminism allows for the goals thus produced to be the 
agent’s alone.   
 Does this picture (supposing it can be suitably articulated) give us anything more 
of value than a deterministic picture would?  I think so, but I don’t think it is happily 
expressed in terms of an augmentation of power or control (if for no other reason than the 
ambiguity of those terms).  What it makes possible is the ability of agents to make 
contributions to the world in ways that were not already implicit in “what came before.”  
This possibility has been linked to a number of things we unquestionably value: 
individuality, creativity, uniqueness, autonomy, moral responsibility, desert for our 
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achievements and efforts, human dignity and the like.54 But it seems to me that there is, 
in addition to these undeniably important things, a certain intrinsic value just in being 
free to select some of our ends, to pursue more than one possible future, and to have 
some role in the formation of our characters.   
The value of such an ability is admittedly difficult to articulate.  I have tried in 
this and in the previous chapter to show how the value of free will overlaps to a 
significant extent with the value we associate with the mind’s making a causal difference, 
and although I will not reiterate those arguments here I think reflection upon them may 
be of help.  For in the case of mental causation, too, it is extremely difficult to say just 
why we need it, just why epiphenomenalism would be so horrible that it would mean “the 
end of the world” (Fodor 1989: 156).  We value our agency because we value our 
individuality, our potential to act on the world and make the difference, at least in some 
cases.  And this is what the libertarian has always sought to provide. 
In the final analysis we may be unable to adequately articulate the value of 
libertarian free will, but I don’t think we can help believing that we have this kind of 
freedom, even if the very notion of it presents us with intractable puzzles.  “We approach 
the issue of free will from many perspectives.  If we cannot solve the problem, at least we 
can surround it” (Nozick 1981: 293).  I do not know whether anything I have said here 
will contribute to a solution to the problem of free will.  I will be happy, however, if I 
have helped to surround it a little more fully.
                                                 
54 See Kane (1996, chapter 6), and see Clarke (2003: 108-116) on the presumption of openness and the 
value of the non-illusoriness of experience.   
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Appendix: Emergentism and Agent-Causation 
Of course action differs from other behaviour in that the agent brings it about, but the problem is how to 
accommodate such bringing about within a naturalist ontology. 
– John Bishop  
 
Materialism is false if anyone ever performs an action. 
– N.M.L. Nathan  
 
A.1 Free Will and Naturalism Revisited 
Perhaps some readers will think it inadvisable to pursue a naturalistic account of agency; 
it might be thought that any robust understanding of human action must go beyond the 
resources naturalism can provide.  The present appendix is geared toward philosophers 
with this kind of concern.  What I hope to illustrate here is that my overall approach to 
the issue of free will is not in any important way tied to either philosophical naturalism or 
methodological naturalism.  Even if we are to reject the causal theory of action and insist 
on a special, irreducible causal relation between agents (enduring substances) and their 
actions or intentions, still, the agent-causalist’s approach may be well motivated, and its 
proponents may find themselves in a securer dialectical position, by adopting my 
strategy.  For in this context as well it may be argued that whatever peculiar metaphysical 
views we must embrace in order to allow for the possibility of agent-causation may be in 
the first instance motivated by problems of concern to libertarians and compatibilists 
alike.  As in the final chapter, here I find it useful to start with concerns about mind and 
agency shared by philosophers on either side of the compatibility debate.  Instead of 
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recounting the three essential components of agency specified in the last chapter, I shall 
begin this appendix with an assessment of the nebulous threat of ‘mechanism’.1 
Let us begin with the so-called ‘British Emergentists’, that collection of 
philosophers including J.S. Mill, Samuel Alexander, C. Lloyd Morgan and C.D. Broad.  
Here we find a collection of mostly compatibilist thinkers who routinely characterized 
their materialistic opponents as ‘mechanists’.  Although they were careful to avoid what 
they considered to be the extremes of substantival dualism, vitalism and so forth, they 
were just as clear that their project was opposed to that of the “mechanistic 
reductionists”: 
The central feature of a mechanical—or, if it be preferred, a mechanistic—interpretation 
[of cosmology] is that it is in terms of resultant effects only, calculable by algebraic 
summation.  It ignores the something more that must be accepted as emergent…Against 
such a mechanical interpretation—such a mechanistic dogma—emergent evolution arises 
in protest.  The gist of its contention is that such an interpretation is quite inadequate.  
Resultants there are; but there is emergence also.  Under naturalistic treatment, however, 
the emergence…is loyally accepted, on the evidence, with natural piety.  That it cannot 
be mechanically interpreted in terms of resultants only is just that for which it is our aim 
to contend with reiterated emphasis. (Morgan 1923: 8) 
                                                 
1 Lest I exaggerate my ambition, I want to be clear that my intention in what follows is to limn an anti-
naturalist approach to the free will problem and show how, if an anti-naturalist view (such as emergentism) 
is the correct view of mind, there is nothing especially problematic or obscure about agent-causation.  As 
for the particular problems agent-causalists face in general, I have nothing to add to their defense beyond 
what Timothy O’Connor (2000a) and Randolph Clarke (2003), among others, have said. 
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Likewise, C.D. Broad challenges what he calls the “Ideal of Pure Mechanism,” 
characterized as follows: 
On a purely mechanical theory all the apparently different kinds of matter would be made 
of the same stuff.  They would differ only in the number, arrangement and movements of 
their constituent particles.  And their apparently different kinds of behaviour would not 
be ultimately different.  For they would all be deducible by a single simple principle of 
composition from the mutual influences of the particles taken by pairs; and these mutual 
influences would all obey a single law which is quite independent of the configurations 
and surroundings in which the particles happen to find themselves. (1925: 45-46) 
Conceding that there is a certain aesthetic draw to the mechanistic view owing to the 
tidiness and unity with which it paints the world, he nevertheless finds fault enough with 
it on a few familiar grounds, among which are these: first, “it has no trace of self-
evidence [and] cannot be the whole truth about the external world” because “it cannot 
deal with the existence or the appearance of ‘secondary qualities’ until it is supplemented 
by laws of the emergent type.”  And second, although it can be (and has been) an 
enormously useful research strategy,  
it tends to over-simplification.  If in fact there are new types of law at certain levels, it is 
very desirable that we should honestly recognise the fact.  And, if we take the 
mechanistic ideal too seriously, we shall be in danger of ignoring or perverting awkward 
facts of this kind.  This sort of over-simplification has certainly happened in the past in 
biology and physiology under the guidance of the mechanistic ideal; and it of course 
reaches its wildest absurdities in the attempts which have been made from time to time to 
treat mental phenomena mechanistically. (pp. 76-77) 
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(I think it noteworthy that Broad saw no a priori block to an entirely mechanistic theory 
of biology, chemistry and the like, but instead considered the question whether there were 
emergents in those domains to be straightforwardly empirical.2 The attempt to understand 
mentality mechanistically, however, is met with open scorn.) 
 It should be emphasized here that the classical emergentists were insisting on an 
ontological thesis, that genuinely new characteristics really do emerge at different levels 
of the world, and that they bring in their train genuinely new causal powers (where 
causation, at least as conceived by Broad, isn’t reducible to constant conjunction or some 
such Humean surrogate.).  They did of course express their distinctive theses in 
epistemological terms at times, just as Mill and Laplace were given to expressing the 
thesis of universal determinism in terms of predictability and allied notions.  But as Brian 
McLaughlin correctly points out, although Mill and Laplace “were not always as careful 
as they might have been in distinguishing epistemological and ontological 
                                                 
2 “I do not see any a priori impossibility in a mechanistic biology or chemistry, so long as it confines itself 
to that kind of behaviour which can be completely described in terms of changes of position, size, shape, 
arrangement of parts, etc.  I have already argued that this type of theory cannot be the whole truth about all 
aspects of the material world.  For one aspect of it is that bits of matter have or seem to have various 
colours, temperatures, smells, tastes, etc.  If the occurrence or the appearance of these ‘secondary qualities’ 
depends on microscopic particles and events, the laws connecting the latter with the former are certainly of 
the emergent type.  And no complete account of the external world can ignore these laws” (p. 72).  Broad is 
not unique among the emergentists on this score.  As McLaughlin points out, Samuel Alexander also 
mentions “the possibility that chemical bonding might be explained by appeal to properties of electrons, 
but…considered it an open question whether the possibility of such an explanation could be realized.  The 
gap between chemistry and physics seemed vast [as did] the gap between biology and chemistry.  It seemed 
very much an empirical question whether the gaps could be bridged” (1992: 56).  However, Alexander, 
along with Broad (though less careful in his wording than the latter), thought it “is a priori that secondary 
qualities are emergent but a posteriori whether other qualities are” (p. 66, n. 24). 
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theses…charitable commentators have rightly taken them to be stating the ontological 
thesis of causal determinism.”  And in like fashion, although the  
Emergentists often speak of emergent properties and laws as unpredictable from what 
they emerge from…contra what some commentators have thought, the Emergentists do 
not maintain that something is an emergent because it is unpredictable.  Rather, they 
maintain that something can be unpredictable because it is an emergent.  Emergence 
implies a kind of unpredictability.  But it is a mistake to conflate emergence with this 
consequence of emergence.  The British Emergentists do not. (1992: 73, n. 31) 
 So the classical emergentists did not merely complain; they also sought to replace 
both the mechanistic and the more robustly dualistic outlooks with a positive, 
metaphysical theory of their own.  What I’m interested in exploring now is whether 
agent-causation, given an emergentist picture of mind, is any more defensible.  I will 
argue that there is nothing especially problematic about the emergence of an agent-causal 
capacity in particular if there exist other emergent phenomena in the world. 
 
A.2 Ontological Emergence 
‘Emergence’, of course, is not a neologism, and that means it comes with baggage.  The 
major works of the British Emergentists are by now well trod territory3 and I will not 
attempt a summary of their respective positions or an analysis of their thought.  However, 
I shall take pains to align my ideas with the spirit of their work, and will draw upon them 
explicitly as the occasion calls for it.  Our first task will be to specify what makes an 
                                                 
3 See, for helpful overviews, McLaughlin (1992), O’Connor (1994), Kim (1999), Papineau (2001), Crane 
(2001). 
 304
emergent property emergent.  Since different senses have been (and continue to be) 
attached to the word, I want to make clear at the outset how I’ll be thinking of it.   
 Central to the idea of emergence is that a system characterized by emergent 
features or properties enjoys a “novel” set of causal powers or dispositions, causal 
powers, that is, that are not merely “additive” or “resultant” from the set of causal powers 
had by its microphysical constituents.  That is to say, an emergent property’s causal 
contribution to the system in which it is instantiated will not be derivable from the laws 
governing the behavior of its constituent elements when those elements are considered in 
isolation from the structural configuration that gives rise to the emergent property in 
question.  “Derivability” is an epistemic notion, but it bears reiterating that emergence as 
traditionally conceived is not.  There really are new causal powers brought into the world 
when an emergent property is instantiated in a system, and the inability to “derive” the 
behavior of such a system in bottom-up fashion is a consequence of this fact.4 The naïve 
                                                 
4 I should mention here that underivability (or unpredictability) has at least two senses, only one of which is 
applicable to emergent properties.  Emergent properties will be inductively predictable or derivable; that is, 
given the prior knowledge that a property P emerges from Q, we can predict that whenever a system 
instantiates Q, P will be instantiated as a matter of law. (If the connection between P and Q is an 
indeterministic one, there will be a finite disjunction of nomically possible emergents given Q, one of the 
disjuncts of which will be P.)  However, emergent properties will not be theoretically predictable or 
straightforwardly derivable just from knowledge of the laws governing the elements that constitute Q, in 
the way that an object’s weight, e.g., is straightforwardly derivable from the weight of its parts.  So C.D. 
Broad: “A trans-ordinal [i.e., emergent] law is as good a law as any other; and, once it has been discovered, 
it can be used like any other to suggest experiments, to make predictions, and to give us practical control 
over external objects.  The only peculiarity of it is that we must wait till we meet with an actual instance of 
an object of the higher order before we can discover such a law; and that we cannot possibly deduce it 
beforehand from any combination of laws which we have discovered by observing aggregates of a lower 
order” (1925: 79). 
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idea is just that once an organism, say, passes a certain threshold of organizational 
complexity, the causal relations that hold between the organism’s parts prior to that 
threshold’s being crossed no longer fully determine how the organism will act or what it 
is capable of doing once that threshold is crossed.  In addition to the causal powers of the 
elements constituting the organism, then, the emergent property brings with it an 
ineliminable “downward” causal influence over how those elements behave. 
 To bring these ideas into sharper relief, I want to consider a few contemporary 
pictures of emergence and explain how I think it should be understood in relation to 
those.  We’ll begin with John Searle’s (1992) description of the sort of emergence he 
endorses.  Searle distinguishes between what he calls “system features,” and “causally 
emergent system features.”  System features are those features of an object that are not 
necessarily had by the constituents of the object: the specific shape, weight and velocity 
of a stone, for example, are properties that the stone has, but which the elements or 
molecules constituting that stone do not have.  These system features can be calculated 
straightforwardly from the way in which the elements are composed or arranged (and 
perhaps the elements’ relations to features of the environment).  Distinct from these 
system features are features which “cannot be figured out just from the composition of 
the elements and environmental relations; they have to be explained in terms of the causal 
interactions among the elements” (p. 111).  Examples of such “causally emergent system 
features” are solidity, liquidity and transparency.  Consciousness and mental phenomena 
generally are, according to Searle, causally emergent system features in this sense. 
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 This is a fairly unproblematic notion of emergence, and there is a loose and 
harmless sense in which the emergent properties he describes bring with them “new” 
causal powers.  For example, the stone will have the power to register a certain reading 
on a scale in virtue of its weight, whereas the individual molecules composing it won’t 
register the same reading.  And, again, some liquids will have the power to quench thirst 
even though their hydrogen atoms, for example, do not.  There is nothing deeply 
mysterious or conceptually troubling about all this.  More positively, I think it is to 
Searle’s credit that he takes into account diachronic, causal relations between micro and 
macro levels, rather than confining himself to the kind of synchronic, noncausal relations 
that typify most accounts of supervenience.5 The latter approach is both natural and 
appropriate when it is the supervenience of aesthetic (and perhaps also moral) qualities 
on objects or properties that we are trying to understand.  It is not so obvious, though, that 
the same ‘time-slice’ approach will be similarly helpful when we’re examining the 
ontological emergence of psychological features from complex, dynamic biological 
systems—it should not be ruled out a priori that emergents are produced causally.  Last, 
there is an unambiguous sense in which Searle’s causally emergent system features are 
dependent upon the physical bases that give rise to them, which is a necessary condition 
on emergent properties.  For these reasons, I think Searle’s account is at least a first step 
in the right direction. 
                                                 
5 I think this is what he does.  I am not at all confident that I fully understand his position, but the text 
seems to support my interpretation. 
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This is not how I’m thinking of emergence, however.  Although it is necessary 
that some kind of supervenience relation or strong causal connection obtain between 
emergent properties and their subvenient bases, this does not suffice for emergence since 
it fails to capture the notion of novel causal powers in the more robust sense.  (I do not 
mean to suggest that Searle is trying to capture this more robust sense of emergence.)  
Causally emergent system features are simply supervenient properties that allegedly 
cannot be deduced by the physical structures of the properties on which they supervene; 
we also need to take into account the causal relations of those lower level structures to 
derive the causal powers of the emergent features.  So far so good.  But this does not 
substantively alter the picture handed down to us by nonreductive physicalism.  Searle is 
quite explicit on this point in another of his books: 
Since all of the surface features of the world are entirely caused by and realised in 
systems of micro-elements, the behaviour of micro-elements is sufficient to determine 
everything that happens.  Such a ‘bottom up’ picture of the world allows for top-down 
causation (our minds, for example, can affect our bodies).  But top-down causation only 
works because the top level is already caused by and realised in the bottom levels. (1984: 
94) 
But, if so, then Searle’s account inherits all of the difficulties we’ve noted for 
nonreductive physicalism in the last chapter, and his assurance that “this picture of the 
world allows for top-down causation” is so far forth a mere promissory note that he 
nowhere attempts to discharge.  In the absence of top-down causation that has a real 
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impact on (either the simultaneous or) the subsequent microphysical states of an 
organism, I deny that the organism has any emergent properties at all.6   
 In contrast to Searle, noted neurophysiologist R.W. Sperry has, in a series of 
articles and books since the late 1960s, emphasized the centrality of downward causation 
in emergent contexts—calling it the “key to the cognitive revolution” (1991: 227)—while 
insisting upon a substance monism over against various thinkers drawing upon his ideas, 
such as Karl Popper and John Eccles (1977).  According to Sperry, emergent properties 
are at once determined by and dependent upon lower level physical states, and such that 
they exert a kind of downward causal control over their subvenient bases.  Commenting 
on his “concept of mind as a causal, functional emergent,” he writes, 
It is the idea, in brief, that conscious phenomena as emergent functional properties of 
brain processing exert an active control role as causal determinants in shaping the flow 
patterns of cerebral excitation.  Once generated from neural events, the higher order 
mental patterns and programs have their own subjective qualities and progress, operate 
and interact by their own causal laws and principles which are different from and cannot 
be reduced to those of neurophysiology…. (1980: 201) 
                                                 
6 I do not mean to sound dismissive of the various ‘complexity sciences’ relying upon what Mark Bedau 
(1997) has labeled ‘weak emergence’, such as complex systems theory, nonlinear dynamics, artificial life 
and hierarchical theories in biology positing forms of ‘downward causation’ within living organisms and 
evolutionary history. I’m not dismissive toward these programs and I’m not interested in a terminological 
dispute, but neither do I wish to use the phrase ‘strong emergence’ when plain old ‘emergence’ will do.  
Throughout I’m just going to use ‘emergence’ to specify this stronger, ontological sense of emergence; and 
I can do so with a quiet mind because traditional emergentism is a metaphysical thesis (even if its 
distinctive doctrines are sometimes expressed epistemologically). 
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In view of Sperry’s insistence on emergent causal powers and his related contention that 
providing a full explanation of the behavior of systems characterized by them “requires 
inclusion of the nonreductive emergent properties with both their sequential same-level 
action plus their supervenient downward control” (1991: 225), it appears as though 
Sperry’s theory moves us closer to a more traditional sort of emergence, and a kind of 
mental causation which could avoid the problem of causal exclusion. 
 However, it is not so easy to understand Sperry’s overall picture or how the 
elements of it cohere.  It would seem, given his ambitious philosophical aims and his 
striking rhetoric, that Sperry is after a very strong form of downward mental causation 
indeed.  His theory, he tells us, was originally structured so as to refute the then prevalent 
“mechanistic, materialistic, behavioristic, fatalistic, reductionistic view of the nature of 
mind and psyche” (1980: 196), by assigning to mental properties causal powers entailing 
that the “old simple laws and primeval forces of the hydrogen age…get superseded, 
overwhelmed, and outclassed” (p. 199) by them.  Moreover, the new framework his 
theory introduces was intended to do nothing less than “alter profoundly the value 
implications of science which were being downgraded by the then strongly dominant 
philosophy of reductive mechanistic materialism” (p. 197), by allowing for a 
reconciliation between science and religion, providing a (compatibilist) solution to the 
problem of free will, overcoming the fact/value dichotomy, and securing the basis for a 
naturalistic global ethic that would “get ethico-religious values from science in a 
prescriptive sense” (1988: 610).  (Whew!)  It isn’t to my purpose to enquire whether 
Sperry’s system can do any such thing as all this.  It is clear, though, that he stands with 
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the traditional emergentists in seeing himself as occupying a position at some distance 
from both reductive physicalism on the one hand and traditional dualism on the other, 
and it is likewise clear that he considers his conception of downward causation to be the 
linchpin in the whole edifice. 
 But just what sort of downward causation does Sperry have in mind?  How 
exactly do mental causes, e.g., “outclass” and “supersede” the neuronal causes upon 
which they supervene?  The question becomes all the more pressing when we read that 
Sperry conceives of mental states as being “built of, composed and constituted of 
physiological and physicochemical elements” (1980: 202), and further that the 
“downward control” of emergent properties occurs simultaneously with the “upward 
determination” of the elements that constitute them (1991: 240).  How could an emergent 
property be the causal (or mereological) result of a set of physicochemical elements, and 
at the same time be causally responsible for the instantiation of the very property that 
constitutes it?  This appears to introduce a very troubling form of causal circularity (and, 
if causation is transitive, ultimately self-causation) that we would do well to avoid. 
 In attempting to clarify his position in response to these and other concerns, I 
believe Sperry successfully demonstrates that his theory is at least a coherent one, but 
that he does so at the expense of rendering some of his more exciting rhetoric unjustified.  
Admitting that his past attempts at explaining the relation between emergent properties 
and their subvening bases have not been overly successful, he returns to a favorite 
analogy meant to show how emergent mental phenomena causally interact with events in 
the brain.  The analogy is simple: a wheel, rolling downhill, is a macro event that 
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downward causes a reconfiguration of the molecules constituting the wheel relative to the 
rest of the world.  Although this is just an analogy, Sperry repeatedly claims that it 
provides a “direct, simple, objective, physical example in respect to the general principle 
of macro-determinism or emergent causation,” a phenomenon which is “ubiquitous, 
almost universal” in nature (1991: 225).  It is furthermore an accurate model of the 
relation between emergent mental properties and their neural correlates because it 
captures precisely the kind of simultaneous downward control and upward determination 
he conceives as obtaining between the mind and the brain: 
It illustrates one way in which nonreductive emergent properties determine the 
interactions of an entity as a whole at its own level, and also exert supervenient 
downward control, determining the space-time trajectories of its components at all lower 
levels. 
The rolling wheel example shows, further, that these emergent interactions are 
accomplished without disrupting the chains of causation among the sub-entities at their 
own lower levels, nor in their upward determination of the emergent properties…there is 
no breach in the previously posited physical determinism within the lower-level 
interactions. (ibid.) 
Clearly, Sperry’s emergent properties do not downward cause any 
reconfigurations of their micro-components or otherwise alter the behavior of lower level 
entities (relative to one another) one bit.  In exactly what way, then, does this 
supervenient downward control make a difference?  The relativity feature implicit in the 
passage quoted above is crucial here:   
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A molecule within the rolling wheel…though retaining its usual inter-molecular relations 
within the wheel, is at the same time, from the standpoint of an outside observer, being 
carried through particular patterns in space and time determined by the over-all properties 
of the wheel as a whole.  There need be no “reconfiguring” of the molecules relative to 
each other within the wheel itself.  However, relative to the rest of the world the result is a 
major “reconfiguring” of the space-time trajectories of all components in the wheel’s 
infrastructure. (p. 230) 
So all the “previously posited” micro-determinism still holds in Sperry’s picture, but we 
avoid the unwanted “mechanistic reductionism” because the “lower level laws fail to 
include the complex, but specific, spacing and timing of the parts.  These space-time, 
configurational, form or pattern factors are predicated to be causative themselves” (p. 
225).  And that amounts to the claim, in Sperry’s estimation, that the fundamental 
physical laws alone can’t provide a full explanation of macro-level processes, or of 
micro-level processes in emergent contexts.  Synchronic downward causation is therefore 
consistent within bottom-up determination, but only because emergent properties “do not 
disrupt or intervene in the causal relations of the lower-level component activity.  
Instead, they supervene…in a way that leaves the micro interactions, per se, unaltered” 
(p. 230). 
 Here a few comments are in order.  First, with respect to Sperry’s contention that 
a relatively humdrum event such as a wheel’s rolling downhill cannot be explained 
without admitting emergent properties, William Hasker’s remarks seem to me right on 
target: 
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The laws of molecular motion don’t mention the particular configuration of molecules in 
a rolling wheel; they couldn’t possibly do this, since they are quite general in nature.  But 
they do, of course, take account of such “space-time, configurational, form or pattern 
factors” in predicting molecular movements…All this occurs within the framework of 
deterministic, “bottom-up” reductionist physics, and so the assumed need in such cases 
for “emergent properties” exerting “supervenient downward control” is shown to be an 
illusion. (1999: 182-183) 
Second, what is true of the wheel is true of allegedly emergent mental phenomena 
generally.  Far from “superseding” or “outclassing” or “overwhelming” their subvenient 
bases, Sperry’s commitments evidently leave no room for emergent properties to exert 
any downward causal influence at all.  For unless an emergent property causally 
influences some lower level elements in their relation to one another, then, given that the 
causal relations of those elements determinately fix the higher level processes “all the 
way up,” by familiar reasoning, all of the causal work is being done at that level.  Third, 
if we should attempt to introduce a stronger form of emergent downward causation 
within Sperry’s framework, his contention that such causation occurs simultaneously 
with the upward determination responsible for bringing the emergent property into 
being—that is, that downward causation is both reflexive and synchronic—will very 
likely render the theory incoherent.  For it is an extremely plausible principle that the 
causal powers an object enjoys at t are fixed by the properties it actually has at t.  So if a 
set of physical conditions B “upwardly determines” the instantiation of an emergent 
property E at t, and nothing else is responsible for bringing about E at t, it evidently 
cannot be the case that E is causally responsible for bringing about B at t, since E is fully 
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dependent on B and did not itself exist prior to t.  If, on the other hand, downward 
causation is taken to occur simultaneously with the instantiation of a set of “basal 
conditions,” there will, in order to avoid causal circularity, need to be a prior cause 
responsible for bringing about the emergent property bearing the downward causal 
influence on those basal conditions.  The coherence of reflexive downward causation, 
then, depends upon there being diachronic causal relations between emergents and base 
properties, rather than the sort of simultaneous “mutual interdependence” that Sperry 
apparently has in mind. 
I conclude, therefore, that Sperry’s view of emergence does not progress much 
beyond that of Searle’s.  Both theorists insist on the dependence of emergent mental 
properties on neural structures and their causal interactions, but, while Sperry seems to 
want a robust sort of downward causation, neither he nor Searle admits a form of 
downward causation strong enough to answer the arguments raised against nonreductive 
physicalism.  And the attempt to strengthen the causal powers bestowed by emergent 
properties while retaining Sperry’s overall framework would likely collapse into 
incoherence. 
 Rather than continuing to analyze additional proposals individually, I think we’ve 
set enough in place to strike out on our own.  What we need is a theory of emergence 
which satisfies the requirement that both Sperry and Searle (along with the classical 
emergentists) insist upon—namely, the dependence of emergent properties on lower level 
physical properties—but which also introduces emergent causal powers with a little more 
oomph.  However, as we’ve already seen, the way in which the dependence of emergent 
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properties is to be understood will need to be articulated in clear view of the fact that 
emergent properties exert downward causal influence; even admitting the possibility of 
simultaneous causation—still a disputed question in metaphysics and the philosophy of 
science—we will have to avoid any combination of dependence and downward causation 
that implies a synchronic, reflexive causal relation holding between emergent properties 
and the lower level conditions giving rise to them.  A diachronic causal relation (upward, 
downward, or both) will need to be admitted somewhere in the story in order to avoid the 
uncomfortable causal circularity involved in the doctrine that upward determination and 
downward “supervenient control” occur simultaneously.   
Before moving on to explore a few alternative pictures of downward causation, I 
want to specify more clearly the background ontology that emergentism assumes:7 (i) The 
concrete entities involved in this story are physical elements and their aggregates, 
including biological organisms. (ii) A higher level of complexity results within a system 
(such as an organism) when the lower level entities constituting it are related in new 
structural configurations. (iii) The higher level properties of such systems result from and 
depend upon the properties and relations of the parts constituting them.  Some of these 
properties, the emergent properties, will not be theoretically predictable.  They will not 
be theoretically predictable in that, given a comprehensive knowledge of the laws 
governing the interactions of the basic elements constituting the system, it will not be 
possible to predict the instantiation of an emergent property (or at any rate the causal 
powers of such a property) when those elements are arranged in the ways that in fact give 
                                                 
7 Compare Kim (1999: 20-22), O’Connor (1994: 103ff.). 
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rise to emergent properties.  The failure of predictability owes not to our epistemic 
limitations, but rather to the fact that emergent properties and their powers cannot be 
derived merely by “adding up” the manifest properties and powers of a system’s parts.  
However, we can make perfectly good inductive predictions regarding emergent 
properties when we antecedently know the conditions under which a given property will 
emerge.  That is, (iv) emergents are connected to the lower lying conditions responsible 
for them with a nomic or modal tie of appropriate force.  Last, (v) emergent properties 
have novel causal powers irreducible to the causal powers of the lower level properties.  
It is to that last condition, and the problems associated with it, that we must now turn. 
 
A.3 Dependence and Downward Causation: Exploring Some Options 
It has been remarked often enough that nonreductive physicalism is really a species of 
emergentism.8 And, aside from the emergentist’s willingness to countenance the falsity of 
physical causal closure, it cannot be denied that the nonreductive physicalist’s and the 
emergentist’s general ontological commitments bear a certain similarity.  That being so, it 
isn’t surprising to find philosophers claiming that the two theories face the same (or very 
similar) difficulties, and even that they stand or fall together.  I think the latter claim is a 
little extreme—they aren’t that similar—but it is certainly true that emergentism faces a 
challenge comparable to the one that has caused so much trouble for nonreductive 
physicalism.  It can be laid out very simply as follows. 
                                                 
8 Crane (2001), Kim, (1999). 
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 Since emergentists are committed to the causal efficacy of emergent states, they 
are committed to downward causation.  For suppose that mental states are emergent 
states.  We want to say that mental states can have a causal impact on subsequent mental 
states, that, i.e., such emergent states play a causal role in producing distinct emergent 
states at the same level.  But since such states emerge from, and therefore depend upon, 
lower level conditions, if a prior emergent state does not in some way affect the physical 
state from which the subsequent emergent state results, that prior emergent state appears 
causally dispensable.  So same level causation requires downward causation.  And, 
clearly, since emergent mental states are distinct from the physical states giving rise to 
them, if such mental states are to causally influence behavior they must work their way 
into the causal processes occurring at the physical level, which is just to say that 
downward causation must occur.  If the physical states are entirely unaffected by the 
emergent ones, epiphenomenalism once again looms. 
 But the dependence of emergent states on lower level conditions gives rise to 
familiar worries about causal exclusion.  The problem isn’t precisely the same in the 
present case because emergentists aren’t committed to physical causal closure, so they 
need not attempt to show how nonphysical states could make a causal difference despite 
the fact that all of the causal roles have already been filled.  However, the mere 
willingness to deny physical causal closure does not immediately get the emergentist out 
of the woods.  For even though emergentism need not be committed to any of the 
particular construals of psychophysical supervenience we’ve already examined, the 
relation between emergents and their lower level bases must be something close to 
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supervenience, or close enough anyway to give rise to a similar challenge.9 For, given 
that an emergent state E* emerges, as a matter of law, from some basal condition B*, 
we’ve seen that a prior emergent state E can be causally responsible for E* only if E is 
causally relevant to B*.  But E will of course have emerged from a basal condition B, and 
there will evidently be some causal connection, at the lower level, between B and B*.  If 
the causal connection between these lower lying states is one of nomological sufficiency, 
and if the causal sequence occurs just as it would have outside of an allegedly emergent 
context—if we can predict it just by way of vector addition, for example—the attempt to 
specify a causal role for E will result in overdetermination; and even though 
overdetermination is possible, we do not want to commit ourselves to it as a systematic 
and widespread phenomenon in order to account for mental causation.  So how, even 
within these general guidelines, can we make sense of downward causation?  Where can 
we find room for the exercise of new causal powers? 
 I have already argued that downward causation should not be thought of as a 
synchronic reflexive relation.  That is, we do not want to say that E causes E* (or B*) by 
causing the instantiation of B, if B itself is responsible for the instantiation of E and 
                                                 
9 Paul Humphreys’ (1997) model of emergence as quantum fusion is perhaps the exception to this general 
rule.  Humphreys has it that emergent properties are the result of sets of basal conditions which fuse 
together under certain conditions, and that when such fusion occurs the elements at the base level are 
simply eliminated.  The base properties, that is, are consumed in the fusion process resulting in an emergent 
property.  In such a case, the macro level emergent property will exhibit causal powers which are not in 
conflict with the causal aspirations of the lower level elements, since those lower level elements have 
ceased to exist.  Since they’ve ceased to exist, there aren’t available any candidate physical bases on which 
an emergent synchronically supervenes and there is therefore no apparent threat of overdetermination or 
causal exclusion on the present view. 
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nothing else is.  For B will have a decomposition into parts p1, p2,…, pn, which parts will 
have certain properties P1, P2,…, Pn, and which will bear to one another some relation R.  
If B is instantiated at t, those parts will stand in R and bear properties P1, P2,…, Pn at t, 
and this event will result, at t, in the occurrence of E.  If E is to exert downward causal 
influence on B, E must make a difference to some property Pi of some part pi of B.  But 
since E, by hypothesis, results from B alone, E isn’t around prior to t to serve as a causal 
factor in bringing about B, and nothing other than B itself can be offered as an 
explanation of E.  The central problem is not so much with the notion of simultaneous 
causation as it is with the circularity involved in holding that an effect of B is 
simultaneously causally responsible for B.  If simultaneous causation is to be 
countenanced, and I see no a priori reason to dismiss it, then we must be able to pinpoint 
further, independent conditions responsible for the occurrence of E.  And that means that 
downward causation requires diachronic relations between levels.  (A string of 
independent simultaneous causes, though conceptually possible, will not help in the 
present context because we’re interested in the causal processes—sustained over a 
temporal interval—leading to action.) 
 Now we are in a position to explore an option in logical space.  At this point all 
I’m interested in is the internal coherence of emergence, but the options discussed below 
will of course need to have some show of plausibility.  That is, they will have to cohere 
with our general ontological guidelines and should avoid such things as gross violations 
of well established physical laws.  I’m going to begin by examining Sydney Shoemaker’s 
(2002) proposal. 
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 The presentation of Shoemaker’s solution requires the introduction of a little 
jargon.  As Shoemaker sees things, there are at least two ways in which we may 
understand what emergent properties are and how they come to be instantiated.  Consider 
first a given physical structural property, a property specified in terms of the micro-
elements constituting it, the basic physical properties of those elements and the way in 
which the elements are arranged or related.  Shoemaker calls such properties physical 
micro-structural properties.  Now suppose that certain of these properties are emergent 
engendering; that is, suppose that whenever such a property is instantiated, the system in 
which it’s instantiated bears some set of causal powers that goes beyond the set of powers 
that can be derived from a complete description of the elements and powers constituting 
its physical micro-structural properties.  Corresponding to the novel causal powers there 
will be an emergent property, a distinct property which results from the right sort of 
physical micro-structural property, or from the right sorts of elements being related in the 
right sorts of ways.   
What is the basis for the determination of emergent properties by physical micro-
structural properties?  One way to see things is that the elements constituting the latter 
properties bear micro-latent properties in addition to their micro-manifest properties.  
Aside from mass, spin and charm or whatever, the micro-elements bear properties that do 
not make their presence known until or unless they are configured in emergent 
engendering ways.  Once so configured, the elements, together with their micro-latent 
properties and their micro-manifest properties, constitute an emergent micro-structural 
property, which includes in its description the physical micro-structural property giving 
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rise to it and also the micro-latent properties had by the constituent elements.  The second 
way to see things is that the micro-manifest properties exhaust the properties the 
constituent elements have, but that such elements have micro-latent causal powers, 
further powers which are grounded in their manifest properties.  These powers are such 
that we can’t know about them without arranging the elements in the requisite ways, but, 
once they are so arranged, they make their presence known by conferring powers on the 
system that cannot be explained by the adding up of the micro-manifest powers.  So in 
the one case, there are (latent) micro-properties which are not observed outside of 
emergent contexts and which are partially responsible for the instantiation of a given 
emergent property, and in the second case, while there may be no such latent properties, 
the micro-manifest properties themselves have micro-latent powers that become manifest 
in emergent contexts.  But “in either case, the elements will have latent powers that are 
bestowed by their properties, and it will be in virtue of these properties and the powers 
bestowed by them that the complexes built out of them will have their emergent 
properties” (p. 54). 
So far, Shoemaker presents us with a pretty clear sense in which emergent 
properties depend upon certain physical properties.  The dependence relation in question 
is no more or less problematic than standard accounts of supervenience, for these 
emergent properties are in fact structural properties just like any other macro property.  
They are constituted by the basic elements and their relations, it’s just that their 
specification includes properties and/or powers not included in the specification of 
physical micro-structural properties, and which are such that “we can learn about [them] 
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only be seeing the results of combining [the constituents] in certain ways” (ibid.).  The 
determination of emergent micro-structural properties by physical micro-structural 
properties will, then, be grounded in the determination of micro-latent powers by micro-
manifest powers: 
There will be such determination between the micro-structural properties just in case for 
each micro-latent power whose instantiation in a micro-entity is involved in the 
instantiation of the emergent micro-structural property there is a micro-manifest power, 
or a set thereof, such that it is true, as a matter of nomological necessity, that any micro-
entity having that micro-manifest power, or that set of micro-manifest powers, also has 
that micro-latent property. (p. 57) 
And whether the micro-latent powers of micro-entities are determined by their manifest 
properties or by additional properties that are entirely micro-latent, the upshot is the same 
in either case.  The micro-level properties determine the emergent properties and their 
causal powers, and the latter supervene on physical structural properties.  On this picture, 
then, there would seem to be no basis for the complaint that emergentism commits us to 
the possibility that nature sometimes gives us something for nothing.   
We now have enough in place to examine Shoemaker’s reply on behalf of 
emergentism.  Suppose that a given physical micro-structural property, P, nomologically 
necessitates, at a time t, the instantiation of an emergent micro-structural property, M.  If 
the determination of M by P is synchronic, as it appears likely to be on this picture, 
Shoemaker concedes that M could not be causally responsible for any part of P; that is, 
he denies the possibility of synchronic reflexive downward causation.  However, he asks 
us to consider the case in which an emergent property M causes a subsequent emergent 
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property, M*.  If the explanation of M* cannot be had without appeal to the causal 
powers bestowed by the previous emergent property, M, then we can say that M* was 
caused in virtue of the emergent property preceding it, rather than in virtue of M’s 
subvening physical property, P.  Since M* supervenes on its own physical property, P*, 
M can claim the credit for it only if M can claim the credit for P*, which is a case of 
diachronic downward causation.  But why shouldn’t P, rather than M, claim the credit for 
P*?  Shoemaker explains: 
Suppose that what gets caused in such a case is a microphysical state of affairs whose 
coming into being involves a certain change in the position of a certain micro-entity, say 
an electron.  This may well be a different effect than one would predict if one went only 
on the micro-manifest powers of the constituent micro-entities.  And to say that the 
causation is “downward” is just to say that the causal powers activated in it are ones that 
are activated only when their possessors are in such a combination, and are such that the 
effects of their activation turn on precisely what sort of emergence engendering 
combination they are involved in. (p. 58) 
The overall idea is this.  The instantiation of P and M involve precisely the same 
elements standing in precisely the same relations to one another.  The salient difference 
between the two properties—which at this point are assumed by Shoemaker to be 
distinct—is that the specification of P involves only the micro-manifest properties and 
their manifest powers, whereas the specification of M involves all that plus the micro-
latent powers (and the micro-latent properties, if such there be) had by those elements.  It 
follows that the state of affairs consisting in the instantiation of P is part of the state of 
affairs consisting in the instantiation of M, and similarly in the case of P* and M*.  And 
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the diachronic downward causation comes in when M causes the instantiation of P*, 
which is part of the instantiation of M* and, by hypothesis, nomically sufficient for the 
rest of it.  Such an account, says Shoemaker, “involves no over-determination and there is 
no case for saying that P preempts M as the cause of P*” (p. 60). 
Now Shoemaker goes on to remark that on the view of property individuation he 
favors, we should not think of physical micro-structural properties and their associated 
emergent micro-structural properties as being distinct.10 But Shoemaker’s views on 
causality and property individuation need not concern us at the moment, for they are 
logically independent of the framework he’s introduced to explain emergence and 
downward causation.  The present question is whether the reply he offers on behalf of the 
emergentist is a tenable one as it stands.  After evaluating that question, we can move on 
to discuss Shoemaker’s suggestion about property identity. 
There is, first, surely some sense in which the potential for the production of 
emergent states needs to be in the basic bits of matter.  Those elements need to “tend 
toward” the production of emergent properties, and it should be the case that whenever 
they are configured in the right sort of way an emergent state results as a matter of 
course.  And it seems true that if we found ourselves in possession of strong empirical 
evidence that emergent states exist, it would be quite natural to postulate a set of “micro-
latent” properties or powers to account for them.  So Shoemaker’s theory fares well on 
that score.  I do not think, for reasons I’ll discuss below, that the postulation of such 
properties and powers would obviate the need for (or at least the reasonableness of) 
                                                 
10 He makes the claim on page 61, citing his (1980).   
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countenancing genuinely emergent properties distinct from their lower lying physical 
structural properties.  In making such a postulation, we are after all merely saying that the 
basic elements carry with them the potentiality to produce emergent states in specific 
circumstances, which is just what the emergentists have always wanted to say.  But it also 
should be noted that by making this claim we are not thereby committing ourselves to the 
view that emergent properties are structural properties at all (which is in any case a claim 
that the classical emergentist will surely want to reject).  The latent powers partially 
responsible for producing a given emergent state may well be causally responsible for 
that state rather than being partially constitutive of it, for example.  Shoemaker does 
indeed defer, at least arguendo, to Kim’s contention that “the emergence 
relation…cannot properly be viewed as causal” (Kim 1999: 32).  But although Kim has 
repeated this claim in several places he has not, so far as I know, given an argument for it 
anywhere.11 And Shoemaker himself seems to concede the possibility when he argues 
that a causal construal of emergence would allow us to reconcile his criteria for property 
individuation with the thesis that emergent micro-structural properties and physical 
micro-structural properties are distinct (p. 61).  Supposing that we leave the possibility of 
a causal construal of emergence as a live option, or supposing that we reject his views on 
                                                 
11 In the paper from which I just extracted the quotation, Kim mentions in an attached footnote that “C. 
Lloyd Morgan explicitly denies that emergence is a form of causation, in Emergent Evolution p. 28” (p. 36, 
n. 36).  I am sure Kim does not mean to let the authority of Morgan stand proxy for an argument and I am 
likewise sure that Kim has reasons for thinking that a causal construal of emergence is not the best way of 
conceiving the relation, but this is the closest I’ve seen him come to providing a justification for the claim.  
Neither does Shoemaker attempt to say what Kim’s reasons for adopting this constraint might be, although, 
as noted below, he himself seems to concede the possibility of the relation being causal.   
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the individuation of properties, however, in either case Shoemaker’s given us a useful 
general model according to which distinct emergent states are causally efficacious in 
bringing about subsequent physical (and emergent) states. 
But why shouldn’t we just accept Shoemaker’s account as presented, identity and 
all?  I think there are a couple of reasons that emergent types should be considered both 
nonstructural and distinct from their subvening states, which has implications for the 
tenability of the foregoing picture in all its detail.  Notice that if we specify that the 
physical micro-structural property P is a proper part of M, then M will necessitate P just 
as, given the determination relation between the two, P will nomologically suffice for M.  
That means P and M will be coextensive,12 which is what led Shoemaker to suggest that 
we identify them in the first place.  But this commits us to two unwanted consequences.  
First, the fact that emergents and their physical bases necessitate each other on this 
picture means that we will not be able to satisfy a presumptive desideratum for any 
theory of emergence, namely, that an asymmetric dependency relation obtains between 
emergent properties and the physical properties responsible for them.  In fact, a 
comparison of the present theory with Shoemaker’s (2001) theory of realization gives us 
the result that emergent properties actually realize their lower lying physical properties.  
And if the realization relation can plausibly be thought of as a form of asymmetric 
dependence, it would seem that we’ve got the dependence the wrong way around. 
Second, the case of interest is that in which the emergent state is an emergent 
mental state, and it is an extremely plausible thesis that such states can be realized in (or 
                                                 
12 And necessarily so if you think, like Shoemaker, that the laws of nature are not contingent. 
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produced by) a variety of dissimilar physical states.  But then Shoemaker’s theory leads 
to the wrong result, for this thesis ensures that a given mental state M could not be type-
identified with a unique (non-disjunctive) physical state P.  That is to say, Shoemaker’s 
peculiar mereological construal of the emergent-mental/physical relation does not make 
room for the phenomenon of multiple realizability, which is a curious upshot in that he 
accepts the multiple realizability of mental states and his work on behalf of nonreductive 
physicalism is intended to allow for it.  Shoemaker is surely right in holding that there 
must be some set of latent powers, had by the basic elements, that accounts for the 
instantiation of a given emergent property in certain circumstances.  However, his 
contention that such emergent types should be understood as structural types—including 
in their specifications the particular elements constituting them together with the intrinsic 
and relational properties of those elements—does not allow for a sufficient degree of 
variability between emergent mental types and the physical types with which they can be 
“paired.”  But there is no reason I know of to think that the failure of multiple 
realizability should be a consequence of emergentism.  Indeed, the traditional 
emergentists all recognized the “configurational plasticity” of special science kinds, and 
Broad (writing almost fifty years prior to Putnam) explicitly argues for the empirical and 
conceptual plausibility of multiple realizability:   
[There] seems to be some evidence that, after a time and within certain limits, another 
part of the brain can take over the functions of a part that has been injured.  Thus the most 
that we can say is that the general integrity of certain parts of the brain seems to be at 
least a temporarily necessary condition for the manifestation of certain specific kinds of 
mental activity…. [At] the level of enlightened common-sense and apart from some 
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general metaphysical theory about the nature of matter and mind, there is no adequate 
evidence for a psycho-neural parallelism of events. (1925: 124-125). 
In light of all this, Shoemaker’s account requires some modification.13  
Here is a modification that seems to me to preserve the benefits of Shoemaker’s 
account but which may avoid some of these unwanted implications.  Suppose that 
emergent types are functional types, which are realized or implemented in emergent 
micro-structural states.  That is, particular instances of emergent states can be thought of 
as emergent micro-structural properties a lá Shoemaker, but the mental types of which 
those emergent micro-structural properties are instances are functional types, involving in 
their specifications the typical causes and effects essential to such states.  The overall 
idea is that we can retain a relatively nonmysterious form of mental/physical 
dependence—mental types are realized in emergent micro-structural types, and the latter 
mereologically supervene on physical elements together with their relations and 
properties (including, of course, their micro-latent powers)—without identifying mental 
types with any of the myriad micro-structural types that could implement them.  Then, 
                                                 
13 It is interesting to compare the present paper with Shoemaker’s (2001) discussion of realization and 
mental causation.  In the latter paper, he affirms not only that mental types are distinct from physical types, 
but he also argues that mental property instances should be considered distinct from the physical property 
instances that realize them, even though the former are to be thought of as proper parts of the latter (p. 80).  
But it seems to me that the reasons he adduces for that conclusion carry over just as well into the present 
context.  If we just identify a given emergent property with the set of causal powers it confers, then, even if 
that set were a proper subset of the powers conferred by some physical property (or property instance), the 
fact that the emergent property may be instantiated as a result of intrinsically distinct physical properties 
should cause us to refrain from making the identification.  And since emergent properties are meant to 
confer causal powers that none of their basal conditions do (save indirectly by producing the emergent 
property), we should a fortiori refrain from making either type or token identifications.  
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since any set of psychological laws would be a set of “emergent laws” referring to mental 
types, we could argue that any emergent mental event has its causal powers in virtue of 
the mental properties it instantiates, since there is no set of fundamental physical laws 
that could exhaustively specify the behavior of systems capable of instantiating emergent 
properties. 
That would seem to be a relatively attractive and economical way to go.  But I 
think it’s clear that the emergentists would be no more happy with emergent properties 
being characterized as functional properties than they would with them being understood 
as structural properties, and that for at least two reasons.  First, the most obvious 
candidates for emergent properties are just those sorts of properties that the emergentists 
and anti-reductionists generally have argued resist both structural and functional 
construals.  C.D. Broad, you will recall, considered the idea that mentality could be 
explainable by the mere aggregation of physical elements and fundamental forces absurd 
and argued in particular that “secondary qualities” could not be dealt with given only the 
resources of “Pure Mechanism,” but rather that they required the postulation of 
supplemental emergent laws (bridge laws, in fact).  Echoing Broad, Wilfrid Sellars 
(1956: 249ff.) sees the “raw feels” of phenomenal experience as the most promising 
contenders for emergent properties, and Bruce Aune likewise argues that the “awkward 
disparity between sensuous phenomena and [physical] aggregates” is best explained by 
taking the former to be emergent relative to the latter, and that the gap between the two 
“must inevitably be bridged by laws having the disquieting character of ‘nomological 
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danglers’” (1967: 256).14 More recently, Timothy O’Connor effectively makes it a matter 
of definition that emergent properties are neither functional/extrinsic nor structural: “In 
calling some phenomenon ‘emergent’, we intend to express the idea that it introduces a 
qualitatively new, macro-level feature into the world…we may express this requirement 
by saying that an emergent property is nonstructural” (2000b: 111).  Second, and 
relatedly, neither a second-order functional property nor a structural property could be 
considered anything genuinely novel or surprising since such properties are nothing more 
than either logical or mereological complexes built up from the lower level materials and 
their relations—and in either case it is hard to see why they would need to be “accepted 
with the natural piety of the investigator,” to use Samuel Alexander’s memorable phrase. 
So suppose, pace Shoemaker and with the traditional emergentists, we continue to 
think of emergent states as distinct from the physical states that give rise to them, and 
suppose we likewise accept that such properties are nonstructural as well.  A property P 
will be a structural property of an object x just in case the proper parts of x bear a certain 
property (or set of properties) Q such that Q ≠ P, and this state of affairs constitutes the 
having of P by x.15 So to say that P is nonstructural is to say that P is distinct from any 
property had by the proper parts of a particular, and that P is likewise distinct from any of 
that particular’s structural properties.  The causal powers conferred by such properties 
                                                 
14 Following Sellars, Aune specifies that emergent properties are to be understood as physical1 ( = part of 
the space-time network and causally involved), but not physical2 (= “definable in terms of theoretical 
primitives adequate to describe completely the actual states though not necessarily the potentialities of the 
universe before the appearance of life” [Meehl and Sellars 1956: 252]). 
15 Here Q is intended to cover both intrinsic and relational properties.  Compare O’Conner (1994). 
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will be in some way determined by the properties of groups of elements related in certain 
ways, but they will not be reducible to the combined manifest powers of those elements. 
Here we run into an obvious problem, however.  If emergent properties are 
neither functional nor structural, the supervenience of such properties on physical bases 
appears to be utterly magical.  I think the only options for the emergentist in response to 
this fact are these: (i) bite the bullet and maintain that there is no underlying mechanism 
responsible for the instantiation of emergent properties, or (ii) maintain that emergent 
properties are produced causally by their subvening properties.  Causal relations may in 
the end be brute as well, of course, but they seem at any rate less objectionably brute than 
brute supervenience for no reason whatever.  So if I were to embrace emergentism, (ii) is 
the one I should choose. 
The conception of emergence to which we’ve now arrived is very close to the one 
advocated by Timothy O’Connor (1994).  In seeking to cash out the dependence of 
emergent properties on physical properties, O’Connor suggests the following variation on 
strong supervenience: 
A-properties of objects supervene on B-properties of their parts = df Necessarily, for any 
object x and A-property a, if x has a, then there are B-properties b, c, d… (including 
relational properties) such that (i) some proper parts of x have (variously) b, c, d… and 
(iii) necessarily, for any things collectively having all of b, c, d… there is an object of 
which they are parts that has a. (p. 96) 
The inner modal operator of clause (iii) is intended by O’Connor to capture a species of 
modality as strong as logical necessity, which may seem surprising since emergents are 
not generally taken to be logical consequences of their base properties.  However, on 
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O’Connor’s view, what causal powers a given property confers on its bearers is an 
essential feature of that property: “…it is part of the nature of a natural property of an 
object that it have the potential for contributing to certain characteristic effects.  This 
implies that the relationship between an object’s properties and its causal powers is a 
logically necessary one” (p. 97).  Accepting this view allows us to formulate a 
dependency relation between emergents and their bases which provides just as strong a 
connection between them as does the one that Shoemaker has on offer, and it has the 
added benefit of allowing us to do so without construing emergents as structural 
properties. 
Now O’Connor claims in his (1994) that “supervenience is needed if emergence is 
to be capable of being incorporated within a scientific framework,” because without “the 
two components of determination and dependency, there would be no potential for 
uncovering precise causal conditions under which emergence occurs” (p. 97).  But in his 
most recent writings he denies that emergent properties supervene, because he wishes to 
view the causal connection between emergents and their base properties as being 
indeterministic (2000b: 112).  On his latest picture, an emergent property E is instantiated 
at t2 in virtue of its having been caused by some physical event at a prior time, t1.  If such 
instances of diachronic upward causation are indeterministic, according to O’Connor, 
then there will be some world in which the same physical properties which are 
instantiated concurrently with E in the actual world are instantiated, but in which E*, 
rather than E, occurs concurrently with the instantiation of those physical properties.  
That is, while in the actual world an object may have properties P and E at a time t, in 
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another possible world that object (or its counterpart) may have P at t and yet fail to have 
E at t, instantiating instead some distinct mental property.  Hence, O’Connor embraces 
the possibility that there may be a mental difference between two worlds without a 
corresponding physical difference between those worlds, which amounts to the failure of 
supervenience.  Does this mean that emergence is no longer capable of being 
incorporated within a scientific framework?  O’Connor does not explain the evolution of 
his thought on this matter, but I speculate that he would respond to the question in 
something like the following way: No.  For any base property P that chancy-causes the 
instantiation of a subsequent emergent property E, it is in the nature of P to produce E-
type events a certain percentage of the time.  That is, P will have some objective 
probability of necessitating E in singular cases.16 However, such irreducibly probabilistic 
laws are clearly within the purview of science, and those probabilistic laws will be 
discoverable regardless whether supervenience is true or false; for indeterminism at the 
macro level causes no more of an in principle block to scientific inquiry than does 
indeterminism at the micro level.   
That (or something like it) seems right to me.  But at this point I am not going to 
take sides on the question whether the connection between emergent properties and the 
                                                 
16 I assume here that O’Connor’s characterization of probabilistic laws could be drawn along broadly 
Armstrongian lines (‘broadly’ because Armstrong would disagree with O’Connor’s contention that the laws 
of nature are not contingent).  According to Armstrong, probabilistic laws are universals that are 
instantiated only in those cases where the probability is realized.  If Fs cause Gs with a probability of P (1 > 
P > 0), then ((Pr:P) (F,G)) is the universal instantiated whenever there obtains a state of affairs in which 
some particular a is F and also G.  Armstrong interprets ((Pr:P) (F,G)) (a’s being F, a’s being G) as saying  
that “a’s being F necessitates a’s being G, a necessitation holding in virtue of the fact that universals F and 
G give a certain probability, P, of such a necessitation” (1983: 132 – his emphasis).  
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appropriate physical properties should be thought of as indeterministic.  For I am not 
convinced that the possibility of downward causation depends crucially either upon the 
adoption of a causal theory of emergence or the assumption of indeterminism.  What is 
crucial to the possibility of downward causation, as I see things, is the existence of 
emergent laws.  And here I think we can do no better than examine Paul Meehl and 
Wilfrid Sellars’ (1956) defense of the possibility of such laws (hence the coherence of 
emergentism), which remains after all these years perhaps the best treatment of the 
subject. 
Meehl and Sellars take up the task of showing, contrary to an argument 
formulated by Stephen Pepper (1926), that properties which are emergent would not ipso 
facto be epiphenomenal properties.  I’m not going to restate Pepper’s argument in all its 
details because it’s mainly an anticipation of the causal exclusion argument advocated by 
Kim, and the reasoning behind it will by now be familiar.  It is enough to note for now 




Φ0 ⇒ Φ1 ⇒ Φ2 
and he assumes at the outset that the underlying physical properties (the Φs) are sufficient 
to fully explain everything that takes place on their level.  The higher level, emergent 
property H supervenes on Φ1, which has as its sufficient cause Φ0 and is itself the 
sufficient cause of Φ2.  It’s little wonder that beginning with the assumption that 
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emergent properties in no way affect the causal transactions at lower levels (one might 
have thought that this is just what was in need of being demonstrated against the 
emergentists!) Pepper is able to draw the desired conclusion, that H is a mere 
epiphenomenon.  But Sellars and Meehl saw things quite differently, and their initial 
remarks get right to the heart of the matter: 
It is obvious that if H is to “make a difference” there must be a difference between 
situations in which it is present and situations in which it is not.  That there is one such 
difference is clear; H-situations differ from non-H-situations in that the former are also 
Φ1 situations and the latter are not.  But this difference, far from being a difference that 
would keep H from being epiphenomenal, is at least part of what is meant by calling H an 
epiphenomenon.  And, indeed, if there were no other difference between H-situations and 
non-H-situations, H would be epiphenomenal.  But what other difference could there be?  
Clearly, it is a mistake to look for this new difference in the form of another characteristic 
that is present when H is present and absent when H is absent.  There remains only the 
possibility that H-situations are governed by different laws than non-H-situations.  And 
this not in the trivial sense that H situations conform to the law “H if and only if Φ1” 
whereas non-H-situations do not (save vacuously), but in the important sense that the 
lower level characteristics themselves exhibit a different lawfulness in H-situations.  In 
other words, for emergent qualities to make a difference which removes them from the 
category of the epiphenomenal…there must be “emergent laws.” (p. 242) 
Meehl and Sellars straightaway eschew a counterfactual relevance approach to 
Pepper’s challenge, which pleases me.  (And here they are entirely faithful to the 
emergentist tradition; C.D. Broad likewise considers the counterfactual relevance of 
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mental events to physical events and argues that the holding of such counterfactuals is 
precisely what would allow the epiphenomenalist to maintain that some physical event 
couldn’t have occurred unless a given mental event preceded it, and “consistently deny 
that these [mental events] have any effect on the movements of our bodies” (1925: 117).)  
Instead, they require that emergent properties “make a difference” more directly, by 
figuring into laws that specify an actual alteration in physical processes as a result of their 
instantiations.  And they proceed to argue against Pepper that the requisite emergent laws 
are perfectly coherent and unproblematic.  To see how, I need to briefly recite the thrust 
of Pepper’s argument. 
Pepper had contended for the epiphenomenality of emergent properties in the 
following way: Suppose that a law governed causal transaction occurs at the physical 
level B, and that the transaction is described as a function of four variables, q, r, s, t.  
Now suppose also that r and s integrate in such a way that a higher, C-level regularity 
emerges, and that this new regularity is described as a function of the variables r, s, a, b.  
The variables r and s, although they belong to the lower level, will have to be included in 
the emergent law because they partially constitute the conditions under which the 
emergent law is possible.  In such a case, Pepper claimed, we’d have to think of the 
“emergent law” as a function of new variables, rather than as a new function involving 
emergent properties.  For either the first function, f1(q,r,s,t), is fully adequate to describe 
the interrelationships of (q,r,s,t) or the second function, f2(q,r,s,t), is fully adequate as a 
description (or there is some third function which is), but if f1 ≠ f2 then they couldn’t both 
be adequate descriptions of the same interrelations.  And if f1 doesn’t fully account for the 
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interrelations of those variables after the integration of r and s (and the alleged 
emergence of a and b), but f2 does, then f1 never was a fully adequate description of their 
behavior before the integration (and putative emergence).  The overall idea is that an 
emergent law must include new variables, and the new variables will either have a 
functional relationship with the lower level variables or they won’t.  If they have no such 
relationship with the lower level variables, they are epiphenomena.  If there is a 
functional relationship between them, however, then they would have to be included in 
the total set of variables at the lower level, which means they would have to “drop down” 
and take their place as elements in the lower level.  And that of course means that they 
could no longer be thought of as emergents. 
 But as Sellars and Meehl pointed out, what the emergentist says is simply that 
there is a lower level of integration (or “a region in the fourspace qrst”) in which f1 holds, 
and there is an “emergent region” in which f2 holds (f1 ≠ f2), a claim which “is 
mathematically unexceptional, since it amounts to no more than the claim that a function 
may graduate the empirical data in restricted regions but break down when extrapolated” 
(p. 246).  Now they concede that if determinism is assumed, so that the emergent 
properties are “lawfully related” to the lower level properties, then descriptive laws 
predicting the course of events at the lower level can in principle always be formulated in 
terms of the lower level variables alone.  For any emergent properties a and b could then 
be described in terms of functions involving those lower level variables; for example, a 
could be written g(q,r), and b could be written h(s,t).  But then there would be available a 
function that adequately describes the interrelations of (q,r,s,t,a,b), and which can be 
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written without mention of a and b.  If the function is E(q,r,s,t,a,b), we can simply 
rewrite it as E[q,r,s,t,g(q,r),h(s,t)], or just f3(q,r,s,t).   
However, it does not follow from these considerations that there couldn’t be any 
emergent properties or that if there were such properties they would of necessity be 
epiphenomenal, since all the foregoing demonstrates is that we could refer to such 
properties without using any new terms, which is hardly surprising.17 And if “raw feels” 
or secondary qualities are to be understood as emergent in this sense, nothing is to be 
gained by refusing to talk about them, according to Meehl and Sellars, since we clearly 
want these features of the world to be included in the vocabulary of science just as much 
as we want any other genuine feature of the world to be so included.  Further, even 
though the base, physical theory can always be extended to account for the influence of 
emergent phenomena (if such there be), such extensions would involve rather 
complicated laws with “tacked on” disjuncts to cover all the cases, whereas the positing 
of emergent laws would greatly simplify description.  Last, it is at least arguable that if 
certain systems begin to behave in unexpected ways once a certain threshold degree of 
complexity is attained, it would be more sensible to posit a new property to account for 
the causal differences rather than maintaining that the micro-particles themselves 
somehow become responsive to the broader context in which their local situation is 
                                                 
17 This can, however, be reformulated as an epistemological objection to emergence to the effect that we’d 
gain nothing in explanatory power by positing emergent properties rather than simply recognizing that 
sometimes the same old particles act differently, but I think there are adequate answers to this version of 
the objection as well.  See O’Connor (1994) for details. 
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imbedded without its being the case that they are responding to the presence of any 
additional properties at all. 
 Now it should be made clear that Meehl and Sellars do not commit themselves to 
the existence of emergent properties or laws because they think the existence of emergent 
phenomena cannot be deduced a priori, but rather that it needs to be established 
empirically; and they further contend that the hypothesis of emergentism is no more or 
less problematic than any other empirical hypothesis.  Their point, then, is not to establish 
the truth of emergentism, but simply to demonstrate its coherence (specifically against 
the charge of epiphenomenalism) and argue that it remains an open question whether 
emergents exist.  Of course, their defense was written almost a half-century ago, but (i) it 
was still written after quantum mechanical explanations of chemical bonding had been 
developed and likewise after the discovery of DNA, and (ii) so far as I can tell we have 
not, during the intervening period, advanced to such a point that scientific inquiry has 
definitively refuted the hypothesis that some emergent properties exist, even if it must be 
granted that explaining chemical phenomena (or genetic transmission or information 
processing or whatever) does not require the postulation of such properties.  So I think 
Brian McLaughlin’s (1992: 89) diagnosis of the downfall of British Emergentism as 
being intimately linked to advances of the sort described above is probably mistaken.  I 
rather agree with David Papineau:  
McLaughlin…attributes the end of British Emergentism, and therewith the rise of 
contemporary physicalism, to the 1920s quantum mechanical reduction of chemical 
forces to general physical forces between subatomic components.  But it seems unlikely 
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that this could have been decisive.  After all, why should anybody be persuaded against 
special mental causes just because of the reduction of chemistry to physics?  (Why should 
it matter to the existence of sui generis mental forces just exactly how many independent 
forces there are at the level of atoms?). (2001: 36, n. 20)18 
If emergence has been ruled out in those other areas, all that follows is that the classical 
emergentists were given to illustrating their case with ill-chosen examples; but from the 
absence of emergence in the chemical domain, etc. we cannot justifiably extrapolate to 
the nonexistence of emergent phenomena generally.19 All the more so given that the 
classical emergentists themselves speculated that chemical bonding might be explainable 
by certain properties and operations of electrons, and insisted that the question whether 
there were emergents in the chemical and biological domains was a straightforwardly 
empirical matter, decidable only a posteriori.  With respect to the emergent nature of 
qualitative mental states, however, they believed that their theory could be established a 
priori.20 
                                                 
18 Similarly, after citing some examples of emergentist proposals in contemporary biology, Timothy 
O’Connor writes, “The cracking of the DNA code was partly responsible for the decline of emergentist 
ideas, although in truth this discovery hardly constitutes compelling evidence against all possible types of 
emergent factors in the basic processes of biological life.  What was convincingly established is that life is 
not itself a simple emergent feature of organic systems, as was assumed by what in hindsight are seen to be 
crude emergentist frameworks, involving a sharp divide between physical, chemical, biological, and 
conscious strata in nature” (2000a: 110).    
19 We can of course make an inductive case against the existence of emergents, and I think it undeniable 
that such an inductive argument will have more weight today than it would have had in the early part of the 
twentieth century.  But I’m going to leave it to contemporary emergentists (e.g., O’Connor 2000a: 112ff.) 
to frame their own response to that challenge. 
20 See note 5 above. 
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Whatever one thinks about the current empirical status of emergentism, it’s 
undeniable that the doctrine is undergoing something of a renaissance.  (Indeed, if Kim is 
right that the “fading away of reductionism and the enthronement of nonreductive 
materialism as the new orthodoxy simply amount to the resurgence of emergentism” 
(1999: 5), then emergentism’s renaissance has been underway for quite some time!)  
What I want now to ask is whether, and to what extent, the notion of emergence could 
help the libertarian in her attempt to explain free will.   
 
A.4 Emergence and Agent-Causation 
Let us take a moment to draw up accounts.  Two of the outstanding problems we 
identified for libertarianism in chapter 2, you will recall, are these: indeterminism appears 
to threaten free will, and libertarian theories are either irredeemably mysterious or 
empirically dubious or both.  And, as you’ll remember, I argued that it has too often been 
taken for granted that the compatibilist has no comparable problems with respect to the 
mysteriousness or overall plausibility of their metaphysics.  This is just false, as we’ve 
seen: the compatibilist owes us a plausible account of mental causation, purposiveness 
and agential production.  Emergentism offers us an account that promises to put mental 
properties to work with quite a bit of oomph, and without shaving away at any of the 
intuitively unique or distinctive aspects of mentality by offering a reductive, mechanistic 
explanation of them.  But how has it accomplished these things?  Consider the 
resources—all of which are simply handed our way by the compatibilist in his battle 
against mechanism—that we have at our disposal if we’re willing to give emergentism a 
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serious look: we have sui generis, nonstructural, physically inexplicable, irreducibly 
nonphysical properties which bestow downward causal powers enabling their bearers to 
directly affect the course of events at the microphysical level.  Surely there is room for 
free will here!  Anyone who thinks otherwise, I’m afraid, betrays either a lousy 
imagination or an unhealthy amount of philosophical prejudice. 
 In truth there is a number of ways that emergentism might be put to work, but 
here I will consider only one theory of free will, the theory of agent-causation.  There are 
a few reasons I’m going to look at agent-causation alone in connection with emergentism.  
Here are two of them.  First, agent-causation very likely requires some significant form of 
dualism (I do not think it requires substantival dualism), whereas simple indeterministic 
and causal indeterministic theories do not in themselves require dualism.  So we are free 
to consider those latter theories in connection with less dualistic views of the mind, 
whereas if we do not discuss agent-causation here we won’t be able to discuss it 
anywhere.  Second, several contemporary agent-causalists, including Timothy O’Connor 
(2000a) and William Hasker (1999), have latched on to an explicitly emergentist 
metaphysics in order to explain their views.  So I will have the benefit of working from 
agent-causal theories already developed in this context.  As O’Connor’s theory is 
probably the best one on the market, I’m going to begin by providing a rough outline of 
his position.  Because my aim is not to defend the truth of agent-causation, I will not 
respond to every objection ever made to the theory; suffice it to say that in my view most 
of the typical objections have been given reasonably plausible answers already.  Instead, I 
am going to argue that on the assumption of emergentism agent-causation is neither 
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empirically implausible nor mysterious in any interesting way.  Actually, I will go 
further: I will argue that the emergentist has good reason to accept, and no compelling 
reason to reject, the theory of agent-causation.  (More cautiously, if he just doesn’t think 
agent-causation does the trick, the emergentist has no reason at all to reject free will). 
We have already noted a few of O’Connor’s metaphysical convictions, including 
how he thinks we should understand emergence.  In order to lay out his theory of agent-
causation we can begin by expanding on his view of the nature of event causation, briefly 
alluded to above.  It is clear, first, that O’Connor resolutely denies Humean approaches to 
causation, according to which the causal relation can be reduced to the constant 
conjunction of types of events (or the distribution of actual frequencies over space-time).  
And it is clear why he must do this: if causation just consisted in facts such as these, any 
attempt to explicate the distinctive form of causation as proposed by the agent-causation 
theorist would obviously be a non-starter.  Recognizing this, O’Connor offers a more 
traditional, nonreductivist account of event causation, inspired by the work of Harré and 
Madden (1975).  The central concept in his preferred understanding of causation is that of 
the “powerful particular”: 
When placed in the appropriate circumstances, an object manifests its causal powers in 
observable effects.  An object’s powers are based on its underlying nature, for example, 
its physical, chemical, or genetic constitution and dynamical structure.  Circumstances 
prompt the exercise of a power in one of two ways: either by stimulating a latent 
mechanism to action or by removing inhibitors to the activity of a mechanism in a state of 
readiness to act. (2000a: 71). 
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 The idea of a powerful particular needs to be understood by means of what 
O’Connor takes to be the core element in our concept of causation, which is the primitive 
and conceptually irreducible notion of the production or bringing about of an effect 
(O’Connor 1995: 175).  What gets produced or brought about by an object in appropriate 
circumstances is going to be the “characteristic” effect of that sort of object in those sorts 
of circumstances, in the strong sense that it would be inconsistent with the nature of the 
object under consideration to deny of it the production of that effect in the circumstances 
specified.  Since it is natural to link the causal powers of an object with the properties it 
has, O’Connor sees the relation between an object’s properties and its causal powers as 
being a logically necessary one (as we noted above).   
So the present theory pushes us in the direction of traditional necessitarian 
approaches to causation; and O’Connor’s (similar to Shoemaker’s (1980)) is a 
necessitarianism of a rather strong sort—properties confer causal powers upon their 
bearers and, moreover, the causal powers a given property confers are conferred by that 
property necessarily, so that in any world in which an object bears that property the 
object’s causal powers will be to that degree identical.  This latter feature is inessential, I 
think, to the groundwork O’Connor wishes to lay for his discussion of agent-causation, 
for his approach would not fall apart if one wanted to hold that powers are only 
contingently associated with properties so long as one retained the requirements that 
some form of objective necessity attaches to each event causal transaction and that the 
“this-worldly” link between properties and powers is strong enough.  But I am not sure 
what would motivate one to take that view. 
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In any event, we have enough in place to see how O’Connor develops an 
analogous theory of the distinct species of causation which, according to the agency 
theory, manifests itself in the characteristic activity of purposive, free agents.  The 
general idea behind agent-causation is of course that human persons (and likely some 
higher animals) are capable of representing alternative courses of action to themselves, 
are able to have desires and beliefs concerning the alternatives thus represented, and 
generally have it within their power to “bring about immediately executive states of 
intention to act in various ways” (2000a: 72) in response to the beliefs and desires they 
have.  It is not true, according to O’Connor, that there obtains an irreducible causal 
relation between agents and their actions; rather, “in the case of an observable bodily 
movement such as waiving my hand, my action consists of the causal relation I bear to 
the coming-to-be of the state of determinate intention to wave my hand, plus the 
sequence of events that flows from that state” (ibid., n. 11). 
But how is this causal capacity to be understood?  O’Connor explains the direct 
causing by the agent of his states of intention in this way: 
[Parallel] to event causes, the distinctive capacities of agent causes (‘active powers’) are 
grounded in a property or set of properties.  So any agent having the relevant internal 
properties will have it directly within his power to cause any of a range of states of 
intention delimited by internal and external circumstances.  However, these properties 
function differently in the associated causal process.  Instead of being associated with 
‘functions from circumstances to effects,’ they (in conjunction with appropriate 
circumstances) make possible the agent’s producing an effect.  These choice-enabling 
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properties ground a different type of causal power or capacity—one that in suitable 
circumstances is freely exercised by the agent himself. (ibid.) 
The distinctive causal powers of agents, then, are grounded in their properties just as any 
object’s powers are likewise grounded in its properties.  But the agent qua agent enjoys a 
different sort of causal capacity, an “active power” which he exercises (in favorable 
circumstances) at will; it is not the case that an agent’s causal powers are exhausted by 
his capacities to produce certain effects in certain circumstances, qua object, as a matter 
of causal necessity. 
 Now this is a rather unique capacity.  As noted, I do not think that the only sort of 
entity that could instantiate such a property would have to be a purely mental substance; 
if there can be such a thing as agent-causation I see no reason why a physical substance 
couldn’t enjoy agent-causal powers.  Quite possibly this is because I have no clear grasp 
on what a substance of either sort is supposed to be.  But I’m all the more confident in my 
assertion in that Thomas Reid, a dualist and agent-causalist both, seems to have agreed: 
[If matter] require only a certain configuration to make it think rationally, it will be 
impossible to show any good reason why the same configuration may not make it act 
rationally and freely…[Those who] reason justly from the system of materialism, will 
easily perceive, that the doctrine of necessity is so far from being a direct inference, that 
it can receive no support from it. (1969: 367) 
 Be that as it may, agent-causation clearly requires emergence, at least, since the 
causal powers in question aren’t reducible to the causal powers of the elements 
constituting the properties in which the agent-causal capacity is grounded.  So it will be 
no surprise that O’Connor goes on to explain that the agent-causal capacity should be 
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understood as a novel emergent property, or “a macroproperty that is generated by the 
properties of an object’s microstructure, but whose role in the causal processes involving 
that object are not reducible to those of the microproperties” (1995: 179).  Since we’ve 
already discussed O’Connor’s theory of emergence (and emergence in general) at some 
length, I’m going to leave this description as it stands. 
Now, to come out of the closet: I must confess to finding the foregoing coherent.  
Or at any rate not incoherent.  Of course, it could justifiably be complained that the devil 
is in the details, and that whatever coherence the above presentation may enjoy owes 
solely to the fact I haven’t given the opponent of agent-causation enough to go on.  My 
response to this objection is twofold: (i) I refer the reader to O’Connor’s own work, in 
which all of the typical complaints against agent-causation are addressed and in which he 
distances himself from some of the more clearly problematic formulations of the doctrine 
that others have offered before him, and (ii) I should like to point out that (a) a number of 
non-libertarians have defended the coherence of agent-causation, even going so far as to 
say that it really would solve the problem of free will but that, alas, we don’t have any 
empirical evidence for it, and (b) it’s worth remembering that the general idea of 
immanent causation has a long and distinguished history, in some instances playing a 
central role in the metaphysics of strongly deterministic thinkers such as (to go no further 
back) Leibniz and Spinoza.  Obviously, if I were attempting to defend the truth of agent-
causation these replies would by no means suffice.  But I’m not, so they’ll have to do for 
now. 
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What I’m interested in presently is whether agent-causation, as presented, is 
irremediably mysterious.  Well it is mysterious, that much is undeniable.  But here we 
must remember the present context, that we have assumed an emergentist framework.  
Assuming an emergentism of the sort our compatibilist friends have advanced, is agent-
causation unacceptably mysterious?  It scarcely needs saying, I would think, that anyone 
who asks us to accept “with natural piety” that mental phenomena are sui generis, 
irreducibly nonphysical features of the world which supervene on physical structures for 
no evident reason whatever and exert some sort of fundamentally new force that pushes 
around molecules from one trajectory to another is hardly in a position to throw around 
accusations of incoherence or mystery-mongering lightly.   
But I can offer more than a tu quoque on behalf of the agent-causalist, I think.  
And at this point I part ways with O’Connor, who writes: 
Now the agency theorist, as we have seen, is committed (on the assumption of substance 
monism) to the emergence of a very different sort of property altogether.  Instead of 
producing certain effects in the appropriate circumstances itself, of necessity, such a 
property enables the particular that possesses it…to freely and directly bring about (or 
not bring about) any of a range of effects…This further commitment leaves the theory’s 
proponent open to a special sort of objection, not applicable to emergentist claims 
generally: given the unique nature of the sort of property the theory postulates, it is 
unclear whether it is really conceivable that such a property could emerge from other 
natural properties. (1995: 179) 
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Here I think O’Connor is just much too concessive.  In fact, I have no idea why he wrote 
this.21 For it can be shown not only that an agent-causal capacity is no more problematic 
than other emergent properties, but that it is in fact less mysterious—or anyway less 
different in kind—than at least some of the others.  Or if it can’t be shown that this is 
true, owing to the absence of any generally accepted metric of mysteriousness, it can at 
the least be strongly suggested that this is so. 
 Take first a few puzzling features of consciousness, a phenomenon which is said 
(under this proposal) to be emergent.  States of phenomenal consciousness are necessarily 
private to someone or other and necessarily owned by someone or other.  They are also 
characterized by perspectival subjectivity, whereas physical states are not; that is, a full 
comprehension of the nature of a given phenomenal state such as pain or the visual 
perception of a given color requires that we actually undergo states of pain or visually 
experience that color.  They are subjective in a way that nothing in the physical world 
seems to be, for once I know all the objective physical facts about a given brain state I 
know all there is to know about that brain state, it would seem, even if I’ve never been 
the subject of a brain state of that type.  Not so for subjective experience.   
These are extremely perplexing features of consciousness.  The first two, 
necessary ownership and privacy, at least have analogues at the physical level.  As 
Michael Tye rightly points out, no one can laugh my laughs or scream my screams any 
                                                 
21 My speculation is this: O’Connor is trying to get us to buy emergentism and agent-causation in one fell 
swoop, as it were, so he isn’t in the kind of dialectical position that would allow him to capitalize on the 
oddity of the former.  I’m in no such position, however, so I’m free to exploit the oddity of emergentism all 
I want. 
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more than they can feel my pains, and neither could there be any unlaughed laughs or 
unscreamed screams any more than there could be ownerless phenomenal states (1995: 
85-87).  But I think there is no similar analogy at all for perspectival subjectivity.  The 
what-it’s-likeness or qualitative features of phenomenal experience are just baffling; but 
there they are, staring us in the face as it were.  They admit of no explanation, according 
to the emergentist, and are therefore to be accepted with natural piety. 
 Now consider intentionality or mental representation.  Here again, we have at 
least an analogue in the non-mental realm.  Smoke signifies fire, the number of rings in 
the trunk of a tree indicates the tree’s age, and so forth.  And some have thought these 
analogies so illuminating that various well-known attempts to “naturalize” mental 
representation and semantic content have been modeled along precisely these lines.  But 
emergentists and anti-materialists generally are no happier with intentionality being 
analyzed in this way than they are with the reductive accounts of phenomenal 
consciousness.  John Searle’s remarks here are characteristic.  In the case of sentient, 
biological organisms such as humans, there is such a thing as “intrinsic intentionality,” 
intentionality that requires the existence of (conscious) intentional states.  The sorts of 
examples adduced by the causal theorist of semantic content, however, are cases of 
merely “as-if intentionality,” which are not even a sort of intentionality at all: “it is 
important to emphasize that as-if intentionality is not a kind of intentionality, rather a 
system that has as-if intentionality is as-if-it-had-intentionality” (1992: 78-79).  And the 
price of denying the distinction between these two, says Searle (p. 82), is the absurdity 
that everything in the universe ends up being mental, since the law-like behavior of 
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anything in the universe can be described as intentional (in the as-if sense).  The real 
thing, according to those who refuse to reduce intentionality, bears only the most 
superficial of similarities to pairs of physical types that merely causally co-vary with one 
another.  Not surprisingly, what the surrogates in the non-mental realm lack are the very 
things that we have seen make mentality so difficult to reduce: 
A symptom that something is radically wrong with the [naturalizing] project is that the 
intentional notions are inherently normative.  They set standards of truth, rationality, 
consistency, etc., and there is no way that these standards can be intrinsic to a system 
consisting entirely of brute, blind, nonintentional causal relations.  There is no normative 
component to billiard ball causation. (p.51) 
And the emergentist of course stands with Searle on the matter.  
Now I think it undeniable that all this is very mysterious.  If we are to accept these 
mental features as fundamental, sui generis features of the world, then we can’t do much 
more than admit that they exist and wonder why on earth they should.  Naturally, this is 
much too high a price for some philosophers—there is after all a reason that some have 
been attracted to the “Quineing Qualia”22 project, and the reductionist about intentionality 
is likely to respond to Searle’s pronouncements with something like Jerry Fodor’s 
amusing remark: “If aboutness is real, it must really be something else” (1987: 97). 
 But why?  Why should qualia be “Quined,” and why should intentionality be 
considered unreal unless it’s reduced to something other than what it seems to be?  For no 
other reason than that these phenomena are just too mysterious for some naturalistically-
                                                 
22 Where to “Quine” is to deny the existence of something obvious or important. 
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minded philosophers to stomach.  Likewise agent-causation (or just the notion of free will 
generally).  But I cannot see how that tells against agent-causation one whit, if it doesn’t 
tell with equal force against these other characteristics of mind that the emergentists and 
anti-reductionists are all in a huff to defend despite the mystery attaching to them.  That 
is, the emergentist simply isn’t in a position to think that such a thing as agent-causation 
(or free will generally) could not exist, and obviously has no ground to stand on if he 
wishes to complain that free will requires the admission of something not 
physicalistically or reductively explainable into our ontology.   
Further, it seems to me that agent-causation is in fact less mysterious and 
conceptually problematic than perspectival subjectivity, for example.  For not only is 
there an analogue of causation in the non-mental domain, but, in contrast to intentionality 
and so forth, the real thing dwells there too—it’s just that there’s another species of that 
one thing that applies to purposive free agents alone.  And we need not even think of 
these two species as being all that different, for on the productive account of causation 
O’Connor and others have described the central notion is that of the powerful particular, 
the thing that efficaciously acts on other things when circumstances are right.  There is 
clearly an important difference between agent-causes and mindless triggerings of causal 
power, but the difference between these is less in the causation than it is in the mind—of 
course human action is going to look different than a run of the mill event-causal process, 
one might think, for it involves essentially the features of mind that the emergentist wants 
us to accept in all their glory, completely unreduced to any of their weak analogies in the 
physical world (if such weak analogies there be).  And of course we think that we are the 
 353
producers of our actions in some way importantly different than the way in which the cue 
ball produces whatever effects it happens to produce.  And naturally we are going to 
want to understand action in such a way that the agent’s role is both clear and 
ineliminable—and if the agent’s role can’t be reduced to a kind of event-causal process 
why on earth should the emergentist demand that it needs to be?  If it can be shown that 
agent-causation is just impossible or that it doesn’t really help, the emergentist would 
have a good reason to reject it.  But the mere complaint that it’s mysterious in some way 
hasn’t any weight in this context whatever. 
What about the empirical plausibility of agent-causation?  I don’t think there 
could be any empirical evidence for it.  How could there be?  No empirical evidence I can 
imagine would force the decision between indeterministic event causation and agent-
causation.  But (unless it is discovered that all human action is deterministic, which it 
hasn’t been) there are no empirical grounds upon which we could argue that agent-
causation is improbable, if emergentism is true.  Agent-causation is therefore no less 
empirically plausible than the thesis that some human action is undetermined, and that’s a 
pretty plausible thesis, especially in this context.  For recall, emergentists were the first to 
lay out a hierarchical view of the world according to which the special sciences 
appropriate to each level enjoy their own, legitimate autonomy from the lower level 
sciences.  To establish the thesis that human action is deterministic, then, it clearly isn’t 
enough to point out that the laws of (macro)physics are deterministic or near enough.  For 
whatever laws there may be governing the mental domain, those laws are emergent and 
therefore cannot be derived or predicted from the lower level laws.  Empirical 
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psychology is on its own.  And I take it that empirical psychology has given us no reason 
at all to believe in the claim that human action is deterministic through and through.  
Quite the contrary, in my view. 
There is one last reason I think the emergentist should give agent-causation—and 
if he doesn’t like agent-causation, then certainly free will—a serious look, and it is this.  
It just seems like we’re not determined to do everything we do, and it appears to us that 
in many cases we really are able to directly and intentionally choose to do one thing 
rather than another then and there.  It seems to me like that anyway, and I know I am not 
alone.  Compare John Searle: 
If there is any fact of experience that we are all familiar with, it’s the simple fact that our 
own choices, decisions, reasonings, and cogitations seem to make a difference to our 
actual behaviour.  There are all sorts of experiences that we have in life where it seems 
just a fact of our experience that though we did one thing, we feel we know perfectly well 
that we could have done something else.  We know we could have done something else, 
because we chose one thing for certain reasons.  But we were aware that there were also 
reasons for choosing something else, and indeed, we might have acted on those reasons 
and chosen that something else.  Another way to put this point is to say: it is just a plain 
empirical fact about our behaviour that it isn’t predictable in the way that the behaviour 
of objects rolling down an inclined plane is predictable.  And the reason it isn’t 
predictable in that way is that we could often have done otherwise than we in fact did.  
Human freedom is just a fact of experience…in the typical case of intentional action, 
there is no way we can carve off the experience of freedom.  It is an essential part of the 
experience of acting. (1984: 87-88, 96) 
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and Thomas Nagel: 
Our ordinary conception of autonomy…presents itself initially as the belief that 
antecedent circumstances, including the condition of the agent, leave some of the things 
we will do undetermined: they are determined by our choices, which are motivationally 
explicable but not themselves causally determined.  Although many of the external and 
internal conditions of choice are inevitably fixed by the world and not under my control, 
some range of open possibilities is generally presented to me on an occasion of action—
and when by acting I make one of those possibilities actual, the final explanation of this 
(once the background which defines the possibilities has been taken into account) is 
given by the intentional explanation of my action, which is comprehensible only through 
my point of view.  My reason for doing it is the whole reason why it happened, and no 
further explanation is either necessary or possible. (1986: 114-115) 
And according to Terence Horgan, et al.: 
[There are] three especially central elements of the phenomenology of doing: (i) the 
aspect of self-as-source, (ii) the aspect of purposiveness, and (iii) the aspect of 
voluntariness. (2003: 323) 
Now none of the above are professed libertarians, but it hardly needs saying that 
the defender of libertarianism is more than happy to concur with their descriptions of 
what it’s like to act and what our ordinary concepts tell us about the nature of our actions.  
For just one example which, as it happens, is directly relevant to the present context, 
consider Timothy O’Connor: 
[The reply] to the charge that we could never have reasons for preferring the agent-causal 
form of explanation to that of causal randomness may be bolstered by a simple appeal to 
how things seem to us when we act.  It is not, after all, simply to provide a theoretical 
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underpinning for our belief in moral responsibility that the agency theory is invoked.  
First and foremost…the agency theory is appealing because it captures the way we 
experience our own activity.  It does not seem to me (at least ordinarily) that I am caused 
to act by the reasons that favor doing so; it seems to be the case, rather, that I produce my 
decision in view of those reasons, and could have, in an unconditional sense, decided 
differently.  This depiction of the phenomenology of action finds endorsement not only, 
as might be expected, in agency theorists…but also in determinists…If these largely 
similar accounts of the experience of action are, as I believe, essentially on target, then it 
is natural for the agency theorist to maintain that they involve the perception of the agent-
causal relation…Such experiences could, of course, be wholly illusory, but do we not 
properly assume, in the absence of strong countervailing reasons, that things are pretty 
much the way they appear to us? (1995: 196-197)  
But why should any of this present the emergentist in particular with a reason to 
accept free will or the agency theory?  Taking our cue from O’Connor, we can surely ask 
why any of this “what it’s like” talk should be considered evidential.  After all, Spinoza 
showed (or asserted anyway) that if a stone were conscious it would seem to it as though 
it were voluntarily directing its own course as it plummeted to the ground, and why can’t 
the emergentist insist that we need to show why it should be any different in our own 
case?  And until such time as we do show this, why can’t he continue to maintain that all 
our thoughts and actions are determined despite the way it seems?   
Well he could, but it would be ad hoc and inconsistent with his methodology.  
Recall that Broad (among other emergentists) thought that whether emergence was true in 
the case of chemistry and biology was an empirical question, to be answered a posteriori.  
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But things were quite different when it came to mental phenomena, regarding which the 
“mechanistic” treatments, in his view, reached their “wildest absurdities.”  Note how the 
cautious, empirical tenor seems to disappear when he discusses “sensible qualities.”  
Whatever one takes the ontological status of such qualities to be, according to Broad, 
Pure Mechanism (or a physicalist reductionism) cannot account for them: 
The plain fact is that the external world, as perceived by us, seems not to have the 
homogeneity demanded by Pure Mechanism.  If it really has the various irreducibly 
different sensible qualities which it seems to have, Pure Mechanism cannot be true of the 
whole of the external world and cannot be the whole truth about any part of it…We must 
remember, moreover, that there is no a priori reason why microscopic events and objects 
should answer the demands of Pure Mechanism even in their interactions with one 
another…and that, in any case, the laws connecting them with the occurrence of 
macroscopic qualities cannot be mechanical in the sense defined. 
 If, on the other hand, we deny that physical objects have the various sensible 
qualities which they seem to us to have, we are still left with the fact that some things 
seem to be red, others to be blue, others to be hot, and so on.  And a complete account of 
the world must include some explanation [of these facts]…We can admit that the ultimate 
physical objects may all be exactly alike…and may interact with each other in the way 
which Pure Mechanism requires.  But we must admit that they are also cause-factors in 
determining the appearance, if not the occurrence, of the various sensible qualities at such 
and such places and times.  And, in these transactions, the laws which they obey cannot 
be mechanical. (1925: 50-51) 
“We can put the whole matter in a nutshell,” Broad tells us, “by saying that the 
appearance of a plurality of irreducible sensible qualities forces us, no matter what theory 
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we adopt about their status, to distinguish two different kinds of law.”  These are the 
“intra-physical” laws, which are the only promising contenders for laws of the sort Pure 
Mechanism requires, and there are the “trans-physical” or emergent laws, which “cannot 
satisfy the demands of Pure Mechanism; and, so far as I can see, there must be at least as 
many irreducible trans-physical laws as there are irreducible determinable sense-
qualities” (p. 52) 
 Now I do not wish to say that Broad isn’t arguing for these claims—obviously, he 
is—but it is clear that the data of first-person experience are being kept resolutely in view 
throughout his critique of the possibility of reducing phenomenal consciousness (as we 
would put it today).  Like most anti-reductionists, the emergentist is quite impressed by 
how things seem.  And the way things seem is of course the locus of anti-reductionist 
sentiment generally; arguments involving color scientists and zombie duplicates and the 
like are really just so much trapping, and are typically much less forceful than the sorts of 
intuitions that drive those arguments to begin with.  It just seems as though these features 
of conscious experience aren’t of a piece with neural goings-on, that’s all.  And the 
emergentist (it seems to me) has as healthy a respect for this fact as any other 
nonphysicalist.  
 But it is not only with respect to the “sensible qualities” that emergentists have 
relied on the data of first-person experience.  It is a familiar fact that emergentists were 
always anxious to distance themselves from epiphenomenalism, which is why they 
insisted that genuinely novel characteristics be accompanied by genuinely novel causal 
powers.  What has not been appreciated, however, is the manner in which the causal 
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efficacy of mentality was defended by emergentism’s most influential systematic 
proponent.  In examining several arguments for the claim that the mind does not affect 
the body, C.D. Broad begins by making a minor point, but one which is interesting 
enough to deserve our attention.  Against those who have thought that the continuity (or 
lack of gaps) in neurological causal sequences provides evidence that “interaction” must 
be impossible, he argues that the wrong picture of psychophysical causation is being 
assumed.  The mind shouldn’t be conceived “as sitting somewhere in a hole in the brain, 
surrounded by telephones” with efferent disturbances coming to an end at one of them 
and the mind responding “by sending an efferent impulse down another of these 
telephones.”  This is simply to “confuse a gap in an explanation to a spatio-temporal gap, 
and to argue from the absence of the latter to the absence of the former.”  But the 
Interactionist’s contention is simply that there is a gap in any purely physiological 
explanation of deliberate action; i.e., that all such explanations fail to account completely 
for the facts because they leave out one necessary condition.  It does not follow in the 
least that there must be a spatio-temporal breach of continuity in the physiological 
conditions, and that the missing condition must fill this gap…To assume this is to make 
the mind a kind of physical object, and to make its action a kind of mechanical action. (p. 
111) 
However, Broad is not happy to let the case for mental causation rest there, and 
the foregoing defense isn’t the one that interests me most.  “We can,” he says, “make 
more detailed objections to the argument [for epiphenomenalism] than this.”  Here is how 
the more detailed objection goes: 
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There is a clear introspective difference between the mental accompaniment of voluntary 
action and that of reflex action.  What goes on in our minds when we decide with 
difficulty to get out of a hot bath on a cold morning is obviously extremely different from 
what goes on in our minds when we sniff pepper and sneeze.  And the difference is 
qualitative; it is not a mere difference of complexity.  This difference has to be explained 
somehow; and the theory under discussion gives no plausible explanation of it.  The 
ordinary view that, in the latter case, the mind is not acting on the body at all; whilst, in 
the former, it is acting on the body in a specific way, does at least make the introspective 
difference between the two intelligible. (p. 112) 
Such are the remarks Broad offers while defending “interaction” against the 
epiphenomenalist’s arguments.  When he considers additional, positive arguments in 
favor of mental causation he contends that they fail, so that “One-sided action of Body on 
Mind is a possible theory.”  But despite its possibility, he says,  
there seems to me to be no positive reason to accept it, and at least one reason for 
doubting it, viz., the conviction which many men have (and which Mr Hume’s arguments 
fail altogether to refute) that we know directly that our volitions are necessary conditions 
for the occurrence of our voluntary movements.  If these conclusions be sound, 
Parallelism, considered as an alterative which excludes Interaction, has no leg left to 
stand upon. (p. 132) 
So what counsels us to accept “the action of mind on body,” in the final analysis, “is the 
fact that we seem to be immediately aware of a causal relation when we voluntarily try to 
produce a bodily movement, and that the arguments meant to show this cannot be true are 
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invalid.”  These two facts, says Broad, seem to him “to have considerable weight.” (p. 
118) 
Would that arguing for free will were this easy!  But why shouldn’t it be, if you’re 
an emergentist?  What I need to hear from Broad is a principled reason why the data of 
first-person experience are to be given full weight when the possibility of reducing 
secondary qualities to material processes is at issue and when the threat of 
epiphenomenalism looms, but not when the freedom of the will is the item under 
scrutiny.  Is it because our experience of being free is consistent with our really not being 
so?  Perhaps it is, but then our experience is meant to be consistent with both 
epiphenomenalism and, as some would have it, even with the nonexistence of any 
conscious phenomena at all.  But I take it we have no reason to believe in either 
epiphenomenalism or eliminativism, and I further take it that we have no reason to reject 
free will.  Not from our own experience, certainly, and not from any argument that has 
yet been given.  For we are evidently “immediately aware of” our own freedom in typical 
cases and “the arguments meant to show this cannot be true are invalid.”  And if that’s 
reason enough to affirm mental causation why on earth isn’t it reason enough to affirm 
free will? 
As last effort to convince you that the emergentist has no response to this 
question, I ask you to perform the following exercise.  Read the following passage 
carefully.  Substitute the term ‘agent-causation’ for ‘interaction’, and ‘mind’ and later ‘it’ 
for ‘the agent’.  Then, ask yourself why exactly the author should have any difficulty 
with the notion of agent-causation. 
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It seems to me that [the scientific argument] has no tendency to disprove 
interaction; but that the facts which it brings forward do tend to suggest the particular 
form which interaction probably takes if it happens at all.  They suggest that what the 
mind does to the body in voluntary action, if it does anything, is to lower the resistance of 
certain synapses and to raise that of others.  The result is that the nervous current follows 
such a course as to produce the particular movement which the mind judges to be 
appropriate at the time.  On such a view the difference between reflex, habitual, and 
deliberate actions for the present purpose becomes fairly plain.  In pure reflexes the mind 
cannot voluntarily affect the resistance of the synapses concerned, and so the action takes 
place in spite of it.  In habitual action it deliberately refrains from interfering with the 
resistance of the synapses, and so the action goes on like a complicated reflex.  But it can 
affect these resistance if it wishes, though often only with difficulty; and it is ready to do 
so if it judges this to be expedient… 
 I conclude that, at the level of enlightened common-sense at which the ordinary 
discussion of Interaction moves, no good reason has been produced for doubting that the 
mind acts on the body in volition…The philosophic arguments are quite inconclusive; 
and the scientific arguments, when properly understood, are quite compatible with [it].  
At most they suggest certain conclusions as to the form which interaction probably takes 
if it happens at all. (Broad 1925: 112-113) 
In light of all this, it seems to me that the agent-causalist would be fully justified 
were he to offer this assessment.  Anyone who thinks that the phenomenology gives us an 
argument of “considerable weight” for the existence of mental causation and that the 
foregoing speculations seem reasonable enough as an account of how it might work, 
should simply accept the freedom of the will with natural piety and have done with it.  
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